Election Politics

Photo 2.1 Before widespread air travel, candidates relied on whistle-stop tours conducted from a campaign train. Here, Harry S. Truman and his wife speak to a crowd in Philadelphia before his come-from-behind victory in the 1948 presidential election.

AP Photo

Learning Objectives

1. Explain how the presidential selection process has evolved since it first operated in 1789.

2. Define which political and personal backgrounds parties’ presidential candidates tend to be drawn from.

(Continued)
3. Identify candidate strategies to fund campaigns that were undertaken to secure delegates to the national convention.

4. Describe ways in which party nominating conventions have changed since first introduced in the 1830s.

5. Explain how party nominees target their general election campaigns on states likely to deliver enough electoral votes in order to win.

6. Summarize how electoral college balloting in December concludes most presidential elections, confirmed by Congress in January of the following year.

Just as the president is the focal point of public life for most Americans, it follows that the presidential election is the country’s pivotal political event. More citizens participate in this process than in any other aspect of civic life—more than 158 million in 2020—and their choices have enormous significance for the nation and, indeed, for the world. The election is usually a unifying event, a collective celebration of democracy coming at the conclusion of an elaborate pageant replete with familiar rituals, colorful characters, and plot lines that capture attention despite being familiar. Each iteration includes some controversies; 2016 had more controversy than usual, and 2020 topped even that.

Today’s selection process bears little resemblance to what the founders outlined in the Constitution. Most of the changes have been extra-constitutional—that is, they have resulted from the evolution of political parties, media practices, technology, and citizen expectations rather than constitutional amendments. There has been almost constant tinkering with the rules governing presidential elections, with most changes producing greater democratization. Even so, important remnants of the constitution’s original indirect democracy persist, including the rules used to register voter choices in the Electoral College. The 2000 and 2016 elections, when George W. Bush and Donald J. Trump won in the Electoral College but lost the popular vote, renewed the debate about election rules. Bush won all of Florida’s electoral votes by winning 537 more popular votes out of nearly 6 million ballots. It took thirty-six days to settle the contest while Americans relearned the arcane workings of the Electoral College and discovered the
fallibility of the state's voting methods and counting rules. Trump won in 2016 because of 78,000 votes in three key states, but he lost the national popular vote by nearly three million, once again triggering questions about the method Americans use to select their national executive. Overshadowing that debate, however, was the question of whether Russia had influenced the outcome of the election. The nation's intelligence community concluded in January 2017 that the Russians had, indeed, undertaken such an effort. Former FBI director Robert Mueller then investigated whether the Trump campaign had conspired with the Russians, concluding there was no illegal conspiracy but lots of communication.

Joe Biden won the national popular vote by seven million in 2020 and also won in the Electoral College by flipping the same three Midwestern states back to the Democrats and narrowly winning two Sunbelt states. Biden's electoral vote total—306—was nearly the same as Trump's in 2016. Voting took place during a pandemic, which led about 100 million voters to cast ballots before election day. And for the first time in American history, a mob incited by the outgoing president descended on the Capitol in a failed attempt to prevent a final tally of the states' electoral votes.

At the conclusion of this chapter, we review recommendations for reform intended to improve system performance and provide for a greater degree of direct democracy. We first examine the major transformations in the nomination and general election phases of the process.

**Evolution of the Selection Process**

In 1789 and 1792, electing a president was simple. Each member of the Electoral College cast two votes, one of which had to be for a person outside the elector's state. Both times George Washington was elected by unanimous votes. And both times John Adams received the second highest number of votes to become the vice president. In 1789, the process took three months: No one campaigned, electors were chosen on the first Wednesday of January, they met in their respective states to vote on the first Wednesday in February, and the votes were counted on April 6. In 1792, the procedure took even less time. The contrast with today's process could not be sharper: Candidates now launch nomination campaigns two years or more before the general election, collectively spending billions of dollars in pursuit of the office, and everyone expects to know the winner on election night.

Consensus support for Washington ensured smooth operation of the selection procedure during the first two elections: There was widespread confidence that the nation's wartime hero would govern in the interest of all the people. When the nation's political consensus eroded, elites developed
a separate nomination procedure. Policy differences in Congress created the basis for an important institution not mentioned in the Constitution—the political party. By the early 1790s, the Federalist Party had formed around the economic policies of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, and his supporters in Congress backed his programs. Resigning as secretary of state in 1793, Thomas Jefferson joined James Madison, then serving in the House of Representatives, as a critic of Hamilton’s policies, and they formed the rival Republican Party, which came to be known as the Democratic-Republican Party. By the mid-1790s, cohesive pro- and anti-administration blocs had formed in Congress, and congressional candidates were labeled either Democratic-Republicans or Federalists.

Political parties had an almost immediate impact on the Electoral College. Electors became party loyalists, whose discipline was apparent in 1800, when Jefferson, the Democratic-Republicans’ candidate for president, and Aaron Burr, the party’s candidate for vice president, tied in the Electoral College vote. Loyal to their party, the electors had cast their ballots for both candidates, but the Constitution had no provision for counting the ballots separately for president and vice president. Jefferson and Burr each received seventy-three votes to President Adams’s sixty-five. The House of Representatives decided the election, where Jefferson won after thirty-six ballots. Hamilton broke the tie by throwing his support behind Jefferson, his longtime rival. Party loyalty, with infrequent exceptions, has prevailed in Electoral College balloting ever since. (The Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1804, provided for separate presidential and vice presidential balloting.)

With the rise of parties, there was also the need for a separate method to choose nominees. In 1796, the Federalists’ leaders chose their candidate, John Adams, and the Democratic-Republicans relied on their party members in Congress, the congressional caucus, to nominate Jefferson. Four years later, the congressional caucus became the nominating mechanism for both parties, a practice that continued until 1824, when the system broke down.

Already assembled in the nation’s capital, a party’s members of Congress could meet easily to select a nominee. Because legislators were familiar with potential presidential candidates from all parts of the new country, they were the logical agents for choosing candidates for an office with a nationwide constituency. Caucuses provided peer review of candidates’ credentials: Essentially, a group of politicians assessed a fellow politician’s skills, abilities, and political appeal. But the congressional caucus violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers by giving members of the legislative body a routine role in choosing the president rather than an emergency role, assumed only in the event of an Electoral College deadlock. The caucus also could not represent areas in which the party had lost
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the previous congressional election, a problem quickly encountered by the Federalists, whose support was largely limited to New England. Moreover, the growing number of interested and informed citizens who participated in grassroots party activities, especially campaigns, had no means to participate in congressional caucus deliberations.

The 1824 election brought an end to nomination by congressional caucus. First, the Democratic-Republicans in Congress insisted on nominating Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford, who had recently suffered a debilitating stroke. Then, in the general election, Andrew Jackson, nominated by the Tennessee legislature, won more popular votes and more electoral votes than any other candidate but failed to achieve a majority in the Electoral College. The election again was decided by the House, where John Quincy Adams emerged victorious after he agreed to make Henry Clay, another of the five contestants, secretary of state in return for his support. These shenanigans permanently discredited King Caucus, as its critics called it. Favorite sons nominated by state legislatures and state conventions dominated the 1828 campaign, but this method proved too decentralized to select a national official. A device was needed that would represent party elements throughout the country, tap the new participatory fervor, and facilitate the nomination of a candidate.

National Party Conventions

Party nominating conventions provided the answer, an assembly made truly national by including delegates from all the states. Rail transportation made such meetings feasible, and the expanding citizen participation in presidential elections made the change necessary. Influence over selection of the party nominee, therefore, shifted to state and local party leaders, particularly those able to commit large blocs of delegate votes to a candidate.

Two minor parties with no appreciable representation in Congress, the Anti-Masons and the National Republicans, led the way with conventions in 1831. To rally support in 1832, the Democrats, under President Andrew Jackson (elected in 1828), also held a convention. Major political parties have nominated their presidential and vice presidential candidates by holding national conventions ever since, though the pandemic of 2020 required dramatic changes. National committees composed of state party leaders call the presidential nominating conventions into session to choose nominees and to adopt a platform of common policy positions. Delegates are selected by states and allocated primarily on the basis of population.

Although today’s conventions in some ways resemble those of the past, the nomination process has undergone drastic revision, especially after 1968, when Democrats introduced reforms that diminished the
conventions’ importance. Just as influence over selection of the party nominee shifted from Congress to party leaders, it has moved within the party from a small group of organization professionals to a broad base of activists and voters. The origins of this shift can be traced to the development of presidential primary elections that began early in the twentieth century. (Florida passed the first primary election law, in 1901.)

Under the system that operated from roughly 1850 to 1950, party leaders from the largest states would bargain over presidential nominations. Most influential were those who controlled large blocs of delegates and could throw their support behind a candidate for the right price. These power brokers—hence the term brokered conventions—might seek a program commitment in the platform, a position in the president’s cabinet, or other forms of federal patronage in return for support. To be successful, candidates had to curry favor with party and elected officials before and during the national convention. An effective campaign manager might tour the country selling the candidate’s virtues and securing delegate commitments prior to the convention, but about half the conventions began with no sense of the likely outcome. Protracted bargaining and negotiation among powerful state and local party leaders were often the result. In 1924, the Democrats were badly divided over the role of the Ku Klux Klan and needed 103 ballots cast over seventeen days to nominate John W. Davis, an effort that must have seemed pointless later when he attracted only 29 percent of the popular vote. Nevertheless, the convention was a deliberative body that reached decisions on common policy positions as well as on nominees. Providing a way to accommodate the demands of major elements within the party established the base for a nationwide campaign.

In this respect, modern conventions are quite different. Not since 1952, when the Democrats needed three ballots to nominate Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois for president, has it taken more than one ballot to determine either party’s nominee.⁸ Raucous floor battles over procedures and delegate credentials have given way to a stream of symbols and speakers whose appearances are carefully choreographed to appeal to a prime-time television audience. Conventions now serve as ratifying assemblies for a popular choice made during the preceding primary elections rather than deliberative bodies, and candidates with popular appeal have the advantage over those whose appeal is primarily with party leaders.

Although much of the convention’s business is still conducted in backroom meetings, the most important business—choosing the presidential nominee—already has been decided through the grueling process used to select convention delegates. Compared with their forerunners, modern conventions conduct business in a routine fashion, adhere to enforceable national party standards for delegate selection and demographic representation, and are more heavily influenced by rank-and-file party supporters
than by party leaders. These changes appeared gradually through a process often fraught with conflict that centered on the rules governing delegate selection.

Reform of the Selection Process

The pace of change accelerated when the Democratic Party adopted internal reforms after it lost the presidency in 1968. In addition to the actions already noted, rules adopted by a variety of actors—one hundred state political parties and fifty legislatures, the national political parties, and Congress—reformed the process, and they continue to modify it. Sometimes individuals and states turned to the courts to interpret provisions of these regulations and reconcile conflicts. In addition, the rules were adjusted so drastically and so often that, particularly in the Democratic Party, candidates and their supporters found it difficult to keep up.

Reform has been especially pervasive in the nomination process. Following their tumultuous convention in 1968, when Vietnam War protesters clashed with police in the streets of Chicago, the Democrats adopted a set of guidelines that reduced the influence of party leaders, encouraged participation by rank-and-file Democrats, and expanded convention representation of previously underrepresented groups, particularly youth, women, and African Americans. The result was a pronounced shift of influence within the party from party professionals toward amateurs, a term encompassing citizens who become engaged in the presidential contest because of a short-term concern, such as an attractive candidate (candidate enthusiasts) or an especially important issue (issue enthusiasts).

States, seeking to conform to the party's new guidelines on participation, adopted the primary as the preferred means of selecting convention delegates. Primaries allow a party's registered voters—and, in some states, Independents—to express a presidential preference that is translated into convention delegates. The party caucus is another way to select delegates. The caucus has been a local meeting of registered party voters that often involves speeches and discussion about the various candidates' merits. A caucus is more social, public, and time-consuming (often requiring two hours to complete) than a primary, in which voters make choices in the privacy of the voting booth. The caucus method is also multistage: Delegates from the local caucuses go to a county convention that selects delegates to a state convention that selects the national delegates. In 1968, only seventeen states chose delegates through primaries; the remainder used caucuses dominated by party leaders. In 2016, twelve states used caucuses in both parties, and three states held a primary in one party and a caucus in the other, but by 2020 there were only four states using caucuses. Because of the shift to primaries, nominations are more apt to reflect the voters'
immediate concerns, nominees are unofficially chosen well before the convention, and the influence of party leaders is reduced. These changes mean peer review has little impact—politicians evaluating the capability of fellow politicians—while the media’s importance has grown. By operating as the principal source of information about the candidates, by sponsoring debates, and by emphasizing the “horse race”—who is ahead—the media have become enormously influential during the delegate selection process. For 2020, the Democratic Party downgraded the convention influence of “superdelegates” selected automatically by virtue of their party leadership posts, further eroding peer review.

The Contemporary Selection Process

Despite the seemingly perpetual flux that characterizes presidential elections, it is possible to identify four broad stages in the process: (1) defining the pool of eligible candidates; (2) nominating the parties’ candidates at the national conventions following delegate selection in the primaries and caucuses; (3) waging the general election campaign, culminating in election day; and (4) validating results through the Electoral College.

