Introduction

The historical interpretation of the world in general, and of global football in particular, raises specific problems regarding method and perspective. The writing of ‘world history’ became particularly prominent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but inclined strongly towards a rather Western-centric perspective. From the 1970s onwards, as ‘global history’ developed as a counterpoint, greater attention was directed towards hitherto marginalized voices and non-Western societies (Robertson 1992: 29–30, 1997; Schafer 2006). Similar trends have arisen within football studies, wherein relatively national or Eurocentric histories have been displaced by studies that chronicle and indeed celebrate the historical diversity and socio-cultural complexity of the ‘global game’ (cf. Walvin 1994; Armstrong and Giulianotti 1997, 1998a, 2001, 2004; Goldblatt 2004, 2006; Lanfranchi et al. 2004).

The distinction between world and global history has noteworthy parallels in the way in which ‘globalization’ has been understood by particular analysts. Paralleling the ‘world history’ model, some analysts tie globalization historically to the emergence and international diffusion of Western modernization – notably capitalism, industrialism and bureaucratization – from the nineteenth century onwards (cf. Giddens 1990; Scholte 2005). We might call this the ‘world globalization model’. Conversely, and mirroring a ‘global history’ standpoint, other analysts view globalization as a longer-term, diverse and multidimensional phenomenon. In this latter perspective, which we might term the ‘global globalization model’, the modern West figures prominently but not exclusively, for crucially we find also an appreciation of how ancient civilizations, Islam, south and east Asia, and Africa, for example, have constructed distinctive forms of globality and have contributed to particular kinds of transcultural interdependence (cf. Hopkins 2002; Robertson 1998a; Robertson and Inglis 2007; Therborn 1995, 2000). For example, Pollock (2000) encourages reflection on ancient kinds of globalization, arguing that outward looking, ‘cosmopolitan’ literary cultures predominated through much of the first millennium, followed by more inward-looking, ‘vernacular’ thinking through much of the second.
This is not, of course, to argue that the ‘global globalization’ model is at odds with the analysis of modernity per se. Indeed, we should note the apparent affinities that arise between the global globalization model and theories of ‘multiple modernity’. This latter perspective posits in part that non-Western societies modernize in distinctive and selective ways relative to the West (cf. Arnason 2001; Eisenstadt 2003; Rostow 1960). For example, as we also note in Chapter 3, many East Asian societies have germinated particular kinds of capitalism or religiosity that are distinct from those dominant models within ‘Anglo-Saxon’ societies (cf. P. Berger 1986; S. Berger and Dore 1999; Beyer 1994; Dore 2000).

In line with these ‘global’ models, our discussion of football’s history seeks to highlight the varied, complex and reversible ways in which different societies have engaged with and interpreted the game. In clarifying this point, we should make three initial remarks. First, we need to bear in mind the categorical distinctions between the terms global history, global change and globalization. Global history refers to a particular way of imagining and telling the past of the world. Global change designates specific modifications or transformations in the world that possess some kind of empirical or material referent. And, to reaffirm our statement in the introduction, we understand globalization as referring to the increased concrete interdependencies of societies and to the greater consciousness of the world as a whole (cf. Robertson 1992: 8). Second, we are not advancing the view that globalization, whether in regard to football or to other socio-cultural forms, constitutes some kind of ‘triumph of the West’ over the rest. Rather, the game displays many historical instances in which the West itself is either socio-culturally divided or ‘left behind’ by other nations and regions. An analogous dispute has recently surrounded the ontological presumptions of the sociology of globalization per se: specifically, that the dominance of a so-called ‘northern’ theory of globalization serves to silence voices and to occlude competing interpretative frameworks from the Global South (Connell 2007). This critique itself builds upon a rather narrower, northern-focused position than that of our own, in defining globalization as ‘the current pattern of world integration via global markets, transnational corporations, and electronic media under the political hegemony of the United States’ (Connell 2005: 72). Nevertheless, and in accordance with our earlier separate works on globalization and football, our focus here is quite clearly on both northern and southern hemispheres, on the fully ‘global’ aspects of the global game.

Third, we are advancing the view that football has been a highly important aspect of globalization processes; indeed, the sport’s significance in this regard is arguably intensifying. To put this in another way, and as we shall see in this chapter and later, football has been a motor, as well as a mirror, of globalization processes in a variety of ways.

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1For example, our books tend to have a global focus; see, for example, Robertson (1992), Nettl and Robertson (1968), Giulianiotti (1999a), and Armstrong and Giulianiotti (2004). Our works more generally have been translated into at least twenty languages.
**Five Historical Phases of Globalization**

In the following discussion, we examine in detail the football–globalization nexus across the *longue durée*. Our analysis is structured by Robertson’s six-phase schema of globalization, which spans the fifteenth century to the early twenty-first century (1992: 58–60; 2007a, 2007b). Our main focus is on setting out briefly the initial five phases that Robertson had extended, before applying these in detail to facilitate a succinct ‘global history’ of football. We then provide an outline, followed by a football application, of the current sixth, ‘millennial’ phase of globalization, as recently advanced by Robertson. Many of the football–globalization processes identified in this discussion are elaborated upon in later chapters.

