GUERRILLA WHAT?

Guerrilla: One who engages in irregular warfare especially as a member of an independent unit.

—Webster’s Dictionary, 2018

Guerrilla government: Public servants who disobey the wishes of their superiors—either directly or indirectly communicated—in order to do what they perceive is “the right thing.”

Kevin Chmielewski is a government guerrilla. In 2018, while deputy chief of staff for operations at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and continuing after he was fired, he leaked information to the press concerning unethical behavior by then EPA administrator Scott Pruitt. “I’ve put the breadcrumbs where they had to go,” he said as he told journalists what they should request in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests (Green 2018). Information leaked to the Sierra Club by Chmielewski showed that Pruitt had secret calendars and illegal dealings with lobbyists, arranged for EPA employees to do work unrelated to EPA matters (such as ordering him a mattress), recklessly spent tens of thousands of dollars of taxpayers’ money, and retaliated against employees when they voiced dissent. When the EPA refused to respond to the FOIA requests, the Sierra Club sued, and 60,000 pages of documents were released. Within days, Pruitt was forced to resign. “I hate to take credit for a man losing his job, but I guess I’d have to say that I take the credit,” Chmielewski said.

Kim Davis is a government guerrilla. The elected county clerk in Rowan County, Kentucky, who refused to sign the marriage licenses of gay couples in 2015, disobeyed the wishes of her superiors—first clandestinely, then openly—in order to do what she considered “the right thing.” In court, Davis argued that to be forced to issue marriage certificates to gay couples would violate her personal religious beliefs and substantially burden her First Amendment right to freedom of religion, regardless of whether the Supreme Court ruled, as it did that year, that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to marry in all fifty states. A judge ordered Ms. Davis to issue the marriage licenses, and when she refused again, she was held in contempt of court and jailed. The Kentucky solution to the problem came in the form of compromise in December 2015, when Governor Matthew Bevin ordered that no
county clerk’s name would be listed on any marriage licenses from that day forward. Davis declared victory since her name would no longer be on the marriage licenses that were so objectionable to her.

As this book goes to press, President Trump is experiencing guerrilla resistance not only from career public servants but also from senior officials within his own administration. A September 2018 Op-Ed headline published in the *New York Times* read “I Am Part of the Resistance inside the Trump Administration” and went on to describe how senior officials (“not the popular ‘resistance’ of the left”) in the Trump administration were clandestinely sabotaging the orders of the president in order to do the right thing. “I work for the president but like-minded colleagues and I have vowed to thwart parts of his agenda and his worst inclinations,” wrote the author, an anonymous senior official inside the administration of President Donald Trump. The Op-Ed piece went on to describe how senior officials who want the administration to be successful are putting loyalty to the country first, “working to insulate their operations from his whims.” Citing his “erratic behavior,” they may say yes to him in meetings, “but in private they have gone to great lengths to keep bad decisions contained to the West Wing,” resulting in a “two-track presidency” where the president says one thing but his staff covertly does another. “This isn’t the work of the so-called deep state. It’s the work of the steady state,” the author wrote.

One example offered had to do with foreign policy: President Trump is fixated with “autocrats and dictators,” the unidentified author wrote, while “the rest of the administration is operating on another track, one where countries like Russia are called out for meddling and punished accordingly, and where allies around the world are engaged as peers rather than ridiculed as rivals.” The author closed by vowing that he and his colleagues will do what they can “to steer the administration in the right direction until—one way or another—it’s over.”

Guerrilla government among career public servants in the Trump administration began months earlier, on January 20, 2017, the day he took office, when a National Park Service (NPS) employee retweeted on the organization’s official Twitter site photos comparing the size of the crowds at Obama’s 2009 inauguration juxtaposed with photos from Trump’s inauguration. The Obama photos showed standing room only. The Trump photos showed empty seats. The Trump administration ordered the NPS to stop tweeting immediately and then expanded the ban to all Department of Interior agencies. The retweet was deleted, but it was too late—it had gone viral. Then, the Badlands National Park tweeted climate change facts that had been deleted from the White House website. The Park Service was ordered to shut down its Twitter account temporarily.

Within days, the Trump administration ordered federal employees at many agencies to stop all news releases, official social media accounts, and correspondence. At the EPA, staff received a memo stating that “no social media will be going out” and “a digital strategist would be coming on board” to coordinate future
efforts (Eilperin and Dennis 2017). All EPA grants were frozen, and employees were instructed not to discuss the freeze with anyone outside the agency (Sheppard 2017). At the Department of Agriculture, staff received a memo ordering them not to release “any public-facing documents,” including “news releases, photos, fact sheets, news feeds, and social media content” (Lartey 2017). At the Department of Transportation, all social media efforts were ordered to halt (Gardner 2017). Career public servants in several agencies catalogued and saved climate change data, then distributed those data to groups outside the government for safekeeping. Other public servants refused to implement orders of the Trump administration they considered unfair or unwise.

Media headlines shouted about the tensions between the president and career public servants (see Box 1.1). For example, a headline in the *New York Times* read “‘A Sense of Dread’ for Civil Servants Shaken by Trump Transition” (Shear and Lichtblau 2017). The Huffington Post issued a plea to federal workers to give them the scoop on what was going on: “Do you work in a federal agency? Email us at scoops@huffingtonpost.com and let us know what you’re seeing and hearing” (Stein and Sheppard 2017). Unofficial Twitter accounts were established allegedly from career public servants to get the information out that the Trump administration was suppressing. (See the First Interlude following this chapter for examples.) Since then, information has been leaked to the press daily. More social media accounts have been created to release information the Trump administration seeks to quash (e.g., @altUSEPA, @ActualEPAfacts, @viralCDC, @Rogue_DOD).

When a Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protections (CBP) employee tweeted criticism of the Trump administration under the handle @ALT_USCIS, CBP agents issued an administrative summons ordering Twitter to identify the tweeter. Twitter refused and sued the Trump administration, arguing that the order was unlawful. Within hours, the Trump administration reversed itself and retracted the order. Other Alt-Twitter accounts tweeted congratulations and solidarity with the anti-Trump CBD account. While it is impossible to know the identity of most tweeters and specifically whether they really were federal government civil servants, in the end it did not matter who they were: They became symbolic of intense guerrilla government in the Trump administration.

A few guerrillas—such as Edward Snowden profiled at the end of this book—end up outing themselves as whistle-blowers, but most do not. While they are unsatisfied with the actions of public organizations, sometimes even documenting fraud and abuse, they typically choose strategically not to go public in a big way. Their reasons for not going public are numerous and include fear of retaliation, as whistle-blowers often pay a heavy price for their actions. Rather than fostering transparency, they choose to remain “in the closet,” moving clandestinely behind the scenes, working against the wishes—either implicitly or explicitly communicated—of their superiors.