No two presidential election cycles are identical, but the customary timeline is relatively predictable (see Figure 2.1). Potential candidates actively maneuver for position during the one or two years preceding the election. Selection of convention delegates begins in January and February of the election year, with conventions typically scheduled first for the out party, the one seeking the White House. Traditionally, the general election campaign begins on Labor Day and runs until election day, the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, but modern campaigns really begin once the major parties’ nominees become clear, sometimes as early as April. When the nomination contest is heated, we may not know the nominees until June, as happened in 2008 when senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton fought to the end. In 2020, the parties’ convention scheduling was disrupted by the coronavirus, but the nominees were known well before the August nominating conventions. Unlike in 2020 when vote counting continued for days after November 3, voters usually know the general election winner on election night, and the mid-Decemberballoting by electors in their state capitals is practically automatic. Finally, the electors’ ballots are officially tabulated the first week in January during a joint session of the U.S. Congress presided over by the incumbent vice president. This ceremony normally attracts little attention, but on January 6, 2021, the nation watched a seditious pro-Trump mob assault the Capitol in support of like-minded Republican legislators seeking to prevent Congress from validating the legitimate winner. The duly elected president is inaugurated on January 20, a date set in the Twentieth Amendment.
Defining the Pool of Eligibles

Who is eligible to serve as president? The formal rules relating to qualifications are minimal and have been remarkably stable over time. Individuals need to meet only three requirements set forth in Article II, section 1 of the Constitution. One must be a natural-born citizen, at least thirty-five years of age, and a resident of the United States for fourteen years or longer. In 2020, nearly 145 million Americans met these constitutional requirements, but the pool of plausible candidates was far smaller. 

From time to time, opponents question a presidential candidate’s citizenship. Large numbers of Americans erroneously believed that Obama was born in Kenya, not Hawaii as his birth certificate makes clear. George Romney (candidate in 1968), John McCain (nominee in 2008), and Ted Cruz (candidate in 2016) were born to American parents living outside U.S. territory (in Mexico, the Panama Canal Zone, and Canada, respectively). Barry Goldwater (nominee in 1964) was born in Arizona before
it was a state. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the meaning of the Constitution’s “natural born” requirement, but the Congressional Research Service concluded in 2011 that natural born means a person born in the United States and under its jurisdiction or born abroad to U.S. citizen-parents.\textsuperscript{13} Two former solicitors general of the United States wrote in the Harvard Law Review that both British common law and actions of the first Congress defined “natural born” as someone who does not have to go through the naturalization process to become a citizen.\textsuperscript{14}

The informal requirements for the presidency are less easily satisfied. People who entertain presidential ambitions must have political availability, the political experiences and personal characteristics that make them attractive to political activists and to the general voting public. Potential candidates accumulate these credentials through personal and career decisions made long before the election year, but there is no explicit checklist of informal qualifications for the presidency. One method to determine what particular political experiences and personal characteristics put an individual in line for a nomination is to look at past candidates, but the attitudes of political leaders and the public change over time, as was quite evident in 2016 and 2020.

**Political Experience of Candidates**

Who is nominated to run for president? Until 2016, the answer had been people with experience in one of a few civilian elective, political offices or the military. Nominees’ backgrounds had changed very little since the second half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{15} Since 1932, with only two exceptions, major-party nominees had been drawn from one of four positions: (1) the presidency, (2) the vice presidency, (3) a state governorship, or (4) the U.S. Senate. (See Appendix B.) Candidates with other backgrounds were unsuccessful. Donald Trump was the first major-party nominee in American history to have no record of public service—elected, appointed, or military—before entering the presidency.

*Presidents and Vice Presidents.* Since 1932, the party controlling the presidency has turned to the presidency or vice presidency for candidates, and the out party has turned primarily to governors and secondarily to senators. In only three of the twenty-three elections from 1932 to 2020 was the name of an incumbent president or vice president not on the ballot. Sixteen times, the incumbent president was renominated, and in five of the seven instances when the incumbent president was either prohibited by the Twenty-Second Amendment from running again (Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1960, Ronald Reagan in 1988, Bill Clinton in 2000, George W. Bush in
2008, Barack Obama in 2016) or declined to do so (Harry S. Truman in 1952 and Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968), the incumbent vice president won his party's nomination. The exceptions occurred in 1952, 2008, and 2016. When Truman halted his reelection effort in 1952, Adlai Stevenson became the nominee rather than the vice president, seventy-five-year-old Alben Barkley. In 2008 and 2016, the incumbent party had an open competition for the presidential nomination because Vice Presidents Dick Cheney and Joe Biden chose not to pursue the office.

There are no guarantees that an incumbent president will be renominated, but it is enormously difficult for the party in power to remove these leaders from the national ticket. Party leaders are reluctant to admit they made a mistake four years earlier, incumbents can favor politically important areas or appoint allies to executive branch positions, and presidents enjoy far greater name recognition and media exposure than others seeking the nomination. Even unpopular presidents are renominated. The Republicans chose Gerald R. Ford in 1976 despite an energy crisis and a slow economy. Democrats renominated Jimmy Carter in 1980 when both inflation and unemployment were high, Iran held Americans hostage, and Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan. Donald Trump waltzed to renomination in 2020 despite a widespread pandemic and the resulting economic downturn.

Incumbent vice presidents who choose to run are more likely to win their party's nomination today than in the past. Modern-day running mates have arguably been more capable than their predecessors, making them more viable prospects for the presidency. Moreover, presidents now assign their vice presidents meaningful responsibilities, including political party activities (especially campaigning in off-year elections), liaison assignments with social groups, and diplomatic missions abroad. As vice presidents' visibility and significance have increased, so have their political chances improved.

If it is an asset in securing the party's nomination, the vice presidency once seemed a liability in winning the general election. George H. W. Bush's victory in 1988 broke a 152-year-old record of losing campaigns. Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey, and Al Gore lost as incumbent vice presidents in 1960, 1968, and 2000.

Senators and Governors. From 1932 through 2020, the party out of power nominated eleven governors, six senators, three former vice presidents, one general, and two businessmen. (See Table 2.1.) Both major parties have looked to governors as promising candidates, except for the period from 1960 to 1972, when Sen. John F. Kennedy (D-1960), Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-1964), Sen. George McGovern (D-1972), and former vice president
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>In Party</th>
<th>Out Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>President (R)</td>
<td>Governor (D)</td>
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<td>1936</td>
<td>President (D)</td>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>President (D)</td>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>President (D)</td>
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<td>1952</td>
<td>Governor (D)</td>
<td>General/educator (R)</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>President (R)</td>
<td>Governor (former) (D)</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>Vice president (R)</td>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>Vice president (D)</td>
<td>Vice president (former) (R)</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>President (R)</td>
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<td>1976</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>President (R)</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>President (D)</td>
<td>Governor (former) (R)</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>Former senator, former secretary of state (D)</td>
<td>Businessman/TV personality (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>President (R)</td>
<td>Vice president (former) (D)</td>
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</tbody>
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Nixon (R-1968) won the nomination. Governorships later regained prominence with the nomination of former governors Carter (D-1976), Reagan (R-1980), and Mitt Romney (R-2012); and sitting governors Michael Dukakis (D-1988), Bill Clinton (D-1992), and George W. Bush (R-2000). In the other five elections since 1960, the party out of power turned to former vice presidents (Walter Mondale in 1984 and Joe Biden in 2020), to senators (Robert Dole in 1996, John Kerry in 2004, and Obama in 2008), and of course to businessman/TV personality Trump in 2016.

These patterns may understate the importance of the Senate as a recruiting ground for president. Many senators have sought their parties’ presidential nomination since the early 1950s. Senators share the political and media spotlight focused on the capital, enjoy the opportunity to address major public problems and develop a record in foreign affairs, and they usually can pursue the presidency without leaving the Senate. Nevertheless, only three times in American history have senators been elected directly to the White House (Warren Harding in 1920, Kennedy in 1960, and Obama in 2008).

Instead of a stepping-stone to the presidency, the Senate has been a path to the vice presidency, which then gave its occupants the inside track either to assume the presidency through succession or to win nomination on their own. Vice Presidents Truman, Nixon, Johnson, Humphrey, Mondale, Quayle, Gore, Biden, and Harris served as senators immediately before assuming their executive posts. (Ford, who succeeded to the presidency when Nixon resigned in 1974, had moved into the vice presidency from the House of Representatives; Dick Cheney, elected vice president in 2000 and 2004, had served in the White House and in the House of Representatives before becoming secretary of defense and then a businessman.) Service in the Senate, therefore, has been an important source of experience for presidents since 1932, but almost all have gained seasoning in the vice presidency.

Until 2008, governors seemed to have a competitive advantage over senators. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush moved directly into the Oval Office from a governor’s mansion. Former governors Carter and Reagan were free to devote themselves full time to the demanding task of winning the nomination, an opportunity not available to the senators who sought the presidency in those years. Governors gain valuable executive experience in managing large-scale public enterprises and thousands of state government employees, in contrast to a senator’s legislative duties and direction of a small personal staff. Moreover, once the Cold War with the Soviet Union ended in 1991, the public was concerned with the domestic economy, taxes, the budget, education, and health care, not foreign policy. This shift favored governors Clinton and G. W. Bush.
With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public concerns once again shifted to national security, which may have boosted senators over governors in the nomination contest. At the outset of 2008, it seemed the war in Iraq would be the dominant issue, again giving senators prominence. Democrat hopefuls included four sitting and two former senators, while there were two sitting and one former Republican senators. Senate prominence declined in 2012; only one former Republican senator competed with one sitting governor, three former governors, two current and two former House members, and a businessman.

Republicans had a crowded field in 2016 when there was no clear front-runner. Seventeen candidates included four current (Cruz, Paul, Rubio, Graham) and one former senator (Santorum), four sitting governors (Christie, Jindal, Kasich, Walker), five former governors (Jeb Bush, Gilmore, Huckabee, Pataki, Perry), a former pediatric neurosurgeon (Carson), and a former Hewlett-Packard CEO (Fiorina). In late summer, Donald Trump, a billionaire businessman and television personality, joined the field.

In sharp contrast, former first lady, senator, and secretary of state Hillary Clinton was the clear front-runner among Democrats pursuing the nomination in 2016. Only four others joined the contest: sitting Vermont senator Sanders, former Virginia senator Webb, former Maryland governor O’Malley, and Rhode Island’s former senator and former governor Chafee.

By June 2019, dozens of Democrats had lined up to take a shot at Trump in 2020. Seven sitting senators (Bennett, Booker, Gillibrand, Harris, Klobuchar, Sanders, Warren), four sitting and two former House members (Gabbard, Moulton, Ryan, Swalwell, Delaney, O’Rourke), one former vice president (Biden), two current and one former governor (Bullock, Inslee, Hickenlooper), three mayors (Buttigieg, de Blasio, Messam), one former cabinet secretary (Castro), and two nonpoliticians (Williamson, Yang) declared. Two billionaires (Steyer, Bloomberg) later joined the field.

On the Republican side, by Labor Day 2019 the incumbent president (Trump) faced challenges from a former governor of Massachusetts (Weld) and from two former House members (Walsh, Sanford). Only the president mounted a meaningful campaign.

**Personal Characteristics of Candidates**

Although millions meet the formal requirements for president, far fewer meet the informal criteria that have guided past choices. Social conventions on race and gender have posed the strongest constraints, challenged by the Democrats in 2008 and 2016. Until Obama’s victory over Clinton for the nomination in 2008, only males of European heritage had been nominated for president by either of the two major parties, although several women and African Americans had waged national campaigns since 1972. In 2016,
Hillary Clinton became the first woman nominated by a major party for president. Former representative Geraldine Ferraro of New York had been the Democrats’ 1984 nominee for vice president, and Sarah Palin, governor of Alaska, was the Republican vice presidential nominee in 2008. Kamala Harris became the Democrats’ successful VP nominee in 2020. In 2008, Bill Richardson became the first Latino to seek a major party’s presidential nomination; two candidates of Cuban heritage were in the Republican field in 2016, Cruz and Rubio. The notably diverse 2020 Democratic field included candidates of Mexican (Castro), Polynesian (Gabbard), South Asian and Caribbean (Harris), and Chinese (Yang) descent, two Black Americans (Booker, Harris), six women (Gabbard, Gillibrand, Harris, Klobuchar, Warren, Williamson), and one openly gay male (Buttigieg).

Presidential aspirants also have had to pass other “tests” based on personal characteristics, informal requirements that have changed in the past five decades. Until 1960, candidates hailed from English ethnic stock and with a single exception practiced a Protestant religion. The successful candidacy of Kennedy, a Roman Catholic, challenged the traditional preference for Protestants. (Al Smith’s loss in 1928 seemed to signal Catholic candidates could not win.) By 2004, Kerry’s Catholicism was not an issue. Republican senator Barry Goldwater was the first nominee from a partly Jewish background, and Sen. Joseph Lieberman, an Orthodox Jew, ran as VP on the Democratic ticket in 2000. Religion as an issue resurfaced in 2008 when critics incorrectly alleged that Obama was a Muslim and again in 2012, when Republican Mitt Romney became the first Mormon to win a party nomination. Recent candidates have come from Irish, Norwegian, Greek, Kenyan, and German heritage, suggesting that the traditional preference for English stock has disappeared.

Representing an idealized version of home and family life once seemed essential to winning nomination. Nelson Rockefeller’s divorce in 1963 from his wife of more than thirty years and his rapid remarriage virtually ensured the failure of his campaigns for the Republican nomination in 1964 and 1968. In 1980, Reagan became the first divorced and remarried president. Trump, in his third marriage, was the second. Public attitudes about other moral and ethical questions can become deciding factors. Gary Hart’s widely reported extramarital affair ended his presidential hopes for 1988, even though he began the campaign as the clear Democratic front-runner. Bill Clinton’s alleged extramarital relationships and marijuana use became issues in 1992, but an admission of past alcohol abuse did not damage George W. Bush in 2000, nor did an acknowledged youthful use of recreational marijuana affect Barack Obama’s prospects in 2008.

It appears, therefore, that several of the informal qualifications applied to the presidency have altered with the passage of time, probably because of changes in the nomination process itself as well as broader currents in
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U.S. society. One observer suggests that the proliferation of presidential primaries “provides a forum in which prejudices can be addressed openly,” and the public is possibly becoming more tolerant overall. 2008, 2016, and 2020 demonstrated that as African Americans, women, and descendants of immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and eastern and southern Europe enter politics, they enhance their chances of competing for the presidency.

