From the point of view of Poland, let me reiterate that the most important thing (after Brexit) is the guarantees for the Polish citizens who are living and working in the United Kingdom. Of course, these guarantees would need to be reciprocal. It’s also important what guarantees the British citizens living and working in other member states of the European Union will have.2

Beata Szydło, Prime Minister of Poland, 28 November 2016

INTRODUCTION

Following the 23 June 2016 vote on the United Kingdom’s membership to the European Union, several EU Member States have expressed concerns about the situation of their citizens residing in the UK and, in some cases, explicitly threatened the UK in order to retaliate against British emigrants. While post-Brexit EU politics mark a peak in the politicization of emigrant welfare, sending states’ concerns for citizens abroad is by no means a new phenomenon. It is clear, however, that migration scholarship has traditionally focused on receiving societies and immigration policies have therefore received more attention than emigration policies. In this chapter, I intend to focus especially on the latter and, more precisely, on sending states’ concerns for the well-being of citizens abroad. Using the concept of transnationalism, I will first discuss the historical evolution of sending states’ involvement in emigration decisions and their relations with citizens residing abroad and members of the diaspora. Second, focusing on a trend of the literature on ‘diaspora policies’, I will demonstrate that, while many sending states have focused on economic and political policies towards citizens abroad, diaspora policies are diversifying and now increasingly include welfare. This, I argue in the third part of the chapter, contributes to a transnationalization of welfare, which had been previously identified...
only by scholars working on informal care practices within immigrant families. Developing the concept of transnational social protection from below and from above, I show that immigrants’ access to social protection goes beyond welfare policies adopted by receiving states to also include numerous sending states’ policies as well as informal strategies developed by immigrants together with market, community and family actors. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion on the implications of sending states’ involvements in expatriates’ welfare for future research on migration.

SENDING STATES’ CONCERNS FOR CITIZENS ABROAD: FROM LIMITED PROTECTION TO TRANSNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

A pervading account in migration studies tends to depict the sending state as powerless and deprived nation-states that citizens leave for relatively wealthier and/or safer receiving states, which, in turn, try to control the influx of newcomers. Such accounts are of limited value for two reasons. First, they neglect the role of sending states in different parts of the world that traditionally used emigration as a ‘safety valve’ to address economic issues or to silence certain groups that were deemed problematic. During Italy’s great emigration of the 19th century, for instance, authorities were initially concerned with the significant loss in population but progressively supported it as a solution to rampant unemployment (Tintori, 2013: 134–135). Similarly, Moroccan political elites played an active part in the selection of emigrants during the 20th century by issuing passports and directing recruiters to politically rebellious areas in the country (de Haas, 2013). Mexico too was long described as having a policy of not having a policy towards citizens abroad (Durand, 2004). This meant that it had mostly a laissez-faire approach to emigration for most of the 20th century and used migration as a safety valve to address unemployment while not engaging actively with citizens abroad (Delano, 2011; Lafleur, 2013a). Overall, these three classic cases of large-scale migration epitomize the attitude of sending states towards citizens abroad during the largest part of the 20th century: a reaction focused mostly on the departure stage, followed by limited engagement with citizens abroad during their residence abroad, which often consisted of limited forms of consular assistance (e.g. repatriation or legal services for individuals in need of protection).

Second, the depiction of sending states as weak and unable to keep linkages with citizens abroad and their descendants after departure can also be explained by the over-emphasis of transnational migration scholars on immigrant agency. Scholars who developed the concept of transnationalism within migration studies from the mid-1990s onwards have neglected the role of sending states in their ability to maintain and develop those transnational connections. Focusing on the role of immigrants in remittance-sending and political activism across borders, ‘transnational relations have always been understood as relations across international borders that do not involve states’ (Collyer and Vathi, 2007: 5). Using historical examples of past transnational activities in which the sending state seemed to be absent has been critical in the ‘weak state’ depiction. Smith (2003b), for instance, refers to the pioneering work of Thomas and Znaniecki (1958: 1474) on the role of Polish migrants in the United States in political and economic struggles of their homeland. Pries, similarly, relies on Piore’s ‘birds of passage’ (1979) to show that early Italian migrants to the New World ‘not only maintained emotional contact by letters and imagination with their (intended) wives, but also controlled their behaviour in the new country by correspondence with other persons or by the reports of other migrants arriving’ (Pries, 2001: 68). Such a focus on migrant agency has led scholars such as Stephen Castles (2002, 2003) to argue that what transnational migration scholars were
calling ‘transnational communities’ were merely modern forms of what used to be called ‘diasporas’.