Guerrillas may cultivate allies among nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) within their policy areas, slip data to other agencies, and ghostwrite testimony for others.
BOX 1.1
GUERRILLA GOVERNMENT MAKES THE HEADLINES

Guerrilla government activities by career public servants in the Trump administration made the news.

- Bloomberg News: “Washington bureaucrats are quietly working to undermine Trump’s agenda” [Flavelle and Bain 2017]
- The Hill: “Acting attorney general orders DOJ not to defend Trump’s travel ban” [Wheeler 2017]
- The Hill: “Trump White House clashes with resistant civil servants” [Kamisar 2017a]
- Huffington Post: “Do civil servants have an obligation to obey the president?” [Newell 2017]
- Boston Review: “Funding the resistance of conscientious civil servants” [Kutz 2017]
- The Hill: “Republicans impatient with Trump civil servants” [Kamisar 2017b]
- Legal Planet: “Will there be guerrilla war at the EPA?” [Farber 2017]
- Constitutional Law: “What will the federal government’s resistance to President Trump look like?” [Horowitz 2017]
- CBC Radio: “Why this U.S. civil servant runs a rogue Twitter account against Trump” [CBC Radio 2017]
- New York Magazine: “Should they stay or should they go? Federal employees talk about the ethics of sticking it out with the Trump administration” [Cogan and Tabor 2017]
- Washington Post: “I’m a scientist. I’m blowing the whistle on the Trump administration” [Clement 2017]
- The Hill: “Blowing the whistle on Trump’s mistreatment of civil servants” [Friedman and Geltzer 2017]
- NBC News: “Dems say whistleblower emails show gov’t workers targeted for not backing Trump” [Clark and Mitchell 2018]
They may hold secret meetings to plot unified staff strategies, leak information to the press, and quietly sabotage the actions of their agencies. Their reasons for doing so are diverse—some are commendable, and some are disturbing. Most work on the assumption that taking actions outside their agencies provides them with a latitude that is not available to them in formal settings. Some want to see interest groups join, if not replace, formal government as the foci of power. Some are tired of hardball power politics and seek to replace it with collaboration and inclusivity. Others are implementing their own version of hardball politics. Most have a wider conceptualization of their work than that articulated by their agencies’ formal and informal statements of mission, but some are more freewheeling, doing what feels right to them. Many are committed to particular methodologies, techniques, or ideas. For some, guerrilla activity is a form of expressive behavior that allows them leverage on issues about which they feel deeply. For others, it is a way of carrying out extreme viewpoints about pressing public policy problems.

Guerrillas bring the credibility of the formal, bureaucratic, political system with them, as well as the credibility of their individual professions. They tend to be independent, multipolar, and sometimes radical. They often have strong views that their agencies’ perspectives on public policy problems are at best not sufficient and at worst illegal. They are not afraid to reach into new territory and often seek to drag the rest of the system with them to explore new possibilities.

At the same time, guerrillas run the risk of being unregulated themselves. Sometimes they fail to see the big picture, promoting policies that may not be compatible with the system as a whole. Sometimes they are caught up in fulfilling their own expressive and instrumental purposes that they may not fulfill the purposes of their organizations. This is the dilemma of guerrilla government.

But given the possibility that guerrillas might be saying things that their organizations need to at least consider, why are these individuals often excluded by their agencies? Some agency managers, like my boss, see them as zealots, pursuing interests that are too extreme for government agencies that must serve the general public. More often, guerrillas are seen as championing values or interests that are in conflict with the status quo or unrealistic given scarce resources. Sometimes they work in agencies that are in need of change. Perhaps the organizations have poor communication systems, or perhaps the people who work there do not use the systems available to them. Sometimes guerrillas are involved in personality clashes or work in dysfunctional organizations. Other times they are embroiled in internal or external politics. Some guerrillas are a breath of fresh air; some are stubborn single-issue fanatics. There are multiple reasons why individuals go the guerrilla route and multiple reasons why their organizations might seek to exclude them.

I once worked with NASA on the Return to Flight Task Group (RTF TG) formed in response to the Columbia space shuttle accident. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board found that the agency’s organization culture, which suppresses dissent, was 50 percent responsible for the accident (the other 50 percent had to do with technical engineering problems). Organization culture consists of the shared basic assumptions,
values, and artifacts that are developed in an organization as management and staff learn from experience and cope with problems. The basic ways of thinking and doing that have worked well enough to be considered valid are taught to new members of the organization as the correct ways to perceive, think, act, and feel. Culture is for the group what character and personality are for the individual.

There are many stories about guerrilla government activities at NASA. For example, my RTF TG subcommittee was told that one of the codirectors of the Space Flight Leadership Council, a NASA insider, called a meeting of the council without notifying the other codirector, a retired U.S. Navy admiral and trusted friend of then NASA administrator Sean O’Keefe. The retired admiral had been brought in by O’Keefe in part to force cultural change in the agency. When the admiral’s staff found out about the secret meeting, they notified the council that the admiral would be attending. The meeting was promptly canceled. That’s guerrilla government.

When I discussed this issue with O’Keefe, his response was, “That happens everywhere.” The more significant problem for NASA, according to O’Keefe, is far more subtle, yet far more pervasive: groupthink. Groupthink is an insular decision-making process in which the members of a group of decision makers are so wedded to the same set of assumptions and beliefs that they ignore, discount, or even ridicule information to the contrary (Janis 1972). Symptoms of groupthink include overestimations of the group’s power and morality, closed-mindedness, and pressure toward uniformity.

At NASA, groups trained in particular disciplines routinely, perhaps subconsciously, dismiss the thinking of others trained differently. “The biggest battles at NASA are not between the agency and Congress as some might think,” O’Keefe said. “They’re between and among the diverse disciplinary groups, say the electrical engineers versus the aerospace engineers, or the biologists versus the astronomers, or the infrared light experts versus the comet specialists.”

“It is not so much that dissenting opinions are crushed or shouted down, but they are automatically deemed improbable. The dismissing of other viewpoints happens so quickly and is so subtle that it is very tough to address as a leader,” O’Keefe emphasized. A huge organizational challenge is how to maintain high analytic standards but nonetheless give due consideration to other perspectives that, if pursued, may reveal important new insights. Otherwise, as the former NASA administrator told me, “groupthink comes to accept deviations as long as they’re within an ‘acceptable’ bounds without defining why something should be considered ‘acceptable.’” In a life-or-death situation—such as a shuttle launch—such thinking can have tremendous impact on human lives.

