Introduction: The Debate over Ideology
The significance of political ideologies

This is the first chapter of a new and (it is hoped) exciting book which studies
the ideologies of modern politics. It seeks to present the features of those ideas
which move people to action in the contemporary world, and seeks to answer
the question of whether we are in a post-ideological society, in which the ideas
that dominated the modern world and spawned mass movements, political
parties and demands for revolutionary change, have lost their appeal. Have
these inspiring ideals ceased to mobilise people, and been replaced by other
ideologies, of different nature and origin, with completely transformed politi-
cal implications? Or is the picture a different one, in which political life, at
least in ‘developed’ countries, is marked precisely by an absence of overarch-
ing ideas or ideologies, with scepticism and hostility to such broad ideologies
as characteristics of our time? In either version of these scenarios, the map of
the political world, or of the ideas that animate political action, would have to
be redrawn. The answer to be arrived at may of course fit neither of these two
scenarios: the ideologies of contemporary politics may be a mixture of old and
new, of old sets of ideas seeking to adapt themselves to a transformed reality,
to an entirely different society which creates new problems for old ideologies.
If political ideologies emerged in historical circumstances far removed from
those of the present, then if they are to be relevant to contemporary politics
they must of necessity change and develop, perhaps reinventing themselves to
some degree. If they do not do this, then they risk becoming fossilized, archaic
remnants of a past age, bereft of the social base and political agency which
gave them their effectiveness and force.

These are the issues to be dealt with in this book. Evidently, it starts from a
central assumption, which is that political ideas matter, and that one cannot
understand political activity without understanding the ideas and visions that
have moved people to political action. This is an assumption which needs at least a preliminary defence. In his study of nationalism, *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson observes that ‘No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers... The cultural significance of such monuments becomes even clearer if one tries to imagine, say, a Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals. Is a sense of absurdity avoidable?’ (Anderson, 1991: 9–10).

The argument seems convincing enough at first reading: it is true that no such memorials exist, at least none which evoke the same feelings of reverence as those who have fallen in war (supposedly) for their country. And yet, both with regard to liberalism and Marxism, there have been many people in the course of history who have sacrificed their lives for those causes, and who have in a sense become martyrs for those ideologies, and the visions of the good society which they represented. One could think of the Italian Marxist Gramsci and his long period of imprisonment in Mussolini’s prisons, leading to his death. Nor has liberalism been without those who were prepared to devote their lives to the struggle for liberal ideas. In the same geographical and chronological framework as Gramsci, just evoked, one could mention the Italian liberal, Piero Gobetti (1901–26), founder of a weekly journal called *La Rivoluzione Liberale*, and forced into exile and premature death by the same Fascist regime which imprisoned Gramsci (Gentile, 2002: 153).

Thus the point seems clear: while there may be no cenotaphs for fallen liberals or tombs of the Unknown Marxist, nationalism does not have a monopoly on self-sacrifice and heroism. Individuals and groups have been prepared to sacrifice themselves for the realisation of political ideals, not in an abstract sense, but because those ideals inspired them with a view of how society should be organised. Indeed, while there may be no ‘tomb of the unknown Marxist’ there are tombs of socialist heroes. The assassination of the French socialist leader Jean Jaurès on the eve of the First World War, on 31 July 1914, was, in the words of the leading expert on Jaurès, ‘the beginning of a true cult’ (Rebérioux, 1994: 14). It culminated in 1924 in the ritual of placing Jaurès in the Pantheon, ten years after his death, and this had all the conscious rituals of secular sainthood, without the absurdity suggested in Anderson’s remarks. So this shows, perhaps in extreme form, that political ideologies have moved people to action, and to sacrifice of their lives. In more mundane and less dramatic forms, political life in many countries has been animated by hundreds, indeed thousands of people engaging in political activity, sometimes of a very humdrum kind, because they believed that they were making some contribution, however small, to the victory of their ‘cause’. So there seems plenty of historical evidence that politics can not be understood without comprehension of ideas or packages of political ideas that have mobilised people to political activity, at whatever level. We are talking here not just of great leaders, charismatic orators, founders or leaders of political parties, but of masses of people who found in political ideals an inspiration and a cause.
However, is this still the case today? And has there been a change in the ideas that move people to action, from ideals devoted to a vision of the good society, to something different? The ‘something different’ might amount to a defence of a particular identity, whether that was conceived in religious terms, cultural terms, or defence of a particular region or nationality. Has the shape of the contemporary world, or its ideological configuration, shifted, so that instead of mobilisation for visions of ‘the good society’ we now live in a society focused on maintaining certain identities, and defending a group’s dignity, or respect? Such a picture is suggested by the philosopher Charles Taylor, who talks of ‘the politics of recognition’ as significant for the contemporary world. As he puts it, ‘a number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition’ (Taylor, 1994: 25). In the public sphere, he suggests, ‘a politics of equal recognition has come to play a bigger and bigger role’ (Taylor, 1994: 37). We want to be recognised as beings of equal dignity, which includes recognition of our particular identity, which gives us a sense of authenticity. The implication, though not spelled out by Taylor in these terms, is that the politics of identity, bound up with ideas of dignity, recognition, and authenticity, has replaced or at least rendered less important the politics of ideology. So the political life of contemporary ‘developed’ societies, and perhaps world-wide, is dominated by a struggle for recognition and respect. The overall aim is that one’s authentic culture, religion and customs are given ‘space’ and respect. This then takes priority over more ideological concerns, which are broader and more sweeping in their scope. Ideas of liberalism, socialism, conservatism, among others, offer more general aspirations, and stem from a common ‘Western’ heritage. They therefore may not be appealing to those whose cultural origins lie elsewhere, who reject the proclaimed universality of those ideals of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’, and seek recognition and respect. This would account for a crisis of ideologies, in which the main ideologies of the Western tradition have lost their mobilising capacity. This would be, at least in part, because those ideologies have a certain cultural underpinning, operate with certain assumptions of progress, rationality, secularism and with a certain pretension to universality. These are all assumptions which have come under suspicion in a much more multicultural world which exalts difference and diversity, and which is more receptive to identity than to ideology.