Robertson’s five general phases of globalization may be summarized as follows.

The first, *germinal* phase of globalization is focused on Europe, and spans the early fifteenth century through to the mid-18th century. Through this period, voyages of ‘discovery’ occur and are the crucial precondition for early forms of transoceanic connectivity and colonial subjugation. National communities emerge (underpinned particularly by the Peace of Westphalia, 1648) and Catholicism expands internationally. Different kinds of mercantilist economic principles and political strategies come to prevail in Western Europe – for example, through the Colbertist system in France – and are manifested in part through struggles and wars between protectionist nations over available international markets. Contemporary time–space thinking is concretized through the Gregorian calendar, heliocentric thinking and the proliferation of different geographic projections; ideas of the individual and humanity are accentuated.

The second, *incipient* phase remains largely European, and spans the mid-eighteenth century to the 1870s. The French Revolution has a near-global and long-lasting impact in terms of concretizing themes of revolutionary transformation and human emancipation for industrializing societies. It also presages an embryonic world conflict, in the form of the Napoleonic wars, and the subsequent crystallization of the international system through the post-war settlement. The Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which effectively destroyed the city and killed up to 100,000 people, was a global ‘moment’ that undermined Portugal’s colonial aspirations while impacting strongly upon Enlightenment thought. A near-global model of homogenous nation-states is established, alongside advances in international relations, legal frameworks, and communication systems (for instance the telegraph system). Conceptions of citizenship and humanity are concretized (notably through the Enlightenment), non-European societies are established, and early international exhibitions are staged.

The third, *take-off* phase marks the electrification of globalization, spanning the 1870s to the mid-1920s. The four ‘elemental reference points’ of
Globalization are crystallized: individual selves, national (male) societies (nation-states), the world system of societies (international relations), and humankind (Robertson 1992: 104). Thus, personal and national identities become more sharply thematized and defined. Modern national societies become more isomorphic in terms of their juridical, political and institutional infrastructure. Non-European societies enter an increasingly complex international society – most notably the USA and Japan. Forms of international culture become more diffuse, for example in the arts and sport. Rapid technological advances help to promote intensive international ‘connectivity’. Ideas of global humanity are formalized, while the first global conflict occurs. Yet each reference point is also constrained by the other three.

Many national museums, international exhibitions and major sporting events are founded or staged, such as the quadrennial Olympic Games from 1896 onwards. These institutions or occasions serve to construct a global looking-glass for nations while also implicitly enhancing the value of international contextualization and competition. Thus, national claims to being ‘the best’ in particular cultural realms are advanced on the basis of international and cross-cultural comparisons.

During this phase, there is a strong accentuation of principles of national self-determination and identification. The ‘Wilsonian moment’ occurs at the end of World War One, as the principle of the equality of all nations is set out on the global stage, inspiring anti-colonial politics that were to result in nationalist revolutions later in the twentieth century (Manela 2007). Meanwhile, throughout this phase, particular national ‘traditions’ are invented, such as through artistic movements, dress, language, and sports. Such ‘forgery in the forging of nations’ connects to rapid social transformations, notably urbanization and mass education (Ascherson 2002: 264; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983: chapter 7). ‘Wilful nostalgia’ also becomes more prominent, as the world is imagined in terms of historical decline, and through senses of loss, homelessness, estrangement and alienation (Robertson 1990a: 46; 1995: 35; cf. Stauth and Turner 1988). Nostalgia is prominent in culture, through popular literature or the ‘folk’ tropes of European composers. On the other hand, the counter-movement of modernism is also very significant (Gay 2007).

The fourth, struggle-for-hegemony phase spans the mid-1920s to the late 1960s, and continues to be shaped by the elemental reference points. Rival political–ideological frameworks come into sharper and more global conflicts, notably between liberal capitalism, state socialism, and fascism. The League of Nations and then the United Nations reflect moves towards global governance, while concretizing principles of national self-determination and the realpolitik of Anglo-European hegemony (Manela 2007). The old European

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3 Of course, the national self-determination movement, which peaked with the League of Nations, was a critical precondition for the establishment of international football.
empires collapse, the ‘Third World’ is established, and nation-states are defined by their Cold War positions. The future of humanity is thematized across cultures, as new technologies of mass destruction are registered by the Holocaust, the A-bomb, and the international stockpiling of atomic weaponry.

