LEARNING OBJECTIVES

1.1 Define what an international organization (IO) is and how it is distinguished from an international institution and a nongovernmental organization.

1.2 Describe the roots of the birth and growth of the modern international organization.

1.3 Identify the range of IO goals.

1.4 Describe the range of reasons why states may want to create or join IOs.

On July 2, 1944, US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. gave a closing speech at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference that created two major international organizations: the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank). World War II was still underway. The D-Day invasion, a major turning point in the war, took place a month earlier, and the war would not be officially over for another fourteen months. The charter of another major international organization, the United Nations, was not approved until June 25, 1945.

Morgenthau’s speech, at the close of three weeks of negotiation, paid homage to the importance of international cooperation in the face of common threats. His key point was that international cooperation can go hand in hand with the protection of national interests. “There is a curious notion,” he said, “that the protection of national interests and the development of international cooperation are conflicting philosophies—that somehow or other men of different nations cannot work together without sacrificing the interests of their particular nations.” He continued,

Yet none of us has found any incompatibility between devotion to our own countries and joint action. Indeed, we have found on the contrary that the only genuine safeguard for our national interests lies in international cooperation. We have come to recognize that the wisest and most effective way to protect our national interests is through international cooperation—that is to say, through united effort for the attainment of common goals.
If we fast forward to the first decades of the twenty-first century, we find ourselves in a time when the debate about the best way states should pursue their interests is again particularly contentious. We live in a world characterized by more interconnectedness, more complex governance issues, and more and different types of actors shaping those issues. We are living in a time of multiple crises where the need for global cooperation could not be greater, while there are many who prefer to turn inward for national solutions and who are critical about the value of international organizations that help to facilitate international cooperation. Some analysts have defined today’s context as one of “polycrisis,” which takes into account the fact that the various crises interact and even reshape one another, which together increase the threat to humanity. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the greatest conflict in Europe since World War II, contributed to an energy crisis and food shortages, while diverting resources that countries could have used to address climate change. Climate change is more widely recognized as a crisis that impacts life on our planet in many different ways, including security, economic growth, resource scarcity, migration, and more. The dramatic increase in climate-related natural disasters over the past twenty years, as well as a range of other natural and man-made hazards, has led the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction to conclude “despite the science and evidence . . . we are turning our only home into an uninhabitable hell for millions of people.”

The global pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus created a health crisis that killed over 6 million people, upended economies, increased poverty, created food security challenges, raised economic inequality, and contributed to a host of other problems. It left developing and emerging market economies with overwhelming economic and health shocks. The World Bank estimated that the coronavirus pandemic pushed as many as 150 million more people into extreme poverty, the highest number since the Bank began collecting such data in 1990. In the same way that the global financial crisis of 2008 was a major geopolitical event that triggered a recession with many ripple effects over time, including contributing to rising public discontent in many parts of the world with their own governments, with global institutions, and the broader liberal order, the crises caused by the COVID-19 pandemic will likewise have ripple effects over time.

The United States, which had played a global leadership role since the end of World War II, essentially threw off that mantle of leadership with the election Donald Trump, who had a visceral distaste for global institutions and alliances, which he believed undermined US sovereignty. His administration (January 2017–January 2021) was dismissive or hostile toward most multilateral organizations and some major treaties and allies, while denying the problems of climate change. The Trump administration pulled out of several treaties, including the Paris Agreement, aimed at strengthening the world’s response to climate change. It exited from the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO, negotiations for the Transpacific Trade Partnership (TPP), the Open Skies Treaty, and the Iran nuclear deal. Trump also called for pulling out of the WHO, NATO and the WTO. Although it did not actually leave the organization, the Trump administration paralyzed the WTO’s dispute mechanism by refusing to appoint new members to its Appellate Body.