At the individual level, organization members face an analogous challenge. They must guard against the human tendency toward believing that circumstances are tolerable, if not fully satisfactory, even when disconfirming information might be present. Thus, one of the problems continually facing NASA is how to change the culture of the agency from one of groupthink, which could easily spawn more guerrilla government activities on the part of those whose ideas are quickly dismissed, to one that embraces a diversity of views and uses those differing viewpoints constructively.
A very different example has to do with a small group of extremists in the Pentagon who, in 2002–2003, manufactured fictitious scare stories about Iraq’s weapons and ties to terrorists in order to bolster justification for the United States to go to war against that country. Many, including the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, which reviewed the decision to attack Saddam Hussein, concluded that these activities were in part fueled by groupthink. This is reminiscent of the case of Oliver North, who, under the Reagan administration, supervised the provision of covert military aid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua in violation of the congressional Boland amendments, which prohibited the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and any other government agency from providing aid to the Contras. My former colleague, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, used to say that the implications of these actions for our constitutional government made his “blood boil.” These are examples of a very different type of guerrilla government—one that allegedly operated with the approval of the respective presidents but against the will of other superiors in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government.

Nearly every seasoned public official with whom I have discussed guerrilla government has offered his or her own stories and examples of this phenomenon (See Box 1.2.). For instance, I received the following e-mail message in response to my call for stories of guerrilla government:

I worked for 35 years as a federal employee and now teach at American University. The instances of guerrilla government are far more widespread than you imagine.

How do we make sense of this thing called guerrilla government? Are there any clues from the literature that might help us think more clearly about this phenomenon? The great thinkers in the social sciences have for years grappled with the concept of guerrilla government under varying labels and in diverse ways. Three major lenses, or vantage points, through which to view guerrilla government emerge from the social science literature; each offers a different type of understanding. These three lenses are bureaucratic politics, organizations and management, and ethics (see Figure 1.1). Below, I briefly introduce each of these to provide an analytical framework for understanding the stories that follow.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

The bureaucratic politics lens is perhaps the clearest one through which to view guerrilla government. Paul Appleby and Norton Long are credited with launching this idea in the 1940s and 1950s in reaction to the idea of the politics-administration dichotomy that was so prevalent in the literature at that time. The politics-administration
Chiune Sugihara was a government guerrilla. He was a Japanese diplomat living in Kaunas, Lithuania, with his wife and children during World War II. He was by all accounts an ordinary man; in fact, a biographer could find nothing extraordinary about his background, skills, or personality (Levine 1996). In the summer of 1940, in direct disobedience of orders from his superiors in Japan as well as the Soviet government, he first clandestinely, and eventually openly, issued thousands of visas to Jewish refugees, allowing them to flee from the Nazis. His visas saved the lives of more than ten thousand Jews.

During his last month in Lithuania, Sugihara sat for more than fifteen hours a day writing and signing visas. By some estimates, he did a month’s worth of work each day. Any Jew who applied with any documentation whatsoever was given a visa without explanation. Sugihara did what he could to speed up the process in every possible way, even bringing in Jewish officials to help him with the processing of the documents. One author commented, “Sugihara … spent his foreign service in all sorts of clandestine activities. This came in handy. He knew how to operate outside the rules, yet he did not implement ‘standard operation procedures’ to prevent ‘unauthorized use’ of his stamps and seals” (Levine 1996, 5).

This routine continued for nearly a month. During that month, the Soviet government repeatedly insisted that Sugihara leave Kaunas. He ignored these orders and continued issuing visas. He also ignored orders from the Japanese foreign ministry to close and vacate the consulate. He continued issuing visas. He finally requested and received the Soviet embassy’s permission to remain in Kaunas until the end of August 1940.

Sugihara continued issuing visas until the last minute, then burned all of his confidential documents to prevent the Soviets from confiscating them. He and his family stayed in a hotel before departing on a train. Sugihara posted a notice on the embassy gate telling people where he could be found. Many Jews came to the hotel, and Sugihara continued to issue visas from the hotel lobby. Later, as the train that would take him and his family safely out of the country started moving down the tracks, Sugihara signed documents with his arms stretched out the window of the train.

Sugihara eventually returned to Japan and lost his job in the foreign ministry, which caused him immense pain and embarrassment. He spent much of the rest of his life feeling humiliated. When asked why he did what he did in Lithuania, Sugihara responded, “I acted according to my sense of human justice, out of love for mankind” (Levine 1996, 282). I have told the Sugihara story in presentations in China and India; in all instances, audience members insisted that diplomats from their countries acted similarly in order to save Jewish lives during World War II.

(Continued)
Fast-forward to June 2005. **W. Mark Felt**, also known as “Deep Throat,” outed himself as the ultimate American guerrilla. He was on the front page of every major newspaper around the world. He was the number two person in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during the Watergate years, and he systematically, clandestinely provided information about illegal actions of the Nixon administration to two *Washington Post* reporters and thus was instrumental in bringing down the president. (The pseudonym Deep Throat came from the title of an X-rated movie in the early 1970s.)

The Watergate scandal began with a burglary and attempted tapping of phones at the national headquarters of the Democratic Party in the Watergate office building in Washington, D.C., in 1972. Members of the Nixon administration were found to have engaged in covert spying on and retaliating against a long list of perceived enemies. President Nixon was directly linked to these activities when he tried to cover up his administration’s involvement.

Felt went beyond merely corroborating facts: He proactively provided leads and outlined a conspiracy sanctioned by the president. In stuff that spy novels are made of, he developed a system of elaborate signals—from rearranged flowerpots on a balcony to drawings of the hands of a clock on newspapers—to communicate with a reporter that it was time to talk again. Most of his meetings with the reporter took place in a dark parking garage.

Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward (1974), the two reporters who relied on Felt, described him as disgusted by the politics that had infiltrated every corner of government—a strong-arm takeover of the agencies by the Nixon White House. . . . He had once called it the “switchblade mentality”—and had referred to the willingness of the President’s men to fight dirty and for keeps, regardless of what effect the slashing might have on the government and the nation. . . . Woodward sensed the resignation of a man whose fight had been worn out in too many battles. (130)

Others portrayed Felt as bitter from being passed over for the job as head of the FBI. Still others called him the conscience of the FBI. He “came to believe that he was fighting an all-out war for the soul of the bureau,” wrote a family friend (O’Connor 2005, 131). Relatives described him as genuinely conflicted as to whether he saw himself as an American patriot or a turncoat. Mark Felt was an extreme government guerrilla, one whose “dissent” forever changed the way Americans think about the presidency.
Several modern-day scholars have contributed to this lineage of thinking, including Meier, who has examined the bureaucratic politics of Hispanic education (Meier and Stewart 1991), fertility control (Meier and McFarlane 1996), sin (Meier 1994), alcohol (Meier and Johnson 1990), insurance (Meier 1988), speed laws (Meier and Morgan 1982), and food (Meier 1978). Mashaw (1985) studied the Social Security Administration and found that career public servants successfully crafted their own version of bureaucratic justice comprising an internal law of administration. Brower and Abolafia (1997) carried out a series of ethnographic studies of political activities among lower-level public servants and found that those who engage in such activities use or create alternate channels because, from their vantage point, the regular channels are part of the problem. These lower-level participants gain identity and self-respect through their covert political activities as they struggle against the depersonlizing forces and irrationalities of bureaucracy. These works all give evidence in support of the idea that guerrilla government in varying degrees is a relatively commonplace activity that cannot be ignored.
BOX 1.3
THE CLASSIC THEMES OF THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS LITERATURE

1. Bureaucrats make policy through the exercise of discretion (Appleby 1949).

2. Public administration is a political process (Appleby 1949; Stein 1952; Cleveland 1956; Key 1958; Derthick and Quirk 1985; Carpenter 2001, 2010).

