Despite predictions to the contrary, the 20th century turned out to be an ethnic century. The conflicts and claims organized at least partly in ethnic or racial terms were legion, but consider a few examples:

- During World War II, Germany’s Nazi regime undertook the systematic extermination of Europe’s Jewish population, along with Gypsies and other “undesirables.” Six million people died as a direct result of this “holocaust,” which gave to the world indelible images of brutality and evil and became one of the defining events of the modern era.

- In 1960, the African state of Nigeria won its independence from Great Britain, but conflicts over the distribution of power among ethnic groups and regions erupted soon afterward. In 1967, in the most dramatic and costly of these, the Igbo people of the southeastern part of the country declared their area the independent Republic of Biafra, precipitating nearly 3 years of open warfare with the Nigerian government. Biafra eventually lost the war, but not before hundreds of thousands of Igbos and other Nigerians had been killed.

- In the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, ethnic political mobilization seemed to be happening everywhere as an array of ethnic and racial groups not only loudly proclaimed their distinctive identities but also
struggled for recognition, rights, and resources. Ethnic and racial boundaries surfaced both as primary sources of identity and as major fault lines within U.S. society, from the civil rights sit-ins and riots in Black ghettos to the legal efforts of the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund to the confrontations led by the American Indian Movement to the angry protests of an assortment of groups of European ancestry. At century’s end, those fault lines remained.

- In 1971, the government of Malaysia amended that country’s constitution, adopted at independence from Great Britain in 1957, to secure the preferential treatment of Malays in education, business, and government, against the objections of the sizable Chinese and other ethnic populations. Among other things, the changes made it an act of sedition to even question such entitlements.

- In the late 1970s, on the Gulf Coast of Texas, competition over scarce fishing resources led to violence between Euro-Americans and immigrant Vietnamese. A White fisherman was killed; Vietnamese fishing boats were burned; and eventually the Ku Klux Klan joined the fray. Many Vietnamese immigrants finally fled the region.

- In the 1980s and 1990s, minority Tamils launched a violent insurgency against the majority Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, an island nation off the southeastern coast of India, crippling its economy and killing thousands. In the first decade of the 21st century, Sri Lanka’s seemingly insoluble “ethnic fratricide” (Tambiah 1986) continues.

- The 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union—one of the world’s most ethnically diverse states—pried open the lid on what was supposedly a socialist melting pot, to reveal a boiling stew of ethnic sentiments and political movements. Ethnic conflicts followed in several regions of the former Soviet Union. Among them, Ukrainian and Russian minorities in Moldova battled against majority Romanians; Abkhazians and southern Ossetians struggled for their own independence in newly independent Georgia; Armenians and Azerbaijanis fought over territorial rights and occupancy; and Chechens envisioned independence from Russian and entered a devastating war in an effort to achieve it.

- The 1990s witnessed a flurry of attacks by German skinheads and other right-wing groups directed against Turks, Greeks, Spaniards, North Africans of various ethnicities, and other immigrant groups who came to Germany over the preceding three decades in search of jobs. Arsonists torched immigrant-occupied apartment houses; men, women, and children were beaten on the street; and dozens of foreigners were killed.
In 1993, in a special issue devoted to multiculturalism in America, *Time* magazine published a story titled “The Politics of Separation.” The subject was the impact of growing ethnic diversity on U.S. campuses. The magazine reported a perception among some students that “to study anyone’s culture but one’s own . . . is to commit an act of identity suicide” (W. Henry 1993:75).

In 1995, French Canadians in the province of Quebec came within a few votes of deciding that the province should separate from the rest of Canada, in all likelihood eventually becoming an independent country. “We were defeated by money and the ethnic vote,” said the province’s premier, a leading separatist, referring to non-French-speaking voters of various ethnicities who narrowly defeated the separatist effort (Farnsworth 1995:1). Before the vote, the Crees, indigenous people living within the province, took out a full-page advertisement in Canadian newspapers announcing their own overwhelming vote against Quebec’s separation. The Crees promised that if Quebec were to separate, they and the vast lands under their control, in turn, would separate from Quebec, remaining part of Canada.