That is one issue to be considered at length below: whether in truth identity has replaced or reduced the importance of ideology, or whether new ideologies which give more importance to ‘the politics of recognition’ have superseded older ideologies which underplayed issues of cultural identity. If one possible antithesis is between ideology and identity, another one is singled out by the American philosopher Richard Rorty, who makes a distinction between ‘movements’ and ‘campaigns’ (Rorty, 1995). This antithesis is better captured by the distinction between ideological politics and issue politics. Rorty’s argument is that a politics of ‘movements’ orients political action to some grand overarching aim. Particular issues are judged in terms of their contribution to the
final goal of overall social transformation, however that is conceived. The implication is that the present may be sacrificed in the light of a better future, as understood by the movement in question. One example, at least implicit in Rorty’s perspective, is the case of socialism: the present generation might have to make sacrifices for a future generation, the movement is oriented towards a final goal, thus breaking with the reformist socialist Bernstein’s distinction that the movement is everything, the final goal is nothing. The movement, for Rorty, is precisely about such a final goal, in the light of which every present action must be evaluated.

The contrast then is between movement politics, which could equally well be called ideological politics, and on the other hand what Rorty calls campaigns, or what could be called issue politics. Campaigns are precisely about issues, about specific matters which are fought for in a limited way: rights of a particular group, a particular instance of environmental pollution or contamination, for instance. Do we stop this particular motorway, or at least protest against it? Do we campaign against the deportation or the denial of rights to migrant workers, les sans-papiers in France, or other European countries? When people take to the streets in the societies of contemporary liberal democracy, it is on particular matters: protests against going to war in Iraq, a demonstration against tuition fees for university students, protests against reform of pension laws and welfare measures. These, it could be said, are campaigns, concerned with particular issues, and they have a finite perspective. In other words they are not seen as contributing to a future and different society, but wish for change in the present, without the aspiration to build a new society. Indeed the results of the particular demonstration or campaign, its implications for the medium or long-term future, may be quite unpredictable and ambiguous, but that is not the concern of the ‘campainers’, whose focus is on the here and now of the particular campaign.

If this distinction is valid, then ideological or ‘movement’ politics has been replaced by issue or campaign politics, or at least the former mobilises fewer people than the latter. We are in a society of a ‘post-ideological’ kind, where it is not the struggle to create a better and totally different society, which occupies that section of the society, itself perhaps a minority, which engages with political activity. On the contrary, it is issues that focus on a particular grievance or matter which agitates the public that are the mobilising factor. We have become a society focusing on issues which are remediable in the here and now, rather than oriented to the vague possibility of ‘les lendemains qui chantent’, in the phrase of the French Popular Front of the 1930s – a golden future, perhaps for a successor generation to the present one, which would compensate for the disappointments or injuries of the present one.

This distinction is, however, a false one. Any struggle for a particular issue, or campaign, can only be justified in terms of a general philosophy, or ideology. To protest against a motorway or out-of-town supermarket is to be spurred on, maybe only implicitly, by a general ideology of ecologism or green politics. To
join in a march against war in Iraq might not be necessarily consciously equated to an affiliation to socialism or any ideology of the Left, but it seems to fit in with a broader philosophy of preferring peaceful resolutions of conflicts though international organisations such as the United Nations rather than the hegemony of the United States. So the distinction between movements and campaigns, between ideological politics and issue politics, seems to break down. Issues can only be identified as such within the framework provided by more general frameworks of ideological politics which give a map of the world, metaphorically speaking, and make it possible to specify why something is an issue and is worth fighting about, or demonstrating about.

However, there may be a tenable distinction between totalising or totalistic ideologies, and more partial or limited ones. The former invoke a picture of an ultimately harmonious society, and a project of overall social and political transformation, by whatever means this is to be achieved. The latter, the more fragmentary or molecular ideologies, as they could also be called, take a less holistic view of society and social change, trying to remedy specific grievances and refusing to sacrifice present generations for the sake of some future goal. In this sense then, a post-ideological society could be seen to be one where the two distinctions made already come together: a society where the politics of identity and molecular ideologies are more prominent than the ideological societies of the 19th and 20th centuries. These societies reached their apogee in the totalitarian forms of Nazism and Fascism in the 20th century. So we have identified two challenges to ideologies, which suggest we are living in a post-ideological society.

The purpose of this introductory chapter is therefore to provide a map of ideological conflict at the beginning of the 21st century. The preceding section has shown some of the forces which have made the established or traditional ideologies problematic. The aim here is to take these arguments further, to discuss the question of whether we do indeed find ourselves in a post-ideological society, or whether this notion is itself ‘ideological’ in the sense of presenting a distorted picture of reality.

The point of departure must be the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the collapse of Communist systems [Isaac, 1998]. The main ideologies of modernity, organised on the classic spectrum of Left and Right, emerged from the French Revolution of 1789, and the debates unleashed by that colossal upheaval. We are now living in a different world, even if it is not so easy to see with such clarity a line of division equivalent in our own times to that represented by 1789. The revolutions which brought the ending of Communism were what Habermas calls ‘nachholende Revolutionen’: revolutions of recuperation, catching up, as far as the citizens of Eastern and Central Europe were concerned, with what had long been taken for granted in liberal democracy in Western Europe [Habermas, 1991]. Ideas of political pluralism, the overthrow of the rule of the single ‘vanguard’ party of communist ideology, and the protection of individual rights and respect for the rule of law: these were some of the leading ideas of the revolutions of 1989 to 1991. Accepting for the moment the
collapse of Communism as marking the division between an old and a new map of the ideological scene, what has changed in this respect? In what ways are we living in a world different from that of the 20th century? The discussion follows a tripartite division: first the traditional or established ideological scene of late-20th century politics, second the factors which brought this into crisis, and third the shape, uncertain as it might be, of the ideological world in the current epoch. The ending of Communism is taken as symbolic of wider changes in society and politics, which have constituted a new shape of political ideologies.

The traditional ideological scene

Taking 1989 as the watershed, the period before this date was marked by a worldwide confrontation between liberalism and Communism, as distinct ideologies which each proclaimed a particular model of society and extolled that as the realisation of a free society. While this is of course presenting a picture painted with broad brushstrokes, it is true that the conflict between 'West' and 'East' was between two ideologies. In the West, the model held up was that of a liberal-democratic political system, operating in the context of a capitalist economy, and safeguarding (or so it was claimed) the rights of the individual. This was the model of a 'free society'. Politically, it was characterised by a plurality of parties competing for power, by a separation of powers and values of constitutionalism, and by some degree of judicial review of executive power. Economically, it involved the commitment to a free market system, in which the means of production were privately owned. However, 'Western' societies in the period after the Second World War were in many cases characterised by a mixed economy in which the state owned a considerable proportion of the productive resources. Here was the contribution of social democracy, a form of socialism which placed itself firmly in the 'Western' camp, but which sought to use the power of the state to mitigate the inequalities of the market system. Social democracy was thus a strong player in the ideological scene characterised here as the traditional one of the late 20th century.