The actions of the Trump administration had a major impact on world politics, undermining global institutions and alliances and norms for cooperation. For the first time, the
government of the country that played a leading role in designing and creating the set of rules, institutions, and ideas that defined the global order since the end of World War II was actively and aggressively questioning the very existence of all of them. This went beyond the waves of criticism from different past US administration, which tended to focus on individual organizations and call for or lead their reform efforts rather than call for their abolition. For Trump, global governance was something negative, something that ran counter to independence. Other countries were also turning inward, including in huge emerging economies like India and Brazil. Britain’s exit from the European Union (EU) on January 31, 2020, was a political earthquake that raised many concerns about the efficacy and role of the EU and its future. The Biden administration returned to multilateralism—to a sigh of relief from many US allies—amid a rebuilding of relationships and strengthening of alliances. But US allies no longer felt as secure as they did in the past. We are left living in an era with great political and economic uncertainty.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also immediately raised questions about the future of the liberal order and the ability of other countries to stop what Paul Krugman called “a raw 18th-century-style land grab by a superpower—but in a 21st-century globalized world.” Russian president Vladimir Putin ignored international laws and norms that states should not try to take over other states. The ripple effects of this war produced death, destruction, and a terrible humanitarian crisis; a strong impact on the global economy; and more focus on what role Russia and China may play in the global order. China was instantly put into an uncomfortable position given its long-standing foreign policy principle of non-interference into the internal affairs of sovereign states. Instead of joining Russia’s veto of a proposed Security Council resolution condemning the invasion, China abstained. On March 2, 2022, a special emergency General Assembly session overwhelmingly voted to rebuke Russia over its invasion, with 141 nations in favor, 5 opposed, and 35 abstaining. China was among those abstaining. China’s stance amid an international rebuke of Russia’s action immediately led many to question what China’s larger strategy and interests were. Would this be a moment where authoritarian states more closely aligned themselves against Western democracies? What would such a change mean for the liberal international order?

The war also required international organizations to try to adapt and adjust. The United Nations came under fire as being irrelevant for not being able to get around Russia’s ability to use its veto power in the Security Council. At the very least, the General Assembly was able to step in under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution that allows it to make recommendations when the Security Council is unable to act due to the lack of unanimity among the veto-holding members. It adopted resolutions on March 2, 2022, and March 24, 2022, that deplored and demanded an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These were supported by a large majority of the world’s states. These were positive steps, but nonbinding, as are all General Assembly resolutions. The international financial institutions condemned the violence. Some, like the World Bank Group, specifically mentioned “the Russian invasion of Ukraine and hostilities against its people,” while others spoke more generally of conflict. Major multilateral development banks stopped their programs in Russia and Belarus. There was talk about whether and how to kick Russia out of the G20, not easy to do as the G20 has no formal rules. The IMF board
temporarily suspended the ceremonial role of the board “Dean,” held by a Russian member of the board. And finally, the war dramatically reenergized NATO, whose members quickly began to send troops to some of its members’ borders with Russia, while shipping huge volumes of weapons to Ukraine. Finland and Sweden announced their intention to join NATO. In effect, the war showed that NATO’s purpose, of defending its members against Russian aggression, still had value, after many years when its purpose was questioned after the demise of the Soviet Union.

We live in a time of daunting regional and global problems that former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan once famously called “problems without passports” because they do not respect national borders. This in itself is not new, but today’s crises are even more dramatic and consequential than others we have faced in recent years. The demand for states and other actors to cooperate is as high as ever. There is rising concern that democracies are threatened, while a looming authoritarian China has become more assertive in global politics under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. China has both embraced multilateralism and major international organizations, while also undermining or ignoring global norms associated with them. For example, China is now the third-largest shareholder in the World Bank and IMF. The development bank it created, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), contains the second-largest membership of multilateral development banks (103) behind the World Bank (189) and regularly cooperates and cofinances with other development banks. China is the second-largest contributor to UN peacekeeping behind the US and is the country that heads the largest number of UN specialized agencies—four out of fifteen: the Food and Agricultural Agency, the International Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the UN Industrial Development Organization. Yet China is a police state that uses strong-armed measures to clamp down on criticism. Its detention of over a million Uighurs and other ethnic minorities and its clampdown on pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong raises heightened concerns among major industrial democracies about whether China is a friend or foe, the level of its threat to the international order, and what strategies should be used for competition, containment, and cooperation.