The fifth, uncertainty phase spans the late 1960s up to the year 2000. Increased wealth, economic crises and ‘post-materialist’ values arise in the West. The global event par excellence – the moon landing – provides fresh ways of imaging and imagining the world. The world system of societies becomes increasingly fluid and complex, as the ‘Cold War’ ends and militant Islamism emerges as the West’s radical other. An exponential growth occurs in new global and social institutions, notably international governmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), and new social movements (NSMs). Cultural and social politics become more prominent as ethnicity, gender, sexuality, consumerism and human rights are deeply politicized. Satellite and digital communication is established, the internet is globalized, and media TNCs are founded. The notions of a global ‘civil society’ and global citizenship are thematized, alongside the status and future of humankind in regard to contemporary ‘risks’ (cf. Robertson 2007a).

Football History: Five Phases

In applying this model to football’s historical globalization, two initial points should be made. First, some empirical and temporal discrepancies inevitably arise between global and football histories, notably up to the mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, we retain the terms ‘germinal’ and ‘incipient’ to describe football’s prehistory, with appropriate amendments to the periodization; by the ‘take-off’ phase, football and wider globalization processes are in closer correspondence. In any case, this historical model of globalization was not intended to be applied in a rigid manner (Robertson 1992: 59).

Second, our analysis accounts for the social construction of football’s history. The five-phase model appreciates the interplay of particular themes at relevant historical moments, notably in regard to the four elemental reference points, from ‘take-off’ onwards.

First and second phases: germinal and incipient – up to 1870s

The first, germinal phase covers football’s prehistory up to the early nineteenth century. We should begin by noting that some emerging disputes surround the origins of football. As expansion into Asian markets has become a major objective, FIFA literature and press releases tend to highlight the region’s ancient foot-ball games. 3 One ancient ball-kicking game

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was *tsu-chu*, played in China between the second and third Centuries BC, while the Japanese game of *kemari* was practised from at least the twelfth Century AD (Goldblatt 2006: 5–9). The Florentine game of *calcio* has been played, particularly by those with social status, since at least the sixteenth century. Other *calcio* games were played across northern Italy, according to local rules, serving to maintain forms of civic and regional distinction (De Biasi and Lanfranchi 1997: 88–9). Elsewhere, other nationalistic claims to football’s origin have been advanced, including Stalinist social history which stated the case for Georgian or northern Russian feudal games, named *lelo* or *shalyga* respectively (Edelman 1993: 29).

In contrast, while noting these ancient curiosities, most academic histories continue to prioritize direct evidence to emphasize the British origins of modern football (cf. Murray 1996; Walvin 1994: 11–12; Lanfranchi et al. 2004: 11). In Britain, different ‘folk’ or ‘mob’ football games were contested as early as the fourteenth century, and possibly extend back to the eighth century (Henderson 2001: 80). Participants were almost entirely male, notably from the lower classes. Games were played according to local customs and often as part of annual festivities such as Shrovetide (the British Mardi Gras), with rival teams differentiated according to village, parish, employment, age or marital status (Magoun 1938: vii; Elias and Dunning 1986; Holt 1989: 14–15). Given the rudimentary rules and prior tensions between competing communities, broken bones and occasional deaths occurred during play. The authorities regularly sought to ban these games, usually to maintain work and public order (Walvin 1975: 16–17). Some analysts have suggested that two main types of folk football were played, dating back to at least the late eighteenth century, with different rules that connect respectively to the modern games of rugby and soccer (Goulstone 2000: 135–6, 142). These pre-modern games and pastimes underwent general adaptation, notably during the early nineteenth century, as Britain underwent protracted industrialization and urbanization.

The second, *incipient* phase of football’s globalization spans the early nineteenth century to the 1870s. Shaped by the crucial interplay between educational institutions and residual folk cultures, this phase culminated in the foundation of modern football. From the 1830s onwards, English public schools underwent a ‘games revolution’, as different sports were introduced to dissipate the rebellious, violent and sexual energies of pupils, and to inculcate new masculine norms centred on leadership, obedience, hygiene and Christianity, as encapsulated in the sporting myth of ‘fair play’ (Mangan 1981: 129–130; Mangan 1998: 182–3). Significant rule-differences remained over the football games played by schools; for instance, Eton and Harrow prohibited catching and running with the ball, unlike Rugby. These games subsequently transferred to the universities, where hands-free football made particular headway at Cambridge.

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*The English writer John Gay penned some verse on ‘The Dangers of Football’ circa 1720, based on his experience of ‘the Furies of the Foot-ball War’, in which various young tradesmen make up a ‘throng’ or ‘crew’ of eager players (see Gay 1974: 153).*
We should also be wary of the way in which this public school story has rather overshadowed a hidden history of football’s working-class origins and organization. Indeed, it has been argued that adapted ‘folk’ games were often more civilized than their public school counterparts, in being more sophisticated in the use of rules, umpires and club systems, and also involved less violence among participants (Goulstone 1974, 2000; Harvey 2005).