Those historical examples of transnational engagement do not necessarily question the innovative character of transnationalism as a concept in the study of migration. Several scholars have made use of Merton’s teachings and what he calls ‘the fallacy of adumbration’ to oppose the temptation for some scholars to look into past events to show the previous existence of transnational phenomena they claim is new (Portes et al., 1999; Smith, 2003a: 725; Vertovec, 2004). While quasi-transnational phenomena may have existed in the past, they only show that today’s practices may have some historical background but do not disqualify the use of the concept of transnationalism. Among the major changes brought about by globalization are the development of communication technologies and the greater affordability of transport, that facilitate both the movements and the various exchanges between the country of residence and the country of origin (Portes et al., 1999; Vertovec, 1999). Overall, in line with Kivisto (2001: 550), it can be argued that contemporary transnational practices occur in a radically transformed global context, which reveals the need for a new conceptual tool to assess the impact of those practices on host and home societies.

As mentioned, a side effect of the development of research on immigrant transnationalism has been the focus on documenting the wide range of migrant activities directed towards the homeland. In that process, the literature has conveyed the impression that the sending state was weak and unable and/or unwilling to engage with citizens abroad. For Itzigsohn (2000), however, the home states’ economic and political dependence on their emigrants might be a powerful stimulant to the development of state policies to reach out to the community. Similarly, Levitt and de la Dehessa (2003) rapidly showed that large and well-organized emigrant communities were capable of stimulating a response from the home country authorities. The case of Mexico illustrates very clearly the point made by these two scholars. After decades of limited engagement with citizens abroad, Mexico began to develop policies towards citizens abroad during the 1980s. This decade is characterized by both a major economic crisis (i.e. the 1982 Peso Crisis) and political unrest (i.e. the fraudulent presidential election of 1988). Rather than maintaining the country in a policy of isolation towards citizens abroad, these two crises revealed the need to engage with them. Authorities thus launched new initiatives both to maximize the economic impact of remittances and to channel the political influence of a population that had showed its opposition to the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) party. In other words, neither limited financial resources nor political instability does automatically entail that the sending state will refrain from engaging with citizens abroad. In other parts of the world, such as Taiwan, ‘brain gain’ programmes (i.e. repatriation programmes catered towards high-skilled workers) have existed since the 1960s and equally demonstrate that sending-state authorities’ interest in the economic instrumentalization of diasporas has strong historical roots (Chang, 1992).

**Governing Diasporas from Abroad**

As the literature on immigrant transnationalism has evolved in recent years, we can identify two main trends in which the concept is being used. On the one hand, a large number of scholars have built on the seminal work of Basch and colleagues (1994) and use it to study cross-border social, political, economic or family-related practices of specific migrant groups (among earlier works, see Bakker and Smith, 2003; Levitt, 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). On the other hand, a more limited number of scholars built on the concept to study specific policy responses – which have been given different names, such as ‘diaspora policies’, ‘diasporic policies’ or ‘diaspora engagement’ policies – that are taken by sending country governments, by
which they seek to engage with citizens abroad, their descendants and/or specific ethnic groups which these states acknowledge as being members of the polity independently of their nationality (see, among others, Collyer, 2013; Delano, 2009; Dufoix et al., 2010; Gamlen, 2006; Lafleur, 2016; Ragazzi, 2014).

