Creating National and Regional Television and Cultural Industries

This chapter focuses historically on the efforts by nations around the world to develop national television systems, particularly from the 1950s through the 1980s, before the era of globalization. Nations poured much of the effort to unify their peoples and to become modern into developing national television, which is eclipsed now in some countries by a much more fragmented, postmodern form of television. However, this chapter develops the idea that the cultural industries of television are often best understood historically as national industries that worked within national markets defined in a reciprocal relationship with government policy and national identity. A number of national systems later turned into regional or transnational exporters and, by the era of satellite broadcasting, an increasing number of translocal and regional broadcasters who produce and program for specific nations outside their borders.

Most of the networks or channels that are thought of as regional or global, such as CNN or MTV, have expanded from an initial base in a single country, where they are most often strongest and most profitable. Some exceptions are a steadily increasing number of U.S.-based satellite/cable TV channels created to target either global or regional audiences, for example, the AXN channel, which carries selected American action television series to Latin America, or the Sony Channel, which carries American sitcoms to Latin America. Another set of new channels consists of the satellite networks, such
as Star TV in Asia and Orbit or Al-Jazeera in the Middle East, which were explicitly started since the 1980s to be regional television networks. Another new category is the local or regional channels that work with cultural-linguistic markets smaller than the nation-state, such as Catalonian television within Spain or Telegu-language television within India.

Through a political economy and historical view, this chapter focuses on some of the main structural elements for the national bases of world television: economic frameworks, ownership bases, governmental regulations and controls, and institutional forms of organization and operation. In terms of complexity theory, these structural elements form boundaries within which cultural forces and agents, such as television producers, distributors, and viewers, operate. The structures of television limit what cultural agents can do, but within those limits, agency may create different patterns. In terms of Giddens’s (1984) approach to structuration, these same structural elements form limits within which television producers, distributors, and viewers operate but also provide the resources that can be used to produce, distribute, and consume television.

**Dependency, the Cold War, and Television Industry Production**

Even after their formal independence, many developing countries still depend on the industrialized world for many things, as detailed later (Hamelink, 1983). This is a structural legacy of imperialism that many countries have struggled with and which only a few countries have substantially overcome.

For quite a long time, these postindependence issues were analyzed in terms of world systems theory and dependency theory. In world systems theory, a core of industrial nations controls the essential dynamics of the world capitalist system. A large number of nations, most of the developing world, are peripheral or essentially dependent, and a smaller number of nations, which Wallerstein (1979) calls semiperipheral, achieve some growth and development. Semiperipheral states include the partially industrialized states of the Third World, Eastern Europe, and, at least before World War I, Russia (Wallerstein, 1991, pp. 88–89). In all of these cases, the world economy, still controlled by the core nations, is expanding and penetrating new states to draw in new raw materials and potential markets. Dependency theory takes a similar analysis, but more from the point of view of developing countries, which even after obtaining political independence, often saw themselves entangled in a series of dependent relations with either their former colonial powers or with competing international powers, such as the
United States or Great Britain. These lines of dependence tended to center on:

Finance: Many countries depended on outside powers for either investments or foreign aid;

Trade: Many countries remained locked in unfavorable trade relations with dominant countries, selling their raw materials cheaply and buying manufactured goods for high prices;

Politics: Countries often had to accept subordinate political alliances to obtain foreign aid or other benefits;

Culture: Countries often imported television, films, and news from either their former colonial power or the United States;

Education: National elites often spoke the languages of either former colonial powers such as France or of emerging global powers such as the United States (Cardoso, 1970).

Dependency varied greatly in regions of the world. The term itself was created by Latin American theorists, like Cardoso (1970), to describe the experience of Latin American countries after becoming independent in the 1820s, then forming powerful new relationships of dependency on Great Britain, France, and the United States. Most other developing countries became independent of colonialism much later, after the 1940s. However, the Latin American experience provided a useful set of prototypes and precedents for understanding dependency among other newly independent countries in other regions. However, regional experiences differed, and dependency developed and transformed in different ways around the world.

The reach of the industrialized nations continued to expand after World War II and to draw the newly independent nations into dependency. Even though the United States had been a literal colonial power in only a few countries, for example, Cuba and the Philippines, the United States now became a logical economic partner for developing country elites around the world. Both the United States and the USSR actively pursued alliances with elites in developing countries as part of the Cold War, so political and military concerns often overlapped or even opposed economic interests of the elites in both industrialized and developing countries.

Almost all national elites, whether in the economy, politics, or cultural industry, were seen as strongly linked to the economic interests of the core countries (dos Santos, 1973). These elites had been educated by the colonial powers, had learned the colonial languages, had often worked in or been trained by their companies, and often saw their economic fortunes as linked
to the corporations and governments of the major core countries, even after independence. So as these elites created political systems, economic groups, and cultural industries, they often saw profit and stability in continuing ties to the core countries. A key example is the television broadcasting personnel in various countries, who have been trained in how to produce television and, implicitly, what television is or should be, by the BBC or other dominant media groups (Golding & Murdock, 1997). Cultural industry elites, in television or elsewhere, were particularly interested in creating and guiding markets for both their economic role and their ideological role in reproducing the systems of culture and information.

Many saw the ideological role of television under dependency as making Third World residents content with their lot as lower paid consumers of the First World products. The core nations saw advertising and the consumerism it promotes as a key vehicle of both economic and ideological expansion (Fox, 1975; Janus, 1981). However, some elites in politics, economics, and media were interested in increasing their own national power and reducing dependency. So a great deal of policy making came to focus on reducing dependency by addressing issues such as enabling countries to produce more of their own media content and reducing imbalances of cultural imports (MacBride Commission, 1980).