3. Bureaucrats and bureaucracy are driven by their own highly particularized and parochial views, interests, and values (Long 1949).

4. Agencies and bureaucracies are constantly jockeying for power, position, and prestige, and this behavior has enormous consequences for public policy (Allison and Zelikow 1999; Halperin 2006).

5. Bureaucrats’ views tend to be influenced by the unique cultures of their agencies (Halperin and Kanter 1973). In other words, where you stand (on a policy issued) depends on where you sit (Neustadt and May 1986).

6. All bureaucracies are endowed with certain resources: policy expertise, longevity and continuity, and responsibility for program implementation (Rourke 1984). Some bureaucrats are more successful than others, however, in using those resources to their advantage (Rourke 1984; Wildavsky 2000).

7. Policy made in an arena of bureaucratic politics is characterized by bargaining, accommodation, and compromise (Allison and Zelikow 1999). This is often a form of muddling-through incrementalism influenced by nonrational factors known as bureaucratic politics (Lindblom 1959).

8. Agencies and bureaucrats within agencies will seek to co-opt outside groups as a means of averting threats (Selznick 2011).

9. Bureaucracies develop relationships with political institutions (such as the office of the president, governor, or mayor), and in the course of those relationships, they give information, provide advice, make decisions, and administer programs in political ways [e.g., “Tell the president only what is necessary to persuade him”] (Wildavsky 1986; Heclo 1978; Cronin 1980; Ripley and Franklin 1991).

10. Organizational arrangements within a bureaucracy are not neutral. They express an ordering of priorities and selective commitment undertaken with political motives (Seidman 1998).

Source: Adapted from Kozak (1988) and Kettl (2017).
Of great importance is the idea that bureaucratic politics involves strong political ties to clientele groups as public servants look to the groups they serve and interact with for security and support. Furthermore, bureaucrats play politics as they interact with political institutions because policy is hammered out in issue networks composed of specialists from government organizations (see, e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 2009). These are just a few of the points made in the bureaucratic politics literature that are relevant to an examination of guerrilla government. The bureaucratic politics lens raises important questions concerning who controls our government organizations, the accountability of public servants, and the roles, responsibility, and responsiveness of bureaucrats in a democratic society. One subset of the bureaucratic politics literature is concerned with organization “deviants” (Ermann and Lundman 1978; Shaughnessy 1981; Punch 1984; Sims 2009). This literature also is relevant to the topic of guerrilla government, as much of it concerns “zealot” public servants (Downs 1993; Gailmard and Patty 2007), including whistle-blowers (Ting 2008), and interorganizational protesters (Gummer 1986; Truelson 1985; De Maria 2008).

Two relevant literatures with different twists consist of writings on policy entrepreneurs and the politics of expertise. Policy entrepreneurs are “advocates who are willing to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, money—to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive or solitary benefits” (Kingdon 2003, 179; see also Mintrom and Norman 2009). Most of the examples in the literature of policy entrepreneurs are high-profile public figures, often called policy elites. Kingdon (2010), for example, discusses consumer advocate Ralph Nader and water-use reformer Senator Pete Domenici. Lewis (1980), in a similar vein, provides detailed case studies of Admiral Hyman Rickover of the U.S. Navy, J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI, and New York City parks commissioner Robert Moses, all policy entrepreneurs. Marmor (1990) analyzes the careers of Robert Ball and Wilbur Cohen, two giants in the history of social insurance in the United States.

Doig and Hargrove (1987) brought together thirteen scholars to write about thirteen high-profile entrepreneurs. Among those highlighted in the resulting volume are James Webb, administrator of NASA, who is often credited with putting a man on the moon; Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the U.S. Forest Service; and Elmer Staats, comptroller general of the United States. The contributions to Doig and Hargrove’s collection distill several of the conditions necessary for entrepreneurial leadership, including a governmental system characterized by fragmentation and overlap, public support for a particular policy area, a capacity to engage in a systematic rational analysis, an ability to see possibilities that others do not see, and a desire to make a difference.

Riccucci (1995) focuses on “execucrat” policy entrepreneurs—career public executives who made a difference. Still, Riccucci’s policy entrepreneurs (e.g., Edward Perkins, who helped break down the system of apartheid in South Africa, and Eileen Claussen, who negotiated and renegotiated the Montreal Protocol), like those just mentioned, all are at a much higher level in government than the majority of guerrillas. Roberts and King (1987, 1991, 1996) profile six policy entrepreneurs outside government who...
successfully introduced, translated, and helped implement new ideas into public prac-
tice, squeezing out lessons learned for those who seek to be change makers.

Brouwer and Biermann (2011) examine the approaches and techniques of policy
entrepreneurs in Dutch water management and conclude that they use four types of
strategies: (1) attention and support-seeking strategies to demonstrate the significance
of problems and to convince a wide range of participants about their preferred policies,
(2) linking strategies to connect their policies with other parties’ projects and ideas,
(3) relation management strategies, and (4) strategies aimed at influencing the times
and places decisions would be made.

Guerrilla government is a mutant cross-pollination of policy entrepreneurship and
the politics of expertise. The politics of expertise is a term used by Benveniste (1977, who
examined why and how experts influence public and private policy. In an argument
reminiscent of the one that knocked down the politics-administration dichotomy,
Benveniste asserts that so-called neutral experts, primarily in the planning field, are
in fact involved in politics, and “politics is never devoid of ideological content” (1977,
21). It is time to “shed the mask” of neutrality, Benveniste argues, and for professional
public servants to admit that they are both experts and committed political actors.

Lewis (1988) phrases the same sentiment in a different way: “Among the many
resources employed by public bureaucracies, professionalism and expertise are particu-
larly significant. . . . When coupled with the ancient notion of the primacy of the state,
they make for a formidable source of power” (158). He goes on to point out that with
this expertise comes specialized knowledge, professional norms, and a prolonged atten-
tion span regarding issues that outlive the attention others in the political process can
give. Hence, professionalized public bureaucrats have a capacity to initiate and inno-
vate that is unparalleled in the political system. They are truly political actors despite
any label of neutrality they may give themselves or others may give them.

Kaufman, Hirschman, and Lipsky

Three great works spanning three different decades have tried to grapple intel-
lectually with the dilemma of guerrilla government in three very different ways. Each
merits special attention.