The recent engagement of sending states with citizens abroad is often presented as a natural consequence of the growing instrumental use of expatriates for economic or political purposes (Lafleur, 2011, 2015). Indeed, from an economic viewpoint, institutions such as the World Bank have been insisting on the role of remittances as a tool for development in the Global South, which may have encouraged sending states to develop specific programmes to increase the flows of remittances (e.g. by granting advantages to emigrants investing in property in the homeland) or maximize their impact (e.g. by lowering transactions fees or setting public-private partnership to channel remittance money to community projects in the homeland (see Duquette-Rury, 2014; Moctezuma Longoria, 2003)). Similarly, political parties in sending countries may also be interested in engaging with citizens abroad if they believe expatriates can have a critical influence on electoral processes either directly (through external voting rights) or indirectly (through the emigrants’ influence on non-migrant relatives).

One element that confirms the idea that sending states may be tempted to instrumentalize citizens abroad for economic or political purposes is that some of the policies they adopt for citizens abroad are mostly of symbolic value. As noted by Waterbury (2010), the adoption of diaspora policies is often accompanied with a discourse that formally acknowledges that expatriates or diaspora are still members of the polity in spite of their physical absence from the territory. The creation of deterriorialized administrative units that encompass symbolically all citizens abroad, such as Haiti’s 11th Department or Peru’s Quinto Suyo (see Berg and Tamagno, 2006; Laguerre, 1999), are clear examples of such attempts. In this respect, sending states’ engagement with citizens abroad often represent a break from a classic Westphalian understanding of the nation-state because it no longer considers citizens abroad as deserters nor citizens whose loyalty should be questioned. On the contrary, this new rhetoric in the Global South often presents emigrants as partners on the road to development, or even, as in the case of Mexico, as the nation’s new heroes.

As the academic interest for these policies grew in recent years, several scholars have questioned this instrumental explanation and tried to explain this global shift in the sending country’s attitudes towards citizens abroad. In particular, the widespread adoption of legislation allowing dual citizenship and granting expatriates external voting rights has received significant attention (see Collyer, 2013; Delano, 2011; Escobar, 2007; Iskander, 2010; Lafleur, 2013b; Margheritis, 2017). This literature identifies four important criticisms of the instrumental approach to diaspora policies.

First, the analysis of the adoption and implementation of these policies reveals that the sending state does not act as a monolithic actor when dealing with citizens abroad. Indeed, a great variety of home country actors have a say in those policies. These comprise different ministries whose prerogatives may include responding to specific expatriates’ needs (e.g. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Welfare and Pensions, Health, Education, etc.), specialized agencies and bodies dedicated to immigration (e.g. the Institute of Mexicans Abroad), Members of Parliament, trade unions, and so on. In addition, sending states’ actors may be developing diaspora policies at different levels of power. While citizenship policies are classically developed at the national level, sub-national actors in different parts of the world have also adopted their own remittance policies (Moctezuma Longoria, 2003), welfare policies (Naujoks,
forthcoming) and even external voting policies (Arrighi and Lafleur, 2019). This is particularly true for sending states where emigration is not concerning equally all parts of the national territory.

Second, a purely instrumental approach towards diaspora policies may neglect that both the sending states and their citizens abroad sometimes have no interest in engaging directly with each other. Indeed, migrants dissatisfied with the social, political and economic environment in their homeland and those who left to flee persecution may be distrustful towards authorities of the state they voluntarily or involuntarily left (see Turner, 2008, on Rwandese emigrants). Conversely, states who consider some or all of their citizens abroad as political enemies refrain from engaging with citizens abroad who came through postwar guest worker schemes. For instance, Morocco’s attempt to engage with citizens abroad who came through postwar guest worker schemes consisted mostly in setting up *Amicales* abroad (i.e. state-sponsored benevolent associations) to protect the regime at home by ensuring that dissident voices were not gaining traction in destination countries (Dumont, 2013). More pragmatically, bureaucratic resistance can appear in the sending country as the expansion of their policies to citizens spread across the globe may significantly complicate their work. The attitude of certain Mexican agencies during the negotiations on the extension of suffrage to Mexicans living abroad was very telling in this respect: electoral authorities in charge of organizing the elections were lukewarm towards this project, which would significantly complicate their tasks, whereas certain political elites and regional authorities saw an opportunity to strengthen ties with citizens abroad.