Also in the 1990s, the term *ethnic cleansing* emerged from the chaos that followed the breakup of the former Yugoslav federation in southern Europe and engulfed the nascent country of Bosnia. The term, coined by Serbian nationalists, referred to the forced removal of non-Serbs from territory claimed or sought by Serbs. It was accompanied in the Bosnian case by wholesale human slaughter, starvation, and rampages of sexual violence directed against Bosnian Muslims by Serbian and Croatian soldiers and civilians. As one commentator pointed out, “ethnic cleansing” had now joined “the euphemistic lexicon of zealotry,” along with Nazi descriptions of the Jewish Holocaust as “the final solution” (Williams 1993:H-3).

These examples admittedly focus on conflict and division, which were not the whole of the ethnic story in the 20th century. Ethnic and racial diversity and identity were also sources of pride, unity, and achievement. The United States often paid tribute to its immigrant origins and the cultural pluralism that resulted (for example, Kallen 1924). Various groups—from Mexican Americans to Haitians to Arab populations from the Middle East—proudly celebrated their own cultures and identities even as they struggled for entry into American prosperity. The Kwanzaa festival, for example, became an annual African American celebration, a time for family, reflection, and commitment. On U.S. college campuses, in corporations, and in major cities, leaders dealing with ethnic and racial issues argued that diversity should be a
strength, not a weakness. When the U.S. women’s gymnastics team won a
gold medal at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, the ethnic composition of
the team—“an Asian American, an African American, and white girls with
names like Miller and Moceanu” (Lexington 1996)—was itself viewed as an
American accomplishment, something the entire nation should look upon
with pride. Debates about affirmative action, the content of school curricu-

lum, and immigration policy led at least one American analyst to suggest, at
century’s end, that “we are all multiculturalists now” (Glazer 1997).

The rise of multiculturalism and its insistence on recognizing and valu-
ing the differences associated with ethnicity and race were not unique to the
United States. Since its founding, Mexico has proudly proclaimed its mul-
tracial heritage, which mixes Indian and Spanish blood and cultures.
Ethnic bonds brought Germans together in a reunified country in 1990,
after decades of division into East and West. In the early 1990s, Australia
finally recognized, after a century and a half of systematic denial, that its
Aboriginal peoples had some claim to the continent European settlers had
taken from them. In Nigeria, long troubled by ethnic tensions and conflict,
novelist and Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka (1996) argued that Nigeria’s via-
bility as a state depended on learning to reconcile and even celebrate its eth-
nic diversity. With massive global migration, ethnic festivals, foods, and
customs enriched cultural life in cities across the world, while the advance
of technology and mass communications made it easier than ever before for
peoples of common origins to maintain ties and identities even as they
moved. Whether one views ethnicity and race as sources of conflict or
causes for celebration—or both at once—the point is the same: The 20th
century demonstrated that they were among the most potent forces in con-
temporary societies.

As the 21st century began, these forces showed little sign of abating. At
the very start of the new millennium, the horror of 9/11 threw the Arab
population of the United States on the defensive. Arab Americans, many of
them born and raised in cities like Detroit and with no direct experience of
the Middle East, suddenly became the collective object of suspicion. Four
years later, Hurricane Katrina exposed a stark racial divide in New
Orleans, reminding many Americans of the high cost that some people pay
for being Black. Nor was America alone. The first years of the new century
saw enraged young North African Muslims torching neighborhoods in
Paris, the City of Light, and Kurds struggling for autonomy in Iraq.
Violence erupted between White Australians—some wearing T-shirts say-
ing “ethnic cleansing unit” (Sallis 2005)—and Middle Eastern immigrants
in the city of Sydney. Warfare with ethnic overtones drove hundreds of
thousands of people from their homes in the Darfur province in western
Sudan, while ethnic tensions slowed economic growth in the Ivory Coast of West Africa. Anti-Semitism appeared resurgent in much of Europe, and opposition to Korean and other minority populations simmered in Japan. As these and a hundred other examples from around the world illustrate, race and ethnicity continue to serve as vehicles of political assertion, tools for exclusion and exploitation, sources of unity, and reservoirs of destructive power. (The map in Figure 1.1 shows the locations of countries mentioned in this book.)

An Unexpected Persistence and Power

It was not supposed to be this way. Ethnicity and race had been expected to disappear as forces to be reckoned with in the modern world. The latter half of the 20th century, by numerous accounts, was supposed to see a dramatic attenuation of ethnic and racial ties. These and other seemingly parochial, even premodern attachments were expected to decline as bases of human consciousness and action, being replaced by other, more comprehensive identities linked to the vast changes shaping the modern world.