We live in a time of debate over whether this liberal international order—the set of rules and policies and norms that guided many states since World War II—can or even should withstand the pressures that are undermining it. The coronavirus pandemic arrived a time major IOs celebrated important anniversaries: July 2019 marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of the World Bank and IMF; October 2020 marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. In 2020, the same year over 100 countries called for an independent investigation of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) slow response to the coronavirus, the World Food Program (WFP) won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work in confronting rising levels of global hunger fueled by the coronavirus pandemic. Today, world leaders echo Morgenthau’s 1944 speech, highlighting the essential nature of international cooperation. Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, has called for a more inclusive multilateralism. “Only together,” she argued, “can we stand up to today’s challenges.” Her call has been repeated by most leaders of international organizations.
The purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive understanding of major international organizations (IOs) and their changing role in global governance. Global governance is a key organizing concept behind the book. The idea behind the term is that states, IOs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, private foundations, and a variety of other actors interact in a complex global landscape that impacts how decisions and policies are made, as well as whether and how problems are solved. In the scholarly and policy worlds, there are a number of definitions for global governance. Some are simple and straightforward. A report by the US National Intelligence Council and EU institute of Security Studies defined global governance as “the collective management of common problems at the international level.”

Rapid globalization, it argued, means that problems and threats that states used to be able to manage at the local level are not only more global but may also be threats to global security and peace. Examples include food and water scarcity, ethnic conflict, terrorism, and infectious diseases. Scholars Thomas Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, by contrast, offered a much broader definition of global governance. Global governance, they stated, is “the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate relations among citizens, society, markets, and the state in the international arena—the wielders and objects of international public power.” They made two important points. Their first point echoes the global governance report noted above: Collective arrangements can help to address transboundary problems, even though there is no overarching global authority. Their second point is that global governance does not necessarily produce positive outcomes. It “can be good, bad, or indifferent.” It is important to remember that the fact that a global problem is on the radar of many different types of actors does not mean the problem will be solved or even reduced. The different involved actors often disagree on how best to solve a particular problem. It is safe to say that global governance may often be a messy process.

Compounding the challenge of getting different types of actors to work together to address global problems is the vagueness of who is doing the governing. As Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan Sell pointed out, policymakers and academics often treat global governance as a process that happens, without making clear who are the global governors. Governors, the authors argued, may be states, IOs, corporations, advocacy groups, and other actors, all of whom are involved in a dynamic political process in which they are exercising power across borders to have an impact on policy and policy outcomes. The authors argued that the “character of the relationship” between the governors and the governed is important to understanding global politics. This book will explore many challenges facing global governance today, with an emphasis on the changing roles played by a set of key organizations. Amitav Acharya adds to the debates about global governance the important question of not just who governs, but why govern. Demand, he has argued, can be shaped by strategic, functional, and normative sources, but it can also be shaped by domestic politics. This can help explain why there is still demand for global governance even when there is a perception that global governance and its institutions don’t always work that well.
International organizations today operate within the liberal international order (LIO) created after World War II and supported by major international organizations. The order is defined as a set of rules and practices based on economic openness, liberal democracy, and individual rights. As Ikenberry has put it, the order was “built around bargains, institutions and social purposes that were tied to the West” and its broader struggle against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{14} IOs have been the key institutions underpinning the order, given their role in facilitating, orchestrating, implementing, and sometimes developing these rules, principles, and practices. Today, scholars and others ask questions about how the order works, whether it is in crisis, how dependable the US is as its anchor, and how flexible it will be to accommodate a variety of challenges—including the rise of illiberal states, backsliding in democracies, and slowdown in areas of globalization.\textsuperscript{15}

IOs have always been seen as essential but controversial actors in world politics. They are expected to do just about everything: rebuild war-torn societies; help to stop the spread of the coronavirus and other diseases; assist countries in avoiding or overcoming financial crises; adjudicate disputes between states; reduce extreme poverty, inequality, and malnutrition; push countries to cooperate on major global environmental problems; make trade more free and fair; promote gender equality, reform legal systems, reduce corruption, confront corruption, tackle terrorism, and more. All IOs have seen their mandates expand over time, and they struggle to balance a growing number of goals and tasks as they are expected to constantly adapt to a changing global context. The work of IOs directly affects the lives of billions of people. The challenges faced by many IOs today are not new. IOs have always faced attacks from critics who believe IOs cause or enhance the same set of problems they are supposed to solve. Many major IOs are also showing their age, with institutional structures that are sometimes slow to adapt and change. All major IOs have undergone numerous reforms, but there are always questions about whether such reforms are sufficient. Many global policy issues today impact multiple IOs, as well as local and regional actors. In this complex and sometimes confusing topography of governance, cooperation across levels and effective institutions are necessary to make a meaningful dent in addressing the “problems without passports.” In fact, IOs are increasingly partnering or collaborating with a host of other actors in an effort to improve their ability to tackle problems within their mandates. Therefore, it is important that IOs remain relevant actors even as the institutional landscape evolves.