Third, a purely instrumental vision of diaspora policies neglects the role that citizens abroad themselves play in the adoption of those policies. As noted by Østergaard-Nielsen (2003), migrant associations and lobbies can develop different forms of political activities, ranging from infrastructure development in their hometown to organizing marches in support or opposition to the sending-state regime. More recently, some states have created specific institutions – sometimes called emigration consultative councils – by which citizens abroad or their representatives can dialogue with home country authorities and express recommendations on policies that specifically concern them (Gamlen et al., 2019). These arenas allow citizens abroad to ask for sending-country intervention either in relation to their life abroad (e.g. discrimination in destination countries, access to social protection, etc.) or to their dealings with the home country (e.g. consular services, return policies, etc.).

Fourth, more recent literature on diaspora policies has also been critical in identifying the role that long-term transformations of the sending societies play in the adoption of such policies. Political scientists with an interest in policy diffusion in particular point to the correlation between the adoption of diaspora policies and the strengthening of democratic institutions (Brand, 2006, 2014; Lafleur, 2015; Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010; Turcu and Urbatsch, 2014). One hypothesis is that the implementation of competitive electoral systems across the world pushes political parties to take a position on issues of specific interest of their electorate in order to gain power. As migration is a key concern of many families in the Global South, diaspora policies should therefore not only be envisaged as a response to the needs of citizens abroad, but also as a way to show that elected officials in the homeland care about the situation of citizens abroad. The rationale, according to which one party’s position on citizens abroad influences the attitudes of non-migrants towards this party, has been a central feature of Mexican presidential electoral campaigns in recent years. In 2000, for instance, opposition candidate Vincente Fox Quesada went to great lengths to reach citizens abroad even though they had no external voting rights at the time. To Fox Quesada,
engaging with citizens abroad was perceived as a critical instrument to reach domestic voters with relatives abroad, and for this reason explicitly placed emigrants as the central actor of the democratic transition he wished to epitomize. However, the influence of regime transformation on the adoption of diaspora policies is not only observable in weaker democracies across the Global South. Within the European Union, states like Belgium and Italy have also adopted new policies towards citizens abroad in recent years, particularly in the area of citizenship and electoral rights. In both countries, political elites have considered larger processes of democratic transformation – such as the regionalization of the state or the revision of the Constitution – as windows of opportunity to adopt diaspora policies. Lastly, in Asia, the case of India also teaches us interesting lessons about selectivity in sending states’ engagement with citizens abroad as the country only allows dual citizenship for Indians living in wealthy industrialized nations while denying it to other Indian migrants residing in less developed destination countries (Agunias et al., 2012).

Overall, following this discussion on sending states’ policies towards citizens abroad and immigrant transnationalism, one can argue that the recent growth in the adoption of diaspora policies across the world is the result of interactions between citizens abroad (and members of the diaspora who do not necessarily hold citizenship) and a multitude of state (ministries, agencies, regional and local governments) and non-state actors (political parties, NGOs, family members) in the homeland.

**THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF IMMIGRANT WELFARE POLICIES**

Sending states’ policies for citizens abroad in the area of welfare is a topic that has received very limited scholarly attention. For migration scholars, welfare has traditionally been considered to be a driver of migration decisions (Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Stark and Bloom, 1985). For instance, existing research highlights that some immigrants move in order to obtain healthcare that is unavailable in their home country or, on the contrary, in response to labour shortages in the healthcare sector of the destination countries (Massey et al., 1993; Tjadens et al., 2013). With the transnational turn in migration studies, the connections between welfare needs in the societies where immigrants are moving to and the societies they are proceeding from are starting to be investigated in more depth. Scholars focusing on the concepts of transnational care and care chains have been at the forefront of this effort, showing how the mobility of migrants driven by labour shortages in the care sectors of industrialized countries itself triggers new needs for care in the societies of origin (Parreñas, 2001; Yeates, 2009). In this context, the concept of transnational social welfare (Yeates, 2008) arose to identify how remittances and other channels of risk protection are enabled by migration. These works have also significantly expanded the meaning of care to embrace various forms of cross-border material and moral support governed by family and kinship ties (Kilkey and Merla, 2014). Alongside the work on transnational families and care, migration and development scholars have also studied the transnational dimension of welfare. Following the growing interest of international organizations such as the World Bank in this area, the impact of remittances on health, education and investments in the country of origin have become a major research topic. Similarly, works on social remittances have invited us to look beyond the mere flow of money and instead consider that migrants also remit ideas, practices and behaviours that can affect perceptions and practices on social protection in their home societies (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011).
Migration and the welfare state have been historically deeply intertwined in Europe. The arrival of guest workers and migrants from former colonies in north-western Europe after World War II supported two decades of sustained economic growth that coincided with the expansion of welfare states (Schierup et al., 2006). In Europe, postwar social protection policies and programmes shared the characteristic of not being designed to respond to the needs of immigrant populations. Because most states originally envisaged the presence of immigrants as temporary, welfare programmes were developed to cater primarily to the needs of their nationals considered to be both ethnically homogeneous and immobile (Hemerijck et al., 2013).