Cultural Imperialism and Media Imperialism

Building on dependency theories, another, perhaps more lasting body of theory was created: cultural imperialism. This theory identified several key problems that must be considered before further discussion of developments in national television. First, perhaps most fundamental, is the creation and reinforcement of commercial models for television. Herbert Schiller (1976) argued that the powerful U.S. communication industries had essentially forced global commercialization on most countries and on the international communication system as a whole. The spread of the commercial model of media, foreign investment in media, and the power of multinational advertisers were viewed as threatening to the use of media for nationally determined, development-oriented purposes (Beltran & Fox de Cardona, 1979; Janus, 1981).

A second key and related issue is the profound role of media in producing ideologies that favored capitalist market development over other possibilities, favoring the economic interests of the United States and other advanced industrial nations (Schiller, 1969). In this view, the ideological role of media is primarily as part of the cultural superstructure that results from the more basic structural economic relations of dependency. In this pattern,
which is related to dependency and world systems theories, the peripheral or developing countries depend on the industrialized world for capital, technology, and most manufactured goods, while tending to export low-cost primary products or cheap manufactures, which add little benefit to the local economy. The role of culture is to make Third World residents content with their lot, an idea similar to, but in many formulations less sophisticated than Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony, in which elites and sometimes others compete to use media and other cultural or informational structures to set a dominant ideology that the members of society tend to accept.

A third key issue in cultural imperialism is the unbalanced flow of media products between countries. Several studies (Beltran, 1978; Beltran & Fox de Cardona, 1979; Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974) identified what was increasingly perceived as a one-way flow of television from a few countries of the First World out to the rest of the world, whereas other studies (Boyd-Barrett, 1980) observed a similar one-way flow of news controlled by the four large news agencies, Associated Press, United Press International, Agence France Presse, and Reuters. Studies (Guback, 1984; Schnitman, 1984) observed a possibly even more unbalanced flow of film from Hollywood to almost everywhere else, except India.

For cultural imperialism theorists, control of domestic media structures and the ideological role of advertising and imported news and media products were primary concerns. This view clearly sees structures and economic factors as determinant and does not give much attention to the interaction of the audience with the actual text or content of the cultural products. Media imperialism theory is somewhat less structural and Marxist in orientation and focuses more on imbalances of power and flows of media (Boyd-Barrett, 1977; Lee, 1980). Lee (1980), in particular, also tried to refine indicators or levels of media imperialism, which could be empirically examined. He focused on flow of television, foreign investment, adoption of foreign models, and impact on cultures. Critics particularly noted that he missed some of the connections between the larger context of dependency and media, particularly the influence of advertising (Mattos, 1984). Boyd-Barrett (1980) also relied on a largely empirical definition; he viewed media imperialism as essentially an unbalanced set of relationships between countries in the sphere of media.

Local Cultural Production

One of the conclusions of Chapter 2 is that outside influences coming into a culture encounter and interact; they hybridize or layer with the institutions,
identities, and cultural production that are already there. Before television came along in the 1950s or later, many countries and cultures already had traditions and highly productive institutions (or industries) of radio, theater, music, film, publishing, circus, dance, and other arts. Many of these contributed to the form and development of local or national television, interacting with the kinds of outside forces that were often the focus of dependency and cultural imperialism theorists. In fact, early theories of media development in the 1950s and 1960s focused almost exclusively on local media capabilities and how they could be grown and adapted to support development programs (Schramm, 1964). Dependency and imperialism theorists critiqued that work because it did not take the strong role of international forces into account (Schiller, 1969), but their work in turn tends to underestimate the local forces involved (Straubhaar, 1981).

Specifically, where other local cultural industries were well developed, they influenced television’s development. In India, a well-developed film industry with massive annual production in not only Hindi but a number of regional languages such as Tamil and Telugu had several impacts on television. Although television started in developmentalist and political directions preferred by the national state, the Hindi film industry was able to push to have its films prominently featured in national Hindi-language broadcasts. Furthermore, the existence of strong state or regional level film industries made India one of the first countries to have strong local or province-level television networks (Kumar, 2006). In several parts of Latin American countries, the role of film was less direct, but directors, actors, writers, and other professionals from film and theater were crucial in providing a base for local production of programming, especially in television’s early days of the 1950s and 1960s.

Existing local forms of media ownership and control were also important. One of the strengths of dependency theorists was to point out how both the state and local cultural industries prior to television had evolved in interaction with outside capital and other forces. In both Asia and Latin America, for example, family media empires had already been built in film, such as the Shaw Brothers film studio and interests that contributed to powerful Hong Kong producer TVRB, or in newspapers and radio, which supplied dominant media groups ready to develop television in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.

**Cultural Imports**

Despite the potential for local cultural production, a classic and enduring pattern of former colonial powers and other dominant economies is to export as
much as possible to the nations that are still dependent on them, keeping the trade balance in their favor as much as possible. Goods exported by the core countries often include cultural products like television programs that are far cheaper for poor countries to import than to produce. This was probably most widely true in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as reflected in the 1974 Nordenstreng and Varis study, which showed that most countries then imported most of their television programs, mostly from the United States. So in some ways, television came to be seen as yet another product typically sold by First World producers to Third World consumers. Such unbalanced cultural imports also add to a pattern of cultural and media imperialism.

Especially for new television operations, importing television programs was always considerably cheaper than producing them at home. However, by the 1980s, studies began to show an increase in national production in several parts of the world (Antola & Rogers, 1984; Straubhaar, 1981; Straubhaar et al., 1992; Waterman & Rogers, 1994). I explore below the factors that made that possible. Conversely, many other countries were unable to produce much of their own television programming, which reveals the most crucial structural boundaries or barriers that blocked some cultural industries and institutions from growing.