The ideology of Communism was opposed in theory and practice to this model of liberal democracy existing in the context of a mixed economy. The ideal here was of a planned society, controlled by a single party acting supposedly in the interests of all, presiding over a society of equals in which the deep divisions of class conflict had been removed by the collective ownership of the productive resources. This rationally controlled society was proclaimed to be on the road to the ultimate disappearance of the state (so Khrushchev had announced), and furthermore, its superiority over the West in terms of equality, planning and rational use of resources, would lead to its eventual victory. It was proclaimed to be a higher form of democracy than the 'bourgeois democracy' of the West, crippled as that was by class inequality and crass consumerism.

If this is, in general outline, an accurate picture of the ideological world at the time of the height of the Cold War, then it has to be nuanced, since other
ideologies also played a part in this picture. We have already mentioned social democracy, an ideology forming part of the broader camp of socialism, and resolutely hostile to Communism which it saw as a totalitarian betrayal of socialism because of its denial of pluralism and the rights of liberal democracy. Nationalism, too, was not absent from the ideological scene. It is true, as many accounts make clear, that nationalism in the period after the end of the Second World War had been discredited by its association with National-Socialism and fascism. Indeed in the western context nationalism was written off as an atavistic backward-looking regression to primitivism whose true face had been revealed by its fascist form. However, we must not forget that nationalism experienced a new lease of life in the period after the end of the Second World War in the form of anti-colonial nationalism and movements of national liberation. Nationalism thus reveals itself as a powerful ideology, with different faces, and this is characteristic of its nature as an ideology of very contrasting political implications. On the one hand it was seen, rightly, as a set of beliefs exalting the nation, and having the corollary of antagonism to other nations. In this sense nationalism is clearly in the camp of ideologies of particularism, of opposition to the internationalist perspectives of liberalism and socialism. Yet in the form of anti-colonial nationalism, it revealed a different face entirely – that of liberation from foreign rule, invoking ideas of autonomy and national self-determination, which place it in the family of ideologies of the Left. Thus, in what is here called the traditional ideological scene, nationalism played a prominent part, despite its former links with movements of fascism and National-Socialism.

Thus we can offer a picture of the ideological scene in the mid-20th century world as dominated on a global scale by a rivalry between two models of society – liberal-democratic and communist – with the latter claiming ideological legitimation from Marxism, a claim which itself involves ideological distortion of Marxism as a critical ideology of politics. As for liberal democracies, it was frequently asserted that these were non-ideological, in two senses, and this has been a recurring argument in the recent history of liberal democracies. Firstly, the assertion was made that liberal-democratic societies were non-ideological in opposition to totalitarian societies, whether of communist or fascist variety. In those latter societies one set of ideas was imposed on everyone, and enforced through the agency of a monopolistic single party possessed of state power. In such societies it was not sufficient to ‘keep one’s head down’, and retreat into the private sphere, since there was no such private sphere. Totalitarian societies demanded the public affirmation, on an ongoing basis, of the one and only ideology, which permeated all aspects of society. Such affirmation took the form of mass rallies, the ritual acknowledgement of ‘Marxism-Leninism’ in all academic or artistic activity which had to be shown to be in accordance with the norms of the dominant ideology. Liberal-democratic societies, by contrast, could rightly assert that it was possible to assert or maintain any ideological position without fear of sanction, provided one accepted the standard liberal norms of tolerance, the rule of law, and respect
for the rights and beliefs of one’s fellow citizens. Liberal-democratic societies were thus non-ideological, or claimed to be so, in the sense that no single belief system was imposed on their citizens, who were left free to manifest their adherence to whatever political ideas they professed. It should however be noted that in reality liberal-democratic systems have not always adhered in practice to such broad toleration of a range of views: examples such as the period of McCarthyism in the United States, and for the earlier period of the Third French Republic, the intolerance towards clerics and those less enthusiastic about the secular republic (Machelon, 1976), show that liberal-democratic societies have not always lived up to their pluralistic ideals. Still, there was a clear distinction between systems in which the populace were forced publicly and ritualistically to manifest their allegiance to the single tolerated state ideology, and those in which a diversity of views was permitted, and where there was a private sphere of belief and personal life free from the interference of the state.

Secondly, the claim was made, most famously by Daniel Bell in his book of 1965, originally published in 1962 to be echoed in different ways by Francis Fukuyama over 30 years later, that liberal democracies had come to ‘the end of ideology’ (Bell, 1965; Fukuyama, 1992; Ryan, 1992). The claims of both authors were similar, and typified a self-belief of liberal democracy, that because there was no significant movement calling for radical change in the structure of Western society, these societies were therefore non-ideological, and that this marked a historical shift in the nature of liberal democracies. Corresponding to their different epochs, each book takes a different route to a similar conclusion. For Bell, the era of class struggle was over, and the coming of the welfare state had taken the wind out of the sails of revolutionary socialism. Speaking from an American perspective, he argued that the political parties competing for political power in Western democracies did not disagree on fundamentals of the political or social system. Conservative and liberal politicians might and did disagree on particular policies, and on the degree of state intervention in the economy: social-democrats favoured a higher degree of intervention; conservatives and liberals (in the European sense) were more inclined to let the free market function without any redistributive efforts by governments; but both sides in this debate accepted the framework of the liberal-democratic political system existing in the economic context of a capitalist system. In this sense, then, an ideological division between those who accepted the system as legitimate, and those who wished to replace it by a totally different form of polity and society, had been superseded. On a global scale, the world might be divided between the two rival systems of capitalism and communism, or liberal democracy and communism, but within liberal-democratic systems there was no deep ideological divide, and all politics was conducted within a framework of the mixed economy and the rules of the game of parliamentary politics.