In spite of national variations, European welfare states therefore emerged as providers of social protection, comprising three broad fields of policies: (1) social insurance, that is a contribution-based system of risk-pooling, protecting families and individuals against risks associated with unemployment, disability, old-age and work-related injuries; (2) social assistance, that is the tax-financed transfer of (cash or in-kind) benefits to groups lacking adequate resources to support themselves because of deprivation; and (3) labour market interventions designed to protect workers and promote employment (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ginneken and International Labour Organization, 1999).

As migration continued and diversified after the end of the guest worker programmes, scholars such as Hammar (1990) and Guiraudon (1998) have shown how the EU integration process, periods of sustained economic growth in western Europe and growing acceptance towards principles of equality and human rights have allowed for the inclusion of migrants in host country social protection schemes after World War II. However, such inclusion does not benefit all foreigners equally.

Today, EU citizens who migrate within Europe are entitled to freedom of circulation with a set of regulations allowing them to benefit from minimum entitlements to social protection across borders. These entitlements vary according to their professional status (students, employees, self-employed, pensioners, etc.) as well as the length of their stay abroad (Vonk, 2012). With regards to contributory social security benefits – or social insurance – European workers are protected by the principle of equal treatment enshrined in various EU norms. This entails, for instance, that EU workers residing in another Member State cannot receive a different treatment from national workers in accessing public health insurance (Groenendijk, 2013). For non-contributory social assistance, on the contrary, even though the principle of equal treatment is also mentioned in Directive 2004/38/EC on the free movement of EU citizens, Member States retain more liberty in defining the conditions of access. In particular, Member States are allowed to remove the residence permit of EU nationals in need of social assistance if they are considered to represent an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the public finances of the host state. In the current socio-economic context, Member States such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands are making increasing use of this provision to expel migrants whom they accuse of taking part in ‘welfare tourism’ (Gsir et al., 2016; Lafleur and Mescoli, 2018).

Third-country nationals residing in Europe have not benefited in the same fashion from the coordination of social protection that has accompanied the European integration process. First, for these migrants, the avenues for coming legally to Europe have significantly shrunk since the 1970s. For those who come without a legal permit, access to social protection provision in the country of residence is substantially more difficult,
and in many cases impossible (Cuadra, 2011; Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman, 2011). Second, even after the adoption of the Single Permit Directive 2011/98/00, which aimed at equalizing the status of documented third-country migrants with that of EU migrants, national barriers are still frequent for third-country migrants trying to gain access to host country social protection (see Beduschi, 2014).

Transnational Social Protection

As epitomized by the case of the European Union, in spite of numerous national and international provisions (Avato et al., 2010; IOM, 2009), inequalities in access to social protection in host countries remain sizeable between migrants and non-migrants and sometimes even between migrants of different nationalities residing in the same countries of residence. This explains why migrants often need to use alternative strategies to be able to cope with the social risks that affect them and their relatives in the host and home countries. These strategies, however, often do not develop within the border of a single nation-state but rather in a transnational space (Faist, 2000) that connects the immigrants’ country of residence with their home country (and often third countries in which they previously lived or where relatives are established). Following Smith and Guarnizo’s (1998) typology of immigrants’ connections with their homeland, it can therefore be argued that these transnational social protection strategies can be of two kinds. First, transnational social protection from above refers to formal strategies led by home country authorities to respond to the social protection needs of citizens abroad through various policies and programmes. Second, transnational social protection from below refers to immigrant-led strategies that use the market, community or family resources across borders to address their social protection needs.