It was the social elites, nevertheless, who were instrumental in establishing football’s rules. As elite teams came into more regular contact, the demand for common rules had intensified. The ‘Cambridge Rules’ were agreed in 1848, regularly updated, and eventually published in 1863. A few days later, the Football Association (FA) was founded in London by various teams committed to a game that banned hacking and handling (Murray 1996: 3–4). The new game of ‘association football’ was sometimes known as ‘soccer’, notably where alternative ‘football’ codes were favoured. In the north, notably Sheffield, a vibrant football culture had initially eclipsed London but by 1877 the FA had secured its authority over the non-handling game (Harvey 2001).

The rulebook distinguished association football from other codes. Rugby’s proponents stayed loyal to handling and hacking, despite player shortages (Birley 1993: 258–160). ‘Australian rules football’ was codified in Melbourne in 1859 by an old Rugbeian and his friends. (Indeed, a little mischievously, some commentators suggest reverse colonialism may have transpired, as the FA’s rules reveal curious similarities to the older, Australian game (Grow 1998: 11–12)). In the United States, the leading colleges battled over football’s rules: soccer-style (backed by Yale) or rugby-style (favoured by Harvard). The Princeton–Rutgers fixture of 1869 was the first intercollegiate football contest. Six years later several institutions agreed rugby-style rules, but distinctive American innovations, such as block-tackling and fixed sets of play (‘downs’), were introduced to produce the unique ‘American football’ code (Gorn and Goldstein 1993: 131).

Aided by ‘universal’ rulebooks, the game’s cult underwent different kinds of ‘mini-globalization’ through British influence overseas. Chief proselytizers of these games included schoolmasters and missionaries who were emboldened by a ‘complacent and confident ethnocentricity’, and were determined to cultivate a ‘universal Tom Brown’ in all imperial outposts; thus, ‘in the most bizarre locations could be found those potent symbols of pedagogic imperialism – football and cricket pitches’ (Mangan 1998: 18, 182).

**Third phase: take-off – 1870s to mid-1920s**

The third, take-off phase covers the 1870s to the mid-1920s, when football became embedded within the popular cultures of Europe and South America, and in ‘Europeanized’ parts of Africa, Asia and North America.

Britain was first to generate many standard traits of contemporary football, in terms of working-class popularity, league structure, and professionalization.
The FA was dominated by southern elites, but working-class teams mushroomed in schools, parishes, and workplaces, abetted by increased leisure time (particularly Saturday afternoons), better public transport, and growing newspaper coverage of fixtures. As thousands of spectators were drawn to the leading fixtures, and as hidden payments became more widespread, the FA’s old amateurist elites were forced to relent, and so player professionalism was legalized in 1885; the world’s first league soon followed, in 1888.

The international diffusion of British games followed two trajectories. Sports like rugby and cricket were popularized through the ‘colonial ecumene’ across imperial outposts, while football spread through a ‘trading ecumene’ via business and industrial routes and in relatively informal social ways (Appadurai 1995: 25; Perkin 1989). British maritime and industrial workers in the 1870s and 1880s played football matches in numerous ports across the Channel, North Sea, Mediterranean, Black Sea, South American coastline, and in Asian outposts such as Hong Kong (Murray 1996: 24; MacClancy 1996: 192; Edelman 1993: 29). Everyday social relations contributed massively to the incubation of football within these settings, as local people watched the British play and, in emulation, were inspired to found their own clubs.

Three aspects of modernization were prominent. First, new football hotbeds were typically undergoing rapid urbanization and industrialization; for example, in South America, Buenos Aires grew from 178,000 inhabitants in 1869 to 1,576,000 by 1914, and São Paulo expanded from 40,000 in 1880 to 800,000 in 1920 (Taylor 1998: 26). These and other cities – notably Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo – harboured large populations of European migrants for whom football was an accessible, enjoyable medium of cross-cultural socialization, and so the game was rapidly transmogrified into the urban, ‘national sport’.

Second, young foreign pupils in British-led schools often returned home to teach football to their compatriots; for example, Anglo-Brazilians like Charles Miller and Oscar Cox founded clubs in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro respectively (Del Burgo 1995: 52–3; Mason 1994: 1–11). Football was taught in many overseas British schools, but failure to sustain a foothold could damage the game’s local diffusion, as transpired in New Zealand and other imperial dominions where when rugby dominated elite education (cf. Little 2002: 40–45).

Third, modern social clubs enabled football’s popular expansion. Across Europe, Anglophile locals founded sport clubs in which football teams blossomed. By 1900, in Italy for example, the Genoa, Juventus, Milan, and Palermo clubs had been established. In Japan, the modernizing Meiji period (1868–1912) enabled European residents to introduce football and other sports to local elites, mainly through schools and sporting clubs (Guttmann and Thompson 2001: 70–1).