However, as many critics of Bell pointed out at the time, did his analysis really establish an ‘end of ideology’? The standard criticism was to point out,
usually with the benefit of hindsight, that Bell’s somewhat conservative analysis of 1965 highlighting the end of ideology and ‘the exhaustion of political ideas’ was followed quite quickly in the later 1960s by a range of radical challenges to the existing order. The student riots of 1968, the urban riots in America, the upsurge of labour militancy in France and Italy, the birth or rebirth of feminist politics and movements of women’s liberation and transformation of sexual relations and marriage norms, all seemed far removed from any consensus on social and political theory. Far from political ideas being exhausted, the 1960s seemed to witness a regeneration of Marxist and socialist theory in universities, and on the global scene a more optimistic feeling stimulated by the Vietnam war that ‘people power’ and challenges to hierarchical relations in all spheres of life were possible. This is the conventional response to Bell’s assertion of the end of ideology. But there seems a deeper line of criticism, which is relevant to characterisation of the present era as well as that of the time of Bell’s original analysis. Even assuming it was true that there was no deep or overt ideological conflict in Western societies in the 1960s, this did not mean such societies were non-ideological or had witnessed the end of ideology. The absence of such ideological conflict or the presence of what seemed to be a consensus on the fundamentals of the established order might rather bear witness to the presence, and indeed success, of a very powerful ideology, of a form of liberalism tempered with a dose of social-democracy. This ideology was the ideology of Western liberal democracy, imposed not by the coercive mechanisms of a one-party state, as in totalitarian systems, but by more subtle mechanisms combining, as Gramsci put it, coercion and consent (Gramsci, 1971: 12). Compared with the repressive nature of Soviet-type systems, Western-type systems were indeed systems of freedom and pluralism, but this did not mean that they were free from ideological conditioning, or the ‘hegemony’ of established ideas, which limited political activity to authorised and ‘respectable’ channels of interest representation: parliament, mass parties and pressure groups operating within the structures of normal political institutions. This meant that the range of accepted political ideas and forms of political action was narrow. While liberal-democratic systems might in theory allow a wide range of political ideas to be debated and considered so that nothing was forbidden, in practice the span of effective political opinion was constrained by a dominant ideology which limited political debate to a set of questions concerned with managing the established system, and which blocked out by various filter mechanisms any more systematic questioning or challenging of that system.

Thus to conclude this picture of what has been called the traditional ideological scene: it was dominated by a global conflict between liberal democracies and communist systems, in which the former claimed to be non-ideological. This claim, it has been argued, was false, in that there was an ideology at work which justified the existing order, and discredited any alternatives to it. Apart from ideologies of liberal democracy and communism, both
nationalism and social democracy were strong presences on the ideological scene, the former in the shape of movements of anti-colonial national liberation, the latter in the form of mass parties and unions acting to humanise capitalism. How did all this change? This is a huge question but one that is necessary to answer because we are in an entirely different ideological scene in the contemporary world. To work out what this new disposition of ideological forces is, we have to explain those factors that shook, indeed destroyed, the previous one.

The crisis of the traditional ideologies

Our concern, then, is with the factors that caused change in the ideological scene and for its new players, and led to a different framework for ideological debate. In the traditional scene the dominant antagonism on a world-wide scale was that between communism and what called itself ‘the free world’. This latter was marked politically by liberal-democratic institutions, existing in a context of capitalism, which itself varied widely in the degree of state intervention tolerated in the workings of that system. But precisely because of the challenge of communism, even though this was not the only cause, the socio-economic elites of Western systems had to accept a degree of ‘social democratisation’ of their economies. This involved a significant role for the welfare state, and in general the removal of some spheres of life from the market system. This is not to say that it was solely because of the fear of communism that welfare state systems were instituted in many liberal-democratic systems after the Second World War. However, in the aftermath of a war fought against fascism, the immediate post-war period was one in which revolution seemed possible. Mass Communist parties in France and Italy were potent political forces, and remained so for the next 30 years or so. However Stalinised they were, or became, especially in the case of the PCF [French Communist Party], they symbolised or represented a kind of warning: that if liberal-democratic systems failed to take account of working-class pressures or demands, then those parties could come to power and install a different type of system. Indeed, in the immediate post-war period, those parties in France and Italy did share in power, albeit briefly. The onset of the Cold War led to the ousting of these parties from governing coalitions, but they remained as mass parties in the political system of their countries, exploiting devotion from their mass base, and claiming with credibility to be, as the French party claimed, a party ‘not like the others’ (Kriegel, 1972).

Even in countries like Britain where a Communist party was not a significant mass force, the period after the Second World War was one where organised labour was a significant force, where the radicalism emerging from the war gave rise to a spirit of refusal to tolerate mass unemployment and a return to the 1930s. Lloyd George’s warning to ruling groups after the First World War, that ‘if you do not give the people reform, they will give you revolution’
was relevant to the period after the Second World War as well. So perhaps it can be said that somewhat paradoxically it was under a general pressure of communism and fear of socialist transformation that conservative groups in liberal-democratic systems were led to tolerate some degree of ‘social democratisation’ of liberal-democratic systems that led to the stabilisation of such systems, or the neutralisation of the ‘threat from the Left’.

The purpose of the present section of this introductory chapter is to try and understand the factors which created a crisis of ideologies. This is a necessary prelude to the third and final part, which seeks to explain ‘where we are now’, as far as the nature of ideological politics in contemporary society is concerned. The traditional scene of ideological politics after the Second World War was marked by the global division and conflict between communism and liberal democracy, and the response of the latter to the former was marked by a social-democratisation of liberal democracy, a degree of social reform and redistribution which meant that a wider range of groups had a stake in the system. This refers above all to working-class movements, represented by trade unions and Labour or social-democratic parties. This did not by any means represent an ‘end of ideology’, as argued by Daniel Bell, but rather an ideology of containment or balancing of various interests within a system taken as given, and labelled with such names as ‘the mixed economy’, ‘the free world’, ‘liberal democracy’. In this situation, there already was manifest a tendency which has become more prominent in contemporary politics, a tendency to narrow the range of ideological conflict, to concentrate debate within a fairly limited part of the spectrum of political ideas. In this respect, what has been called post-ideological politics is not something totally new. There have always been tendencies to constrain or limit the scope of political debate so that political issues are debated as issues of how to work within a particular political and social system taken as given, rather than extend the sphere of political discussion to encompass debate about what kind of political system is desirable; what the nature of the good society is.