Transnational Social Protection ‘from Above’

As discussed in the first section of the chapter, sending states’ involvement in the social protection of their citizens abroad is not new. Before the global development of diaspora policies, the external dimension of social policies allowed some emigrants to continue to access remotely the social protection benefits provided by their home country or previous countries of residence based on rights acquired there in the past. Bilateral social security agreements between sending and receiving countries have existed for decades and commit individual states or groups of states (multilateral agreements) to cooperating in the field of social protection (Holzmann et al., 2005). Typically, such agreements have been signed between countries formerly bound by guest worker programmes (e.g. Germany and Turkey), former colonial ties or by geographical proximity to facilitate the payment of pensions abroad. These agreements can also allow for the reimbursement of some healthcare costs incurred by return migrants in their home country by the former country of employment (e.g. Belgium–Morocco Social Security Agreement). As underscored by Avato and colleagues (2010), two basic principles are usually found in those agreements: (1) portability to ensure that benefits are paid independently of the migrants’ place of residence; and (2) totalization to protect migrant workers’ rights to benefits when they have paid social security contributions in different countries.

Social security agreements and other national and supranational provisions allowing the exportability of social security benefits can be of great potential use for EU and non-EU citizens in times of crisis. In Spain, for instance, Latin American immigrants who were affected by the surge of unemployment in Spain that followed the 2008 economic crisis were given the opportunity to export their Spanish unemployment benefits in order to facilitate their return to Latin America.
While this example illustrates that sending and receiving states can cooperate to protect the welfare entitlement of mobile individuals, external provisions of social policies do not always take into consideration the fact that immigrant families may be split across borders. In Europe, for instance, few EU Member States agree to pay child benefits to non-European immigrant workers when the children are not living with them. Similarly, citizens who leave their homeland often face great difficulties accessing social protection in their homeland whenever they return on a temporary or permanent basis.

Besides bilateral and multilateral social security agreements, there also exist a number of international treaties and conventions from institutions such as the International Labour Organisation or the United Nations that are designed to set minimum standards and encourage good practices at the global level. In particular, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families establishes, among other things, the principle of equal treatment between nationals and immigrants in different social protection areas. This convention, signed in 1990, entered into force in 2003 after its ratifications by 20 states, mostly located in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Among those states, however, no major immigrant-receiving country in the European Union or Asia (e.g. Singapore) – where social protection systems tend to be more advanced – can be found.

Overall, research has shown that levels of formal social protection in high-income countries (including EU Member States) is usually higher for migrants coming from other high-income countries (such as other EU Member States or OECD non-EU Member States) because social security systems tend to be similarly developed. They thus conclude that undocumented migrants and third-country nationals coming from states that have weak institutions (or coming from low-income states) are less able to combine access to host and home country social protection policies (Avato et al., 2010; Holzmann et al., 2005). For this reason, social security agreements and other mechanisms to export social security entitlements represent an incomplete solution to the social protection needs of EU and non-EU migrants.

Traditional social protection policies are designed to protect individuals residing primarily on the national territory and – as we have just discussed – only sometimes include an external dimension for citizens residing abroad. However, home state engagement for the protection of citizens abroad – which I call transnational social protection from above – comprises more than these policies. Indeed, home states may offer social protection to citizens abroad through emigration-related policies and institutions that do not traditionally belong to the realm of social security. Such policies, which we described as diaspora policies in the second section above, are not new.

Contrary to social protection policies, diaspora policies are designed to cater exclusively to the needs of citizens abroad and, only in some cases, to the needs of their family members who stayed behind. They also differ from other state-based social protection policies by the fact that the legal status of citizens abroad is often irrelevant for them to be able to benefit from these policies. Accordingly, diaspora policies have the potential to address the needs of some of the most socio-economically vulnerable migrants: those who are undocumented.