The first is Kaufman’s The Forest Ranger (1960), which many consider the first of
a series of important books taking an in-depth look at the importance of bureaucratic
discretion. In that work, Kaufman examines the U.S. Forest Service of the 1950s from
the ranger district upward. In his own words, the book is about how daily decisions and
actions at lower echelons make concrete realities of the policy statements and declared
objectives of the leadership. Forest rangers are members of the federal bureaucracy,
yet much of their work is carried out in a decentralized fashion in locations far from
Washington, D.C., in remotely dispersed locations. They have many masters: local resi-
dents, timber companies, ranchers, miners, conservationists, members of the general
public, members of Congress, and the president. Despite the possibilities for fragmenta-
tion, the Forest Service of Kaufman’s era was amazingly cohesive and uniform in action.
Much of Kaufman’s book describes the mechanisms whereby the Forest Service leaders maintained uniformity and control of the diffuse organization, seeking in part to discourage guerrilla government before it could have a chance to germinate. As deviation threats increased, for example, central controls multiplied. As impulses toward fragmentation grew, the discretion of field officers was contracted. In order to narrow the rangers’ latitude in decision making, the leaders saw to it that “preformed decisions” were made at all levels above the rangers (213). Rangers were thoroughly screened to promote homogeneity, while the Forest Service “manipulate[d] the intellects and wills” of its members (232). In-service indoctrination and training promoted standardization. An attempt to defuse differences of opinion was made prior to the promulgation of policies. Rangers’ allegiances to local populations were neutralized through frequent rotation of rangers among Forest Service sites throughout the United States. The result was that the patterns of informal organization in the national forests were rarely at odds with the policies enunciated at higher levels, and centrifugal tendencies were vanquished. Forest rangers in the 1950s, in short, tended to “value the organization more than they value[d] getting their own way” (199). Is this the answer to guerrilla government? Alas, no. Despite these attempts to forge a tightly run Forest Service and the nearly all-obeying forest ranger, Kaufman acknowledges, there were exceptions. He notes, “In the last analysis all influences on administrative behavior are filtered through a screen of individual values, concepts, and images” (223).

A second work that merits special attention is Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), an economic analysis of reactions to decline in firms, organizations, and nation-states. How can a book on the reactions to decline in firms, organizations, and nation-states inform the guerrilla government debate? Hirschman outlines a typology of responses to dissatisfaction: exit (leaving, quitting, or ending the relationship), voice (expressing one’s dissatisfaction), and loyalty (faithfully waiting for conditions to improve). He is also concerned with the interrelationship of these options and asks, for example, if pursuing the voice option diminishes the possibility of the adoption of the loyalty option. Hirschman points out that these categories overlap at times, as when loyalists are especially vocal.

Farrell (1983) adds a fourth element to Hirschman’s work: neglect. Neglect is defined as “passively allowing conditions to deteriorate through reduced interest or effort, chronic lateness or absences, using company time for personal business, or increased error rate” (Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, and Mainous 1988, 601). While Hirschman’s work was never intended to explain or predict responses of bureaucrats to dissatisfaction in public bureaucracies, it has been applied to such research by scholars such as Golden (1992, 2000), who examined bureaucratic responses to presidential control during the Reagan years in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. It has also been used in the marital counseling literature to explain the options of spouses who are unhappy in their marriages. While valuable, Hirschman’s work does not begin to explain the complexities and intricacies involved in guerrilla government, but in Hirschman’s defense, it was never intended to tackle such a broad range of subjects as those to which it has been applied.
Brehm and Gates (1997) go beyond Hirschman by defining the primary set of alternative actions from which a subordinate bureaucrat chooses, such as working, leisure-shirking (not working because one does not feel like it), dissent-shirking, and sabotage. Which option a particular bureaucrat chooses is likely to depend first on the bureaucrat’s own functional preferences, second on the preferences of the bureaucrat’s peers, and lastly on the efforts of the supervisor. Brehm and Gates found that strong functional and solitary preferences significantly encourage work and discourage sabotage. Caldwell and Canuto-Carranco’s (2010) research furthers this finding by explaining why voice is the most effective moral choice for organization members dealing with dysfunctional leaders.

A third oft-cited book on policy making by career public servants is Lipsky’s Street-Level Bureaucracy (2010), the first edition of which was published in 1980. While much of Lipsky’s classic work does not pertain to the study at hand, some insights can be gleaned from it to illuminate the issue of guerrilla government. Lipsky analyzes the actions and roles of “frontline” public servants, such as police officers and social workers, and argues that they are essentially policy makers. This phenomenon is built upon two interrelated facets of these public servants’ positions: a relatively high degree of discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority. Lipsky helps us understand the “why” and “how” of guerrilla government: why guerrillas have so much power and how they might use it. While the guerrillas studied in this book are a mix of street-level bureaucrats, midlevel managers, and high-level managers (which Lipsky is careful to differentiate), they, too, tend to be in jobs with a great amount of discretion that gives them a certain amount of power. So, too, do the guerrillas studied here enjoy relative autonomy—up to a point—from organizational authority.

Vinzant and Crothers (1998) examine successful street-level bureaucrats and find in them many of the leadership skills enunciated earlier in Doig and Hargrove’s collection of analyses of agency heads. Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) take Lipsky’s analysis one step further by offering multiple stories told by “the coal miners of policy” (157). These stories highlight the fact that frontline workers’ beliefs and values are formed in “rough-and-tumble interaction with peers and citizen-clients, not in regulated, formal interaction with supervisors” (157). Frontline workers’ actions demonstrate the immense freedom that lower-level public servants have to use their own discretion, as well as the fact that much of the organization culture that informs those actions comes from stories passed on from one worker to the next.

The empirical literature of the past ten years adds to these perspectives. Riccucci (2005) studied street-level bureaucrats implementing policies for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program in Michigan and found that their discretionary decisions were affected more by clients than by supervisors. DeHart-Davis (2007) analyzed the “unbureaucratic personality” and found, seemingly paradoxically, a negative correlation between an individual’s public service commitment and that individual’s willingness to bend rules, as guerrillas often do. Oberfield (2010) investigated rule following and discretion at the front lines of government and found that the bureaucrats’ views of
rule following remained largely unchanged from the views they held when they entered the organization. Oberfield (2012) then studied how police officers develop their views about using force and concluded that self-selection (personality) and socialization while on the job combine to influence those views. Tummers and Van de Walle (2012) scrutinized health care professionals’ resistance to change and found that it was largely driven by professional belief that the change would not serve clients or save money, followed by personal self-interest, including a fear of loss of status, income, and administrative discretion.