Whether and how to reform IOs is a topic of lively debate. For each major IO, there is a spectrum of opinions, ranging from why we should abolish it to why we should help it to grow larger and do even more. Civil society actors, often the staunchest critics of IOs, also disagree among themselves about whether the best strategy is to work with IOs or remain critical watchdogs. The debates are rich and sometimes raucous. The only agreements are that the world has changed dramatically since most major IOs were established at the end of World War II, that the architecture of global governance from that era is ill-equipped to address the global and regional challenges of today, and that this change requires some type of shift in what IOs are expected and able to do.

The book presents the tools and knowledge useful for navigating the cacophony of perspectives about IOs and their role in global governance, which allow for an informed view of IO
principles, practices, and performance. The tools of navigation are developed by first grounding the study of IOs in an intellectual setting that surveys different approaches to analyze the importance and impact of IOs and their role in global governance found in the academic literature (Chapter 2). The remaining chapters examine the historical development, governance, activities, structure, and performance of a set of major IOs. The book focuses on the United Nations (UN), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO), which historically have been the most powerful, important, and influential IOs in the world. The UN is the leading IO created to try to maintain peace in the world. The World Bank, IMF, and WTO are the IOs that have most influenced the phenomenon of globalization, a process by which sharply lower communication and transportation costs and fewer barriers to transboundary flows of trade, knowledge, and people have created more integration among states, markets, people, and technologies. The European Union is also an important player in global politics and is addressed as part of a chapter that examines regional organizations more broadly. Regional organizations play active roles in international politics today, and their ability to successfully address problems is also contested.

A second chapter on each of the major IOs presents a case study designed to illuminate a major challenge or issue that has confronted the organization in order to help understand both its ability to help solve global problems and the factors that influence its activities, responses, and evolution. The UN case study is a historical one that examines why the UN and the entire international community failed to act in the Rwandan genocide of the mid-1990s, when over half a million people were massacred in 100 days. The World Bank case study focuses on the institution’s environmental behavior and performance, which adds up to a series of forward and backward steps. This case provides insight into how such a large organization struggles with its growing number of mandates. The IMF case reviews the IMF’s actions before, during, and after the 2008 global financial crisis to show how a major IO can be the “go-to” organization in a crisis, even if the fund was struggling with its legitimacy at the time. The WTO case study looks at the role of the organization in the area of intellectual property rights, trade, and access to medicine. The issue of poor-country access to medication raises big questions on how to balance intellectual property rights with saving lives, an issue especially relevant in efforts to vaccinate the world against COVID-19. The case study on regional organizations examines the evolving role of the African Union with a focus on its ability to reduce conflict in Africa.

The remainder of this introductory chapter returns to the focus on IOs by offering basic definitions and concepts on IOs, what they do, when and why they were born, and a brief history of their evolution.

WHAT IS AN IO?

What is an international organization? There is no simple, straightforward definition because there are differences between how scholars define IOs and what the term means in everyday use. The general definition of an international organization is a formal organization with members from three or more states that pursues a specific set of goals. Technically, there are two main categories
of IOs. The first is an intergovernmental organization (IGO) whose members are states represented by their governments. IOs are established by intergovernmental agreement. Examples include the UN, the World Bank, and regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Some IOs also include other IOs or even NGOs as members. The second category is an international NGO whose members are individuals, groups, or associations. Amnesty International and World Wildlife Fund are well-known examples. Today, there are thousands of international NGOs operating around the world, and they are interacting in complex ways with other more traditional actors. What distinguishes traditional NGOs from IOs is that members of the former do not officially represent governments. To complicate matters, there are also hybrid organizations, with members from both inside and outside of government. An example is the International Labour Organization, the first specialized agency of the UN, with a governing body that consists of government, employer, and employee members. In practice, when most people refer to IOs, they mean the first category, IOs. They are mostly referring to the global organizations rather than regional ones. When referring to the second category, people use the term “NGOs.” This book will use the terms “IO” and “IGO” synonymously and use “NGO” and “regional organization” for those latter categories.