Lastly, diaspora policies are usually implemented by institutions that are traditionally not taken into consideration in studies on social protection: embassies, consulates, emigration ministries or emigrant representative councils and bodies (e.g. the Migrant Workers and Other Overseas Filipinos Resource Center, Committees of Italians Abroad, Assembly of French Abroad, etc.).

In spite of recent developments in the literature, no work has yet studied in a systematic way the diaspora policies designed to respond
directly to the social protection needs of emigrants and their families. However, preliminary empirical evidence shows that such policies are numerous and diverse (Delano and Gamlen, 2014; Lafleur and Lizin, 2016). They can include, for instance, educational programmes facilitating integration into the host country labour market, language classes, programmes facilitating access to health in the host country, home country pension schemes available from abroad, programmes facilitating the creation of businesses by return migrants and programmes to repatriate high-skilled workers.

Health is the branch of social protection in which diaspora policies have been the most innovative in recent years. Latin American states such as Ecuador and Colombia have been very eager to organize information campaigns in consulates abroad on immigrants’ access to formal healthcare schemes in their country of residence (Delano, 2018). Mexican consulates in the United States have also cooperated with US legislators to allow documented Mexican workers to expand US health insurance benefits to relatives living in Mexico (Vargas Bustamante et al., 2012; Wallace et al., 2009). In Asia, different countries have set up Welfare Funds such as Sri Lanka’s ‘Sahana Insurance Scheme’, which offers medical insurance to emigrants and other benefits such as insurance for funeral expenses and disability insurance (Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2012). The Philippines have also created a Welfare Fund to provide health insurance to undocumented Filipino migrants and their relatives. Typically, such funds cover disabilities and diseases incurred by immigrants while working abroad. The Philippines went a step further with their Overseas Workers Welfare Fund, which also includes medical coverage to immigrants’ family members who stayed behind. More precisely, in exchange for the payment of a premium of about US$16, immigrants and dependants in the homeland receive basic health coverage. Scholars have noted, however, that such funds usually promise a wide array of low-cost services but do not necessarily succeed in actually delivering the services they promise. Also, the risk of funds mismanagement in states with weaker institutions also exists (Mackenzie, 2005).

These different examples underline the potential impact of migration-related policies and institutions on immigrants’ access to social protection. Doing so, they also reveal that researchers tend to neglect the role of the sending state when studying immigrant responses to social risks.

Transnational Social Protection ‘from Below’

Combining formal welfare entitlements here and there does not give us a full picture of immigrants’ strategies to access social protection. Indeed, immigrants often rely on other more informal strategies, using market, community or family resources which together form what I call transnational social protection from below.

Market-based strategies are available to immigrants although they frequently come at a higher cost than state-based policies. Some private health insurance schemes are, for example, developed specifically for mobile, high-income migrants from the Global North (often called expatriates) and their families to guarantee high levels of social protection independently of their physical location (Wilde et al., 2003). More immigrants, on the contrary, have access to private insurance schemes to repatriate their body to the home country in case of death, so that family members are not faced with additional financial hardship when they lose a family member (Chaïb, 1994).

A much larger body of migration studies literature has looked at family- and community-based social protection strategies that benefit those who move and those who stay behind. At the community level, research has long shown that migrant communities
can play key roles in granting newcomers access to the labour market in the destination country (Massey and España, 1987; Portes and Stepick, 1993). However, the influence of community strategies in other areas of social protection, besides employment, is a more recent research topic, even though many ethnic-based forms of solidarity have been utilized for decades to face unexpected expenses in the home or host society. For example, different West African immigrant communities in Europe have been practising a micro-loan system called ‘tontine’ for decades (Boulanger, 2014). Such a system makes large sums of money available to immigrants (or their relatives in the home country) in need of expensive health treatments, but who do not have health insurance coverage or the necessary capital to pay for these treatments upfront.

Migration scholars since the 1980s have also looked at migration in itself as a risk mitigation strategy at the household level (see Stark and Bloom, 1985, on the new economics of labour migration). Whereas households in many European welfare states can count on private or public social insurance to protect their incomes, other households may send members abroad as part of a strategy to diversify sources of income (Adams, 1998; Taylor et al., 2003). In such informal social protection systems, both the costs and benefits associated with migration are shared across borders between members of the household. As demonstrated by the abundant literature on migration and development, money transfers from migrant workers to family members in the home country facilitate, to varying degrees, household members’ access to education, healthcare, housing or land ownership (Drabo and Ebeke, 2010; Frank et al., 2009; Goldring, 2004).