Empirically, structural factors promoting national television production growth include market size and market characteristics, state intervention, entrepreneurial behavior, and ownership structures. This chapter will focus on specific structural forces, while subsequent chapters focus on questions related to cultural factors, such as producer behavior, genre development, and audience preferences.

The Nation-State and Television

Television has differed crucially from music, film, radio, newspapers, and newer media in several crucial ways, some of which focus on the interest and the power of many nation-states to control or even own and operate television to ensure or at least pursue several key national goals.

First, radio and television are for the 20th century what the print media of newspapers and books were to the 19th century: the primary means of building and reinforcing national identity. Television becomes a crucial medium to unify geographically and ethnically dispersed and diverse peoples into a sense of nationhood. For example, writing of the history of Egyptian television, Abu-Lughod (2005) says that “in Egypt, public television was seen as an aggressive attempt to assimilate the distinct communities into a nation state” (p. 5).
Second, the state has unique powers to control radio and television by being able to decide who gets a license to use the radio spectrum to broadcast. Many states simply took over television themselves to promote national identity, to control national politics, to mobilize people to support government development programs, or to educate people in new ideas and ways of working or living that national states wanted to promote. India was a good example of a state that initially ran television directly under a state monopoly, Doordarshan, to achieve all these goals, even though television there eventually became much more complicated (Kumar, 2006). Other states, like Mexico, left broadcasting in private hands under a monopoly that worked closely with government to achieve most of the same goals (Fernández & Paxman, 2001).

Third, political, economic, and other leaders, both domestic and transnational, need the state to use television to carry out certain educational tasks that turn people not only into citizens of a nation but also into useful employees and consumers. Speaking of Turkey, Sengul (2006) said, “First of all, the need to integrate new migrant communities into the texture of western cities created both a need and a demand for programs that would serve as pedagogical and performative items to this end” (p. 10).

Fourth, television was initially so much more expensive than radio that it was more likely to remain a national project, clearly under the gaze of the national state. In fact, in much of the world, particularly large parts of the Arab world (Boyd, 1993), Africa (Head, 1974), and Asia (Lent, 1978), national government started television because no private actor had enough money.

Dependency and Ownership

Direct foreign investment in media ownership first followed lines of colonialism and then dependency. For example, the logic of regional proximity led U.S. companies to become involved in Latin America from the 19th century on, first with resource extraction and trade, later with direct investment for manufacturing. So radio and television developed in Latin America in the context of a region that had already moved from mercantilist capitalism under Spain and Portugal to a capitalism dependent on trade, capital, investment, and corporate models from the United States and Europe. American advertisers and advertising agencies promoted commercial radio and television elsewhere because they wanted to have commercial media with which to work (Fox, 1975, 1997).

The United States, Britain, and France also made a considerable direct investment in colonial and other Third World newspapers in the 1920s, in movies in the 1920s–1930s, in radio in the 1930s and 1940s (Schwoch,
1990), and in television in the 1960s and 1970s (Beltran & Fox de Cardona, 1979). Early in the 20th century, as today, many local elites have found it convenient to grow their national industries through cooperative links with global corporations (Herman & McChesney, 1997). For example, Brazil’s TV Globo is now one of the largest media corporations in the world outside the core industrial countries. But when Robert Marinho started it in Brazil in 1962, he was unsure of his own capabilities in a new medium. In classic industrial strategy, he sought to minimize his risk with an alliance for technology, capital, and management advice with Time-Life, which invested in TV Globo and advised him until 1968, when it was forced out by the government (Straubhaar, 1984). There was one initial wave of investment in foreign television companies in the 1960s, particularly by the United States in Latin America. However, most countries enacted laws that prohibited or limited direct foreign investment in television, even if it meant forcing out some of the investments made in the 1960s. “With a few minor exceptions, nationalism would prompt foreign governments to deny outsiders control of sensitive and powerful medium of television” (Duarte, 2001, p. 21).

Dependency theorists note that local families, often those already involved with print media, started most radio and television operations in Latin America, but they took these initiatives within a context of a capitalism that might be characterized as dependent (Fejes, 1981). These cultural industries were also hybrid. They blended national characteristics, such as family ownership and strong ties to the state, together with typically U.S. characteristics such as commercialization, professionalization of network management, production, and the development of truly national advertising markets with strong ties to national and global advertising agencies. Of the influences exerted on Brazil’s TV Globo by Time-Life, for example, the most lasting were the reorganization of its production system, its network/affiliate management, and its relations with advertisers and ratings firms. In contrast, Time Life’s programming advice was almost immediately rejected as useless within the Brazilian cultural market context, and program decisions were made by a combination of Brazilian advertising executives who knew the national market and program producers hired from other networks who knew which genres worked in that market (Straubhaar, 1981, 1984).

The State as Owner

In Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, television was usually started by the state (Katz & Wedell, 1976). In many countries, including most of Asia, government acted to ensure its role in controlling a powerful medium. In some countries—for example, most of Africa—an additional reason was that only
the state had enough money to start and operate television networks because the consumer markets were not rich enough to support commercial television. In a few places, such as Taiwan and South Korea, private television was permitted, but formal joint ownership with government agencies was required to ensure control. Former colonial powers had invested in electronic media in other parts of the world, but these media were also often nationalized in the 1960s and 1970s.

In dependency theory, not enough attention was paid to the national entrepreneurs or government elites who started television broadcasting. Several critics of dependency and of cultural imperialism argued that these theories did not attribute sufficient responsibility to national elites. As Sarti (1981) observed, Latin America has had enough time to develop its own systems and ideologies, traceable to indigenous class interests, and that to attribute too much influence to the other developed nations is to neglect analysis of internal class and group interests that also determine the nature of the system.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1973) described a scenario that foresees growth and development for some countries like Brazil or Chile within a context of dependence on developed countries, called associated-dependent development. Cardoso and Evans (1979) identified three groups as crucial to the process of dependent development: the state-owned enterprises of the developing countries, the multinational corporations that invest or sell in developing countries, and local firms, which are usually associated with either or both. Cardoso called these groups the tripod of dependent development, and Evans saw them as being in an alliance.