This then raises a more normative question of the relationship between ideology and democracy, or between ideological conflict and democracy. The confrontation between different ideologies is a necessary part of a healthy democracy, but clearly this is a position which requires justification. Ideological conflict or confrontation between different ideologies involves the debate, discussion and political struggle between competing views of how society should be organised, and the attempt to realise such views in practice. Without such confrontation between opposing ideologies, political life becomes stifled or limited, confined to a merely technical, though not unimportant, discussion about how to manage the existing political order. In this sense it is necessary to ‘rehabilitate’ political ideologies as necessary elements in a healthy democracy against those who wish to drive ideologies out of political life because they see them as dogmatic and totalitarian constructions which threaten democracy.
Such an idea is opposed by those who suggest that if a society is torn with conflict between proponents of different ideologies, who are unable to agree on any rules of the game, or have no values in common at all, then it is difficult to see how that society could cohere. In that sense then, this insight seems to be at the base of John Rawls’ form of liberalism, in his book *Political Liberalism*, where he wishes to exclude from political life what he calls ‘a comprehensive doctrine’, which we might call ideologies of politics (Rawls, 1996). Rawls announces that his essay on ‘the idea of public reason revisited’ is his ‘most detailed account of why the constraints of public reason, as manifested in a modern constitutional democracy based on a liberal political conception [an idea first discussed in *Political Liberalism* in 1993] are ones that holders of both religious and non-religious comprehensive views can reasonably endorse’ (Rawls, 2001: vi).

By ‘comprehensive views’ (whether religious or non-religious) Rawls really means ‘ideologies’, which indeed are comprehensive views of how society should be organised. He wishes to exclude such comprehensive views from political life, or to at least minimise their impact, through his device of an overlapping consensus. What Rawls says in *Political Liberalism* is that the liberal political ideal is one in which political power should be exercised ‘when constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice are at stake, only in ways that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of their common human reason’ (Rawls, 1996: 140). This means that the state must not impose any one ideology or substantive view (what Rawls calls a comprehensive view) on its citizens. Further than that, his argument is that given that we live in a society of ‘reasonable pluralism’, political life must exclude the political ideologies or comprehensive doctrines on which there could be no agreement between citizens: as Rawls puts it, ‘faced with the fact of reasonable pluralism, a liberal view removes from the political agenda the most divisive issues, serious contention about which must undermine the bases of social cooperation’ (Rawls, 1996: 157). This statement is complemented by his definition of a political conception: ‘a political conception is at best but a guiding framework of deliberation and reflection which helps us reach political agreement on at least the constitutional essentials and the basic questions of justice’ (Rawls, 1996: 156). What are the implications of this for the discussion of the relationship of democratic politics and political ideologies?

There is no doubt that a democratic society or a liberal-democratic society would preclude the state from imposing on its citizens any particular ideology or comprehensive view, since that would clearly lead to a monolithic or even totalitarian society, where dissenting or minority views are penalised and discriminated against by the state. Secondly, there can be no denying pluralism, reasonable or not, in modern societies – the fact that modernity means disagreement between citizens on issues of how society should be structured and organised. Indeed, such ‘reasonable pluralism’ finds expression in the presence of different political ideologies, historically and in contemporary politics, which explicitly articulate such perspectives. But the problem arises when we
have to work out what the role of ideologies is in political life. Rawls argues that
the sphere of the political is detached from particular conceptions of the good
embodied in broader political ideologies or comprehensive doctrines. It is this
which is to be challenged, as leading to an unrealistic and impoverished view of
political life which removes from the centre of political life precisely those issues
which should be basic to it, namely the conflict or contest between competing
conceptions of the good life, i.e. political ideologies. Ideologies have thus to be
given a more central place than Rawls seems to give them.

Rawls' argument therefore attempts to exclude political ideologies from the
centre of political life since there cannot be agreement on different conceptions
of the good society. His idea of public reason seeks to circumscribe the sphere of
'the political' to a constitutional framework embodying ideas of reciprocity and
autonomy. This is a symptom of a fear of ideological politics and a desire to limit
the area of the political to a consensus on constitutional essentials. However, the
argument presented here is that this cannot be done, and if attempted it leads to
an impoverished conception of 'the political' which in part accounts for the
narrowing scope of political debate in liberal-democratic societies.

The argument here now proceeds from a different perspective. Having said
that the shape of ideological politics was dominated by the opposition between
liberalism and communism, what factors have undermined this framework, and
what is the state of ideological politics in the contemporary world? Clearly, the
collapse of communism fundamentally changed the ideological scene in that
the main rival to liberal democracy on a world scale was no longer a presence
on the world scene. However, while the revolutions of 1989 marked a new
beginning in ideological politics, there were other factors at work which
unleashed or intensified a crisis of the ideologies which had dominated both
the 'long 19th century' as well as the 'short 20th century'. So the question to
be probed is what those factors were, and whether they have indeed led to
something that could be called a 'post-ideological society'.

It was stated above that both the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994) and the
politics of issues or campaigns (Rorty, 1995) have posed challenges to the shape
of ideological politics. The first of these, the politics of recognition, is linked with
ideas of multiculturalism and 'identity politics'. The core ideas of both can be said
to involve demands that the particular culture and values of groups are valued
and protected. In this sense, what is at stake is not the demand for the overall
transformation of society, but rather that the existing society opens up a space
for the culture of particular groups, and leaves them alone to follow their own
practices and customs. If ideological politics is concerned with projects of total
social transformation, identity politics rejects such projects in favour of demands
for recognition, or more positive valuing. In that sense such a form of politics
could be said to be 'post-ideological', because it abandons broad ideologies in
favour of narrower concerns, to do with the particular group (ethnic, cultural,
sexual, regional) and the practices and values specific to it. This marks a 'retreat
from ideology', and a withdrawal from wider schemes of political change.
The second transformation heralded above – a politics of single-issue campaigns and scepticism towards overarching models of the good society – also has implications suggesting the movement towards a post-ideological society. If the wider mobilisation of citizens can hope for some success only on specific issues or campaigns, then the broader horizon afforded by totalistic ideologies is shunned, and it is only action on discrete policies that is given any value.

The politics of identity or recognition and the politics of campaigns or single issues are both important features of contemporary politics. While not entirely new, they have become more salient in the contemporary world, for reasons that have to do with changes in the state and in capitalism, on a worldwide scale. The much greater degree of migration and flows of people, caused by or symptomatic of globalisation, make multicultural citizenship a reality. No longer are nation-states, if they ever were, communities of one dominant culture to which immigrants were expected to assimilate, keeping their own cultural identity as an almost secret private practice. Similarly, the greater scope of state action, itself a feature of much of modern history, so not itself a new phenomenon, has meant that there are few areas of life in which it does not come to impinge on citizens’ lives. Through the wider concern with ecological issues, and their politicisation, or the fact that such issues have become objects of government policy, citizens concerned with questions of the environment are likely to feel the impact of such policy.