Competing for the Nomination

Once the pool of eligible candidates is established, the selection process begins. This phase has two major components: (1) choosing delegates to the two parties’ national conventions and (2) selecting the nominees at the conventions. By far the more complicated of these steps, the selection of delegates, became the principal focus of party reform efforts after 1968 and continues to undergo change. Prior to the conventions, candidates crisscross the country to win delegates, who then attend the convention to select the party’s nominee.
The first primary of 2020 was held in New Hampshire following the Iowa caucuses, both in early February. Rather than concluding in June, as expected, delegate selection continued into August after states delayed their primaries for public health reasons. Because so many of the primaries were held early, by mid-March, both parties had selected more than half their convention delegates. Ultimately, the Republicans selected 2,550 convention delegates, and the Democrats 4,749, but they never assembled, although the Republicans tried mightily. Consistent with post-1968 reforms, most delegates were chosen through primaries. Voter participation in primaries had been growing steadily (an estimated 57.68 million in 2016) but declined in 2020 as voters sometimes could not vote in person and states postponed or even canceled their primaries after nominations were sewed up.23

For 2020, Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina were again positioned to be the first four states selecting delegates, all in February. Connecticut held the final primary on August 11.24 Later events were largely moot after Bernie Sanders halted active campaigning on April 8, 2020, effectively conceding to Joe Biden. There was never a contest for the Republican nomination.

In truth, the nomination contest begins much earlier than January of the election year. By starting their campaigns early, candidates seek to amass the financial backing, attract the media attention, and generate the popular support necessary to ensure eventual victory. President Trump formed his 2020 reelection effort the day after he was inaugurated in 2017 (a first for any incumbent), and former Maryland congressman John K. Delaney was the first Democrat to declare July 28, 2017, joined before the end of the year by Andrew Yang and Elizabeth Warren.

The Nomination Campaign

The nomination campaign is a winnowing process in which each of the two major parties eliminates from the pool of potential candidates all but the one who will represent the party in the general election. As political scientist Austin Ranney argued in 1974, the nomination phase of the campaign is more important than the election stage because “the parties’ nominating processes eliminate far more presidential possibilities than do the voters’ electing processes.”25 In the 1970s, aspirants typically did not know how many opponents they would face or who they would be. The competition took place in weekly stages, with candidates hopscotching the nation in pursuit of votes and contributions. First-time candidates had to organize a nationwide political effort, a chore that dwarfs the campaign required to win a Senate seat or governorship in even the largest states.

This competitive situation has changed. As more states moved their primaries to earlier positions in the schedule—called front-loading—the
critical events take place during a very brief window near the beginning of the six-month process. Instead of having the luxury of adjusting strategy along the way, candidates need to establish campaign organizations in many states and to raise enormous sums of money early in the process. Many of the traditional uncertainties—for example, new candidates entering the competition—have become less likely, as early contests quickly trigger the departure of weaker candidates instead of creating opportunities for new entrants. In 2008, both parties chose 50 percent of their convention delegates by the end of the day on February 5, and more than three-quarters of all delegates by the first Tuesday in March. But instead of an early nomination victory, the Democrats’ contest between Clinton and Obama extended into June. In 2012, both Republicans and Democrats wanted to slow down the process and lengthen it. By contrast, Republicans in 2016 desperately hoped that their rule changes would produce a more compressed process, producing early unity around a nominee, a strategy regretted by many establishment Republicans once Trump’s nomination appeared inevitable.

Because the early contests are so important, presidential hopefuls spend considerable time before January of the election year laying the campaign’s groundwork. Decades ago, journalist Arthur Hadley called this period the “invisible primary,” a testing ground for the would-be president to determine whether his or her candidacy is viable. Candidates must assemble a staff to help raise money, develop campaign strategy, hone a message, and identify a larger group of people willing to do the advance work necessary to organize states for the primaries and caucuses. Candidates visit party organizations throughout the country, especially in the two traditional early states, Iowa and New Hampshire, to curry favor with activists and solicit endorsements. Democrats authorized Nevada and South Carolina to join the early group of contests in 2008, but Florida and Michigan then demanded to be added as well. The resulting legal and political challenges complicated candidates’ strategies. A similar scramble occurred in 2012, when Florida, Michigan, and Nevada defied Republican efforts to start the process later. No states challenged the parties’ calendars in 2016 or 2020.

Because media coverage provides name recognition and potentially positive publicity, developing a favorable relationship with reporters and commentators is crucial. Those hopefuls not regarded by the media as serious contenders find it almost impossible to become viable candidates. Even the suggestion that some candidates are “top tier” and others “second tier,” the terms widely used to sort the large fields in 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020, could adversely affect a candidacy. As Ranney suggested, most candidates’ campaigns are scuttled, if not officially canceled, during the “invisible primary” stage.
Financing Nomination Campaigns

Candidates for the nomination must raise funds early to prepare for the competition. Dramatic changes occurred between 1976 and 2016 in campaign funding. After the excesses of Nixon’s 1972 campaign, Congress provided federal funds for the 1976 presidential election. Candidates seeking a major party nomination could qualify to receive federal funds by raising individual contributions totaling at least $5,000 in twenty different states. Federal dollars would match individual contributions of $250 or less. The intent was to shift funding away from a few wealthy “fat cats” to a broader base of contributors, to help underdog candidates contest the nomination, and to enable candidates to remain in the race despite poor showings in early contests. By disclosing contributions publicly, reformers hoped to discourage misbehavior like President Nixon’s use of cash contributions to fund a variety of dirty tricks during the 1972 election. Cash contributions are now limited to $50.

By checking a box on their federal income tax forms, taxpayers authorize the government to set aside $3 of their tax payments for public financing of campaigns. The Federal Election Commission (FEC), a bipartisan body of six members nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, oversees the administration of the public financing provisions. These changes were initially popular, but participation in the system dropped from 28.7 percent of all tax returns in 1980 to 6 percent in 2013 and 4 percent in 2018. Few candidates now use federal funding because of its other requirements. Those who accept public financing must abide by limits on total expenditures and a cap on spending in individual states that is based on population. Most candidates seek to avoid these limits. The 2004 election was the first in which both parties’ nominees declined federal matching funds and no leading candidate has accepted them since, making the system’s future bleak. Today, only weak candidates seek matching funds. Four Democratic candidates received such funding in 2008, and Martin O’Malley (D) was the only major party candidate to do so in 2016. None did so in 2020.

Candidates’ personal wealth played a role in the shift away from public funds. In 1996, Steve Forbes loaned his campaign $37.5 million. He was ultimately unsuccessful, but Forbes dramatically influenced the Republican nomination process by outspending his rivals in Iowa, New Hampshire, and several other early contests. Even Bob Dole, the fund-raising leader that year, could not match such expenditures because he had to observe the federal limits. Anticipating that Forbes would pursue a similar tactic in 2000, Bush raised a then-record $94 million in private funds so he could avoid the spending limits and Dole’s problems.

Despite public funding, candidates’ financial resources were still highly unequal, and in most election years, the field’s leading fund-raiser won the
nomination. The new system favors very wealthy candidates or those who can tap networks of donors during the invisible primary before the Iowa and New Hampshire contests. The calendar of contests and funding system rules favor front-runners, making it difficult for primary voters to give other candidates a second look.

Wealthy donors have also made a comeback. The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in the case of *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* opened the doors to oceans of political money. The decision allowed unions, corporations, and associations to spend unlimited amounts in elections and “paved the way for . . . the creation of super-PACs [political action committees], which can accept unlimited contributions from corporations, unions and individuals for the purpose of making independent expenditures,” spending intended to influence the outcome of elections but not coordinated with a candidate’s campaign. Super-PACs must disclose their donors, giving them a bit of transparency, but they are often headed by candidates’ political allies, making non-coordination highly questionable.

Super-PACs spend large sums on ads both for and against candidates. Candidates deny coordinating expenditures with the super-PACs that help them, but it is clear that super-PACs complicate both the strategic calculations of candidates and the public’s ability to follow the campaign’s dynamics. During 2016, both Jeb Bush and Hillary Clinton found ways to help supportive super-PACs raise funds and to draw on them for campaign assistance. In 2020, well-funded super-PACs spent heavily on advertising targeted in key states.

A new category of spenders arose in 2016: nonprofit social welfare groups. Like a super-PAC, donations to nonprofits are unlimited, but unlike their cousins, the donors need not be disclosed, creating what reformers call dark money. This money ostensibly must be spent on projects advancing the public good, in this case, financing ads that support the same issues advanced by a candidate. Money can underwrite a potential candidate’s travel, pay for polling, and build volunteer lists. Fears grew that “for the first time in a generation, there will be a clear avenue for America’s richest to secretly spend an unchecked sum to choose their party’s nominee for the White House.”

Two other stories dominated the 2016 nomination stage. Donald J. Trump emerged victorious after loudly proclaiming that he was the only “self-funded” candidate, thereby turning personal wealth into an asset because it made him beholden to no one. Trump loaned funds to his campaign as needed throughout the primary/caucus stage, even though he also raised substantial funds. By the end of June 2016, Trump had loaned his campaign nearly $50 million and had raised another $37 million. Among Democrats, Bernie Sanders created a large donor base and relied on small
donations to raise and spend nearly as much money as the successful nominee, Hillary Clinton. By the end of June 2016, Sanders had spent only $3 million less than Clinton.

In 2020, Michael Bloomberg easily eclipsed Trump’s earlier self-financing, spending more than $1 billion of his own wealth in a fruitless effort that lasted only about 100 days. Tom Steyer, another billionaire Democrat, spent $342 million of his own money. Progressive candidates Bernie Sanders ($211 million) and Elizabeth Warren ($127 million) raised a majority of their funds from small contributions of $200 or less. Buttigieg ($99.9 million), Harris ($40.1 million), and Klobuchar ($27.6 million) relied more heavily on contributions greater than $200. Biden struggled to raise money early, especially after disappointing finishes in the Iowa and New Hampshire contests. By the end of February, he ranked sixth among Democrats in campaign spending.\(^{41}\)

**Dynamics of the Contest**

Before front-loading became so pronounced, candidates competed in as many locations as funds allowed. This was especially true for Democrats, whose rules call for proportional allocation of delegates: As long as candidates receive at least 15 percent of the vote, they are awarded a share of delegates proportional to the vote share.\(^{42}\) Republican candidates also faced proportional rules starting in 2012, when fewer states awarded all delegates to the first-place finisher in a primary. The earliest contests, the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary, attract most of the major contenders because they are the first tests of rank-and-file voter sentiment. Iowa returned to prominence in 2008 after being overshadowed for many years by New Hampshire, where the delegate total is small but the winner receives immediate national attention. The small New Hampshire electorate enables candidates with more modest financial resources to conduct voter-intensive campaigns, as was the case for McCain in 2008.

Since 1988, campaigns have had to contend with a single day when a large number of states held primaries, dubbed **Super Tuesday**. Twenty states selected delegates, sixteen through primaries and four through caucuses in 1988. In 1992, only eleven states participated in Super Tuesday, but the Democratic designers accomplished their goal of boosting the chances of a moderate candidate when Clinton won all six of the southern primaries and two caucuses. The media renamed Super Tuesday to “Titanic Tuesday” and “Mega Tuesday” in 2000 because the delegate total rose dramatically when New York and California joined the list of states holding primaries that day. In 2008, the list grew to twenty-two contests choosing delegates. Hillary Clinton had hoped to score a knockout that day, when nearly 40 percent of all convention delegates were selected. Fourteen states held
events on the first Tuesday in March 2020, including California and Texas. Bloomberg’s strategy was to skip the four early contests and focus on Super Tuesday. He failed to win any states.

Holding primaries early in the nomination process is a reversal from the past when late primaries could be decisive. Until 1996, California scheduled its primary on the final day of delegate selection, giving Golden State voters the chance to determine a party’s nominee, as they did with Goldwater in 1964 and McGovern in 1972. After losing the election in 1996, Republicans adopted rules that encouraged states to schedule their primaries later in 2000 by providing them with bonus delegates. But the schedule was only slightly less front-loaded in 2000, and the contests were concluded earlier than ever before—March 9, when both McCain and former senator Bill Bradley, the number-two candidate in each party, discontinued their campaigns.

The two parties set a “window” for delegate selection, providing special exceptions for Iowa and New Hampshire, a privileged position also extended to Nevada and South Carolina beginning in 2008. In these relatively small states, candidates engage in retail politics, meeting with voters on a more personal basis than is possible in larger states, where candidates must rely on media advertising, or wholesale politics. Clinton and Obama were so evenly matched in 2008 that the states scheduled later in the process played an unexpectedly important role. For a while, Democrats wondered whether the nomination campaign would continue until the convention determined the nominee. But superdelegates, elected and party officials who attend the convention because of their leadership positions, sided with Obama, whose delegate total exceeded Clinton’s after all primaries and caucuses had been concluded. In 2016, superdelegates heavily favored Clinton over Sanders, a source of dismay for progressive supporters who thought the rules were rigged against them. As a result, Democrats changed the rules for 2020 to prevent superdelegates from voting during the first round of convention balloting.

Republicans, even less accustomed to crowded candidate fields, experienced an “open convention” in 1976, when Ford’s victory over Reagan was not sealed until just before the delegates convened. With a very crowded field in 2016, Republicans enacted rules that concentrated the delegate selection process into three months. Nearly two-thirds of Republican delegates had been selected by April 1, 2016. As more and more Republican candidates dropped out of the competition, “Never Trumpers” pressured the remaining candidates, Cruz and Kasich, to coordinate their efforts in order to deny Trump a first-ballot nomination at the convention, but the effort failed.

State caucuses operate in the shadow of the primaries, although they remain important for candidates able to mobilize an intensely motivated group of supporters who can exert greater influence than in a primary.
Until 2008, the Iowa caucuses, long the first-in-the-nation delegate selection contest, had diminished in importance as a launching pad for presidential contenders. McCain sidestepped Iowa altogether in 2000 to focus on New Hampshire, but Dean's 2004 defeat in Iowa signaled the decline of his candidacy. Obama's 2008 victory in Iowa triggered a surge of favorable media coverage, and his campaign targeted other caucus contests, allowing him to keep pace with Clinton's emphasis on primaries. Iowa Democrats experienced long delays and confusion in tabulating caucus votes in 2020, perhaps signaling another decline in the state's influence and potentially a future shift to a primary. South Carolina was the decisive contest in 2020 when its large group of Black voters—following the endorsement of Rep. Jim Clyburn—heavily swung their support behind Joe Biden who had finished fourth (Iowa), fifth (New Hampshire), and second (Nevada) in the three preceding contests.