The Economic and Political Role of States

The initial role of many Third World states has been to grant and, sometimes, control or regulate concessions to foreign exporters and investors. In this process, many smaller states have found themselves relatively powerless in dealing with multinational companies. Unlike the government of a large state like Brazil, smaller states do not have the information or bureaucratic expertise to negotiate adequately with multinationals. However, governments have often focused harder on media multinational investors than others because almost all states are leery of foreign control over media. In fact, until the 1990s, almost all states, including the United States, forbade direct foreign investment in television broadcasting.

Results from dependency and media imperialism analysis contributed in many ways to a wave of policy intervention against foreign investment in broadcasting and importation of foreign media products that was
remarkably effective in many countries. Most countries enacted controls against foreign ownership of electronic media, either by nationalizing older foreign investments or by having the state initiate and control television broadcasting (Katz & Wedell, 1976). Clearly some states were more active and capable than others. Evans (1979) noted the state’s role in financing local entrepreneurs in their dealings and joint ventures with multinational corporations. Evans also noted that the state in South Korea and other Asian countries had been very active in helping national firms negotiate and deal with outside multinationals, especially in the computer industries (Evans, 1992).

In Europe and Japan, the states deliberately built up public-sector broadcasting to ensure national cultural and informational sovereignty. During the 1960s and especially during the 1970s New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debate in the United Nations, the desirability of a greater role for public-policy and public-sector broadcasting was widely discussed (McPhail, 1989). However, economic support for new public or state-sector broadcasting projects was limited. Private-sector broadcast firms also vigorously opposed any change. So private ownership and control of broadcast industries continued to grow, even in Western Europe, where the public-sector model was stronger (McChesney, 1997).

Import Substitution in Cultural Industries

In Asia, Europe, Latin America, and some other areas, one of the main strategies for reducing dependence has been import substitution industrialization: creating market reserve policies and tariff barriers to protect infant industries and promote the growth of national industries or national/multinational joint ventures to supply national markets. A number of Latin American countries have been pursuing import substitution in various sectors since the 1930s (Baer, 1989). Initially focused on areas such as petroleum and steel, this policy was powerfully applied by several states to cultural products as well, such as radio in the 1930s and 1940s, film (Schnitman, 1984), and television (Straubhaar, 1981). Just after World War II, a number of Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and India, also focused on import substitution for their own markets, including cultural industry markets (Ito, 1991). Many countries in Latin America, Asia, and Europe took various measures to increase national television production and reduce imports. This question of reducing television imports also figured strongly in the NWICO debate and other national communication policy discussions of the 1970s and 1980s.
A number of states, particularly in Europe and Asia, have relied extensively on requiring certain quotas of national production on television, especially on prime time (Grantham, 2000). Several Asian countries, such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, set those quotas high, essentially requiring almost 90% national television production for most of the 1970s through the 1990s (Ito, 1991; Lee, 1980). Although they were more controversial in world policy debates, national content quotas in Canada and Western Europe were actually less stringent than those in several East Asian countries.

However, many countries were not able to do that kind of cultural import substitution. In other words, a crucial distinction appeared between those developing countries where certain key conditions facilitated a relatively autonomous approach to television institutions and industries and those where these conditions did not exist. Many would-be producers of television programming have been constrained by economic realities. The continuing results of conditions of dependency, such as low-income resources, lack of industrial infrastructure, lack of support by weak governments, inappropriate models for production, and lack of trained personnel, have kept a number of poorer countries from developing much local or national production, even if their audiences might prefer more national programs. This is particularly true for the smallest and poorest of nations, such as those in the English-speaking Caribbean (Brown, 1987).

Adaptation and Glocalization of Foreign Models

The adoption and adaptation, or glocalization, of foreign models has gone through several phases. The studies of the 1970s, such as Katz and Wedell (1976), observed the first phase, a postcolonial era in which developing countries typically modeled the structures of former colonial powers or dominant economic partners. In this manner, former British Commonwealth countries tended to copy or adapt structures like the BBC, former French colonies modeled French institutions, and Latin America, the Philippines, and others that depended on the U.S. economy or experienced U.S. political intervention tended to model the U.S. commercial broadcasting system (Katz & Wedell, 1976; Lee, 1980). A number of countries also tried mixed models of public and private ownership.

Over time, however, even as postcolonial dependencies in developed world countries sorted out and shifted, an asymmetrical replication persisted of core capitalist country structures, especially those of the United States. Although some countries originally modeled British or French colonial systems, many have moved increasingly toward the U.S. model because it
reflects an increasingly dominant, essentially capitalist economic model. This took place in part because of direct economic dependency on the United States and U.S. firms. The U.S. model spread well beyond its area of direct primary influence in Latin America, however, because as more countries shifted toward greater integration with the world capitalist economy, policy makers and would-be media owners both saw the U.S. model as a highly functional and commercially successful way of organizing television. That view was, needless to say, powerfully reinforced by both foreign and domestic advertisers, who wanted to see television become an advertising vehicle open to them (Fox, 1975). One of the weaknesses of the media imperialism model is that it did not recognize the power of advertising as a systemic influence, although some analyses of the era, particularly in Latin America, pointed that out (Fejes, 1980; Fox, 1975; Janus, 1977; Mattos, 1984).