Thus, the reality of bureaucratic politics is both good and bad. At best, bureaucratic politics allows career public servants the discretion to make sense out of their day-to-day challenges, to act in ways that they deem fair, just, and equitable. At worst, bureaucratic politics is a form of arrogance that allows public servants to act according to their own whims, perhaps to stereotype, and to invent ways of dealing with public policy challenges that may or may not comport with the will of people. The bureaucratic politics lens raises important questions concerning who controls government organizations; the accountability of public servants; the roles, responsibilities, and responsiveness of bureaucrats in a democratic society; and the tensions between public servants and political appointees.

**ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGEMENT**

Classic organization theorists, such as Cyert and March (1963), Emery and Trist (1965), Katz and Kahn (1978), Thompson (1967), Lawrence and Lorsch (1969), and Aldrich (1972), all maintain that organizations both are shaped by and seek to shape the environments in which they exist. This “open-systems” approach to understanding organizations maintains that organizations are in constant interaction with their environments, that organization boundaries are permeable, and that organizations both consume resources and export resources to the outside world. In other words, organizations do not exist in a vacuum.

This notion contrasts with traditional theories that tended to view organizations as “closed systems,” which led to an overemphasis on the internal functioning of organizations. While the internal functioning of an organization is significant and cannot be ignored, it is essential to remember that all organizations “swim” in tumultuous environments that affect every organizational level. The open-systems perspective is important when analyzing public organizations, and it is especially important when thinking about guerrilla government. Public organizations, such as those profiled in this book, seek to thrive in environments that include influences by the concerned public, elected officials, the judiciary, interest groups, and nongovernmental organizations, to name just a few significant entities. Working with, and being influenced by, individuals and groups outside their own organizations has long been a fact of life for public servants (Gaus 1947; Brownlow 1958; Wildavsky 1964; Stillman 2004). In addition, these individuals exist in social networks—both inside and outside their organizations—that influence their ideas, attitudes, and behaviors (Moynihan and Pandey 2008).
Perhaps the most exciting modern offshoot of the open-systems perspective is that of networked governance. A network is a spiderweb of relationships and connections between and among individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions dedicated to a common purpose. Every guerrilla profiled in this book is part of, and used to his or her advantage, an extensive network. O’Toole (1997) describes networks as a pattern of two or more units, in which not all the major components are encompassed within a single hierarchical array. . . . Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof. . . . The institutional glue congealing networked ties may include authority bonds, exchange relations, and coalitions based on common interest. (45)

O’Toole contrasts the reality of networks with the dominant picture portrayed in courses, texts, and standard theories, that of a universe centered on the individual agency and its management.

Among the first public management scholars to develop a theory of networked governance were Provan and Milward (1995), who studied the implementation of mental health programs in four cities and established the importance of network linkages between and among organizations and individuals. LaPorte (1996) points out that trust becomes increasingly vital in networked arrangements because of the importance of collaboration. In reality, managers in networked settings do not supervise most of those on whom their own success depends (O’Toole 1997). Since administrators do not necessarily possess authority, they may actually weaken their own influence by giving directives. Facilitation, negotiation, conflict management, and collaborative problem-solving skills become extremely important (O’Leary and Bingham 2007; O’Leary and Vij 2012), as do individual attributes such as having an open mind, being trustworthy, and being self-aware (O’Leary, Choi, and Gerard 2012; O’Leary and Gerard 2012, 2013).

A growing literature on “collaborative public management” (Kettl 2002; Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 2004; Agranoff 2004) analyzes the boundary-spanning activities of public servants who are trying to solve problems that cannot be solved easily by a single organization (see also O’Leary and Bingham 2009; Bingham and O’Leary 2008). Public servants find themselves seeking ways to shift network membership toward more supportive coalitions, locating key allies, and attempting to build collaborations of organizations and people. The collaborative public management literature can help us understand the reality of the spiderwebs of acquaintances and partnerships in which the guerrillas studied in this book thrived.

ETHICS

Ethics is the study of values and how to define right and wrong action (Cooper 2001, 2012; Menzel 1999; Van Wart 1996). Scholars have analyzed personal ethics (Bowman and Wall 1997; Nieuwenburg 2014; Lavina 2016), organizational ethics (Zajac and Comfort 1997; Van Der Wal 2011; Andersen and Jakobsen 2016), professional
Ethics is more than just thinking about right and wrong—it is doing right, not wrong. As those who study ethics like to say, ethics is not a spectator sport—it is a contact sport. Therefore, the ethical lens is, in my view, the most important lens through which to view guerrilla government, yet it is perhaps also the most difficult to think about in a concrete fashion. What constitutes ethical behavior and how do we ensure it? Who decides what is ethical and what is not?

Waldo (1988) offers a map of the ethical obligations of public servants, with special reference to the United States. His map is still relevant today and is especially applicable to the issue of guerrilla government. In his map, presented in Figure 1.2, Waldo identified a dozen sources and types of ethical obligations, but he cautions that the list is capable of “indefinite expansion” (103) and that the obligations do not lend themselves to any prioritization.

The first ethical obligation is an obligation to the Constitution. The upholding of regime and regime values, Waldo writes, is a typical source of public servant obligations. In the United States, the Constitution is the foundation of regime and regime values (Richardson 1997). This sentiment is in sync with that expressed by Rohr (1986), who maintains that nothing is more fundamental to governance than a constitution. It also comports with the opinion of Rosenbloom, Carroll, and Carroll (2000), who maintain that “constitutional competence” is essential for all public managers.

A second obligation of public servants is an obligation to law. This refers to the laws made pursuant to, and in addition to, the Constitution. Public servants must follow and implement the law. But, Waldo asks, what if the law is unclear? What if laws conflict?

Next Waldo tackles a public manager’s obligation to nation or country. Waldo points out that in many situations, obligation to one’s “Fatherland, Motherland, Homeland” (104) overrides the obligation to regime. President Abraham Lincoln articulated this tension in a letter dated April 4, 1864, when, in justifying his actions to end slavery, he asked, “Was it possible to lose the Nation, and yet preserve the Constitution?”

Obligation to democracy is next on Waldo’s map for public servants. Waldo explains democracy as the will of the people but then asks several provocative questions: How do we know the will of the people? It is intertwined with the Constitution, but it is not 100 percent contained in the Constitution. What about other laws? What about avenues in addition to law? And is the will of the people to be put ahead of the welfare of the people, say, when a public servant has information not available to the people? Ethicist Louis C. Gawthrop (1998) takes this obligation one step further:

To labor in the service of democracy is to recognize that all of us are called, in one way or another, in varying degrees of responsibility, to be watchmen, sentinels, or prophets for others—any others—as well as for one another,
in attempting to attain the common good . . . public administrators must be willing to confront the suppressive and debilitating constraints that are currently being imposed on “bureaucracy” from all directions, and to reaffirm the values and virtues inherent in the notion of service that have unified the ethical forces of democracy in the past. Public service in the spirit of democracy demands an unqualified commitment to the common good. Nothing less will do; nothing more is needed. (100–101)

Obligation to organizational/bureaucratic norms is another competing obligation with which public servants must grapple. Such obligations are both generic and specific. Generic obligations can be found in most, if not all, public bureaucracies in the United States: loyalty, duty, order, economy, efficiency. Specific organizational/
bureaucratic norms will change from organization to organization depending on the function of the organization, the clientele, and the technology. The Forest Service, as profiled in Kaufman’s book, is a good example of an organization with strong bureaucratic norms.