Nevertheless, some British colonists viewed football as another sport that embodied imperial manliness and Christianity (Mangan 2001: 41).
In line with Rogers’ (1962) analysis of cultural diffusion, we may observe that football typically depended upon initial patronage by local elites before spreading through the population (Guttmann 1994: 43–44, 70), most obviously in South American nations like Brazil, Peru and Uruguay (Mason 1994: 13–14; Leite Lopes 1997: 56; Carvalho, Stein and Stokes 1984: 21; Giulianotti 1999b: 136–7). In France, football spread among the Anglophile bourgeoisie and in port cities, then settled in multi-sports clubs, secular and religious institutions, and in the military when national service was established in the 1880s (Hare 2003: 16–18). Conversely, German elites prohibited football in schools and the military, as an alien British threat to the gymnastic Turnen movement (Murray 1996: 26; Merkel 2000: 169–171; Eisenberg 1991).

The British were highly active in football’s civil society development. First, expatriates taught, organized and popularized the game, notably Scotsmen John Hurley (in Montevideo) and John Madden (Prague), and Englishmen Harry Welfare (Rio) and Jimmy Hogan (Vienna). Second, the British inspired the foundation of many clubs and governing bodies, as reflected in the ‘archaic’ names of leading South American sides such as Corinthians (São Paulo), River Plate (Buenos Aires), Newell’s Old Boys (Rosario), Wanderers and Liverpool (Montevideo). Argentina’s football bodies retained English as their official language until 1906, and only inserted the Spanish term fútbol into their title in 1934 (Mason 1994: 2–4; Archetti 1996: 203). Third, illustrating modern linguistic transmission, many English football-related terms (such as offside and corner) were transferred directly into local languages or, as in Russia, creolized to fit local phonetics (e.g. forvard, gvgolkiper) (Okay 2002: 6–7; Frykholm 1997: 147–8).

Critically, British elites failed to formulate an internationalist political strategy to match the social efforts at grassroots level. Thus FIFA, the body which would soon govern world football, was founded in 1904 by seven mainland European football nations, with belated and highly ambivalent British participation. Only through the IFAB, which governed the laws of football from 1886 onwards, was British long-term political influence secured.

We noted earlier that the ‘take-off’ period was shaped increasingly by the inter-relationships of the four elemental reference points, namely individuals, national societies, international relations, and humankind. Football was no exception.

At the individual level, some players were venerated as local male heroes in communities and, through press reports, nationally. British professionals were typically working-class, but enjoyed notably better earnings, conditions and far higher social status than other workers (Mason 1980: 103; 1996). Match reports in the 1900s often lionized individual exploits rather than team events; in turn, some top players like Billy Meredith and Steve...

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The process of influence and emulation could also go the other way; for example, since their foundation in 1865, the English side Nottingham Forest have played in ‘Garibaldi Red’, in honour of the Italian redshirts.
Bloomer set out to entertain crowds and featured at times in stage shows and films (Woolridge 2002). Yet Britain’s players faced two squeezes upon their autonomy. On the field, individualistic playing styles were tempered by more cautious and defensive playing systems. In England in the 1870s, the number of forward players was reduced from eight to seven, and ‘combination’ or passing football was promoted, particularly by Scottish professionals (Russell 1997: 20–1). Soon, two further forwards were withdrawn, giving the 2–3–5 formation (Lodziak 1966: 22–3). Off the field, the ‘retain and transfer’ system prevented players from moving freely between clubs, such that, in many cases, professionalization strengthened the industrial power of club officials (Russell 1997: 25–7; Mason 1980).

At the level of national societies, by the mid-1920s, football was the dominant sport, and contributed strongly to public life. In England, league crowds quintupled between 1889 and 1914 to an average 23,000 (Tranter 1998: 17). Cup final attendances of over 100,000 became common, surging to around 200,000 at the famous 1923 Wembley final. Many British grounds were often poorly equipped to support this popularization, sometimes with disastrous consequences: for example, 26 died and 500 were injured when a stand collapsed at Rangers’ Ibrox stadium in 1902.

In Europe, football crowds and stadium development were markedly smaller: for example, by 1926, Milan’s leading stadium only held around 35,000, while in Madrid the capacity was nearer 15,000 (Inglis 1990: 11, 210). More impressively, in France, the 1924 Olympic football final was held in the packed 60,000 Colombes stadium (Mason 1995: 31). In Latin America, crowds at fixtures featuring British teams reached several thousand, but in Brazil larger stadiums only held around 20,000 until Vasco’s 50,000 capacity ground opened in 1927 (Leite Lopes 1997: 62). Yet national interest in football was sustained by newspapers and magazines across Europe and South America. Several sport-focused publications emerged during this period – such as *La Gazzetta dello Sport* (Italy, in 1896), *El Mundo Deportivo* (Spain, in 1906) and *El Gráfico* (Argentina, in 1919) – and were soon dominated by football.