### Media Influence and Campaign Consultants

“For most of us, the combination of media coverage and media advertising is the campaign; few voters see the candidates in person or involve themselves directly in campaign events,” wrote Marjorie Randon Hershey after the 2000 election.45 Little has changed in two decades. As the nomination process has grown in complexity, the influence of the media also has grown. Candidates who must campaign in a score of states within two weeks, as they have done since 1992, necessarily rely on the media to communicate with large numbers of potential voters. Televised ads, network-sponsored debates, prime-time news coverage, the Internet, and now Twitter are critical to candidates' efforts. Digital events necessitated by COVID-19 in 2020 might endure.

The media tend to focus on the game aspects of the pre-election-year maneuvering and the early contests. As candidates begin to emerge, journalists concentrate on the competition for financial contributions, the reputations of professionals enlisted to work on a campaign, and speculation about the candidates’ relative chances of success based on polls and non-binding straw votes in various states. Once the delegate selection contests begin, the media focus on political tactics, strategy, and competitive position more than on the candidates’ messages and issue stands, particularly in covering Iowa, New Hampshire, and the other early contests. In general, the media use a winner-take-all principle that, regardless of how narrow the primary victory or the popular-vote margin, gives most attention to the victorious candidate or unexpected results. In the 1976 Iowa caucuses, for example, Carter was declared the “clear winner” and described as leading the pack of contenders even though he received only about 14,000
votes, 28 percent of the 50,000 cast; he actually trailed the “uncommitted” group.\textsuperscript{46} Gore defeated Bradley in the 2000 New Hampshire primary by a mere 49.7 percent to 45.6 percent, but Bradley’s narrow loss was a less important story than Gore’s victory.\textsuperscript{47} Kerry salvaged his campaign with a first-place finish in Iowa in 2004, even though he led John Edwards by a modest number of votes. Sometimes, an unexpected runner-up may garner attention: After winning just 16 percent of the votes to finish second in the Iowa caucuses in 1984, Gary Hart got as much publicity as Walter Mondale, who captured three times as many votes.\textsuperscript{48}

As the fate of presidential candidates has passed from a small group of party professionals to rank-and-file voters, media coverage and public opinion polls have grown in importance. Media evaluations help determine candidate viability—labeling candidates “likely” or “unlikely” as well as “winners” or “losers.” Media-sponsored candidate debates garner widespread attention. Voters and contributors gravitate to the perceived winners and desert the apparent losers. Republican hopefuls participated in twenty debates in 2012, too many in the view of party leaders who were intent on reducing that total in 2016, but the crowded field raised problems. With so many candidates, the first prime-time debate included only the top ten hopefuls as measured in the national polls. The other seven candidates (dubbed the “undercard,” or the “kids’ table”) competed in an earlier contest on the same day.

Democrats in 2020 scheduled eleven debates (the last was cancelled), the first two of which were spread over two nights in late June and July. A random drawing assigned candidates to the first or second night, and to participate, candidates needed to have at least 1 percent support in three national polls or raise at least $63,000 from at least 200 donors in twenty states. Ten candidates participated each night. As the nomination contest progressed, candidates needed to meet more demanding requirements—5, and later 10 percent support in polls, and ultimately 20 percent of allocated delegates, targets that only Biden and Sanders met.\textsuperscript{49}

Favorable polls impress reporters, editorial writers, political activists, and many rank-and-file voters, leading to more primary and caucus victories for the poll leaders. This reinforcement process helps ensure that, by the time the delegates gather for their party’s national convention, one candidate almost always has enough delegates to receive the nomination.\textsuperscript{50} Donald Trump pursued a novel nomination strategy in 2016. He relied heavily on social media, large-scale public rallies, and aggressive debate tactics to deliver outrageous statements that won extensive free media coverage valued by one source as the equivalent of $1.9 billion.\textsuperscript{51} At the same time, he attacked media outlets as purveyors of “fake news.” In this way, Trump overcame the weak organization and poorer funding of his campaign relative to his competitors.
The National Convention

No part of the selection process has undergone more dramatic change than the nominating conventions. Long the province of party leaders, today’s conventions are largely media extravaganzas choreographed to project images designed to reawaken party loyalty, appeal to contemporary public concerns, and project the most desirable aspects of the newly anointed presidential ticket. This was never clearer than in 2020 when delegates never fully convened, and the public watched four-night infomercials for the two parties and their nominees.

Between 1976 and 2012, the FEC provided funding to the Democratic and Republican Parties to finance their nominating conventions, but that public subsidy ($18.24 million each in 2012) was repealed by Congress in 2014, putting the parties on their own. In 2012, Congress appropriated another $50 million to cover security costs at each convention, and the same funding was provided to state and local law enforcement to help with security in 2016. Both parties spent much more for their conventions, an additional $60 million each in 2008 and an estimated $100 million in 2012.52 Facing the need to raise even more money in 2016, the major political parties received permission from Congress to set up separate political committees for convention fund-raising and raised the limits on convention contributions for individuals and PACs. Seventy-four individuals gave the maximum of $100,200 to the party convention committees.53 Host cities raise additional millions. Although Democrats and Republicans conducted only limited party business at their 2020 conventions in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Charlotte, North Carolina, those cities raised about $43 million and $38 million, respectively, for the mostly virtual events.54

Nominating the Ticket

Conventions offer little drama about the choice of the presidential nominee. In the thirty-eight conventions held by the two major parties from 1948 through 2020, only two nominees—Thomas Dewey in 1948 and Adlai Stevenson in 1952—failed to win a majority of the convention votes on the first ballot. In all other cases, victory has gone to the candidate who arrived at the convention with the largest number of pledged delegates. Nevertheless, the state-by-state balloting remains a traditional feature of the process.

Selecting the vice presidential nominee is the convention’s final chore and the only chance to create any suspense. Delegates make the choice, but it has been a matter of political custom since 1940 to allow presidential nominees to pick their running mates after conferring with leaders whose judgment they trust. Parties traditionally attempt to balance...
the ticket—that is, broaden its appeal by selecting a person who differs in politically helpful ways from the presidential nominee.


The final night of the convention is devoted to acceptance speeches. The presidential nominee tries to make peace with former competitors and to reunite party factions that have confronted one another during the long campaign and the usually hectic days of the convention. Party leaders come to the stage and pledge their support. As in so many ways, 2020 was different. Biden highlighted his party’s commitment to responsible campaigning by delivering an acceptance speech in a largely empty exhibition center in Wilmington, DE. After North Carolina’s governor and Jacksonville, Florida’s mayor blocked use of convention centers for an indoor, in-person event, President Trump addressed thousands at an outdoor gathering using the White House as a dramatic backdrop, an unprecedented use of the presidential residence.

**Conducting Party Business**

Parties write and adopt convention platforms, although participants acknowledge that winning presidential candidates may disavow planks with which they disagree. Because delegates, party leaders, and major groups affiliated with the party have strong feelings about some issues, the platform provides an opportunity to resolve differences and fashion politically palatable compromises. Civil rights and the Vietnam War once prompted major disagreements within the Democratic Party; civil rights, foreign policy, and abortion have been important bones of contention among Republicans.
To avoid damage from intra-party differences, almost every presidential candidate decides to provide major rivals and their supporters with concessions in the platform and a prime-time speaking opportunity during the convention. Occasionally, this tactic can backfire. At the 1992 Republican convention, Pat Buchanan's address to a national audience proved so controversial that he was not invited to speak four years later.

National nominating conventions have become so predictable that network television has dramatically reduced coverage. To obtain the traditional “gavel to gavel” coverage that ushered in the television age, viewers must follow proceedings on cable networks, such as CNN, MSNBC, Fox News, CSPAN, or on the Internet. Parties have become so adept at scripting these quadrennial gatherings that their very existence is jeopardized. In 2020, Biden representatives hammered out common ground with Sanders's representatives, effectively creating a common platform. By contrast, Republicans simply readopted the platform from 2016 and embraced President Trump's policy positions.

The General Election

Once the nomination contests become clear, the likely nominees start to campaign, but the general election begins in earnest after the parties select official nominees in late summer. Candidates develop new political appeals for this stage, primarily a contest between the two major parties' standard bearers and, occasionally, an Independent candidate. The campaign's audience increases greatly: More than twice as many people vote in the general election as participate in the nomination process. Candidates and staff decide how they can win the support of suddenly attentive voters, appeal to segments of the other party, and retain disappointed partisans who backed losing candidates for the nomination. Time is a serious complication because the nationwide phase of the presidential contest is compressed into ten weeks, traditionally running from Labor Day to election day.

Two features of the general election make it fundamentally different from the nomination phase: (1) the Electoral College and (2) the distinctive provisions of the campaign finance laws. Compared with the ever-changing nomination stage, the constitutionally prescribed presidential election process has been remarkably stable over time, while campaign finance practices have changed significantly since 1972.

The Electoral College

Presidential candidates plan and carry out their general election strategies with one ultimate goal: winning a majority of the Electoral College

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Chapter 2 | Election Politics

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votes cast by state electors. Early in U.S. history, electoral votes were determined by congressional districts. The winner of a popular-vote plurality in each district would receive the associated electoral vote, with the statewide winner of the popular vote getting the two electoral votes representing senators. But legislatures soon began to adopt the unit or general-ticket rule, whereby all the state's electoral votes went to the candidate who received the plurality of the statewide popular vote. This rule benefited the state's largest party and maximized the state's influence in the election by permitting it to throw all its electoral votes to one candidate. By 1836, the unit system had replaced the district plan. Since then, two states have returned to the old plan: Maine in 1969 and Nebraska in 1992.

The final product is a strange method for choosing a chief executive. Although most Americans view the system as a popular election, it is not. Voters' ballots actually determine which slate of electors pledged to support the party's presidential candidate will cast the state's electoral votes. The electors are party loyalists, chosen variously in primaries, at party conventions, or by state party committees. In mid-December, only the electors pledged to the popular vote winner meet in their state capitals to cast ballots. (Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia bind the electors to vote for the winner of the popular vote, and in Chiafalo v. Washington the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in 2020 that such laws are constitutional.) The official electoral vote certificates are transmitted to Washington, D.C., and counted in early January. Next, the presiding officer of the Senate—the incumbent vice president—announces the outcome before a joint session of Congress. If, as usually happens, one candidate receives an absolute majority of the electoral votes, currently 270, the vice president officially declares that candidate the winner. Because the winner of the popular vote usually wins in the Electoral College as well, we call this final stage of the selection process the validation of the popular-vote outcome. For candidates who win without a popular-vote plurality, as George W. Bush did in 2000 and Donald Trump in 2016, the Electoral College may validate a victory but raise questions about legitimacy.

Financing the General Election

Mounting a nationwide campaign requires greater financial resources than winning the nomination. For the general election, public financing is available to nominees of the major parties. Any party that won 25 percent or more of the popular vote in the last presidential election is considered a major party. However, only one of the last eight major party candidates has chosen to tap this source of funding. McCain received $84.1 million in 2008, but Obama declined public funding. Neither Romney nor Obama
sought such funding in 2012, nor did Trump or Clinton in 2016, nor Biden or Trump in 2020.\footnote{58}

Candidates of minor parties, those who won between 5 percent and 25 percent of the vote in the previous election, receive partial public financing, and they can raise private funds up to the major-party limit. Ross Perot spent an estimated $63 million of his own money to mount his 1992 campaign, and because of his 19 percent showing, he received $29 million in federal funds in 1996 but was limited to using only $50,000 of his own money in the general election. Pat Buchanan, the official Reform Party nominee in 2000, received $12.6 million as a result of Perot’s 8.4 percent share of the vote in 1996. But the party was ineligible for public funding in 2004 after Buchanan’s poor showing of 0.43 percent of the popular vote. Candidates whose parties are just getting started may receive no help, a major disadvantage.

Two other sources engage in campaign spending. Until 2002, there was no limit on \textit{independent campaign expenditures} made by individuals or political committees that advocate the defeat or election of a presidential candidate but are not made in conjunction with a candidate’s campaign. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act or BCRA, applied to the 2004 campaign and prohibited corporations and labor unions from spending their funds on television ads broadly construed as for or against candidates thirty days before a primary and sixty days before a general election.\footnote{59} In June 2007, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in \textit{Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life} weakened these provisions. More significantly, another Supreme Court decision discussed earlier, \textit{Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission} (2010), now allows corporations, unions, and nonprofit organizations to spend as much as they want in support of or in opposition to candidates. Independent expenditures in the 2012 presidential campaign nearly quadrupled to $539 million with a two-to-one advantage for Romney, and in 2016 they grew to $669 million, split almost evenly between the candidates. Independent expenditures in 2020 totaled just under $900 million, with Biden benefiting by nearly 2:1.\footnote{60}

Until 1996, party organizations raised funds, commonly called \textit{soft money}, that had largely been used for grassroots activities such as distributing campaign buttons, stickers, and yard signs; registering voters; and transporting voters to the polls. In 2000, the national parties spent more for television advertising in the presidential election than did the candidates, especially in the \textit{battleground states}, those most hotly contested by the major candidates.\footnote{61} In Florida, the key to Bush’s victory, pro-Bush party expenditures exceeded those for Gore by about $4 million.\footnote{62}

BCRA aimed to end abuse of soft money.\footnote{63} In its wake, however, independent party expenditures rose dramatically in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections. But the landscape changed dramatically again in 2016: Both
parties spent less in support of their own candidate and against the opponent. From a two-party high of $138.5 million in 2004, total party expenditures in 2016 dropped to $7.1 million. Outside groups and wealthy donors have become the new dominant players.