For a number of contemporary writers, this focus on the U.S. model has transformed into a focus on a globalizing modernity that includes many aspects of U.S.-style capitalism (Giddens), but that has now lost some of its U.S. particularities precisely as it has become more universalized (Robertson, 1995). This widespread tendency to adopt a model of capitalist production, including in media, is then localized, or as Robertson hypothesizes, glocalized. Countries such as Japan make significant changes to such models, and those revised regional models then attract other developing economies (Iwabuchi, 2002). Iwabuchi (1997) evocatively called this attractiveness of the revised or glocalized model to other Asian cultures and economies “the sweet smell of Asian modernity.”

Advertising

When related to cultural dependency, particularly in television, most observers add advertising to the foreign economic influences observed by the dependent development paradigm in the general economy. Fejes (1980) emphasized the influence of multinational advertising on television industries throughout Latin America, both currently and historically. He noted that “it was the demands of advertising, particularly the advertising of multinational corporations, that shaped the commercial development of television in Latin America” (p. 25). Evans (personal interview, 1979) and Beltran and Fox de Cardona (1979, pp. 36–37) have observed that the television industry still depends on foreign financing in the form of advertising revenues from multinational corporations and advertising agencies.

By the 1980s, work in Brazil by Mattos (1984) and elsewhere noted that the state itself was a powerful advertiser. In much of Latin America and Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, a form of state capitalism prevailed in which
various aspects of the national state, including commercial banks, development banks, trading companies, pension funds, investment funds, manufacturing firms, and military firms, were involved in as much as half of the national gross national product. By directing the advertising of all these state firms, governments in Brazil, Mexico, China, Korea, and Taiwan, among others, could reward cooperative media and punish critical media—a powerful tool for control, which often overshadowed the power of foreign advertisers.

National Conglomerates and Competition

Fox (1997), McChesney (1999), and others also called attention to the importance of national economic conglomerates, including the media themselves, as advertisers. In Venezuela, for example, the Cisneros Group is involved in many activities other than broadcasting and can support itself with its own advertising to some degree. Even with media business, per se, national conglomerates can cross-promote their own cultural products. TV Globo and others, for example, make quite a bit of money by selling television program soundtracks that the programs themselves promote.

This is one example of a larger phenomenon. From the 1970s on, a number of the larger or wealthier national cultural markets began to show a tendency toward the development of concentrated and conglomerated cultural industries. Private television in Latin America and Asia became concentrated, with one or two firms usually achieving dominance over the market or the audience’s viewing habits. In many cases, this was accomplished in part through cozy relationships with national governments, for example, the Brazilian military government’s favored relationship with TV Globo or the ruling party’s encouragement of a virtual monopoly over television in Mexico by Televisa (whose owners included a former president, Miguel Aleman). Similarly, governments favored or in some cases co-owned key private stations in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong. Monopolizing distribution to the audience is a form of horizontal integration (controlling most of one level of economic activity, like broadcasting or film distribution).

Most broadcasters outside the United States also produced most of their own programs in-house, a sort of vertical integration of production and distribution. In part, this is because many countries did not have institutions like Hollywood film studios to fall back on for production of programs, as the U.S. television networks did. In part, this also centralized all profit for the broadcasters, instead of splitting it between producers and broadcasters. This horizontal and vertical integration also made control over production
easier for government authorities that wanted to keep track of content. In many other cases, the state owned and operated television networks. These government broadcasters even more naturally tended to both horizontal and vertical integration.

The Cultural Role of States: National Security and National Identity

It is clear that the core countries try to assert political and cultural hegemonies over other nations. At the most obvious level, there are also regional economic hegemonies in which Japan asserts special relationships with Asian countries, the United States with North, Central, and South America, and some European states with nations in Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. However, other nations, at least the larger states in the Third World, have frequently resisted. Many nation-states intervene as gatekeepers to limit cultural inflows, to protect cultural industries, and to resist ideological domination.

Both industrial and cultural policies have led to the protection of national cultural industries. Control of media content and control over the direction of cultural discourse are also clearly important for political and even military reasons, as well. Extensive debates about communications and cultural policy in Latin America and elsewhere led to little affect or action, according to some observers (Fox, 1988). But, in fact, in a number of countries, economic policy and institutions, cultural policy and cultural industries, and the military all have a role in the function of national identity in national security policy. These bodies have combined to create formal and informal policies that promoted the protection of national cultural industries precisely to reinforce a certain sense of national identity. In many countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, and South Korea, an alliance of the state bureaucracy, political parties, private interests in the media industries, and, often, the military supported such cultural nationalism (Atwood & Mattos, 1982; Mattos, 1982; Sinclair, 1994).

In a number of places, radio and television have created unifying spoken languages that bring diverse dialects together. This happens within nations, as in Brazil or India, where Hindi is emerging as a dominant language for a variety of groups. It also happens across nations, as in the Arab world, where Nasser’s Voice of the Arabs from Egypt began to unify speakers of different dialects of Arabic or where the Arabic adaptation of Sesame Street came up with an innovative, simplified common written Arabic to teach children. The unifying force of media can also be seen at a subnational level, as when television broadcasting in a local language, such as Catalan,
reinforces that local identity against the national one (Moragas Spa, Garitaonaindia Garnacho, & Lopez, 1999).

At least until the 1990s, most television was watched via national systems. Furthermore, much if not most of that television was still produced at the national level, particularly programs in the prime-time hours when most people watch (see Table A.1, which looks at trends from 1962 to 2002). States have worked hard to create this outcome because national production of television reinforces a sense of identity that has a number of desirable aspects. National television can reinforce national political identity and loyalty among the citizens, sustain a sense of patriotism, conform to a military sense of national security, and reinforce a sense of being a national consumer within a national market, which also helps the state by strengthening national industry. When Katz and Wedell (1976) surveyed national ambitions for broadcasting in the 1970s, creation of a national identity was one of the highest aspirations for radio and television. That aspiration continues for many.