Recent work also shows that immigrants’ choice of recipients for remittances may be guided by an expectation to receive ‘reverse remittances’ in the future – that is, financial, moral or administrative support flowing from those particular family members/contacts to the immigrants (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Mazzucato, 2011; Palash and Baby-Collin, 2018). Informal social protection strategies of immigrants can thus be reciprocal systems of exchange: in times of economic crisis when migrants are at risk of unemployment and/or consider returning to the home country, such networks can make a difference in the immigrants’ ability to deal with social risks.

With the transnational turn in migration studies, the connections between social protection needs in the host and home societies have begun to be investigated in greater depth. From this perspective, scholars using the concept of care and transnational welfare have started to expand the meaning of social protection by looking at various forms of cross-border material and moral support governed by family and kinship ties (Hochschild, 2000; Kilkey and Merla, 2014; Parreñas, 2001; Yeates, 2009).

While the latest research on transnational care provides interesting typologies of some informal social protection strategies of migrants, it also has two limitations. First, it tends to focus on the informal social protection strategies of migrants originating from low-income countries moving to high-income countries. Second, it does not pay sufficient attention to home country programmes and policies that migrants can access to respond to their own needs for social protection.

CONCLUSION: WHAT FUTURE FOR IMMIGRANT SOCIAL PROTECTION?

As demonstrated in the quote presented at the outset of this chapter, sending states’ concerns for the well-being of citizens abroad has gained new ground in Europe following the result of the 2016 British referendum on EU membership. Positions taken by different governments following the results of the referendum indeed indicate that welfare policies which mobile citizens in Europe had taken
for granted may be jeopardized in the near future. On the other side of the Atlantic, similar concerns have been aroused among immigrants residing in the United States, where announcements of massive deportations and restrictive immigration policies have also triggered the reaction of sending states such as Mexico.

As the current political contexts in Europe and North America seem particularly prone to sending-state intervention in the area of welfare, researchers interested in immigrant welfare therefore need to move beyond the receiving-state focus that seems to have dominated most of the existing scholarship. This chapter showed that by combining the bodies of literature on social policy, immigrant transnationalism and diaspora policy, we can draw a more nuanced picture of the strategies used by immigrants to cope with social risks. Such nuances require that future research not only needs to take the sending and receiving policies in the area of welfare into account, but also needs to examine their interaction with less formal transnational social protection strategies that involve immigrants and other market-, community- and family-based actors. In this regard, recent theoretical contributions that invite us to look at transnational resources environments are critical to understanding the contemporary form of cross-border strategies used by immigrants to respond to social risks (Levitt et al., 2017; Serra Mingot and Mazzucato, 2017).

Looking at the role of the sending states through diaspora policies and the external dimension of social policies, we have seen that sending-state intervention can reduce the gap in social protection coverage between migrants and non-migrants in the host country. They are therefore likely to change our perception on the vulnerability of certain migrant groups. However, as they very much depend on individual sending states’ willingness to engage with their citizens abroad, such policies can also increase inequalities between migrants who benefit from them and other migrants whose home states are not equally engaged. This idea, according to which the transnationalization of social protection can not only help address global social inequalities, but can also inadvertently reproduce old inequalities and create new ones (Amelina et al., 2012; Faist and Bilecen, 2015), opens up important normative debates on the desirability of diaspora policies in the area of social protection.

While the increasing involvement of some sending states in expatriates’ well-being acts as a disincentive for receiving states to lower social protection standards for foreigners, do such policies affect immigrant integration? Should sending states in the Global South divert resources from fragile social protection systems designed for non-migrants in order to respond to the needs of citizens abroad? These are just a few of the many questions triggered by the transnationalization of immigrant welfare that illustrate the need not only for additional empirical research on the topic but also for renewed normative debates on how immigration redefines welfare states’ territorial boundaries, their legitimacy and their sustainability.

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Notes

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