Certainly a good many sociologists expected as much. As early as 1926, Robert Park, a professor at the University of Chicago and perhaps the most influential American sociologist of his day, observed that certain forces at work in the world were bound to dismantle the prejudices and boundaries that separated races and peoples. Powerful global factors, argued Park—trade, migration, new communication technologies, even the cinema—were bringing about a vast "interpenetration of peoples." These factors, Park (1926/1950) claimed, "enforce new contacts and result in new forms of competition and of conflict. But out of this confusion and ferment, new and more intimate forms of association arise" (p. 150). Indeed, wrote Park,

In the relations of races there is a cycle of events which tends everywhere to repeat itself...The race relations cycle which takes the form, to state it abstractly, of contacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation, is apparently progressive and irreversible. (P. 150)

Park wrote at a time when the term *race* had a broader meaning than it does now. His conception of "races" treated separately, for example, the Slavic peoples, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, Puerto Ricans, Portuguese, and others (Park 1934, 1939; see also Banton 1983, chap. 3). Today, if we were to encounter these peoples in communities outside their countries of origin, we would consider them ethnic groups or would combine them into more
Figure 1.1
Approximate Locations of Countries or Regions Mentioned in the Book
inclusive racial categories: Japanese and Chinese as Asians, for example, and Slavic peoples and Portuguese as Whites.

Embedded in Park’s ideas is a clear sense of transformation. The forces of history were already transforming the world’s peoples, and the rest of the 20th century would only accelerate the process. The impact would integrate peoples with one another, leading ultimately to universal participation in a common life and culture. “If America was once in any exclusive sense the melting pot of races,” wrote Park (1926/1950), “it is no longer. The melting pot is the world” (p. 149).

Not everyone saw things this way. More skeptical voices could be heard in the sociological chorus in the early decades of the 20th century, perhaps none more so than W. E. B. DuBois, who in 1905 claimed that the color line would be the paramount problem of humankind in the 20th century (DuBois 1903/1986; see also Berry 1965:129–35). But most sociologists subscribed to Park’s view of the future, at least for industrial, multiethnic societies such as the United States. The melting pot—both global and local—would work its magic; ethnic and racial bonds would be forgotten; and the peoples of the world would be integrated into a broad stream of shared cultures and social relations. “Everywhere there is competition and conflict; but everywhere the intimacies which participation in a common life enforces have created new accommodation, and relations which once were merely formal or utilitarian have become personal and human” (Park 1926/1950:149).

Park was much influenced in his thinking by studies of the immigrant experience in North America. He and his fellow social scientists at the University of Chicago paid close attention to the stream of migrants from the various countries of Europe who, late in the 19th and early in the 20th centuries, poured into the growing cities and insatiable labor markets of the industrializing United States. They found that over time and through generations, these migrants learned English, sent their children to school, struggled for economic and political success, spread across the continent, replaced customs from the old country with customs from the new, and even began to marry across the ethnic boundaries that originally separated them. These early students of European immigration frequently found evidence of Park’s proposed sequence: contact with other groups; competition and conflict among them over territory and opportunities; eventual accommodation to one another’s presence, character, and interests; and gradual assimilation as newcomers began to participate more and more in the dominant society and its institutions and came to share in “a common culture and a common historical life” (Park 1926/1950:149).

The idea that ethnic or racial attachments and identities would decline in significance emerged from other contexts as well. In the aftermath of World
War II, a good deal of scholarly attention turned to the less developed countries of the so-called Third World, many of them struggling for independence from colonial powers and most of them experiencing rapid industrialization and urbanization (see, for example, Deutsch 1961). Many of these states were products of negotiation and conflict among the European colonial powers. Often they were composites of diverse peoples, carriers of distinct cultures and political histories who were brought together by the circumstances of forced colonial appropriation and administrative convenience. Nigeria, for example, which was consolidated as a British colony in 1914, drew under a single administrative umbrella a broad collection of peoples and previously independent kingdoms: Fulani, Igbo, Tiv, Ijaw, Oyo, and many others (Young 1976).