Another difference between scholarly and everyday language can be found in the term “international institutions.” For most people, the term “international institution” is synonymous with “international organization.” The UN, IMF, and WTO, for example, are commonly referred to as either. In this book, the terms are also used interchangeably. But in the scholarly world, institution also has meanings that are broader than organization. International institutions have been defined by political scientists as “persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.” These are the rules that help to govern world politics. They may include international law and international norms, for example, that may or may not be the responsibility of a particular organization. In other words, in the scholarly world an international institution may include both “the rules that govern elements of world politics and the organizations that help to implement those rules.”

Many scholars have also used the term “institutions” synonymously with “regimes,” defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” This definition was used by scholars examining issues such as trade regimes or security regimes that consisted of broader governing arrangements that may or may not encompass formal organizations. One way to make the distinction between “institution/regime” and “organization” is to think of organizations as institutions with walls and bureaucrats—or as one scholar quipped, “palpable entities with headquarters and letterheads, voting procedures, and generous pension plans.” To illustrate, the Bretton Woods system was set up in 1944 as a regime to govern international monetary relations by pegging currencies to the dollar and the dollar to gold, but at its center was an international organization—the IMF. The distinction may sound like a trivial one, but it is analytically important when there is a need to separate a particular organization from the broader issues to which it is linked. In other words, there are reasons to look at the trees rather than the forest when trying to understand how IOs themselves impact international problems and policy for better or for worse. As Chapter 2 discusses in detail, the concept of regime has gained fresh traction in recent years as scholars use the term “regime complex,”
which zooms out beyond one regime to look at how individual regimes may overlap and interact to better understand how these configurations impact global governance.

**BRIEF HISTORY AND EVOLUTION**

The modern IO has its roots in the mid-nineteenth century, when states set up a handful of organizations to cooperate on a focused set of issues such as health and trade. Many of the IOs created in the nineteenth century were born in Europe and in the wake of major outbreaks of violence, such as the Napoleonic Wars, Franco-Prussian War, and Crimean War.

One of the first modern IOs (which still exists) was the Central Commission for Navigation of the Rhine, established in 1815 by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna to promote free navigation on the Rhine River. The Superior Council of Health was created in 1838 in Constantinople with Ottoman and European delegates to control outbreaks of cholera and other diseases—in part, by promoting new sanitary measures and calling for quarantines. The European Commission for the Control of the Danube was set up in 1856 to improve navigation on the Danube as part of the Treaty of Paris signed at the end of Crimean War.

The diplomacy by conference that was firmly established in the nineteenth century was also a precursor to the modern IO, as was the development of international law. For example, the Congress of Vienna—itself created by the victors of the Napoleonic Wars—provided opportunities for its members to consult periodically as a means to balance power and deter aggression. While the Congress of Vienna did not succeed in creating the regular consultations envisioned, as Inis Claude Jr. noted, “The techniques of diplomacy had been irrevocably changed.” The subsequent Concert of Europe consisted of the Great Powers (Russia, Prussia, Austria, Great Britain, and later joined by France) and met on occasion for the rest of the century to try and collaborate on issues of concern. It has been credited with opening up diplomatic channels as well as laying the foundation of an executive council that some saw as a prototype for the UN Security Council. The process of consultation and coordination, and the dominating role of the most powerful states, contributed to norms about multilateral diplomacy and negotiation and also reflected a growing awareness that international cooperation could help states achieve outcomes they might be unable to achieve unilaterally. All this was occurring as communication and transport links continued to draw people closer together, enhancing opportunities for both conflict and cooperation.