More generally, the crisis of ideologies is indeed a real feature of contemporary politics. The concept of ‘fragmentation’ is important as an aid to understanding this phenomenon. By fragmentation is to be understood a society in which the concept of the collective, of larger aggregated forces of political agency such as class and nation, have become less significant in their structuring of political and social action. In turn this undermines the appeal or even the possibility of traditional ideological politics. It sparks a movement from totalising to molecular ideologies. The latter are less concerned with transforming society and more focused on partial particular actions, whether conducive to ‘recognition’ of certain identities or on specific ‘campaigns’ on certain policies or issues. However, it is to be argued that this turn from the totalising to the specific or molecular is not welcome, from a democratic perspective. Such a ‘turn’ may be understandable in the light of both the history of the 20th century, with totalitarian movements and their brand of ideological politics, and in view of the social changes on a global basis that have broken up the unity of units such as class and nation. Yet the fragmentation of ideological politics needs to be resisted, since it divides political communities into separate cultural and social enclaves, at greater risk of isolation from each other and antagonism between them. The argument to be presented in this book is that in the face of these tendencies towards social and ideological fragmentation, a revival of ideology is needed. This would involve the emergence of new forms of ideological politics better able than the old ones to both recognise and to overcome the divisive tendencies in contemporary politics. At a later stage
in this book the idea of a new counter-ideology will be advanced, different from the vacuous ideas of something like ‘the Third Way’. This counter-ideology is presented as a set of ideas critical of neo-liberalism, itself seen as the dominant presence on the contemporary ideological scene.

So the argument here is that in the aftermath of the collapse of Communism, certain tendencies were accentuated which have caused a crisis of ideologies. The idea of fragmentation is used to suggest that the institutions which used to provide the framework of politics have become weaker. In particular this refers to the nation-state, traditionally the unit within which ideological politics has been played out, and to a society structured on class lines. In a more diverse, individualistic society, in which collective forces and cohesive agencies of political and social change are less powerful, the ideologies of the past are also feebler, and less able to mobilise people for collective action. The concluding section of this chapter must then draw out the implications of what has been said, and conclude with a picture of the contemporary ideological scene.

**Where is ideology today?**

The final part of this chapter seeks to discuss, in the light of the preceding discussion, the main features of the contemporary ideological scene. The important question to be answered is whether because of the undoubted changes in society, ideological politics has become redundant. This would mean that overall schemes of social and political transformation have lost the appeal which they previously had, and that a much more fragmented society undermines the social base for totalising ideologies of thought and action. The argument to be developed here, and explored in more detail throughout the subsequent chapters, is that new issues have indeed heightened a crisis of ideologies. The map of the political world which guided politics for the last two centuries no longer provides helpful orientation in a fundamentally transformed society. The implications for ideological politics need to be thought through. If what are here called ‘old’ ideologies which are the familiar ones of the Left-Right spectrum are faced with the challenges of a fundamentally transformed society, different responses are possible. The first would be to write off these so-called ‘old ideologies’, and see them as having been replaced by the less totalistic or molecular ideologies which focus more on partial issues, and which have abandoned the overarching ambitions of previous modes of ideological politics. A second possibility would be to call for a process of ideological adjustment: that the hitherto dominant ideologies need refocusing, to adjust themselves and their concerns to a reality transformed in fundamentally new ways. One example of such a ‘retooling’, if such it can be called, would be the claimed adjustment of traditional social democracy to some form of ‘Third Way’ politics, taking account of new issues unaccounted for in the old style of socialist politics.

It is a different perspective which will be argued for here: it is maintained that a new picture of the ideological scene is needed, one which cannot be
easily encompassed by the traditional ideologies of Left and Right. This does not mean, however, that the notion of ideological politics is irrelevant, or that contemporary liberal democracy is best described either as ‘post-ideological’ or ‘non-ideological’. The ideological scene of contemporary liberal democracy is best characterised by a new bifurcation, between a hegemonic (but not unchallenged) neo-liberalism and a set of resistances which form the bases of an embryonic counter-ideology, itself seeking forms of definition and social agency. This requires an argument for a new map of the ideological scene, and an explanation of how this map relates to the ideologies that were previously the major players or mobilising factors in world politics.

First then must come a survey of the new factors or issues which threw the established ideological map of the world into doubt. What are the new concerns which have impacted on the ideologies of the modern period? These are placed under two related headings: first the issue of community and fragmentation, and second the issues of identity, which would encompass questions of religion as well as more general protests against the quantification of the world. While these are all not entirely new issues, they have arisen in much more exacerbated form, posing problems for political action and theory which are insoluble within the established categories of ideological politics. They thus force on us a rethinking of the ideological scene and the need to conceptualise political ideals in new ways, without abandoning the category of political ideology in general.

With regard to the first set of issues, the argument to be maintained here is that traditional ideologies of Left and Right did indeed seek to offer, as their mobilising vision, a picture of political and social community. Thus the issue of community is in itself nothing new. However the ideal of community, envisaged in different ways by the various ideologies of modernity, has become infinitely more difficult to achieve in a fragmented and more divided society, and thus has to be rethought on a global scale in ways which call for new political ideologies. The ideologies which emerged at the end of the 18th century, and whose agenda formed the material of modern politics, sought to remedy the disintegration of the newly-formed society of modernity. Certain social prerequisites were available for this task, or indeed were being brought into being by those ideologies themselves: above all those of the nation-state, based on a common culture, and the relatively structured bonds of class politics. In this sense Marx’s dictum is correct: ‘Mankind only sets itself such tasks as it can solve... the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation’ (Marx, 2000: 426). The meaning in this context is that the previously dominant ideologies not only offered an idea of community, but provided within their conceptual vocabulary the solution or the means to achieve this desired end. In the case, say, of nationalism or socialism, the ideologies in question not only posed the problem (How is a new community to be formed?) but offered a solution adequate to their time, whether in terms of an idea of national community,
however defined, or an idea of socialist community seen as emerging through the very process of capitalist production itself.