A common assumption from the late 1940s to at least the early 1960s was that the diverse identities carried by peoples such as these would disappear as the colonies or newly independent countries they were now part of continued to develop. Urbanization would bring groups together in cities, where they would mingle, intermarry, and exchange ideas, losing touch with their regions of origin. Growing markets for industrial labor would be indifferent to the origins of the workers they attracted, treating group members indiscriminately as individuals and mixing them in the workplace, leveling their differences. New technologies of mass communication would bridge diverse tribal connections and local experiences, linking people to people and idea to idea on an unprecedented scale. Modernized educational systems would teach citizens a common language, a common body of knowledge, and a common culture, fostering a shared and broadened consciousness of self and society. Nation-building processes would bind citizen loyalties to rising new states, undermining older ties to kinship, local community, and tradition (for example, see Black 1966; Deutsch 1966; McCall 1955; Pye 1966). All of this might take time, and some surely would resist these changes (Eisenstadt and Rokkan 1973), but the modernizing dynamic would prevail. In Nigeria, for example, the Tiv and the Ijaw and all the others would become Nigerians before long, not only by virtue of the formalities of independence and citizenship but also through a newly comprehensive political and cultural consciousness. In this view, ethnicity was merely part of “the unfinished business for political modernizers” (Burgess 1978:272), certain to be finished before long.

Finally, the expectation that ethnic and racial attachments would decline found support in some of the classical sources of sociological thought. Karl Marx’s radical historical vision saw capitalism as the hammer that eventually would pulverize ties of nationality or tribe, fashioning in their stead the iron bonds of class, linking people to each other on the basis of their
positions in the process of economic production. By the 1960s, a growing body of work in the social sciences, influenced in part by Marxist analyses, was displaying this “radical expectancy” (Glazer and Moynihan 1975:7), the belief that class interests would emerge as the bedrock of collective identity and political consciousness, displacing alternative bases of action. As capitalism developed around the world, other sources of group ties—language, religion, national origin, and the like—would become insignificant. Persons and groups would discover that their “true” interests were defined by their positions in productive processes or markets and would reconceptualize and reorganize themselves along class lines.\(^1\)

Another European social thinker, Max Weber, agreed that ethnicity would decline in importance but envisioned a different mechanism at work. For Weber, the rationalization of human action and organization was the hallmark of modernity. Ethnicity, in contrast, was a communal relationship. It was based not on the rational calculation of interest, but on subjective feelings among group members “that they belong together” (Weber 1968:40). As modernity and hence rationalization progressed, thought Weber, communal relationships would be displaced. Only where “rationally-regulated action is not widespread”—that is, where modernization had yet to take root—would such relationships remain compelling (p. 389). In the Weberian scheme, “ethnicity could hardly be expected to survive the great tidal wave of bureaucratic rationality sweeping over the western world” (Parkin 1979:32). Weber’s and Marx’s ideas, although very different, had similar implications: Over time, ethnicity and race would decline as significant social forces in the modern world.

This line of thinking was by no means entirely wrong. Immigrants often did adopt the practices and ideas of the societies they entered; political and economic development did transform social relations, daily experience, and even identities; and as capitalism developed, class-based interests, cutting across ethnic, racial, and other boundaries, often did get mobilized into political conflict. Somehow, however, the decline of ethnic and racial attachments failed to follow, at least on a large scale. The last third of the 20th century made a shambles of these projections. In recent decades, far from disappearing, ethnicity and race have been resurgent around the world, often with lethal consequences. As Donald Horowitz wrote in 1985,

Ethnicity is at the center of politics in country after country, a potent source of challenges to the cohesion of states and of international tension. . . . [It] has fought and bled and burned its way into public and scholarly consciousness. (P. xi)
In short, modernity—that gradual and eventually global process by which industrialization, urbanization, mass communications, and other institutional changes transformed human life and society—was supposed to bring an end to ethnicity and race. They were supposed to go away. But it didn’t happen, and now, in a new century, they seem as potent as ever.

This book is an attempt to understand why. Why have ethnicity and race, defying predictions, remained such persistent and powerful forces in the modern world?

A Puzzling Diversity of Forms

The unexpected persistence of ethnicity and race is not the only puzzle here. Equally as puzzling and intellectually challenging are the diversity of the forms ethnicity and race seem to take, the variety of functions they apparently serve, and the quite different kinds of attachments that claim the ethnic or racial label.