The nineteenth century developments were mixed in terms of their success. Collaboration often failed, the conference system functioned sporadically, and it did not produce permanent institutions. “The Concert of Europe was rather inappropriately named,” wrote Claude. “It was an orchestra without a conductor or regular rehearsals, whose members played with so little respect for the score that they produced cacophony more often than harmony.” In the aftermath of World War I (1914–1918), a number of IOs and NGOs were born amid renewed efforts to create a more peaceful world and avoid a return to the horror and destruction caused by what was known as the Great War. The most important of these was the League of Nations, the forerunner of the UN. The League was established in 1920 out of the Versailles
Peace Conference negotiating an end to World War I. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, its mandate was to achieve international peace and security in part by having member states agree to submit disputes with members or nonmembers for arbitration or judicial settlement and agree “in no case to resort to war until three months” after attempts at such settlement or decision occurred. Articles 12 through 16 reflected an attempt at a collective security provision in calling for members to respond against a member resorting to war by severing trade or financial relationships and, if necessary, using military, naval, or air force.

The creation of the League had its immediate roots in a number of private and public efforts to help design a post-war order. Groups such as the League of Nations Society (Britain) and League to Enforce Peace (United States) were vocal. Government officials in France, Britain, South Africa, and elsewhere were also actively drafting proposals for the organization of the post-war era. US President Woodrow Wilson ardently backed the notion of a League of Nations as early as 1916, and most famously called for “a general association of nations . . . formed . . . for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike” as the last point of his “Fourteen Points” speech presented to the US Congress on January 8, 1918.

While the League was a novel and dramatic experiment at the time, an embodiment of liberal views dating back at least to Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795), it was also burdened by a number of weaknesses that ultimately led to its failure and collapse in 1939. The League was unable to check the aggressive behavior of Japan (which quit the League in 1931), Italy (which withdrew in 1937), and Germany (which joined in 1926 and exited in 1933), and therefore slow or halt the inevitable steps leading toward World War II. Ambiguity about the specific roles of the League’s Council and Assembly and the requirement of unanimity on voting on important issues also all contributed to the League’s downfall. And while Wilson “dominated the ideological scene” surrounding the League’s development, the United States in the end did not join, and the absence of a major international power hurt the League deeply. It was formally disbanded in April 1946.

Today’s most powerful IOs were born in the waning days and aftermath of World War II. The UN, World Bank, IMF, General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (later to evolve into the WTO), and the European Coal and Steel Community (later to evolve into the European Union) were founded between 1944 and 1951. Their histories, governance, activities, and challenges are discussed in subsequent chapters. As with the League of Nations, they were created above all as grand, dramatic experiments to help avoid future world wars, even though individual countries may have had additional reasons for participating.

The number of IOs has also grown dramatically since the end of World War II. In some ways, it is even difficult to know how many there are. According to the Yearbook of International Organizations, there are at least 290 “conventional” intergovernmental international organizations today, of which almost three-quarters have regionally-based membership. These organizations vary enormously in size, scope, goals, and influence. By contrast, there are almost 10,000 international and regional NGOs. The Yearbook adds additional categories that show even more variety, including “organizations emanating from places, persons, bodies”; “organizations of special form”; and “autonomous conference
series,” to name a few. But there is no consensus on numbers, with other sources listing fewer or more.

In terms of size, the entire UN family, for example, consists of 193 nations and employs around 40,000 people. The UN once put the seemingly large numbers of employees into perspective by pointing out that Disneyland and Walt Disney World together employed more people than the UN. The UN’s core budget for 2022 was $3.12 billion. Its peacekeeping budget, which can fluctuate substantially as missions change, was around $6.4 billion. By contrast, the Geneva-based WTO had a small staff of just over 600 and a budget of around 200 million Swiss francs in 2022.

**RANGE OF IO GOALS**

IO goals also range from the very narrow to the very broad. The small, Paris-based International Institute of Refrigeration, with a membership of 59 countries, has the specific mandate of expanding knowledge of refrigeration technology and applications. Compare that to the World Bank, which works in poor countries to reduce poverty, promote sustainable development, support private sector development, modernize judicial and legal systems, build educational systems, promote gender equality and justice, and combat infectious disease. When organizations have huge, broad goals, it is also difficult to measure their performance. The UN Security Council, for example, is tasked with “maintaining international peace and security.” Does that mean it is unsuccessful every time there is a conflict or that we can realistically expect it to reduce all conflict?

Regional organizations also come in all shapes and sizes, from the very large (European Union) to the much smaller (Asian and Pacific Coconut Community). Like their global counterparts, regional organizations’ goals may cover a broad range of sectors and activities. IOs, global and regional, operate in areas that include security, development, education, telecommunications, health, environment, human rights, trade, agriculture, labor, migration, tourism, and so on—just about every imaginable issue that crosses borders.