Until 2008, the system of public financing introduced in the 1976 election was viewed as a success: Major-party candidates no longer depended on wealthy contributors and other private sources to finance their campaigns; expenditures of the two major-party candidates were limited and equalized, an advantage for Democrats who were historically outspent by their opponents. Today, each presidential election sets new records: 2008 was the first billion-dollar presidential election, a mark exceeded in the next three. For 2016, contributions to Clinton’s campaign and spending from supportive outside groups totaled $770 million. Trump and his allies had combined resources of $408 million. (Trump ended up spending more than $66 million of his own funds; Hillary Clinton spent a little less than $1.5 million of hers.) Candidates reached a new high in 2020: Biden raised just over $1 billion and got an additional $580 million in help from outside groups; Trump raised $774 million and outside groups another $314 million.

With such high spending, today’s candidates rely heavily on donors giving the maximum legal contribution to the candidates ($2,800 in 2020), and the era of “fat cats” is back. Billionaire casino-owner Sheldon Adelson and his wife contributed an estimated $92.8 million to multiple groups supporting Romney and other Republican candidates in 2012 and another $82.5 million in 2016, including $20.4 million to pro-Trump groups. Campaign spending on presidential elections is now out-of-control after a quarter century of restraint.

Targeting the Campaign

As in the nomination process, candidates must decide which states will be the focus of their efforts in the fall campaign. The most important consideration is the Electoral College: A candidate must win a majority—270—of the 538 electoral votes. This fact places a premium on carrying the states with the most electoral votes (see Figure 2.2). From 2004 through 2020, the candidate winning the eleven largest states—California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas—could win the presidency while losing the thirty-nine other states and the District of Columbia. Understandably, candidates from both major parties concentrate their personal visits and spending on states with the most electoral votes, but there are also other considerations.

Competitiveness is another element affecting candidates’ decisions on where to campaign, the chance of winning a particular state. Are the party’s
candidates generally successful there, or do the results swing back and forth from one election to the next? Distinctly one-party states are likely to be slighted by the major-party candidates as a waste of time and money, while swing states with large populations (think Florida and Ohio) draw a good deal of attention. Polling also helps identify competitiveness: Where does a candidate have a chance to beat the opponent?

In formulating campaign strategy, therefore, candidates and their advisers start with the electoral map as modified by calculations of probable success. The Electoral College creates fifty-one separate presidential contests—fifty states plus the District of Columbia—primarily following the winner-take-all principle; the goal is a popular-vote victory, no matter how small the margin. The winner in a large state benefits from the unit rule by getting all the state’s electoral votes. As we have noted, Bush won Florida in 2000 by a margin of 537 votes of the 5.963 million legitimate ballots cast. But he won all twenty-five of the state’s electoral votes, which gave him enough votes to win in the Electoral College, 271. Bush’s victory in Florida was not final until a
Part I | The President and the Public

controversial 5–4 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Bush v. Gore* (2000). This
decision reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s order for a statewide recount,
which led to Gore’s final concession on December 13. Seven justices agreed
that Florida did not have a clear, consistent standard to govern manual
recounts, but only five—all Republican appointees—believed that a deadline
established in an obscure 1887 law that precluded recounts within six days
of Electoral College balloting applied in this instance. Despite deep disagree-
ment on the Court, the Florida recount was halted, and Bush emerged the
victor.

Electoral votes were reapportioned for the 2004 and 2012 presidential
elections, reflecting the results of the 2000 and 2010 censuses and the
subsequent reallocation of seats in the House of Representatives. States in
the North, East, and Midwest lost seats, while those in the South and West
gained. Following the 2020 census, Texas will gain two more votes while
Colorado, Florida, Montana, North Carolina and Oregon will gain one vote
each. California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
West Virginia will lose one vote each.

Democratic candidates have confronted a difficult strategic problem
arising from the historic realignment of the South in presidential politics.
Southern voters solidly supported Democrats for many decades following
the Civil War but then shifted party allegiance. Until 1992, no Democrat had
ever won the White House without carrying a majority of southern states.
Southern support evaporated even for Jimmy Carter in 1980, when only
Georgia supported its favorite son. No southern state voted for the Demo-
ocratic ticket in 1984 or 1988. The Solid South was a Republican stronghold
until Clinton won Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Tennessee in 1992. George W. Bush won the entire South in 2000, including Democratic
nominee Gore’s home state of Tennessee. Eleven states switched columns
from 1996, including Florida, New Hampshire, and West Virginia, a tradi-
tional Democratic stronghold. Nevertheless, Gore could have won the elec-
tion with either New Hampshire’s four votes or Florida’s twenty-five; many
Gore voters believed that liberal Democrats supporting Ralph Nader in
both states prevented victory. Bush also lost enough votes to Pat Buchanan
in New Mexico and Wisconsin to cost him their sixteen electoral votes.

Only three states changed party columns in 2004, but nine states
moved to the Democrats in 2008, including three in the South, three in
the West, and three in the Midwest. With broad popular support, Obama
won in the Electoral College, 365 to 173, the largest margin of victory
since Clinton in 1996. For 2012, states that Obama won in 2008 lost six
votes in the Electoral College following the census, and two states shifted
from Democrat to Republican. In the end, Obama won thirty-three fewer
electoral votes. His popular-vote total was also down by 4.5 million votes.
In 2016, Trump won the Electoral College 304–227, but he lost the popular vote by nearly 2.9 million. The key to Trump’s success was winning three states the Democrats had believed were secure: Clinton lost Michigan by 10,704 votes, Pennsylvania by 44,292 votes, and Wisconsin by 22,748. Seventy-eight thousand voters in three states—fewer than could fit into any one of those states’ Big 10 stadiums—combined to deliver forty-six electoral votes to Trump and to prevent a Clinton victory. If the votes for the left-leaning Green candidate had gone to Clinton, she would have won in each of these three states. Several other states switched from D to R, including Florida, Iowa, Ohio, and one congressional district in Maine. Overall, Clinton lost 100 electoral votes from Obama’s total in 2012. (Five electors should have supported her but failed to do so; two abandoned Trump, as well.) Trump won thirty states and Clinton twenty plus D.C.

Biden’s victory in 2020 rested heavily on the same three critical states returning to the Democrats’ camp. He won Michigan by 154,188 votes, Pennsylvania by 80,818, and Wisconsin by 20,510. In addition, Arizona, Georgia, and one vote in Nebraska moved to the Democrats, giving Biden a 306–232 victory, identical to the 2016 result if all electors had remained faithful. His popular-vote margin of more than seven million gave him a clear majority of the most voters ever to participate in a U.S. presidential election. Population growth and increased turnout combined to give Biden and Trump the most votes that a candidate from their parties had ever won.

Appealing for Public Support

Presidential campaigns spend millions of dollars and untold hours pursuing two goals: motivating people to cast a ballot and persuading them to support a particular candidate. Several factors other than campaign appeals determine who votes and how they vote. Voters’ choices depend on their long-term political predispositions, such as party loyalties and social group affiliations, and their reactions to short-term forces, such as the candidates and issues involved in specific elections. Candidates and their campaign professionals try to design appeals that activate these influences, attract support, and counter perceived weaknesses.

Because the audience is larger and the time is shorter during the general election period than during the nomination period, candidates use their resources primarily for mass-media appeals. Advertising expenditures have risen accordingly, with campaigns spending half their funding on radio and television messages. Since 1952, television has been the chief source of campaign information for most Americans and is still used more than the Internet, newspapers, or radio.74 Rather than being national in scope, however, campaign advertising is targeted to selected markets in crucial Electoral College states, a pattern especially apparent since 2000.
when major-party campaigns have focused on a defined list of battleground states. Obama’s money advantage allowed him to challenge in many more states in 2008, even those considered long shots, such as McCain’s home state of Arizona. In 2016, the campaigns focused on a dozen states with the greatest attention on Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Michigan, Wisconsin, and especially Pennsylvania were the principal targets in 2020, but Democrats also pursued Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, and Texas.

Students of elections have categorized influences on voter decisions as either long term or short term. Long-term influences include partisanship and group membership, whereas candidate image, issues, and campaign incidents are short term.

**Long-Term Influences.** Partisan loyalty, although still important for a large part of the public, has become less significant as a determinant of election outcomes. Conditions have changed considerably since researchers studying presidential elections in the 1950s concluded that the single most important determinant of voting was the voter’s party identification. This general psychological attachment, shaped by family and social groups, tended to intensify with age. For the average person looking for guidance on how to vote amid the complexities of personalities, issues, and events of the 1950s, the party label of the candidates was the most important reference point. Partisanship was also fairly constant: About 45 percent of Americans in 1952 and 1956 said they thought of themselves as Democrats, and about 28 percent viewed themselves as Republicans, for a combined total of nearly three-fourths of the electorate. When asked to classify themselves further as “strong” or “weak” partisans, Republicans and Democrats both tended to divide equally between those two categories. Independents in 1952 and 1956 averaged about 23 percent of the electorate.

In the mid- to late-1960s, however, partisan affiliation in the United States began to change (see Table 2.2). Beginning with the 1968 election, the number of Independents started to rise, primarily at the expense of the Democrats; by 1972, Independents constituted one-third of the electorate. Even voters who stayed with the Democrats were more inclined than formerly to say they were weak, rather than strong, party members. By 1988, some polls found that Independents outnumbered Democrats. Voters who entered the electorate in 1964 or later are much more likely to be political Independents than were voters of earlier political generations, a development that has been linked to the influence of Vietnam and Watergate and later to declining confidence in government.

Total partisanship—the combined percentage of citizens declaring themselves Democrats or Republicans—fell to its lowest level between
1972 and 1976, rebounded slightly in the 1980s, and sank again in the 1990s. The percentage of Independents has remained strong since the 1970s. By the 2004 election, the electorate’s composition was 33 percent Democrats, 28 percent Republicans, and 39 percent Independents. Another 17 percent of Independents “leaned” Democratic, and 12 percent “leaned” Republican. In 2008, Independents outnumbered Democrats 40 percent to 34 percent, with Republicans a distant third at 26 percent. Independents reversed places with Democrats in 2012 and Republicans lost slightly (see Table 2.2). The Pew Research Center found 2012 to have been more like 2008; about one-third of the voters were Democrats, one-quarter Republican, and the remainder Independent, with 10 percent more voters “leaning” Democratic. In the lead-up to the 2016 election, both Pew and Gallup found that Independents approached 40 percent and consistently outnumbered both Democrats and Republicans. By 2020, Pew found that Independents had declined to 34 percent, Democrats followed at 33 percent, and Republican identifiers stood at 29 percent. Campaigns seek to activate traditional party loyalties even as they attempt to lure Independents by blurring traditional themes, a tightrope act that can confuse the general public.

In 2016, Trump (“lock her up!”) and, to a lesser extent, Clinton (“basket of deplorables”) vilified their opponent or supporters on the campaign trail, tactics reflecting a striking change that has occurred in partisanship over the past two decades—the rise of negative partisanship. Voters “largely align against” a party and its nominee “instead of affiliating with” the other option. In 2016, neither party’s voters were enthusiastic about their own nominee, but “large majorities of Democrats and Republicans truly despised the opposing party’s nominee” and those negative feelings extended to the opposition party, as well.

Yet voters appear to be relying heavily on partisanship in making their voting decisions even while they have lower opinions of both political parties. Even in 2016, nearly 63 percent of voters identified to some degree with one of the two major parties and another 22 percent were self-identified Independents who leaned toward a party. Relatively few voters defected from those party preferences, with only 11 percent of Democrats and 12 percent of Republicans voting for the presidential candidate of the other party. Many factors help explain this development: the widespread use of negative campaign tactics; the proliferation of more ideological media and Internet outlets; the salience of emotionally polarizing issues such as abortion and gay rights; rising racial resentment as nonwhite voters moved disproportionately toward the Democratic party; and the ability of voters to select sources of information and friends that reinforce their opinions.

Political conflict has become more intense even as group support for the parties has become more distinctive. Parties try to tap social group
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Note: Responses to this question: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” Independents include voters labeled as “Independent Democrats” and “Independent Republicans,” sometimes referred to as “leaners.”
membership to win votes. Patterns of group support established during the New Deal persisted during succeeding decades, although with decreasing vibrancy. In the 1940s, Democrats’ support came from southerners, union members, Catholics, and people with limited education, lower incomes, and a working-class background. Northerners, whites, Protestants, and people with more education, higher incomes, and a professional or business background supported Republican candidates. The support of many groups for their traditional party’s candidate shift from election to election. Democrats lost the southern white vote: By 1988, only one in three white votes went to Dukakis, and only 26 percent of white males supported him. On the other hand, support of nonwhites for Democrats strengthened after 1964 and reached near-historic levels in 2008, and in 2012, nonwhites represented 45 percent of the Democratic vote. Union members, long a foundation of Democratic support, voted strongly for Nixon, Reagan, and Trump, even as the percentage of unionized workers declined precipitously.

Obama’s victorious coalition in 2008 rested on strong support among women (56 percent of that vote), African Americans (95 percent), Hispanics (67 percent), and young voters. Exit polls showed Obama winning 69 percent of support from first-time voters and a similar percentage among the eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old voters (66 percent). Obama lost among white voters (55 percent to 43 percent), those sixty and older (51 percent to 47 percent), Protestants (54 percent to 45 percent), and rural voters (53 percent to 45 percent). He garnered the votes of just 31 percent of southern whites, but his advantage in other categories was so great that the popular-vote outcome—53 percent to 46 percent in his favor—was not in question.

In 2016, Clinton hoped to reassemble the Obama coalition, and Trump worked to erode it. The first woman to head a major-party ticket won less of the women’s vote than the campaign had expected (54 percent to 42 percent), a smaller margin than Obama enjoyed in 2008. Trump carried men 53 percent to 41 percent. Black voters again voted overwhelmingly for the Democrat (88 percent to 8 percent) and whites for the Republican (58 percent to 37 percent). Younger voters went for Clinton while older voters supported Trump. Clinton’s support rose with education, but Trump led among whites without a college degree, 67 percent to 28 percent. Trump’s decisive advantage among rural voters (62 percent to 34 percent) helped explain his victories in Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, where he won rural counties by large margins, offsetting Clinton’s advantage in urban areas. Most partisans went back home to support their own party’s nominee, and Independents chose Trump 48 percent to 42 percent.