Cultural Industries

For many countries, by the 1980s, the political economy of television had changed and nationalized, as both nation-states and national cultural industries had grown in power. In Cardoso’s (1973) terms, in many countries, the tripod’s legs of state and national capital had grown to match the third leg, foreign capital. That change was, interestingly, in some part due to a policy reaction to the earlier analyses of dependency theory. Some states had acted against dependency, so that theory had to change, in part, due to its own successes. However, this analysis best applies to the larger and more powerful states and cultural industries; some smaller, poorer countries remained heavily limited by the constraints or boundary conditions economic dependency imposed. Still, overall, another era of generally increased national television production began in the 1970s and 1980s.

Another school of thought in the 1980s tried to build on both the political economy and cultural studies schools of thought by looking at television as a cultural industry. Some saw cultural industries as virtually all-powerful actors in determining what people think (Guback & Varis, 1986). Others saw cultural industries as the home for several sets of actors with varying degrees of power, actors who are themselves but one part of a larger process of creating cultural products and making meaning (Sinclair, 1995).

The original literature on cultural industries comes from the Frankfurt School (Adorno, 1957), where they were seen as turning both high culture
and folk culture into industrialized mass cultural products that strongly controlled the development of culture, arriving at a kind of mass man in a mass culture. This paradigm has been powerful, particularly in Latin America, where it fit nicely with an era of industrialization, urbanization, and massification of social life. During this period, traditional agrarian societies rapidly transformed into modern urban ones, and the common experience was now of the urban working class, as compared to the rural peasant. Cultural industry theory has converged with theories about economic determinism, economic dependence, and hegemony to see large cultural industries, both domestic and foreign, as overwhelming individuals and determining cultural outcomes (Beltran, 1978). Building further on the cultural industry literature and dependency theory, McAnany (1984) described how the commercial Brazilian television industry had grown beyond the limits originally predicted by dependency theory but was still constrained by structural problems of a limited, at least partially dependent economy and still working within organizational commercial media models imported from the United States.

This approach to cultural industries recognized the limits placed on many nations’ media systems by operating within subordinate positions in the world economy, but it also recognized and gave analytical emphasis to the distinct dynamics of each nation or industry’s historical development. Key national issues included conflicts between domestic and transnational elites, interests of key national elites, entrepreneurial competition, the agendas and actions of key production personnel, and the effects of state intervention, particularly as policy maker, provider of infrastructure, and advertiser (Mattelart & Mattelart, 1990; Mattos, 1982; Straubhaar, 1984; Vink, 1988). Larger nations saw an increasingly complex and dynamic development of local cultural industries. As technologies and economic developments permitted smaller-scale production, local radio, local newspapers or newsletters, local video productions, and so on enabled various cultural fronts or actors to produce culture in an increasingly industrialized way.

Crucial Structural Conditions of National Cultural Industries

A number of crucial structural conditions made national media production more likely. These conditions enabled national cultural producers to resist the contrasting advantages of global and regional producers. In terms of complexity theory, these were crucial initial conditions, which shaped the boundaries of what was possible for the actors that operated inside those systems or institutions. In terms of structuration theory, these factors drew the limits on what is possible, set rules on how producers can operate, and
provided the resources that would or would not permit extensive national cultural production.

*Market size* was crucial. Small countries generally produced less television, whereas most large countries eventually became significant producers of television. Larger markets enabled producers to achieve economies of scale and to attempt more complex and costly genres of production. “Producers in countries that belong to large natural language markets have a financial incentive to create larger budget films and programs that generally have greater intrinsic audience appeal, a clear advantage in international competition” (Wildman & Siwek, 1988, p. 68). Even a rich small country like Belgium or Norway had the total wealth to produce only a limited amount of television, whereas a large poor country like India could assemble the resources to do quite a bit.

The *relative wealth* of a market was also crucial. A relatively small or medium-size market, like Japan, Taiwan, or Hong Kong, could still produce quite a bit of television if it was wealthy enough. *The financial base* likewise placed boundaries around what kind of programming could be produced. Reliance on advertising constrained programming options to those that were commercially successful; that is, those that drew the largest or most economically attractive audiences. Government finance tended to give greater control over programming to government institutions and ruling political parties. License fees, used, for example, in Britain or Japan, tended to insulate programming against both government and commercial pressures. *Commercial structure* bounded or limited what kind of media products would be produced. If commercial success in a market was imperative, the most commercially successful program models would be adopted, whether they were local or foreign.

*Competition* among media in a national, regional, or global market may have promoted creativity, but it also tended to disperse resources among a number of competitors. Growth for television stations or networks was sometimes enhanced by limiting the number of competitors. Lord Reith decided in the 1920s that the BBC needed a monopoly over resources to produce a quantity of diverse, quality programming. Although thinking in the United States has always favored competition, many other countries in almost all regions opted instead for television monopolies in the early days of the medium, often to pool resources for production, although often simply to make television easier to control (Katz & Wedell, 1976).

*Government policies* could provide or deny crucial resources to television. It could enable television industries to act independently of foreign pressure. The state could be a media actor on its own, a facilitating or obstructive regulator, or the creator of favorable conditions, such as subsidy for construction, research and development, or other needs.
Other cultural industries could support or limit television industries. Television drew heavily on the strength of related local cultural industries (film, music, theater, recordings). If those were underdeveloped, too, that placed another boundary to television production. For example, most developing countries that became major television producers, such as Brazil, Egypt, or India, drew heavily on previously built-up film industries to do so. The fact that India had well-developed film industries in local languages such as Telugu made the emergence of strong, separate television networks at the local level much more possible than in most countries (Kumar, 2006).