Football was structured along national lines. National associations and leagues were formally established in the four British ‘Home Nations’ by 1890. Mainland Europe followed, for example, with the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Germany all hosting football associations and leagues by 1902. In South America, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil had all established national governing bodies by 1914, but league tournaments centred on major urban centres were the norm.

Major football fixtures helped to cement national solidarity, generating strong communities of sentiment that were sustained by nation-building narratives in the media. Football fixtures and tournaments graced significant national days, such as the 1916 independence celebrations in South America. As Latin Americans established their own teams, many were named in honour of national heroes and events. Overall, rather as other analysts have pointed to administrators and railroad workers, so we would
emphasize the role of football players, coaches, teams and tournaments, in connecting cities and towns with hinterlands, and building forms of national identity at grassroots levels.

National ‘traditions’ in playing style started to emerge. In England, robust physical play was prominent alongside the residual, tricky spontaneity of some individualistic dribblers (Mason 1980: 208–213; Russell 1997: 25). Scotland’s industrial heartlands produced numerous technically-proficient players who excelled at the passing game, and subsequently transformed football methods in Britain and then in Europe. In Argentina and Uruguay, the concept of *fútbol rioplatense* was developed in the early twentieth century, ‘based on a superb technique, keeping, with endless touches, possession of the ball, and on rapid changes of rhythm in the attack,’ while also playing at different tempos across the pitch (Archetti 1996: 204). Uruguay could also be rather more pragmatic, alternating between combative and passing styles with remarkable results to win the 1924 and 1928 Olympic football gold medals (Giulianotti 1999b; cf. Taylor 1998: 29).

The invention of traditions was stronger where teams represented particular publics and ways of life. In Germany, the club name Borussia (from the Latin for Prussia) became commonplace. In South America, many clubs reflected strong class-defined habituses, giving rise to subsequent rivalries between elites and the ‘popular classes’ e.g. in Peru, Universitario-Alianza Lima; in Paraguay, Olimpia-Cerro Porteño; in Rio, Fluminense-Flamengo; in Porto Alegre, Grêmio-Internacional, and so on. Similarly, in Europe, class-inflected derbies still underpin the game’s popular folklore: in Milan, between Internazionale and AC Milan; in Lisbon, between Sporting and Benfica; in Seville, between Sevilla and Betis; and in Istanbul, between Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş.

In Europe, more extensive ‘ideologies of home’ underpinned some club identities, with specific ethno-national and ethno-religious ingredients. For example, Basque national politics and identity rapidly crystallized in the late nineteenth century, and several clubs were founded soon afterwards. Athletic Bilbao became a leading team in Spain, and instituted *la cantera*, a policy committed to recruiting only ‘Basque’ players. In Scotland, the Rangers–Celtic ‘sectarian’ rivalry was well established by 1914. Celtic were founded as a charitable organization for poor Irish-Catholic immigrants while Rangers were staunchly Unionist, Protestant and refused to employ known Catholics.

Across Mitteleuropa, Jewish clubs were formed and embraced a strong ethno-religious identity, adorned in the blue-and-white colours of Israel and wearing the ‘Star of David’ on their jerseys. Jewish communities adapted the British colonial ideology of ‘muscular Christianity’ to sculpt ‘muscular Judaism’ as a strategy for combating ‘Jewish distress’ and wider anti-Semitism (Foer 2004: 69–70).

In colonial contexts, football matches could become sites of nationalist resistance towards occupying powers. In Korea, locals painted goalposts white to symbolize nationalist opposition towards Japanese occupation (Jong-Young
2004: 77–8). In India, local victories against British sides symbolized the national potential for independence (Majumdar and Bandyopadhyay: 2005: 124–141). Yet the myth of British invincibility and superiority was hard to deflate, whether among football’s world officialdom or during international fixtures; beating England remained elusive for many national teams that were more technically accomplished (cf. Meisl 1955: 61–2).

The take-off phase witnessed early but recurring claims by local clubs to have the deepest football histories. In Spain, Athletic Bilbao, Barcelona, and Recreativo Huelva all claim to be the first Spanish club (Ball 2003: 43). In Germany, club names such as TSV 1860 München, FC Schalke 04, or Hannover 96 contain claims to their respective years of foundation, yet the dates typically allude to the start of sporting participation as a whole and not to the football team’s establishment (Hesse-Lichtenberger 2002: 22).

Finally, it is important to consider the debates and evidence regarding contexts in which football’s take-off was less obvious or rather circumscribed. First, there is the issue of social contact: indigenous populations in many parts of rural Africa or Asia had relatively little exposure to football due in large part to their restricted everyday social relations with Europeans or with modern educational systems. Second, there is the issue of cultural differentiation or rejection of football: in many former British territories and New World societies – notably the Indian subcontinent, the United States, Canada, Australia and Ireland – particular sports other than football were embraced or developed, at least in part as a way of constructing distinctive forms of cultural nationalism, often across very dispersed and ethnically varied populations. This is not to say that football was entirely expunged from these locations; indeed, there were some significant pockets of strong football activity, such as St Louis in the United States, Calcutta in India, and Irish towns and cities where British barracks and emerging heavy industries were to be found. We discuss these issues in rather more depth in Chapter 2, notably regarding the United States.