Exit polls showed that Biden’s victorious coalition included a higher percentage of women than Clinton received (57 percent), nearly the same percentage of Blacks (87 percent), more white votes (41 percent), and more of the youngest voters (65 percent). Rural voters still went strongly for
Trump, but down 5 percent from 2016 (57 percent to 42 percent). Biden enjoyed significant improvement among Independents, where he defeated Trump 54 to 41 percent, a major reversal of Clinton’s performance. College graduates preferred Biden over Trump by 55 percent to 43 percent, while Trump barely won among voters without a college degree, 50 percent to 48 percent. First-time voters preferred Biden by 64 percent to 32 percent. Biden gained critical support in large counties outside major metropolitan areas.\textsuperscript{86}

The two parties’ base coalitions remained largely unchanged. “The Democrats are the party of nonwhites, women, city dwellers, the young, and ‘highbrow’ culture. The Republican electorate consists disproportionately of older White males, evangelicals, southerners, and people more interested in Nascar than the NBA.”\textsuperscript{87}

The rise of negative partisanship combined with social groups’ party preferences means that America increasingly looks like a society at war with itself. Most of the traditional party loyalties from the New Deal era and later have disappeared. Organized labor occasionally divided its vote in the past but is now very fragmented. Democrats have the advantage among three of the four new groups that emerged over the past half-century—women, young voters, and Hispanics. The fourth group—fundamentalist Christians—is strongly Republican. Because many American voters view parties in a negative light, short-term influences—candidates, issues, and events—as well as presidential performance are now more important than ever.

\textit{Short-Term Influences.} During presidential campaigns, the public focuses a great deal of attention on the candidates’ personality and character traits. Each campaign organization strives to create a composite image of its candidate’s most attractive features. To do this sometimes means transforming liabilities into assets: Age becomes mature judgment (Eisenhower); youth and inexperience become vigor (Kennedy). Alternatively, a candidate can direct attention to the opponent’s personal liabilities, a risky move because some voters see such an effort as dirty campaigning.

The 1988 and 2012 campaigns provide good examples of how candidates try to shape each other’s image. George H. W. Bush created a negative portrait of little-known Michael Dukakis in 1988. Building on interviews with Democrats who had supported Reagan in 1980 and 1984, the Bush campaign charged that the Democratic nominee was sympathetic to criminals, weak on defense, opposed to saying the Pledge of Allegiance in school, and a liberal who favored high taxes and big government.\textsuperscript{88} In 2012, the Obama campaign defined Romney as a wealthy, hard-hearted businessman responsible for U.S. workers losing their jobs. Unfortunately for Romney, a secret video tape of a fund-raising dinner where he had denounced 47
percent of the people as seeking government handouts seemed to confirm much of the stereotype.

In 2016, the Clinton campaign and supportive outside groups focused on Donald Trump's personality and why it made him unfit for the presidency. Trump aired far fewer ads than Clinton and they had more policy content, providing more comparisons of himself with Clinton. But pro-Trump ads sponsored by outside groups were quite negative toward Clinton. Trump pursued the unconventional strategy of relying heavily on social media (his supporters loved his Twitter messages) and large rallies where he made controversial statements that attracted blanket (free) media coverage. Many comments focused on crimes allegedly committed by Clinton that triggered chants by his supporters to “Lock her up.” A comprehensive study of the election's political advertising concluded that 2016 was the “second most negative in the last decade and a half.”

Voters look for many qualities in a president. Honesty, trustworthiness, the ability to bring about change, empathy toward people like themselves, and having a vision for the future are often mentioned. In 1992, change favored Bill Clinton, and in 1996 it was having a vision for the future that distinguished him from Dole. In 2000, honesty was the trait mentioned most by voters (24 percent), and 80 percent of those who mentioned it voted for George W. Bush, also perceived as the stronger leader and more likeable despite Gore's greater experience and greater empathy. In 2004, Bush was regarded as more honest and trustworthy (47 percent to 40 percent), the stronger leader (56 percent to 36 percent), and clearer on the issues (57 percent to 34 percent), while Kerry was slightly more likely to understand the problems of “people like you” (46 percent to 44 percent).

In 2008, candidates for the nomination focused on experience versus change: Who would bring the necessary experience to the job and be able to hit the ground running on “day one,” as Hillary Clinton put it versus who would be an agent for change? Change emerged as a more powerful appeal than experience. Both Clinton (eight years in the White House as first lady and eight years in the Senate) and John McCain, (four years in the U.S. House and twenty-two in the Senate) altered their campaigns to answer Obama's powerful appeal for “change you can believe in.” By election day, 59 percent of voters thought McCain had the right experience to be president versus 51 percent for Obama. Voters preferred Obama’s judgment over McCain’s (57 percent to 49 percent), and more people thought Obama was in touch with people like themselves (57 percent to 39 percent). Obama’s empathy advantage was again strong in 2012. Leadership and empathy were especially important to Independent voters, a group hotly pursued by both campaigns.

Although the public knew both 2016 candidates quite well, neither was viewed favorably. In fact, polls showed that Trump and Clinton had
the lowest favorability ratings of any candidates since the question became a polling standard in 1980. Trump's unfavorable ratings exceeded his favorable ratings by an average of −24 percent during the campaign's final three months and Clinton's averaged −16 percent. The difference was that among voters who disliked both candidates, Trump led by 22 percent of the vote; many of the late deciders, nearly one in every eight voters, overwhelmingly disliked both candidates. Clinton had an enormous advantage among voters in experience (90 percent to 8 percent) and judgment (66 percent to 26 percent), but Trump was viewed as far more likely to bring about change (83 percent to 14 percent). Twenty percent of Trump voters did not believe he had the temperament to be effective in office, just as 20 percent of Clinton's voters doubted that she was honest and trustworthy, probably the lingering doubts about her missing emails and Trump's repeated attacks on "Crooked Hillary."94

Once again, both candidates in 2020 had higher unfavorable ratings than favorable, though Trump's were clearly worse. Biden had notable advantages over Trump as more likable, honest, and "cares about the needs of people like you," while Trump's sole advantage was in being a strong/decisive leader. Biden's advantage was among those voters who believed he could unite the country and exercise good judgment.95

Issues are another major short-term influence on voting behavior. University of Michigan researchers in the 1950s suggested that issues influence a voter's choice only if three conditions are present: (1) The voter is aware that an issue or several issues exist, (2) issues are of some personal concern to the voter, and (3) the voter perceives that one party represents his or her position better than the other party does.96 Relatively few U.S. voters in the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections met these criteria—at most one-quarter to one-third. Another one-third of the respondents were unaware of any of the sixteen principal issues about which they were questioned. Even the two-thirds who were aware of one or more issues frequently had no personal concern about them. Many of those who were aware and concerned about issues were unable to perceive differences between the two parties' positions. The analysts concluded that issues potentially determined the choice of, at most, only one-third of the electorate. (The proportion who actually voted as they did because of issues was probably even less.)

Studies of political attitudes in the 1960s and 1970s found that the number and types of issues of which voters were aware had increased.97 Voters during the Eisenhower years exhibited some interest in traditional domestic matters, such as welfare and labor-management relationships, and in a few foreign policy issues, such as the threat of communism and the danger of the atomic bomb. Beginning with the 1964 election, however, voters' interests broadened to include concerns such as civil rights and the
Vietnam War. The war, in particular, remained an important consideration in the 1968 and 1972 contests and was joined by new matters—crime, disorder, and juvenile delinquency, which, along with race problems, were known as social issues.

Salient issues vary from election to election. Greater issue clarity existed between the candidates in the elections of 1984, 1992, 1996, and 2004. Exit polls in 2004 revealed that Bush voters identified moral values and terrorism as their most important issues, while the economy and jobs, Iraq, and health care mattered most to Kerry voters. The economy dominated voter concerns in 2008 and 2012; 63 percent of voters in 2008 and 59 percent in 2012 cited it as their most important concern. Of those who were very worried about the economy in 2008, 59 percent favored Obama; voters in 2012 split evenly on whether Obama or Romney could do a better job on the economy, but a plurality saw things as getting better and a majority (53 percent to 38 percent) blamed Bush for the nation's economic problems rather than Obama. Voters' lingering feelings about George W. Bush had weighed heavily against McCain in 2008. Seventy-one percent of the voters disapproved of the way Bush had performed as president, and 48 percent said McCain would continue Bush's policies.

Immigration dominated much of the 2016 campaign from the moment Donald Trump descended on the Trump Tower elevator to declare his candidacy in June 2015, but on election day voters ranked the economy as most important: 52 percent ranked the economy number one, followed by 18 percent terrorism and 13 percent immigration. Clinton held a 52–41 advantage among those listing the economy most important but trailed Trump 40–57 on terrorism and 33–64 on immigration. In 2020, the economy ranked first for 35 percent of voters and favored Trump, followed by racial inequality (20 percent) and coronavirus (17 percent), both decisively favoring Biden. Crime and safety and health care (both 11 percent) favored Trump and Biden, respectively.

Campaigns loomed large in 2016. The FBI played a prominent role, first declaring in June 2016 that Clinton would not be prosecuted for using a private email server while serving as secretary of state that potentially made classified documents vulnerable. But a mere nine days before the election, Director James Comey announced that the FBI was examining another group of emails found on the computer of a close Clinton aide. Even though Comey announced three days before the election that no charges against Clinton would arise from the new emails, Clinton believed that the sudden doubt injected into voters’ minds cost her the election. Clinton was also filmed stumbling during a bout with pneumonia, and Trump was embarrassed by the release of an Access Hollywood audio and videotape shortly before the second debate in which he described grabbing
attractive women by their genitals. Eventually, a dozen women came forward to denounce his unwanted advances over the years.

In early October 2016, the director of National Intelligence and secretary of Homeland Security warned that agents of the Russian government were interfering in U.S. elections by posting fake messages on social media, hacking Democratic National Committee emails, and releasing them through WikiLeaks, all actions timed to embarrass the Democrats. Multiple intelligence agencies of U.S. allies alerted their counterparts in the United States that there were contacts between Russian agents and Trump campaign officials as well as close Trump associates. After the election, Obama ordered a full investigation. The FBI and U.S. intelligence agencies concluded unanimously that Russia had interfered in the presidential election with the goal of helping Donald Trump win. Two questions remained: Had the interference influenced the outcome? Had any Americans colluded with the Russians? Intelligence officials refused to take a position on how much the interference had impacted the election’s outcome. Congressional investigations into collusion got bogged down in partisan conflict (House) and even when the investigation was more bipartisan (Senate) proved unable to produce definitive answers.

The principal investigation into Russian interference was conducted by a Special Counsel appointed by the Justice Department in May 2017. Robert Mueller was a Republican and former Marine who had served as FBI director under both Bush and Obama. Although President Trump falsely railed against Mueller as having personal conflicts of interest and as heading a “rigged witch hunt” conducted by partisan Democrats, Mueller’s probe produced an impressive number of indictments and guilty pleas. Mueller charged thirteen Russians and three companies with using social media to spread false stories about immigration, religion, and race designed to fan social conflict, reduce turnout of typically Democratic voters, and help the Trump campaign. Mueller charged twelve Russian intelligence agents with hacking the DNC server, laundering money, and breaking into state election boards (more than twenty) in order to sabotage Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Mueller secured guilty pleas from Rick Gates (Trump’s deputy campaign manager and deputy inauguration chair) and Michael Flynn (Trump’s first National Security Adviser and campaign aide), while charging Paul Manafort (Trump’s campaign chair) with multiple bank and tax fraud charges not related to the campaign for which he was found guilty. Trump’s personal attorney, Michael Cohen, pled guilty to six bank fraud and tax evasion charges as well as two violations of campaign finance laws after Mueller referred findings to the district attorney of the Southern District of New York.

Gates, Flynn, Cohen, and lesser campaign figures cooperated with the Mueller investigation. (Manafort cooperated briefly before reversing field, as did Flynn.) And Mueller’s probe could not prove a campaign conspiracy
The arrest, indictment, and conviction of Roger Stone, a longtime political adviser to Trump, suggested that he was the conduit through which coordination occurred between the Trump campaign and Julian Assange, head of WikiLeaks. President Trump later commuted Stone’s sentence and later pardoned him. Trump similarly pardoned Manafort and Flynn. So far as we know, Russia’s was the most sustained effort to influence the outcome of a modern U.S. presidential election. Kathleen Hall Jamieson conducted the most systematic academic study of whether the Russian efforts helped influence the outcome of the 2016 election. She concluded that Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, and Tumblr were unwitting “conduits for Russian propaganda” and that as many as one in every four Americans “visited a fake news website” in the final weeks leading up to the election, exposure that was increased by the sharing of fake stories on Facebook viewed by 126 million Americans. “Late deciders—who disapproved of both candidates—voted disproportionately for Trump,” the result of an overwhelmingly negative media environment in the closing weeks of the campaign. The hacked emails released by WikiLeaks produced a glut of negative publicity for Clinton (the media described the theft as “leaks”), refocused the topics raised during the two final debates, and diminished the effect of revelations about Trump’s reprehensible personal behavior toward women. Based on its uncritical focus on the stolen emails, Jamieson concluded that, “The press served as a conveyor belt of stolen content rather than a gatekeeper” that helps the public figure out the meaning of what it sees.