Producer behavior often followed commercial imperatives, but it also responded to the demands of the domestic market or audience when resources allowed. However, in some cultures—for example, Russia since 2000—political imperatives were reimposed over what were successful commercial networks. Within the boundaries placed by these political economy structures, developments tended to be nonlinear and hard to predict, but patterns are discernable among the groups of actors involved. The key groups were those involved in the management and direction of television, the entrepreneurs; those involved in the actual program planning and production, the producers; and the receivers or audiences.

Entrepreneurial behavior by those who own or manage cultural industries likewise tailored operations to the programming interests of domestic (or regional or global) audiences and to domestic and foreign business needs and markets, with considerable differentiation among larger markets/systems.

Audience behavior not only reflected choices among what was offered, but also worked within a cultural context; the national culture could define audience tastes to dispose viewers toward choosing national productions over imported ones. National culture’s appeal to domestic audiences was (and is) a crucial local advantage. National industries’ ability to compete with foreign imports varied depending on the homogeneity of audiences and their acceptance of national culture.

Over time, the patterns of action and behavior by these kinds of actors tended to stabilize and form culturally defined boundaries. Among industry professionals, those took the form of “the way we do things here.” Among audiences, they took the form of preferences for certain kinds of programming or genres.

Achieving National Coverage via Satellite

Satellites have often been seen as an inherently globalizing technology by many scholars. However, their initial major impact was their use to distribute
television channels from broadcast networks to affiliates and from cable channel producers to local cable system head-ends within national systems. I will take up their global role more in Chapter 5, but the main impact of satellites as a mass medium arguably continues to be this intermediate role of delivering signals from network producers to affiliates, retransmitters, and cable head-ends. For example, much of the population in many rural areas gets television by satellite dishes hooked to local retransmitters, not even affiliate stations, just literal retransmitters. For example, in rural Brazil, most small towns and villages have a municipal dish that pulls down the main commercial channel, TV Globo, and retransmits it to the local area. If residents want a second channel, they have to lobby the mayor to put up a second retransmitter or go get their own satellite dish so that they can receive the other national broadcast networks (La Pastina, 1999).

In 1975, HBO exemplified this stage of the process, achieving national impact by putting its channel on a satellite for distribution to cable systems all over the United States (Baldwin & McEvoy, 1988). The international impact of television satellites started about this same time, as cable systems in Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean also began to pull down and distribute HBO and other channels primarily intended for domestic U.S. distribution.

In the 1970s, a number of governments around the world saw satellite distribution of national television channels as a crucial priority. The USSR invested massively in satellite distribution to reach across its seven time zones and two continents to deliver a centrally controlled message to its large, diverse population (Mickiewicz, 1988). India obtained early assistance from U.S. satellites to deliver television signals to a widespread rural audience under the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (Singhal & Rogers, 1989). Brazil and Mexico both invested tens of millions of scarce, borrowed dollars in nationally owned satellite systems to ensure that they could subsidize the extension of their national television networks (Hudson, 1990). These systems initially reached rebroadcast transmitters and community viewing facilities, but eventually, many individuals also bought antennas so they could receive national television via satellite (Straubhaar, 2003).

Supplementing National Coverage via Satellite: Translocal Television in the Nation

Many people have also bought antennas or subscribed to cable television systems to receive television that is aimed at the nation from outside via satellite, what Kumar (2006) calls translocal, technically transnational signals programmed outside the nation, which are aimed at its audience or cultures within it. One leading example is Zee TV and others in India (Thussu,
1998), which have used regional satellite platforms, starting with Star TV, to transmit alternative national- or local-language programming into India since 1991 (Star TV) and 1992 (Zee TV; Sinclair, 2005). This translocal television in India built on several factors. Like a number of other countries that experienced powerful impacts of translocal, transnational, or global television in the 1990s, the existing broadcast television in India was a government monopoly that had not diversified into some areas of strong potential interest, such as music video, in-depth news, and regional-language programming. Unlike some countries, where cable remained an expensive luxury for the middle classes, translocal television in India built on transmitting satellite signals to a rapidly growing local infrastructure of “cablewallahs,” local, often irregular cable systems. The latter grew from 150 operators in 1985 to 100,000 in 1995, when they were finally regulated, with perhaps 60,000 still in business by 2002 (Sinclair, 2005). Perhaps most important, translocal television was driven by both national and regional Indian entrepreneurs like those behind ZeeTV, which developed a national audience with entertainment in “Hinglish” (Sinclair, 2005), and those behind Sun TV (regional Tamil television) and Eenadu (regional Telegu television; Kumar, 2006).

In the early 1990s, translocal channels grew up in a number of parts of the world as entrepreneurs or émigré groups saw satellite television as a way of sending television back into their homelands for commercial, religious, or political purposes. A number of channels—music channels, as well as news, religious information, and ethnic channels aimed at groups like the Kurds—were broadcast into Turkey by groups wishing to challenge the state monopoly on broadcast television. Similar channels were initially broadcast from outside the Arabic-speaking world back into it, such as Middle Eastern Broadcasting Center (MBC). A number of satellite channels have also been broadcast back into Iran by various dissident groups and entrepreneurs (Semati, 2006).

Another variation on the translocal is outside channels aimed at national audiences and those who have migrated away, for example, Indians in the United States or Turks in Europe. For example, a number of channels have targeted both Turkey and Turkish audiences in Europe since the early 1990s (Aksoy & Robins, 2000; Oncu, 2000). In fact, Zee TV has also come to serve dispersed or diaspora Indian audiences across the globe, but I will talk more about Zee TV as a global medium in Chapter 4, about global television.