Football’s international relations underwent ‘take-off’ in five particular ways. First, the Home Nations established their own national championship in 1884, and founded the IFAB two years later. Second, formal international football relations intensified and were built upon nation-state lines, notably within FIFA (cf. Beck 1999: 56–7). Thus, the organizational framework of the new governing body was strongly informed by Wilsonian principles of national self-determination, and would subsequently enable elites from non-Western and post-colonial societies to exercise major political influence in football non-Western and post-colonial societies to exercise major political influence in football from the 1970s onwards. During the take-off phase, international fixtures became commonplace, notably in South America, where Argentina met Uruguay 41 times between 1901 and 1914 (Mason

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7 The Korean FA’s website states, ‘During the decades of colonial rule by Japan, football contributed to alleviating the frustrations of the subjugated Koreans and fostering the hope of liberation’. See http://en.kfa.or.kr/kfa_history/history.asp.
1995: 27). In 1910, an early South American tournament was contested; six years later the first continental governing body (CONMEBOL) was founded.

Third, football facilitated non-European participation within the emerging world system of societies. Many British clubs undertook overseas tours across Europe, Latin America and the Empire’s colonies and dominions. The Oxbridge amateur side, Corinthians, was notably peripatetic, touring South Africa in 1897 and then making three trips to Brazil before 1914 (Walvin 1994: 110). Several English teams – notably Swindon Town, Everton and Tottenham – visited Argentina, attracting crowds of over 20,000.

Fourth, as global conflict loomed, most sports, including football, became theatres for the display of national virility and military capability. Despite regular internationals, Anglo-German relations inside FIFA became fraught. During warfare, troops on all sides played recreational football behind the lines, or discussed the game in the trenches. When called into attack, some British troops emerged from the trenches and charged across no man’s land with a football at their feet (Birley 1995: 74). Inevitably, many club and national sides were decimated in the conflict: for example, the Heart of Midlothian team lost seven men in action, while Tottenham Hotspur lost eleven former players. After the armistice, the British nations resigned from FIFA rather than share membership with their former foes.

Fifth, football tournaments reflected the vitality of international society. Successful Olympic football tournaments, from 1908 onwards, confirmed the need for a separate global event. The 1924 Paris Olympics marked South America’s football powers, won by the brilliant Uruguayans in a final against Switzerland for which 250,000 ticket applications had been lodged (Goldblatt 2003: 46).

Apropos humankind, political battles were contested regarding social inclusion and participation, notably along class, ‘race’ and gender lines. Class disputes took different forms. In Britain, the professionalism issue had underlined class and regional divisions between mainly southern amateur-gentlemen and northern business interests (Hargreaves 1986: 68–9). Elsewhere, class antagonisms typically centred on status closure and resource denial. In pre-revolutionary Russia, working class groups were persistently prevented from accessing clubs, league tournaments, match officials and playing fields. In response, ‘outlaw’ worker teams were gradually established (Frykholm 1997: 144–5). For those contexts in which working-class sides were established, we noted earlier the role of class-based rivalries in many club cultures.

Second, race and ethnicity were central to struggles for recognition or participation in non-European contexts. In Chile and Brazil, various authorities questioned the right of black players to play internationals (Taylor 1998: 81–2). Uruguay gained enormously from its greater tolerance of non-white players, notably the ‘Black Marvel’ José Leandro Andrade. In Brazil, white elite clubs were initially challenged by factory teams such as Bangú that fielded talented black and mulatto players (Leite Lopes 2000: 246–7).
In 1923, Vasco da Gama won the Rio championship, being the only leading club to hire lower class players, including non-whites, on a professional basis. Suitably piqued, Rio’s sporting elites excluded Vasco from future tournaments and implemented spurious social rules such as literacy tests to eliminate non-whites (Leite Lopes 1997: 63–4). In southern Africa, sport participation was marked by increasingly inflexible racial stratification, with white colonists dominating rugby and cricket while other populations seized upon football (Nauright 1999: 190–191; Alegi 2004; cf. Giulianotti 2004a: 80–83). Across the continent, the game often symbolized forms of African indigenous pride and proto-nationalism; in Ghana, for example, the ‘Hearts of Oak’ side was founded in 1911 in memory of Accra’s slaves.