It is reasonable to argue that the many-pronged information war launched by Russia could have made the critical difference in a race decided by a few thousand votes in a few states. Moreover, Russian intervention was timed to have the greatest desired effect. Take, for example, the fascinating sequence of events on October 7, 2016. At 3 p.m., spokespersons release the joint statement from Homeland Security and the director of National Intelligence about Russia’s interference in the presidential election. That startling story was pushed aside just after 4 p.m. by the Washington Post’s story on Donald Trump’s lewd comments directed at women caught on mic by Access Hollywood. They also posted a link to the actual recording. Just a half hour later, however, WikiLeaks released the first group of emails stolen from Clinton’s campaign director, John Podesta. This final story was an apparent effort, largely successful, to distract attention away from the two earlier stories.

By mid-August 2018, Gallup found that among the 75 percent of Americans who believed Russia had interfered in the election, 39 percent believed it had affected the outcome and 36 percent believed that it had not. Mueller’s probe did not uncover definitive evidence about collusion; nonetheless, Jamieson’s carefully argued account makes it clear there is a
high probability that Russia’s efforts had a decisive impact on the 2016 election.

Despite repeated warnings throughout 2020 that Russia was at it again, now joined by Iran and China, interference appears to have been less extensive than it was in 2016. The two nations launched targeted misinformation campaigns intended to influence registered voters. In addition, President Trump had sought the assistance of Ukrainian officials to soil the image of former Vice President Biden; pressure was put on Ukraine leaders to claim that VP Biden assisted his younger son, Hunter, to secure a lucrative position on the board of an energy company and then shielded him from investigation. This effort resulted in the House impeaching the president and the Senate later acquitting him, an episode discussed at greater length elsewhere in this book.

Incumbency. Incumbency may be viewed as a candidate characteristic that also involves issues. Service in the job provides experience no one else can claim. Incumbency provides concrete advantages: An incumbent already has national campaign experience (true for all incumbents except Ford, who had been appointed to the vice presidency), can obtain media coverage more easily, and has considerable discretion in allocating federal benefits.

Four of the eight incumbent presidents who ran for reelection between 1976 and 2020 won (Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama), while only one of the past four incumbent vice presidents who sought the presidency was successful (George H. W. Bush). The failure of Ford, Carter, G. H. W. Bush, and Trump to gain a second term demonstrates the disadvantages of incumbency, particularly if service in the presidency coincides with negative economic conditions, such as a recession, high inflation, an unresolved foreign crisis, or a pandemic for which a president is blamed. Experience in the job, then, is not a political plus if a sitting president’s record is considered weak or national conditions seem to have deteriorated under the incumbent’s stewardship. The president may be held accountable by voters who cast their ballots retrospectively rather than prospectively; in other words, these voters evaluate an administration’s past performance rather than try to predict future performance.

Retrospective voting helps to explain Carter’s defeat in 1980 and Reagan’s reelection in 1984. Carter’s failure to resolve the hostage crisis in Iran seemed to demonstrate national weakness; in contrast, Reagan embraced pride in America as a major campaign theme. Both elections found citizens voting retrospectively, first providing a negative and then a positive verdict. In 1996, Clinton benefited from the peace and prosperity of his first term. When Gore distanced himself from Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky, he also moved away from the administration’s achievements. Personal incumbency was not a factor in 2008 and 2016, but party incumbency
was. For the first and second times since 1952, neither party’s nominee was an incumbent president or vice president. Democrats actively linked Bush’s record to the Republican nominee in 2008, even though the president made no campaign appearances with McCain. In stark contrast, Hillary Clinton featured Barack and Michelle Obama during rally after rally, particularly during the final month of the 2016 campaign. But, as we have seen, the Obama coalition did not reassemble for Clinton or at least not with the same enthusiasm.

After four tumultuous (some would say chaotic) years, Trump expected his reelection campaign to focus on favorable economic conditions, but the pandemic triggered widespread economic disruption and highlighted the administration’s clumsy response. As an incumbent, Trump could also have expected to raise more campaign funds and target government initiatives to his advantage. Surprisingly, Biden outraised Trump in the fall and enjoyed a large financial advantage. The president announced several foreign policy successes (for example, recognition of Israel by several Gulf states) but the long-anticipated Department of Justice report uncovering an Obama/Biden plot to spy on Trump’s 2016 campaign never materialized. Instead, the president’s allies tried to conjure up another email scandal to implicate Hunter Biden in wrongdoing. In short, incumbency helped less than it might have.\textsuperscript{116}

\textit{Presidential Debates}. Voters have the opportunity to assess the issue positions and personal characteristics of presidential and vice presidential contenders during nationally televised debates. Debates, first staged in 1960 and held each election year since 1976, are the most widely watched campaign events. An estimated 73 million viewers watched the first Biden–Trump debate in 2020.

Candidates hope to avoid making a mistake on live television, a particular danger for incumbents. Ford misspoke in 1976 by saying that the countries of Eastern Europe were not under Soviet domination; Reagan appeared confused and out of touch during his first debate with Mondale in 1984 before rallying in the second encounter. Challengers try to demonstrate their knowledge of issues and their presidential bearing to a nationwide audience. Kennedy in 1960, Reagan in 1980, and George W. Bush in 2000 exceeded expectations and dispelled negative impressions while debating a more experienced opponent. Candidates usually prepare carefully prior to the meeting and repeat themes already prominent in the campaign, producing non-spontaneous exchanges. Trailing candidates hope the debates will reverse their fortunes, but Kerry, McCain, and Romney were disappointed.
Donald Trump pointedly approached the 2016 debates in a confident, relaxed manner, refusing to sequester himself for days of preparation as most candidates have done. Post-debate polls showed that he lost all three 2016 encounters, the first of which was the most watched presidential debate in history, with 84 million television viewers. Trump’s unrehearsed style contrasted with Clinton’s careful, lawyer-like approach.\textsuperscript{117} The second debate came on the heels of the \textit{Access Hollywood} tape, which triggered pressure on him to withdraw from the race. Trump instead assembled women who had charged Bill Clinton with unwanted sexual advances and gave them prime seats in the debate audience.

During the first debate of 2020, Trump interrupted Biden and the moderator so often that it was nearly incoherent, far from an exercise in civic education. Trump refused to participate in the second debate after organizers insisted it be held virtually following the president’s recent bout with COVID-19. The toned-down third debate was more civil than the first; the moderator was able to shut off the candidates’ microphones to prevent interruptions.

Vice presidential candidates have debated since 1976 without much impact on the election outcomes. The largest audience tuned in to see the 2008 encounter between longtime senator Joe Biden and national neophyte Sarah Palin, whose folksy style contrasted sharply with Biden’s occasional lapse into Washington speak. An even greater mismatch pitted Dan Quayle against the much older and far more experienced Lloyd Bentsen in 1988. Responding to what he would do if forced to assume the duties of president, Quayle compared himself to former president John F. Kennedy. Bentsen pounced with withering directness: “Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy. I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy was a friend of mine. Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy.” Quayle never recovered.\textsuperscript{118}

Televised debates enable even the least engaged citizen to develop an impression of the major-party contenders. Candidates are schooled in stagecraft, and the public may now expect more than just a polite exchange of policy views as candidates try to display assertiveness, empathy, humor, or character.

\section*{Election Day}

One irony of the presidential elections since 1960 is that although more citizens had acquired the right to vote, a shrinking proportion had exercised that right until recently. As Table 2.3 indicates, the estimated number of people of voting age has more than doubled since 1932. After reaching a peak in 1960, however, the percentage of people who voted declined in the next twenty years before modest increases in 1984 and 1992, when 55.2 percent voted.\textsuperscript{119} Only 49.1 percent showed up in 1996, the lowest turnout since 1924. There was a modest uptick in 2000, to 51.2 percent, and a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimated Population of Voting Age (in millions)</th>
<th>Number of Votes Cast (in millions)</th>
<th>Number of Votes as Percentage of Population of Voting Age</th>
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<td>39.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>257.6</td>
<td>159.7</td>
<td>61.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Beginning in 1972, persons eighteen to twenty years old were eligible to vote in all states.
startling increase in 2004, variously set at 55.3 percent of the voting-age population (all those eighteen and older) or 60.7 percent using the more accurate measure of the voting-eligible population, which excludes noncitizens and felons. In 2008, turnout rose to 56.9 percent for the voting-age population (including noneligible residents, immigrants, and prison inmates) and to 63 percent of the voting-eligible population. These levels declined in 2012 but rose again in 2016 to 54.7 percent (voting age) and 60.2 percent (voting eligible). With both campaigns actively mobilizing their own voters in 2020 and the widespread use of early voting, turnout jumped to 62 percent (voting age) and 66.7 percent (voting eligible), the highest since 1964.120

Optimists believe that the long-term decline in voter participation has been halted. Indeed, the trend ran counter to most theories of why people do not vote. Throughout the 1990s, most states had eased registration and voting laws, removing hurdles that prevent citizens from going to the polls. Federal laws made it far easier for a person to register and to vote for president in 1996, the low point in the trend, than in 1960. A person's lack of education is often put forward as a reason for not voting, but the level of education of U.S. citizens rose even as participation declined. Lack of political information is yet another frequently cited explanation, but more
Americans than ever are aware of the candidates and their views on public issues, thanks to media coverage and the debates. Finally, close political races are supposed to stimulate people to get out and vote because they think their ballot will make a difference in the outcome. Recent increases could prove temporary.

Why did voting decline after 1960, and then surge, decline, and surge in subsequent elections? Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde link the long-term decline to the erosion in political party identification and to lower political efficacy—the belief that citizens can influence what government does. But these authors note that neither party identification nor political efficacy changed significantly in 1992 and 1996 to explain the rising numbers. Subsequent gains and losses seem unique to particular contests. For example, Ross Perot’s presence on the ballot probably contributed to the 1992 turnout increase; 14 percent of Perot voters (nearly three million votes) indicated in exit polls that without Perot on the ballot, they would not have voted.

After the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in *Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder* to strike down key requirements of the 1964 Voting Rights Act, numerous states adopted more stringent requirements ostensibly to combat voter fraud even though the number of documented voter fraud cases remains quite low. Advocates of greater participation saw these efforts as voter suppression because most had disproportionate impacts on minorities. In response to the pandemic, many states in 2020 expanded early voting, a period of four to forty-five days prior to election day when votes could be cast either in person or through mailed ballots. About 100 million citizens voted before November 3. More Republicans cast ballots on election day while more Democrats voted early. President Trump vigorously criticized expanded use of mail-in ballots (65 million) as encouraging fraud. Despite Trump’s claim that the election had been stolen, more than fifty dozen court cases demonstrated that there were few instances of individual let alone systematic fraud in 2020. The convenience of in-home voting might remain a fixture in many states, but the partisan differences in voting preferences triggered another round of arguments about election fraud versus voter suppression.

**Validation**

Translating popular votes into the official outcome is the final stage of the selection process, in which the Electoral College produces the true winner. Until 2000, it had been more than a century since the constitutionally prescribed process failed to do so or produced a winner who was not also the “people’s choice,” although we had been dangerously close to such an Electoral College misfire on several occasions. Then it happened again in 2016.
Despite the separation of the presidential and the vice presidential balloting in 1804, there remain three possible ways for a misfire to occur. First, the Electoral College does not ensure that the candidate who receives the most popular votes wins the presidency: John Quincy Adams in 1824, Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876, and Benjamin Harrison in 1888 became president even though they finished second in total popular vote to their respective political opponents. The same thing happened in 2000, when Gore won a national plurality of 543,895 votes but lost in the Electoral College. And in 2016, Clinton won nearly 2.9 million more popular votes than Trump but finished second in the Electoral College.123

Second, candidates in 1800, 1824, and 1876 failed to win an Electoral College majority, leaving Congress to resolve the contest. In the first two cases, the House of Representatives, voting by states, decided the winner. In 1876, Congress created an Electoral Commission to resolve disputes over competing slates of electors in three states, thereby producing a winner.

The 2016 election illustrates a third danger of the Electoral College system: An elector need not cast his or her ballot for the candidate who wins the plurality of votes in the elector’s state. This problem of the faithless elector occurred eight times in the twentieth century, and a record number of electors were faithless in 2016—four in Washington state, two in Texas, and one in Hawaii, with others thwarted while attempting to do so in Maine, Minnesota, and Colorado. (This total surpassed the six in 1808.) Several voiced support for the defeated Bernie Sanders but others were intentionally trying to block Trump’s election.124 It is not particularly dangerous when isolated electors make an error or refuse to follow the result of their states’ popular votes, but widespread desertion would be another matter.

The Electoral College as it operates today violates some major tenets of political equality that are central to our contemporary understanding of democracy. Each person’s vote does not count equally: Your influence on the outcome depends on where you live. If you support a losing candidate in a non-competitive state, it is as though you had not voted at all because under the general-ticket system all the electoral votes of a state go to the candidate with a plurality of its popular votes. Citizens who live in populous, politically competitive states have a premium placed on their votes because they affect how large blocs of electoral votes are cast.125 Supporters of third-party candidates have virtually no impact. Perot received 19,741,048 votes, 18.9 percent of the total cast nationally in 1992, but he won no electoral votes because he did not finish first in any state or in any of the House districts in Maine and Nebraska.

Proposals to reform the Electoral College system seek to avoid system misfires and uphold a more modern understanding of democracy. They range from the rather modest suggestion of prohibiting faithless electors—votes would be cast automatically—to scrapping the present system and
moving to a direct popular election. Intermediate suggestions would nationalize the congressional district plan used in Maine and Nebraska, divide electoral votes proportionally between (or among) the contenders, or provide the popular-vote winner with bonus votes, enough to ensure his or her victory in the Electoral College. No proposal is foolproof, and all must develop safeguards against new problems.

Is the Electoral College a constitutional anachronism that should no longer be preserved? Numerous constitutional amendments came forward in the aftermath of the 2000 election, just the latest in a long line. In fact “there have been more proposals for Constitutional amendments on changing the Electoral College than on any other subject,” more than seven hundred throughout U.S. history. The passage of a constitutional amendment is problematic because national legislators will calculate how the new system will affect their states’ influence on the outcome (or their chances to pursue the office) and vote accordingly. A new reform proposal seeks to sidestep the difficulty of passing a constitutional amendment.