Like many other transnational forms of television, translocal television seems to depend on both national domestic trends and opportunities perceived by transnational actors; for example, the people who started Zee TV or Rupert Murdoch, who initially carried such programming into India on
Star TV. If major audience interests were not being met by national broadcast channels, then satellite technology provided a new technological option, starting in the early 1990s, for reaching those audiences and interests. In both India and Turkey, the state operated national television under clear but narrow mandates that excluded a number of things in which audiences were potentially quite interested, such as a wider range of entertainment options, including music videos, and minority-language television. In Turkey, Islamic-focused television was also attractive. In a number of cases, after the possibility of translocal television via satellite had broken the monopoly of former national broadcasters, a liberalization of competition occurred in the 1990s that permitted national and regional broadcasters to start business. (That overall process of liberalization, as an aspect of globalization, is covered more in the following chapter.)

Television Above and Below the National Level

In places where the national state has not become a strong pole of identity, local and supranational regional cultural identities are often particularly strong. In much of Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America, national television does not reach much of the population, or it reaches them only in national languages that they do not speak comfortably. As a result, much of the population either ignores television, tries to create local productions, or seeks out television from neighboring or related countries in languages that they do speak.

For example, in Mozambique, only 25% to 35% of the population speaks Portuguese, roughly the same percentage that has access to television. Consequently, the reach of television is so limited that many people focus on local languages and local cultural forms, which are more likely to be expressed on radio than on television, if they appear in mass media at all. Given limited resources for production, television in Mozambique has always depended on imported programming for much of its schedule. Although many of those imports used to come from Europe or the United States, Mozambican television has turned increasingly to imports from Brazil, which exports a great deal of soap opera, music, and comedy. That Brazilian programming has the advantage of being in the national language, Portuguese, as well as drawing on a common cultural heritage of symbols, references, and even jokes that build on their common history as former Portuguese colonies. This situation contributes to the growth of a transnational Lusophone, or Portuguese-speaking cultural-linguistic market that includes Brazil, Mozambique, Portugal, and others. This kind of transnational development is covered more in Chapter 4.
In a few wealthy countries, such as Canada, Spain, or Great Britain, there are enough resources to permit local production in subnational languages, such as French (in Quebec), Catalan, Welsh, or Scottish (Moragas Spa et al., 1999), or a number of regional languages in India (Kumar, 2006). In some countries, minorities are part of large diasporas, such as the overseas Chinese in Malaysia or Canada. These immigrants tend to use a variety of technological options, from video to satellite channels to Web pages, Internet music downloads, and Internet streaming video to gain access to television produced in the languages they speak and reflecting the cultures with which they identify.

Local television is still more limited by costs of production. It is less developed in most countries than national television due to the need to spread costs across a larger audience to achieve economies of scale. Local television genres are also in a way limited by the need for a strong visual component, whereas musical genres can be remarkably varied. Television genres have developed remarkably over the past 20 to 30 years, however. A number of low-cost genres have evolved, which can be produced almost anywhere with the simplest and cheapest of equipment: news, talk, variety, live music, and games. More and more nations are producing an increasing proportion of their own programming using such genres. Table A.1 shows that a significant number of countries are doing more than half of their own programming, both in the total broadcast day and during prime time, where audience viewing is concentrated and the most popular programs are usually placed.

Some genres also lend themselves to more localized programming on provincial-level or municipal stations. Latin America, for example, has experienced an increase in local news and discussion programs on television stations. For public stations, such programs are a natural line of programming, if resources from public or state sources allow. For private stations, the viability of such local programming depends on costs of production balanced against audience demand and advertiser willingness to pay. Indications from an early study (Huesca, 1985) in one fairly poor Latin American country, Bolivia, is that local programming in news and public affairs varied considerably, particularly depending on who owned and controlled the station and what their resources were, but many stations were doing quite a bit. Furthermore, stations were able to draw on some resources and programs produced by alternative producers. Bolivia, like Brazil and a number of other countries, has had a growing tradition for several years of alternative video production by nongovernmental organizations, activist groups, church groups, unions, and so on (Alvarado, 1988). As one of the main alternative video producers then in Brazil, Luiz Santoro (1989), observed, many such groups saw alternative video as a means toward producing materials for television as local, provincial, or even national opportunities open up. Since then,
alternative video producers have circulated materials on public access cable and, more recently, on the Internet. As alternative regional satellite broadcasters grow, alternative video or television may also find a possible outlet there (Downing, 2001). For example, the new regional satellite broadcast channel in Latin America, Telesur, sponsored by Venezuela and several other Latin American governments, has begun to use such materials to create alternatives to the existing regional commercial channels (Aharonian, 2006).

**Glocal Processes and National Identities**

In television and in other cultural industries as well, people use globally distributed forms to create cultural products, which define and redefine the national and the local. Robertson (1995) observed that “globalization has involved the reconstruction, in a sense the production, of ‘home,’ ‘community’ and ‘locality’” (p. 30). Cultural producers use forms and genres that have spread globally to express ideas of what home is like. There is a subtle interplay between the global, national, and local in television form and content.

It is increasingly hard to have a national idea that does not relate at least in part to global roots. In other words, the national productive apparatus for cultural industry described so far in this chapter produces many products that are national hybrids of a variety of influences, global, regional or cultural-linguistic, national, and local. The creative process that proceeds through these cultural industries reflects hybrid forms. Globalized ideas of how identities are expressed affect national and local cultures:

Much of the apparatus of contemporary nations, including the form of the particularities—the construction of their unique identities—is very similar across the entire world (Meyer, 1980; Robertson, 1991), in spite of much variation in levels of “development.” This is, perhaps, the most tangible of contemporary sites of the interpenetration of particularism and universalism. (Robertson, 1995, p. 34)