**WHY DO STATES CREATE IOS?**

As already noted, the US was the driving force creating the major IOs at the end of World War II, and those IOs supported the liberal international order. But more broadly, including IOs created in the nineteenth century and even IOs created today by illiberal nations, states create IOs to pursue a variety of common interests and to serve a variety of functions that states cannot achieve individually. At the most basic level, an IO provides a forum where states can meet regularly to accomplish whatever goals they have set for it. This regular communication makes it easier for states to share information and to pursue common interests, which results, ideally, in greater cooperation through specific actions that help to achieve shared goals. IOs bring together experts and decision-makers to create and disseminate new knowledge, policies, and rules. They also help to implement and monitor the outcomes of these actions. Therefore, IOs help to coordinate global responses and the global rules themselves, and they monitor and enforce actors’ compliance with those rules. The small United Nations Environment Programme, for example,
has played a critical role facilitating interstate agreement on a variety of international environmental treaties, such as ozone depletion and persistent organic pollutants. It also works to promote state compliance with international environmental agreements.

IOs also provide states the ability to coordinate their actions by pooling financial, technological, and analytical resources to accomplish common goals. For example, the World Bank and its regional relatives get financial resources from member states and then raise their own money on international capital markets, so they can lend billions of dollars a year to developing countries. The International Food Policy Research Institute, likewise, organizes analytical resources on a smaller scale, as it conducts research and works with developing countries to help them create policies to reduce hunger and malnutrition.

States ask IOs to draft laws, build scientific networks, rebuild war-torn states, and help to create new democracies. In this sense, states are delegating authority and power to IOs to carry out the states’ interests. At the same time, states are not keen to lose their sovereignty, so often, the result has a contradictory quality. Jessica Mathews described this as a process by which states “hand international organizations sweeping new responsibilities and then rein them in with circumscribed mandates or inadequate funding.”

States are often attracted to IOs for their strategic value or as another path to pursue foreign policy objectives. For instance, the United States has sought UN approval to offer international legitimacy for its actions. One of the most famous examples of this was when the Truman administration sought and received UN Security Council approval for its decision to defend South Korea after Communist North Korea attacked it in 1950. Although this was a Cold War conflict (with North Korea backed by China and the Soviet Union), the United States was able to get around the Soviet veto on the Security Council because at the time the Soviets were boycotting the Security Council, protesting that Communist China was excluded from holding a permanent seat (which was held by the exiled government in Taiwan until 1971). In fact, for some time now, almost all of the United States’ interventions received endorsements from either the UN Security Council or NATO.

Scholar G. John Ikenberry has argued that states winning major wars in the nineteenth and twentieth century created international institutions as a way to “lock in” their victory by creating a “favorable and durable post-war order,” even though there is a cost to such a strategy—that new institutions ultimately restrain the victors’ ability to exercise their power. For realists and neorealists, the strategic component is even starker—that powerful states create IOs as a means to pursue their self-interest in maintaining or increasing their share of world power.

IOs also have important symbolic value for states. Many former Soviet bloc countries were passionate about joining NATO after the end of the Cold War, in part because NATO symbolized the “West” that they wanted to be part of. While NATO’s raison d’être, deterring Soviet aggression in Western Europe, was in flux after the Soviet Union had collapsed, its symbolic importance never waned.

States also join IOs to show they are in favor of the IO goals, even if they really are pursuing policies that clearly clash with those goals. As Susan Strange put it, the symbolic value of an IO allows “everybody to declare themselves in favor of truth, beauty, goodness, and world
community, while leaving governments free to pursue national self-interests and do exactly what they wish.\textsuperscript{49} The former UN Commission on Human Rights was abolished in 2006 because its members included states that were clearly abusing the human rights of their citizens.

There are also other domestic political reasons that make IO membership attractive to states, reasons that have little to do with broader issues of international cooperation. For example, Jon Pevehouse has argued that new democracies may seek membership in some IOs whose members are mainly democracies, as a means to show that they, too, are committed to democratic reform.\textsuperscript{50} The domestic determinants of IO memberships can also reveal the inner workings of domestic politics, particularly how some domestic actors use IOs to gain leverage over other domestic actors.