The situation now is different and more problematic, in that while aspirations to community and to a better or more satisfying society remain strong, they are more difficult to realise in a society which is not only more fragmented, but where the goals of community have to be recast at an international level. Those institutions, processes and social units which earlier or more traditional ideologies posited as the bases for their desired community are no longer available as the basis for their aspirations. It follows from this that old ideologies have to be recast or re-conceptualised in ways which mean they are no longer the same, and the ideological map of the world has to be seen in new terms, which will be sketched out below. However, more needs to be said on the way in which a new type of society has rendered critical the situation of established ideologies. It is argued here that it is not just a question of degree – i.e. that community, as envisaged by critical ideologies of the past, has become more difficult to achieve as the target or goal recedes. This is undoubtedly true, since the revolution of modernity has hollowed out to an unprecedented degree those forms of solidarity and human community which were relied on to make possible a new form of society. The task of achieving community is also more difficult in another way, because of the crumbling of those integrative forces of nation and class which were the predominant building blocks of a new social order, as envisaged in different ways by political ideologies of the modern period. The nation-state is now a much weaker building block, since it has been hollowed out both internally, by a variety of cultures, and externally, by flows of market forces. For much of the modern period the nation-state represented an attainable and a desirable form of political and social community founded on a shared culture, even though that shared culture was not naturally present as a given but was brought into being by agencies of the nation-state itself as a further confirmation of Marx’s dictum cited above. For example, the creation in France of the Third Republic and the forging of a republican-national synthesis was not the expression of an already created spirit of national solidarity but was itself the process of creating that sense of national unity and political solidarity of citizens. Similarly the process of ‘forging the nation’, historically well described in the British case by Linda Colley (2005), depended on bringing into being or reinforcing certain structures and mentalities (Empire, Protestantism, war with hostile nations) that forged a sentiment of national solidarity.

However, in the present situation, the forging of such sentiments of national solidarity, and of other kinds of community as well, comes up against greater obstacles or problems. Creating a common culture is a task of much greater difficulty since the multicultural nature of nation-states in the contemporary world means that the core on which to base a shared national identity has shrunk. A thinner conception of national identity thus seems appropriate, but one may doubt whether what Habermas calls ‘constitutional patriotism’ is
enough to generate reserves of community to bring citizens together in the ways envisaged by old-style nationalism. This may be no bad thing in some respects but it means then that new political ideologies have to be formulated that take account of this looser community; looser than that envisaged by ideologies of the past. To put it plainly, the argument here is that the much greater movements of immigration and flows of people and commodities across national borders have created aggregations of people to whom the traditional ideologies are of diminishing relevance. Community thus has to be reasserted in ways which are new, in theoretical frameworks which are not represented by existing ideologies of politics. The strategy of this book, which should be clarified at the very beginning, is thus a two-fold one: it is to assert firstly that integrative and mobilising ideologies of politics are necessary in the contemporary world, but, secondly, that the available ones are so badly crippled by changes in real life that they (and the aspirations they articulate) have to be reformulated in ways that may make them unrecognisably different from their previous forms.

Let us now then look at the second factor undermining or challenging existing political ideologies, shaping the ideological scene, which can be put under the broad label of ‘identity’. The ideas presented so far in this introductory chapter can be summarised in the following way: those ideas which dominated the ideological scene in the 19th and much of the 20th century are in crisis. The collapse of Communism opened up a new phase in the ideological scene, and the question at issue is how best to characterise this new phase. Are we in a situation that could be described as post-ideological, in which the broad visions which animated citizens, both activists and those who could be called the majority of the less involved, have lost their appeal? For some theorists, like Anthony Giddens, the contemporary situation can best be labelled as ‘beyond left and right’ (Giddens, 1994). Giddens argues that the traditional antithesis of Left and Right is no longer appropriate to describe the ideological scene of contemporary liberal-democratic societies. His argument centres on the propositions that both terms in this antithesis are irrelevant in a fundamentally transformed society. The Left, he asserts, used to be in the vanguard of progress and modernity, standing for an egalitarian society in which the state had a crucial redistributive role, exemplified by the welfare state. Yet this idea of a directing and coordinating state, which acts in a somewhat paternalistic way, is out-of-date in a more complex society of ‘reflexive modernity’. Such a society is marked by greater individualism, a rejection of the state imposing uniform ways of satisfying people’s needs. Hence the Left, according to Giddens, which used to embody values of innovation and progress, stands in contemporary society in a position of wishing to preserve a welfare and redistributive state out-of-touch with the needs of a society more diverse and resistant to state regulation.

By the same token, according to Giddens, the traditional Right is in equal difficulties. Appeals to traditional authority and a concept of hierarchy, both of which were central to old-style conservatism in Britain and elsewhere, have
lost their relevance in a society where tradition is a much weaker force, where
a more educated population rejects the deference and acceptance of estab-
lished institutions on which parties of the conservative Right used to rely.
Hence traditional conservatives either have to reinvent themselves as ‘new
Right’ neo-liberals, or accept that their vision of an organic and cohesive soci-
ety is doomed to have diminishing and minority appeal in a society that has
uprooted the traditional social bases and political institutions on which ‘old
Right’ politics and ideologies rested. The conclusion drawn is that in a society
beyond Left and Right, a new ideological approach is needed, which focuses
more on ‘lifestyle politics’, issues of consumption, individualism and the pri-
vate sphere which the established ideologies of the past neglected.

The arguments which Giddens uses to argue that we are in a situation ‘beyond
left and right’ stem from his analysis of contemporary society, seen as a society
of ‘reflexive modernisation’. Contemporary society is a ‘post-traditional’ one,
marked by ‘manufactured uncertainty’, and the implication is that new political
ideas are needed to respond to the changed conditions of this detraditionalised
society. His argument seems to be that new issues have come on to the agenda,
which the established ideologies of Left and Right (traditional socialism and
Marxism, and a conservatism cherishing tradition) are unable to grasp. Giddens
proposes that a radical alternative, which goes beyond ideas of Left and Right,
would have to comprise four sets of issues, which he lists as follows: humanized
nature; the idea of a post-scarcity economy; an idea of negotiated power; and
finally the invocation of ‘dialogic democracy’. These can be briefly explained as
follows: ‘Humanized nature’ involves an ecological perspective, which at least
some of the ideologies of the ‘classical’ Left did not take into account. The idea
of ‘post-scarcity economy’ rests on the proposition that scarcity has been over-
come, and that the emphasis on ‘productivism’ is inappropriate: ‘the dominating
influence of paid work and of economic concerns is placed in question’ (Giddens,
1994: 169). Giddens maintains that the objective of full employment makes little
sense any more, and that the goal of ‘productivity’ should replace that of ‘produc-
tivism’, since ‘productivity stands opposed to compulsiveness and to dependency,
not only in work but in other areas, including personal life’ (Giddens, 1994: 180).
Giddens further argues that an idea of negotiated power should replace imposition
of commands from above, and finally that a democracy based on dialogue
with those holding different cultural and political values should be practised out-
side the formal political sphere. The hope would be that such ‘dialogic democ-
archy’ would then react back on the formal political institutions of the liberal-
democratic polity.