Consider, for example, the route Armenian identity has taken. In 1894, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire, Abd al-Hamid, caught up in the chaos of a crumbling empire, launched a massacre of the Armenian population in the eastern part of what is now Turkey. The extermination effort continued for more than two decades. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians died, and thousands more fled the country (Arlen 1975; Weitz 2003).

A significant number of those who fled ended up in the United States. By 1900, 12,000 Armenians had taken refuge on American soil; by World War I, there were 60,000. They have continued to come, for a variety of reasons and from various parts of the Middle East, up to the present time. Somewhere between half a million and a million Armenian Americans live in the United States today, most of them descendants of these immigrants. Many of them are now members of the third or fourth generation on American soil. Anny Bakalian (1993), in her study of Armenian Americans, traces the reconstruction of Armenian identity in these later generations. She describes it as passage from “being” to “feeling” Armenian. “Being” Armenian referred to sharing a distinct language, living a similar and distinct style of life, carrying a common and identifiable Armenian culture, and living one’s life within predominantly Armenian sets of social relations, from marriage to friendship. “Feeling” Armenian is quite different. For American-born generations of Armenians,

The Armenian language is no longer used as a means of everyday communication. The secular culture, even cuisine, is relegated to special occasions and
acquires symbolic connotations. Frequency of attendance at Armenian religious services is gradually reduced, as is participation in communal life and activities sponsored by Armenian voluntary associations. Social ties, even intimate relations and conjugal bonds, with non-Armenians become increasingly the norm. (Bakalian 1993:5–6)

Despite this change, however, Bakalian (1993) argues that “the majority of Armenian-Americans, even the great-grandchildren of the immigrant generation, continue to maintain high levels of Armenian identity, fierce pride in their ancestral heritage, and a strong sense of we-ness or peoplehood” (p. 6). They have not lost their identity. They have held on to it, but they also have transformed it.

Joane Nagel (1996) invites us to compare this experience of Armenianness with the experience of Armenianness “in Turkey during World War I when Armenians were the targets of pogroms, or in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, where Christian Armenians and Muslim Azerbaijanis fight for control of borders and minority enclaves” (p. 25). Obviously, what it means to be Armenian in each of these times and places is very different, yet all these persons lay claim to an Armenian identity. Do they actually have much in common other than the label they attach to their identity? What is the ultimate meaning of Armenianness, embracing as it does such a diverse set of experiences and persons?

So it is with ethnicity and race more generally. The examples with which we opened this chapter capture ethnic and racial identities at their most dramatic and compelling. The identities in those examples, for the most part, are surrounded by passion and conflict, often with a great deal at stake. But not all ethnic and racial identities are experienced this way. Some are quietly assumed or unconsciously left behind. Some are used to mobilize people or register claims; others seem to have no use at all. For some groups, ethnic or racial background reliably predicts life chances, organizes social relations and daily experience, and plays a prominent role in individual self-concepts. For others, ethnic or racial background may do only one or two of these things, or none at all. Some people are reminded of their ethnic or racial identities—proudly, angrily, sadly, or indifferently—every day. Others for the most part ignore them or trot them out on holidays or at family reunions where the old stories are told for the umpteenth time and the traditional foods get their once-yearly tasting. What is more, all these different manifestations of ethnic or racial identity may be apparent at once within a single group, as some group members build their lives around such an identity and others turn away. Nor is identity—particularly in the case of race—always a matter of choice. Some
can pay their ethnic or racial identities little mind, while others are never allowed to forget them.

Such diversity begs explanation. Why is ethnicity one thing here, another there, and both things somewhere else? If ethnicity can be so many things, has it any distinctive core at all? As John Comaroff (1991) put it,

If the Gods—or social scientists, it makes little difference—do know the answer, maybe they could explain: Why is ethnicity sometimes the basis of bitter conflict, even genocide, while, at other times, it is no more than the stuff of gastronomic totemism? (P. 663)

Adding race to the picture only adds to the complications.

The puzzle of power and persistence is thus accompanied by the puzzle of variation and change. That second puzzle, too, drives the argument in this book. How are we to account for the rise and fall of ethnic and racial identities and conflicts and for their myriad variations? And what about the future? Will ethnicity and race continue to wield their peculiar power in the 21st century? What forms will they take, and what consequences will they have for human beings and for society?