A sixth obligation espoused by Waldo is **obligation to profession and professionalism**. Most professions have established tenets that act to shape the values and behavior of their members. Most professions also have codes of ethics that members must follow. The American Society for Public Administration’s code of ethics states that public servants should serve the public interest, respect the Constitution and the law, demonstrate personal integrity, promote ethical organizations, and strive for professional excellence (see Box 1.4). It is interesting to note that up until March 2013, the American Society for Public Administration code of ethics included a clause that stated that respecting the Constitution and the law includes “encouraging and facilitating legitimate dissent activities.”

Next on Waldo’s map is **obligation to family and friends**. In the United States, we generally have an ethos that obligation to family and friends cannot or should not supersede other ethical obligations of public servants. Yet in many other countries in which family or other social group remains the center of loyalty and values, Waldo points out, public servants choose family and friends over their other ethical obligations, making the creation of an effective government impossible.

Waldo’s eighth obligation is **obligation to self**. As Shakespeare says, “To thine own self be true.” At the end of a long day, can you look at yourself in the mirror and feel good about what you’ve done? “The argument for self,” Waldo writes, “is that self-regard is the basis for other-regard, that proper conduct toward others, doing one’s duty, must be based on personal strength and integrity” (105).

**Obligation to middle-range collectives** is next on Waldo’s map. Examples include obligations to political party, class, ethnic group, gender, union, church, and interest group, to mention just a few possibilities. These can, and do, pose ethical obligations to public servants.

**Obligation to the public interest or the general welfare** is one that is often articulated by public servants and is often espoused in the literature. Waldo points out that this obligation has linkages to many of the other obligations: to the Constitution, to nation, and to democracy, for example. It is one of the most difficult concepts to operationalize, yet one of the powerful pulls a public servant may feel.

Waldo’s eleventh duty is **obligation to humanity or the world**. Waldo sums it up best:

It is an old idea, and perhaps despite all a growing idea, that an obligation is owed to humanity in general, to the world as a total entity, to the future as the symbol and summation of all that can be hoped. All “higher” religions trend in this direction, however vaguely and imperfectly. It is certainly an ingredient in various forms of one-world consciousness, and it figures prominently in the environmental ethic and in ecological politics. (106)
Waldo ends his map with an obligation to religion or to God. For many individuals, religion and God are one and the same, but for others, the two are separate and distinct. This obligation can pose formidable challenges for those public servants (like...
Kim Davis mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) who view it as clashing with their other obligations, such as to the law or to organizational/bureaucratic norms. A missionary acquaintance of mine wears a necklace with a pendant that reads in Greek, “God is first, family and friends are second, and I am third.” This expresses his personal hierarchy of competing obligations.

The message of Waldo’s map of ethical obligations is that different public servants will be compelled by different ethical obligations. This makes ironclad conclusions about whether guerrillas are right or wrong difficult at times. Compounding this analytical challenge is the “problem of ambiguity” in making ethical determinations (Cooper 2012; Dobel 1999; Fleishman 1981; Rohr 1988).

Other important perspectives through which to view guerrilla government abound in the literature. A few stand out. For example, Cooper (2012, 65–89), citing Mosher (1968), maintains that responsibility is the key to ethical behavior in the public sector. This includes objective responsibility (e.g., what the law says) and subjective responsibility (e.g., personal and professional beliefs). Cooper urges public managers facing ethical dilemmas to identify all possible alternatives, project probable consequences, and analyze those consequences by viewing them through the lenses of moral rules and ethical principles, by conducting self-appraisal, and by thinking through how they might defend their actions before a broad audience.

Other authors challenge us to think more deeply about the connection between bureaucratic discretion and ethical dilemmas. O’Kelly and Dubnick (2006) maintain that issues of administrative discretion can be thought of more seriously as moral challenges. Bruhn (2009) argues that all organizations have gray areas where the line between right and wrong is blurred, but major decisions are made nonetheless, catalyzing ethical challenges. Echoing this sentiment are Loyens and Maesschalck (2010), who argue that there is common ground between ethical dilemmas and discretion in policy implementation. Heintzman (2007) and Getha-Taylor (2009) separately argue that in order to reestablish public trust, government must make ethical behavior a priority, and this requires attention to public service values.

The implications of guerrilla government for democracy are a very critical concern. As you read about the episodes of guerrilla government that follow, ask yourself which of these competing obligations each of the guerrillas was responding to. What is each guerrilla’s obligation hierarchy? What should it be? Even though the work they do may arguably be commendable, are guerrillas going against the state? Are they subverting the mandates of elected officials? Are they following the letter of the law but breaking the spirit of the law? What makes their ideals “right” and “just” for the people? Are they “doing the right thing”?

LOOKING AHEAD

While each of the authors whose work is highlighted above offers unique and valuable insights, taken as a whole, these scholars pose more questions than they answer,
inviting a closer examination of the guerrilla government phenomenon. I wanted to know more about these so-called guerrillas, such as who they are and why they developed counteragency agendas. I wanted to know to what extent organizational systems account for multiple causes of guerrilla government. I wanted to know whether there are models of organizational systems that allow a voice for these individuals. I wanted to know whether it is possible to keep guerrillas in, or bring them back into, the affairs of an organization. I wanted to know whether there is a link between the formal and informal procedures for resolving conflict within agencies and the prevalence of guerrilla government. These are some of the questions addressed in this book.

As I was concluding my work on a previous edition of this book, my phone rang. It was a biologist friend from Arizona. She knew about the book I was writing, and she wanted to know if I had heard about Dave Wegner, a scientist and government guerrilla at the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) within the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) who successfully waged an “environmental war” in the Grand Canyon. Wegner, she told me, was instrumental in coordinating the first-ever Grand Canyon spike release (the rapid release of large quantities of water) to simulate natural conditions of water flow through the canyon. He appeared on television with Bruce Babbitt, then secretary of the interior, achieving hero status among many scientists, conservationists, and environmentalists. Wegner eventually publicly blasted Babbitt when they disagreed on future policy and later lost his BOR job. His job officially was phased out and his office moved to Denver, but knowledgeable insiders say that the truth is that those in charge got tired of Wegner’s behind-the-scenes guerrilla activities to promote his pet cause.