States also find it useful to use IOs as scapegoats for difficult policy decisions taken or not taken. Developing country governments often enter into economically painful agreements with the IMF as a way to push through unpopular policies. Countries regularly blame the UN as an organization for its inaction, even when such inaction may also reflect decisions made by its powerful member states. Former UN Under-Secretary Sir Brian Urquhart pointed out that the UN has been the “fall guy” for governments ever since its birth. A classic case, he recalled, was when the United States decided that it would not go to war with the Soviet Union over its 1956 invasion of Hungary, then passed the issue to the UN “and had a lovely time saying the UN was absolutely useless because they hadn’t thrown the Soviet Union out of Hungary.”\textsuperscript{51}

IOs play many other roles for states. IOs are increasingly involved in broad agenda-setting exercises that bring together diverse groups of actors to create policy networks and develop soft law, action plans, or other guiding documents aimed at addressing specific international problems. These activities give IOs the ability to create and spread norms, ideas, and standards of behavior in a growing number of issue areas. One example is the World Bank’s involvement, along with the International Union for Conservation of Nature, in creating the World Commission on Dams in the late 1990s, which brought together a variety of stakeholders to evaluate the role and impact of large dams on development. Another example is the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, a set of ambitious goals that IOs helped to develop—and states signed onto—as a means to improve the welfare of the world’s poorest people by 2030.\textsuperscript{52}

States have created IOs to adjudicate their disputes. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the main judicial organ of the UN, was set up to resolve disputes between member states, as well as to offer advisory opinions on questions of international law. While the ICJ had little, if any, impact on major disputes before the end of the Cold War, since then it has become fairly active. The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism was for many years one of the more powerful international judicial bodies, given that member states must submit to it and accept its rulings. States have also created international law organizations to try individuals accused of war crimes and other grave crimes against humanity, as well as to promote reconciliation and bring justice to victims. Examples include the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as the newer International Criminal Court.

States have also created IOs as a means to pool their sovereignty. This is evident in the grand experiment taking place in Europe: the European Union (EU). The EU and its institutions are a unique mix with characteristics of traditional IOs, plus something more. The EU has been called a
transnational polity, a postsovereign system, and a supranational system, among other descriptions. Member-state sovereignty and borders are sacrosanct in some areas, but not others. For example, the European Court of Justice can override member-state law and create new law, while the European Central Bank manages the monetary policy of EU member states that adopted the euro.

Whatever we call the EU, it is clearly one of the most powerful examples of a regional organization. Organizations like NATO, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and Mercosur are often in the news as they tackle issues of great importance to their regions. Regional organizations have complex relationships with international organizations. Sometimes they cooperate, sometimes they clash. Depending on the issue area and region, regional organizations may enhance or undermine an international organization’s legitimacy and authority.

**CONCLUSION**

The remaining chapters not only aim to provide readers with the nuts and bolts about what exactly specific IOs do and why they were created, but they also seek to bring to life the many different perspectives and contentious debates concerning what IOs should be doing and whether they are operating effectively as actors working in global and regional governance. Underneath many of the debates are fundamental, irresolvable philosophical differences, especially when it comes to issues such as whether IOs should or do infringe on sovereignty. There is real and deep disagreement over issues such as whether IOs should intercede to stop genocide and other human rights violations, whether IOs should try to force countries to change specific policies (economic and environmental, for example), and how much power and authority states should give to IOs. The implications of these debates are very tangible because they affect individual lives. It is also the case that, between the extreme views of IOs as scoundrels or saviors and IOs as creatures of powerful states or the foundation of future global government, there is a vibrant middle ground with more nuanced analyses of these important actors. This is important because we cannot make sweeping pronouncements about the role or utility of IOs. There is so much variation in what they do, why they do it, and how well they do it. All IOs are working on complex, multifaceted problems that are difficult to solve, and they are doing so in a changing international context. With so many member states in each IO, consensus can be difficult and made more complex by all the other actors involved in a given issue area. Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations Secretary-General from 1953 until his death in a plane crash in 1961, is reported to have said that the UN was “not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.”53 This view seems appropriate to a range of IOs, which may be imperfect but have clearly made some contributions to reducing “problems without passports.”

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