Ethnicity and Race as Sociological Topics

In recent decades, it has become apparent that ethnicity and race are among the most common categories that contemporary human beings use to organize their ideas about who they are, to evaluate their experiences and behavior, and to understand the world around them. In some societies, of course, ethnic and racial categories and ties are more salient than in others. It is increasingly evident, nevertheless, that ethnicity and race are among the fundamental organizing concepts of the contemporary world. That fact alone would make them central topics within sociology.

They also appear to have striking potency as bases of collective identity and action. The unanticipated and often dramatic staying power of ethnic and racial identities demonstrates as much. Groups organized around ethnicity and race are reshaping societies, upsetting old assumptions, and challenging established systems of power. In essence, they are remaking significant parts of the modern world.

The distinctive contribution of sociology as a discipline has been the study of just such processes: of variously defined groups within society, of intergroup relations, of collective action, and of the multitudinous forces and factors that impinge on these. The study of ethnicity and race, in other words, is a fundamentally sociological enterprise.
Another of the great strengths of sociology has been its insistence on placing social phenomena within broad social and historical contexts. From its beginnings in the classical works of 19th- and early-20th-century thinkers, sociology has been preoccupied with social change on a grand scale, in particular with the onset of modernity and industrialism and with their diverse effects on human relationships and on the human search for meaning, community, order, and understanding.

Ethnicity and race are arenas in which those relationships and that search are continually in flux. They have to do with fundamental group processes: how human beings come to see themselves and others in particular ways, how they come to act on those perceptions, and how their understandings and actions are shaped by social and historical forces. Two very different—if typically related—sets of factors are at work in those processes. One set consists of the attributes, resources, and ideas of groups themselves; the other consists of the environments that those groups encounter. To understand ethnicity and race, therefore, we have to study both composition and context. We have to look both at what groups bring with them to their encounters with other people and with the world around them and at what the world that they encounter consists of. We need to understand both how people interpret and negotiate their lives in ethnic or racial ways and how larger historical and social forces organize the arenas and terms in which those people act, encouraging or discouraging the interpretations they make, facilitating some forms of organization and action and hindering others.

These issues and concerns also shape the inquiry in this book, most of which has do in one way or another with the following questions:

- What is it that makes ethnicity and race such powerful bases of identity and action, and how do we explain their striking diversity?
- How are ethnic and racial identities constructed, maintained, and transformed?
- Under what conditions are ethnic or racial forms of identification and action likely to arise?
- What will happen to ethnicity and race in the future? Will they survive as prominent organizational themes in the modern world? Or will the 21st century finally realize the misplaced predictions of the 20th and see the demise of ethnicity and race as bases of identity and action?

An Outline of What Follows

We begin our approach to these questions with definitions. Chapter 2 maps the confusing terrain of ethnicity, race, and nationalism; discusses the ways
these terms are commonly used (and confused); and provides the definitions that are used in this book.

Chapter 3 then examines the two broad models of ethnic and racial identities that have organized a great deal of social scientific thinking in recent years, commonly known as the *primordialist* and *circumstantialist* accounts. We situate these schools of thought in the context of global change, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and suggest that they may be less diametrically opposed to each other than is generally assumed.

Chapter 4 lays out the key elements of a constructionist conception of ethnicity and race. It uses pieces of both primordialist and circumstantialist perspectives to account for ethnic and racial power, persistence, and variation but adds to those perspectives a central concern with the ways that groups participate in the construction of their own (and others') identities.

In Chapter 5, we illustrate some constructions of ethnic and racial identities through a series of case studies, both historical and contemporary. The emphasis in these narratives is on the interplay between group characteristics and ideas, on one hand, and contextual factors, on the other, in the making and remaking of identity.

Chapters 6 and 7 take up the elements involved in the construction of ethnicity and race more systematically and in more detail. Chapter 6 examines some of the arenas of social life—the construction sites—where ethnic and racial identities are built and transformed and the ways that contextual factors shape those constructions. Chapter 7 examines the materials that groups bring to those sites and the ways group factors are used in the construction process.

Finally, Chapter 8 looks ahead, considering two apparently contradictory trends—mixing and multiplicity versus separation and consolidation—that give to ethnicity and race two very different faces as the 21st century progresses.

**Note**

1. Robert Park, although hardly a Marxist, shared the general view that economic relations were the ones that would endure. “Race conflicts in the modern world,” he wrote, “will be more and more in the future confused with, and eventually superseded by, the conflicts of classes” (Park 1939:45).