I flew to Washington, D.C., to interview Daniel Beard, former commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation and then president of the Audubon Society, who called himself Dave Wegner’s “protector.” He told me that Wegner was not “one of the Bureau boys.” Wegner’s guerrilla government way of operating was controversial within the BOR. As director of the Grand Canyon Environmental Studies Office (GCESO), Wegner forged linkages with members of the local, state, national, and international scientific community by parceling out grants for the study of the Grand Canyon ecosystem. The grant funds came from the hydropower industry, which gave money annually to the GCESO “in order to look good and to get the environmentalists off their backs,” Beard told me. The fact that the funds were not kept in-house, and that Wegner was able to forge a huge network of supporters by leveraging these funds, was a source of irritation to many inside the BOR.

Wegner initiated a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study to bring good science to policy decisions concerning the Grand Canyon. Yet he used the NAS for both scientific and political purposes. The NAS panel provided invaluable feedback about the scientific studies being done and not being done in the Grand Canyon. At the same time, when the NAS gave Wegner the stamp of approval, he used it to fend off his opponents and naysayers.

Wegner participated in fund-raisers to save the Grand Canyon and the Colorado River, helped draft legislation aimed at protecting both, was an instrumental force
behind the scenes in the making of several documentary films about the environmental problems there, and was a master at cultivating positive relations with the media. It was not unusual for Wegner to plan and implement extravagant media blitzes either directly with the press or through leaks to environmental and scientific organizations.

Other Wegner links with environmental groups were well known: He would ghost-write letters and testimony to be delivered to elected officials, and he had a hand in every major environmental bill introduced concerning the Grand Canyon in a twenty-year period. He was a master at lobbying, fund-raising, and cultivating congressional staff as allies. There was also a passive-aggressive side to Wegner, Beard told me. He would often not implement orders he thought were unfair, unwise, or possibly harmful to the ecosystem of the Grand Canyon. He was not a bureau man but a Grand Canyon man. His allegiance clearly was not to the DOI but to the environment. It was also not unusual for Wegner to hold clandestine meetings to plot a unified strategy among staff and nonstaff scientists if he was convinced that such actions were needed to protect the environment.

With another great guerrilla episode halfway written, I flew out to Arizona to interview Dave Wegner himself. After a four-hour discussion that was closer to an interrogation, I realized that he was resisting telling me his story. He would neither confirm nor deny what my biologist friend and Beard had told me. He did not want to talk. A chapter in my book about his actions could make his life miserable, he finally said. He abruptly ended the interview. I had hit a dead end.

Similarly, after writing up a different chapter on guerrilla government activities, this time concerning housing policy in a major metropolitan area, I e-mailed it to the guerrilla and asked if I had portrayed the facts correctly. I received the following response from him:

Dear Professor O’Leary,

Thank you for forwarding your write-up of my story to me. To answer your question, yes you have portrayed the facts of my case 100% correctly. However, regretfully, I am not giving you permission to use my story as I am too easily identifiable from the details of the situation to colleagues here. . . . I plan to retire next summer after which my anxiety over publication would be significantly lessened, but right now I don’t wish to unnecessarily complicate my final year of state service.

While I have hit many similar brick walls over the years, I fortunately also have interviewed dozens of guerrillas who were willing to share their stories with me. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 offer in-depth stories of guerrilla government that started with such interviews, and Chapters 5 and 6 offer new stories concerning the leaking of top-secret information. (My requests to interview Private Chelsea Manning were denied by officials at the U.S. Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas.) I selected the stories related in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 from among many told to me over the past thirty years because,
first, the guerrillas themselves agreed to provide information; second, they were verifiable by multiple sources; and third, they provide clear examples of an array of guerrillas, why they did what they did, and the roles their organizations played in catalyzing their guerrilla activities. Chapters 5 and 6 detail the amazing stories, covered broadly in the international media, of government guerrillas who leaked classified government documents in different ways and for different reasons. Taken together, the stories related in Chapters 2 through 6 provide a window into the world of guerrilla government. While three of the five take place in the environmental policy arena (which is the subject of my policy expertise), similar events could take place in virtually any public organization in any country, regardless of policy area.

The first episode, concerning the “Nevada Four,” surfaced as I served on a National Academy of Sciences panel concerning irrigation-induced water quality problems in the western United States. For four years, we heard “gloom and doom” stories of how DOI irrigation practices were destroying the environment in nearly every regional office site in the western United States—except one in Nevada. Something just didn’t ring true when the Nevada DOI employees initially testified that legislation imposed “from outside the Department” forced them to change their internal departmental policies, enabling them to implement innovations they had always dreamed of creating but could never get clearance for from their superiors. After confirming my suspicions through private conversations with one of the site’s speakers, I began to investigate the real story of guerrilla government in the DOI.

The second episode, which took place in the Seattle regional office of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, surfaced when I was presenting my research on the DOI at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, where I used to work. One of my colleagues there was a retired EPA deputy regional administrator. “Guerrilla government happens more than people will admit,” he said. “Let me tell you about my own experience.” His experience, and the experiences of his former colleagues at the EPA, became the core of that story.

The third episode, about off-road vehicles in the Hoosier National Forest, surfaced when I placed an ad in the national newsletter of the American Society for Public Administration’s Section on Environmental and Natural Resources Administration asking for guerrilla government stories for my book. Dozens of letters poured in, with the story of Claude Ferguson and the Forest Service coming, ironically, from one of my own students who had worked for Ferguson.

It was impossible not to write about the fourth episode, the WikiLeaks scandal. When it hit the international media, I was contacted by colleagues around the world who told me that the book would be incomplete without this case. The story related in Chapter 5 is based on secondary data derived from archives, blogs, reprints of Private Manning’s e-mail messages, and news accounts.

Just when the world thought it had seen the largest security scandal in history, Edward Snowden leaked 1.7 million top-secret documents to journalists. This chapter, too, is based on secondary data derived from archives, blogs, e-mail messages, and news
accounts. In addition, Snowden released several videos from Russia where he is hiding out, telling his side of the story.

Sprinkled among the five primary case studies are interludes of vignettes or snapshots of other guerrilla government stories from outside the environmental policy arena. I offer these to provide a greater sense of the prevalence, types, and modes of guerrilla government activity happening today. New in this edition of the book are highlights of “Alt”-Twitter accounts used to undermine the work of President Trump, as well as a highlight of the Department of State’s “dissent channel” and examples of its use.

The last chapter of this book steps back from the cases and examines the phenomenon of guerrilla government and its implications. The chapter presents six harsh realities about guerrilla government and discusses ways of addressing guerrilla government, including implementing dispute system design, changing organization culture, training employees in collaborative problem solving, integrating the expressive and instrumental objectives of organizations, and training new political appointees. The chapter also presents advice gleaned from a survey of 216 organization managers and offers a vision for life “in the system” that seeks to bring government guerrillas back into the fold. Finally, a postlude asks if there are lessons to be learned from this study of guerrilla government and offers questions for discussion.