Under the National Popular Vote reform, states adopt legislation that awards all of their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote, even if that person did not finish first in the state’s balloting. Maryland was the first state to adopt such legislation in 2007, although the change will not go into effect until enough other states have adopted similar legislation to total 270 electoral votes. By 2020, fifteen states (Maryland, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Vermont, Washington, Massachusetts, California, Rhode Island, New York, Connecticut, Oregon, New Mexico, Colorado, Delaware) and the District of Columbia, totaling 196 electoral votes, had adopted the reform legislation, and nine other states had passed the bill in one house of the legislature. Advocates point out that general elections focus candidates’ travel and television advertising on a handful of battleground states, especially Ohio, Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. To avoid relegating most of the nation to spectator status, supporters argue, adopting their reform would force candidates to wage a truly national contest.

Defenders of the current system note that the most serious misfires occurred during periods of intense political divisiveness (for example, 1824 and 1876), when alternative selection systems would have been just as severely tested. Several of the close calls in the twentieth century, such as those in 1948 and 1968, occurred when political parties were suffering serious internal divisions. Only 1888, 2000, and 2016 offer clear examples of a popular-vote winner who lost the general election. If popular-vote rules had been in place in 2000, the chaos would have been even more widespread because the results would have been challenged in many states with close outcomes, not just in Florida. A national recount would have been far more complex than state-by-state challenges. (We saw something
like this in 2020 when President Trump challenged results in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.) Democrats sought reform after 2000. Disappointed Republicans considered adopting either proportional or district-based systems of allocating electoral votes in key battleground states won by Obama in 2012, hoping to provide support for the Republican presidential candidate in 2016. Changing the rules can change the outcome, but in 2016, Trump won five of those six battleground states under the unaltered rules.¹³⁰

Defenders also argue that the present system has been remarkably successful in producing peaceful resolutions even in tumultuous years. Its virtues include the requirement that candidates not only receive significant popular support but also win support distributed geographically, enabling the winner to govern. George W. Bush, for example, won thirty states in 2000, including eleven that had voted for Clinton in 1996. Ethnic minority groups, it is often argued, receive special leverage under the present system because they are concentrated in states with large electoral vote totals and receive attention because their support might make the difference between winning all the electoral votes or none. In 2020, we saw the impact of Black voters in Detroit, Michigan; Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Finally, some observers fear a threat to two-party stability because direct election might produce many candidates. The plurality winner would fall far short of a majority unless there was also a runoff requirement, via a ranked-choice mechanism or yet another national election.

Partisans differ in responses to these proposals. By early 2020, 58 percent of all Americans supported amending the Constitution so that the winner of the most votes nationwide wins the presidency. Eighty-one percent of Democrats and Democrat-leaners supported the change but only 32 percent of Republicans and Republican-leaners.¹³¹

Analysts differ over the wisdom of retaining the present electoral system. Maintaining government legitimacy is a shared concern. Historically, successful candidates unable to secure a popular-vote majority at least gained legitimacy by enjoying an Electoral College majority. Defenders of the Electoral College also believe legitimacy is achieved through continuity with the past, but reformers believe it is achieved through enhancing popular control and avoiding controversy like that surrounding Bush's 2000 victory and Trump's in 2016. Legitimacy may also suffer if a losing candidate refuses to concede defeat, as we saw in 2020.

Conclusion: Transitions to Governing

For the individual and election team that prevail in the long and grueling presidential selection process, victory requires a sudden change in focus. Winning is the means to an end, not an end in itself. During the
weeks between election and inauguration, the president-elect must put together a team of political executives to staff the new administration and establish a plan for how to launch the program and policy priorities discussed during the campaign. Legislation approved in 1963 and amended thereafter created a formal transition process that funds the incoming administration, provides temporary office space for the newcomers, and allows outgoing and incoming officials to confer and share information. Harry Truman, who had been caught unawares and unprepared when he suddenly assumed the presidency from FDR, pioneered much of this process in 1952 when he prepared for the first inter-party transition conducted after the inauguration date was moved from March 4 to January 20.\textsuperscript{132}

Four days after election day in 2020, final vote counts in Pennsylvania led major print and broadcast media to declare Joseph R. Biden the \textit{president-elect}, that is, the likely winner of upcoming electoral college balloting. At that point, Biden had seventy-four days to prepare to face a health pandemic, its resulting economic dislocations, widespread demands for racial justice, and ongoing environmental dangers. But in the face of these pressing problems, the head of the General Services Administration delayed officially starting the transition process for seventeen days, reflecting President Trump’s insistence that he had not lost the election.

For the first time in the modern era, rather than facilitating the time-honored peaceful transfer of power that lies at the heart of a democratic political system, President Trump sought to reverse the November 3 ballot ing.\textsuperscript{133} Trump denounced election officials in critical swing states, personally lobbied local and state officials to reject vote counts, alleged conspiracies to deny him victory, pursued aggressive legal and public relations strategies that questioned the election outcome, and encouraged supporters to take illegal actions to “stop the steal.” Judge after judge rejected unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud and election irregularities: Trump lost more than sixty lawsuits filed in federal and state courts by his campaign and political allies. Nonetheless, sympathetic Republicans and associated media outlets convinced many Republicans that Biden’s victory was illegitimate.\textsuperscript{134} During this time, Trump solicited roughly $250 million from grassroots supporters to fund his court challenges and his post-presidential political ambitions.\textsuperscript{135}

In a last, desperate gasp, Trump worked with allies to encourage die-hard supporters to descend on Washington, D.C., on January 6, 2021, the day Congress counted electoral college ballots. That afternoon, he delivered incendiary comments to the crowd, and watched on TV as rioters attacked the Capitol in hopes of preventing Congress from certifying Joe Biden’s victory. Rep. Liz Cheney (R-WY), who later voted to impeach Trump, said: “The President of the United States summoned this mob,
assembled the mob, and lit the flame of this attack. Everything that followed was his doing. None of this would have happened without the President. Washington was awash with rumors of other desperate actions that the president might take, including reports of White House advisers encouraging him to declare martial law.

The president’s refusal to concede defeat made it difficult for President Biden to “hit the ground running” and get his new administration off to a good start. Before exploring how a president’s personal beliefs, abilities, and personality influence performance in office, we examine the chief executive’s relationship with the public between elections, a link that has increased in importance in modern times as presidents attempt to sustain the support that brought them to the office in the first place.

SUGGESTED READINGS


**RESOURCES ON THE WEB**

On the arcane workings of the Electoral College, see www.archives.gov/electoral-college?_ga=2.31305087.1364476467.1606243847-1173108847.1606243847.

For an extensive collection of data on the presidency, including information about recent elections, see the American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.


For a rich collection of presidential election maps, see www.uselectionatlas.org/.

**NOTES**


5. Other constitutional amendments dealing with presidential selection have expanded participation (Amendments 15, 19, 24, 26), set the term of office (20, 22), and sought to cope with death or disability (20, 25).
6. David, Goldman, and Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions*, 50. The National Republican Party was soon to give way to the Whigs, with many Whig supporters joining the Republican Party when it was formed in the 1850s (57–59).

7. Ibid., 61.

8. First-ballot convention decisions have been surprisingly prevalent. Through 2012, the two major parties selected their candidates on the first ballot at sixty-one of eighty-seven conventions. Many of the multiballot conventions were held from 1840 to 1888, when sixteen of the twenty-two went past the first ballot. What distinguishes the post-1952 era is that none of the twenty-eight conventions went past one ballot.


11. “Because 1956 was the first time that the Republicans were both the incumbent party and the one that met second, it is when the tradition of the Democrats having the later nomination was fully replaced with one of giving that privilege to the incumbents.” Bruce E. Altschuler, “Scheduling the Party Conventions,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36 (December 2006): 662.


16. Before Richard Nixon’s selection in 1960, the last incumbent vice president to be nominated was Martin Van Buren in 1836.

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27. See the useful table “Chronological Cumulative Allocation of Delegates,” www.thegreenpapers.com/P08/ccad.phtml.


30. In 2020, individuals were limited to contributions of $2,800 to a presidential candidate for each election (the nomination and general election are considered separate contests), up from earlier limits; $5,000 per year to a political action committee (a group that contributes to more than one candidate); $10,000 to a state or local party committee; $35,500 to the national committee of a political party; and $106,500 per account per year for specialized national party committees for nominating conventions, legal proceedings, and party headquarters. Presidential candidates are free to spend an unlimited amount of their and their immediate family’s money on their campaigns, but if they accept public financing, their contributions to their campaigns are limited to $50,000 per election. These limits are raised from cycle to cycle. See the Federal Election Commission “Contribution Limits,” www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits/.


35. This did not happen in 2004 when Howard Dean led the field in fund-raising or in 2008 when McCain was not the leader. Overall, it is not clear whether the additional financial resources produce victory or whether contributors simply choose to give their money to the leading candidate.


42. In 1984, the minimum was 20 percent, a rule that favored the front-runner, Walter Mondale. Complaints from defeated candidates Jesse Jackson and Gary Hart resulted in lowering the qualifying level to 15 percent for the 1988 contest, and that rule has continued. Most Republican contests have been conducted under winner-take-all rules, although some states use proportional rules for both parties.


48. Broh, A Horse of a Different Color, 44.

50. Exceptions to this pattern can be found when two candidates end the preconvention period fairly even. This was the case with McGovern and Humphrey in 1972, Ford and Reagan in 1976, Mondale and Hart in 1984, and Clinton and Obama in 2008; in each case, however, the preconvention leader took the nomination.


52. The difference in convention costs is made up by contributions from individuals and organizations to the convention organizing committees in each city. See www.opensecrets.org/pres08/convcmtes.php?cycle=2008.


57. “No elector has ever been prosecuted for failing to vote as pledged.” From “About the Electors,” https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/electors?_ga=2.105057155.1085907781.1605976187-26321649.1605976187. However, in 2016 three electors were not allowed to cast their vote.


61. Corrado, “Financing the 2000 Elections,” 107. In 1996, each party had launched issue advocacy campaigns, media advertisements that do not expressly support or oppose a candidate but ostensibly educate the public about an issue or a candidate’s position on an issue. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) ads helped Bill Clinton well before the nomination contests began. When Dole ran short of money in late spring 1996, the Republican National Committee (RNC) stepped in with a similar campaign.
62. Ibid., 109. In 2000, independent expenditures by political groups favored Gore by a margin of seven to one, with Planned Parenthood leading the way.


65. Although presidential candidates are free to refuse public funds, no major-party nominee had done so in the general election through 2004, perhaps because the maximum contribution limitations made raising money from individuals and groups more difficult. Candidates may also have thought the public favors the use of public, rather than private, funds. This changed dramatically in 2008 when Obama reversed his previous public position and refused public funding.


68. The Twenty-Third Amendment, ratified in 1961, gave the District of Columbia the right to participate in presidential elections. Previously, District residents were excluded. Their inclusion accounts for there being three more electoral votes (538) than the total number of senators and representatives (535). Citizens living in U.S. territories and the commonwealth of Puerto Rico do not have a vote in the general election.


70. Gore received 266 votes. One elector from the District of Columbia, Barbara Lett-Simmons, who should have cast her ballot for Gore and Lieberman, instead cast a blank ballot as a means of protesting the lack of D.C. statehood and a vote in Congress. Therefore, the two-party total is not 538. A copy of the ballot can be viewed at the Electoral College website of the National Archives, www.archives.gov/federal_register/electoral_college/2000_certificates/vote_dc.html.
71. New York and Pennsylvania each lost two House seats. Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin each lost one. Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and Texas each gained two seats; and California, Colorado, Nevada, and North Carolina each gained one. Because of widespread criticism following the 1990 census, the Census Bureau agreed to conduct a postcensus survey to determine the extent to which some population groups had been undercounted. The results of that study should have led to adjustments in congressional representation, but the secretary of commerce recommended following the initial census findings. A similar debate followed the 2000 census. Utah filed suit to have its residents serving as missionaries abroad included in the count, which would give it the additional seat awarded to North Carolina. In *Utah v. Evans* (2002), the Supreme Court decided in favor of North Carolina.

72. In 1992, Clinton amassed 370 electoral votes by winning thirty-two states, each state that had voted for Dukakis in 1988 and all but one of the twelve where the previous Democratic nominee had won at least 45 percent of the vote. Clinton totaled 379 electoral votes in 1996, winning twenty-nine of the same states and adding two longtime Republican strongholds—Arizona and Florida.

73. Gore lost New Hampshire by 7,300 votes; Nader garnered 22,198 there. Nader also received 97,488 votes in Florida, thousands more than Gore needed for victory. Bush lost New Mexico by 366 votes; Buchanan received 1,392 there. In Wisconsin, Bush lost by 5,708, while Buchanan secured 11,471. See official 2000 election results at www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm.


80. Ibid.

81. Shanto Iyengar and Masha Krupenkin, “The Strengthening of Partisan Affect,” Political Psychology 39:S1 (February 2018): 201–218. The party identification data from the article were modified to make them consistent with the American National Election Study reported later in this chapter.


83. Offsetting gains in nonwhite voting, white fundamentalist Christians have gained significance in national politics. This group has become solidly Republican and in 1988 was nearly as large a proportion of the voting population as Blacks (9 percent versus 10 percent). See poll results reported in Gerald M. Pomper, “The Presidential Election,” in Pomper, The Election of 1996, 134.

84. Abramowitz and Webster, op. cit., 2018, Table 1.


87. Abramowitz and Webster, op. cit., 2018.


92. ABC News Survey, conducted October 9 through November 4, 2004, archived on *National Journal*.


109. Ibid., 220; 10–11.

110. Ibid., 213.

111. Ibid., 13.


113. Ibid., 153–155.

114. Gallup survey, “Americans’ Views on Russia, the 2016 Election, and U.S.-Russian Relations,” Gallup, August 1–12, 2018, news.gallup.com/
poll/241145/americans-views-russia-2016-election-russian-relations-trends.aspx?g_source=link_newsv9&g_campaign=item_241124&g_medium=copy.


121. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 Elections, chap. 4.