The problem with these ideas is that they are extremely vague, and it is not
clear that they do necessarily mean the irrelevance or the supersession of ide-
ologies of Left and Right. There is no reason why, for example, ‘traditional’
socialism could not be ‘updated’ to take account of ecological issues, or to
adjust to a situation in which the traditional idea of a career for life is no
longer the realistic aspiration for much of the population. Indeed, as will be
argued later, this is the problem which confronts both ideologies of Left and Right. The problem is one of adjusting to a more ‘liquid’ society, as Zygmunt Bauman characterises the contemporary epoch (Bauman, 2000): a society in which previously fixed relations and structures, whether those of class, marriage, the nation-state, have become much more fluid and provisional. In response to the perspective proposed by Giddens, another way of viewing the subject-matter is offered here, which provides the framework for the more detailed treatment of particular ideologies which makes up the bulk of the ensuing chapters.

The relation between ideology and politics has become more complex and difficult to analyse in the contemporary age. The idea of ideological politics invokes the aspiration to mould society according to a grand pattern or vision which the ideology encapsulates. A more fragmented society with its ‘liquid’ nature does indeed undermine some of the premises on which the grand ideological projects of modernity rested, expressed in the traditional ideologies of Left and Right. In this sense, the picture offered by sociologists such as Bauman and Giddens is an accurate one: they present a view of a society much more divided and fragmented, in which there is greater scepticism towards the goal of political transformation. This therefore opens up the idea of the challenges faced by contemporary ideologies, by any attempt to transform the existing society in the light of an overarching philosophy of politics. This is the crucial question to be investigated in what follows: do ideologies have any place in this more liquid, sceptical society of ‘reflexive modernisation’ in which choice has a greater role to play? It is argued here that this does not make ideologies redundant, but on the contrary that the impoverishment of much of political life in liberal-democratic societies stems precisely from the weakness of ideological politics – the lack of broad visions which offer a goal to be striven for. If pragmatism is the opposite of an ideological perspective on politics, then an excess of pragmatism can be no less threatening than too much dogmatic adherence to an ideological framework for discussing political issues.

The starting point must therefore be to explain in what ways the hitherto dominant ideologies of politics have responded to the challenges emanating from a fundamentally transformed society. It is argued here that the starting point proposed by Giddens – that of a society of greater reflexivity and rejection of tradition – is correct, but this does not warrant the conclusion that a situation has been reached where political ideas are ‘beyond left and right’. Earlier in this chapter a distinction was introduced between totalising or holistic ideologies, and those which were more molecular or specific, concentrating not so much on the total transformation of society but more on particular issues, or aspects of social transformation. The question to be posed is whether there has been a transition from a society whose politics were dominated by struggles over the nature of society as a whole (ideological politics in the full meaning of the word) to one where the stakes are less totalistic, though that does not mean unimportant. By a molecular ideology would be meant
ideologies like feminism and ecologism, whose status as an ideology is disputed. Their ideological status is questioned because there are some doubts whether these two are ideologies in the sense of covering the full range of issues which constitute social life. Could there be a ‘feminist society’, or an ‘ecological society’, in the sense in which one could speak of a ‘conservative society’ or a ‘fascist society’? Those who give a negative answer to this question suggest that these theories of feminism and ecologism are too narrowly focused on one particular aspect of social life to merit admission to the ‘club’ of political ideologies. The aspect of social life with which each is concerned may be of crucial importance, but does that one aspect provide enough material to give answers to the question of how society in its totality should be constituted? Has the political life of liberal-democratic societies changed so that it is those more issue-oriented specific or molecular ideologies which have taken over from the traditional ideologies of politics that saw politics in more general and sweeping terms?

If this is so, then one would paint a picture of historical transformation in which the greater fragmentation or ‘liquid’ nature of contemporary liberal democracy has as its consequence a movement from grand theories to more narrowly-focused ideas, which avoid the pretensions of the larger projects of modernity. But this is too simplistic a picture. The basic arguments which underlie this book will now be set out, to conclude the chapter and provide the ‘leitmotif’ for the material that follows. The picture which will be developed in the next chapter seeks to defend the relevance of political ideologies to what is a new type of society, as well as the need for a new reading of the ideological map of the world, which gives due focus to the fundamental idea of hegemony or ideological domination, accompanied by opposition to such domination. It is argued that an accurate map of the ideological world has to recognise both the dominant role of one form of liberalism, here called neoliberalism, as well as the diversity of the challenges to it. Ideologies are still relevant to contemporary politics, and further than that, necessary to a healthy democratic life. However, the traditional ideological map of the world is no longer adequate: it needs reformulating, and in that sense there is a crisis of those traditional ideologies and of the language of politics which has dominated political life since the epoch of revolution unleashed by the American and French Revolutions. The next chapter seeks to present in broad terms the new ideological structure of the contemporary age, before in subsequent chapters tracing out the implications of this new ideological structure both for ‘old’ established ideologies and for the relative newcomers to the ideological scene. The focus throughout is on the notion of a crisis of ideologies, and the implications of this for the future development of political ideologies, which are seen as necessary elements in a fully democratic society. While ideological politics has, in the course of the 20th century, revealed its dangers – the possible degeneration of ideological politics into monolithic totalitarian dictatorships – this does not validate the conclusion that ideological politics should be rejected.
in favour of a politics of identity or a politics of issues. On the contrary, it will be argued here that the politics of identity or of issues are really impossible as guides to action without the broader framework provided by the ideologies of politics which form the subject matter of subsequent chapters. On the one hand these ideologies are in crisis, in the face of a fundamentally changed society; on the other hand, this does not warrant or support the argument that we are in a society on the world level which is free from ideology, or indeed could ever be. It is hoped that this view will be supported by the examination of particular ideologies of politics in subsequent chapters.

Further reading

On the background to contemporary ideologies:


Giddens, Anthony (1994) *Beyond left and right: the future of radical politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press (a broad survey, different in perspective from that proposed in the present book, which argues that new issues have made traditional Left-Right conflict out-of-date).