Third, on gender, football typically reproduced patriarchal social values. In Britain, despite pressures to display only decorative qualities among spectators, some middle-class women did play as early as the 1890s in Scotland, while the ‘British Ladies Football Club’ later played matches before up to 8,000 spectators (Williams 2003: 114; cf. Tranter 1998: 79). Women’s wartime industry assisted the creation of football teams, most famously the Dick, Kerr Ladies club which subsequently toured Britain, France and North America (Newsham 1994). When Dick, Kerr teams attracted nearly 900,000 spectators to 67 fixtures in 1921, the FA effectively killed women’s football by banning these matches from being played at its members’ grounds.

Overseas, in some contexts, such as China (from 1915 to the 1920s) and Denmark, female corporeal exercise and emancipation were advocated, enabling radical physical educationalists to promote stronger participation in football (Hong and Mangan 2003: 47–8; Brus and Trangbæk 2003: 97). More commonly, women’s football was viewed as curious entertainment and mocked by the local press, notwithstanding often sizeable crowds (cf. Fasting 2003: 149–150; Hjelm and Olofsson 2003: 184–5; Marschik 1998: 71).

Fourth, the possibilities of football in advancing peaceful co-existence were also explored. De Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympic movement, believed that international sporting contacts could advance cosmopolitanism and cultural tolerance (Morgan 1995). On the day that Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, setting off the chain of events that would produce the First World War, FIFA passed a resolution calling for all nations to ‘substitute arbitration for violence’ (Goldblatt 2006: 234–5). A few months later, the myth of the ‘Christmas Truce’ was born, as the story emerged in rather sketchy detail of how British and German troops had ceased their hostilities, met in no-man’s-land, and played impromptu football matches to mark Yuletide (cf. Brown and Seaton 1999). In general terms, however, fraternal cosmopolitanism was one of many social values that transpired within football. We noted, for example, football’s colonial and nationalist aspects which sought to enforce social harmonization through organized play. On the other extreme, some fixtures, whether in Europe or Latin America, could also occasion serious crowd disorder.
Fourth phase: ‘struggle-for-hegemony’ – mid-1920s to late 1960s

The **fourth**, ‘struggle-for-hegemony’ phase spans the mid-1920s to the late 1960s. Two football ‘moments’ heralded this phase.

First, in 1925, bowing to English and commercial pressures, the IFAB amended football’s offside law, making defensive play more difficult and increasing goal-scoring opportunities. All football nations were obliged to respond to the new rule. In Britain, a goal glut ensued, followed by greater coaching professionalism. Arsenal, under Herbert Chapman, dominated English football during the 1930s by creating the ‘WM’ team formation, producing ‘safety-first’, watchful, counter-attacking football that mirrored the decade’s insecurities and anxieties (Meisl 1955: 17–25).

The position of the centre-half varied across football regions: WM withdrew this player from midfield into defence, but elsewhere he remained upfield – notably in South America (until well into the 1950s) and most of the European mainland (such as in the brilliant Austrian *wunderteam*). Italy, who won the 1934 and 1938 World Cups, advanced *Il Metodo* (the method), featuring a watchful centre-half and two withdrawn forwards to create a 2–3–2–3 formation. Even when Switzerland, under Karl Rappan, introduced a further defender, the ‘sweeper’ role remained relatively inventive.

Second, FIFA started to prepare its own international tournament. The first World Cup, hosted and won by Uruguay in 1930, drew only thirteen nations, but was an enormous local success, with over 90,000 fans at the final. The 1934 and 1938 events were hosted in France and Italy respectively, thus the tournament became a fixed quadrennial event, interrupted only by global warfare.

The four elemental reference points of globalization acquired greater centrality during this phase. At the level of **individuals**, firstly, more top football players acquired local or national hero-status. In Germany, the great 1930s Schalke team sustained close ties with local working class communities. The brilliant Matthias Sindelar, ‘the wafer’, became a 1930s Viennese coffee-house hero (Horak and Maderthaner 1996). The ‘Black Diamond’ Leônidas was a national hero in Brazil, appearing regularly in popular media and endorsing everyday products (Mason 1994: 55). In England, players like Jackie Milburn (Newcastle United) and Nat Lofthouse (Bolton Wanderers) were typically loyal to their clubs and teammates, and struck unassuming figures off the pitch. However, during periods of wider industrial emancipation, football’s labour relations remained antediluvian; systems like the UK’s ‘retain and transfer’ allowed clubs to keep, dismiss or transfer their employees like chattel (cf. Imlach 2005).

Uruguay’s players became national heroes when winning the 1930 and 1950 World Cups. The latter win, against hosts and hot favourites Brazil,
inspired national narratives along a *Bildung* theme (cf. Dallmayr 1998: 244). Indeed, some have stated that modern Uruguay was built by two Varelas: the first (José Pedro) was a nineteenth century President and educational reformer; the second (Obdulio, no relation) was the great World Cup captain of 1950 (Giulianotti 1999b). The mythology of football heroes also featured genuine tragedies, most obviously the air disasters that wiped out the brilliant Torino team in 1949 and which killed eight Manchester United players in 1958.

Second, elite player status was enhanced by the founding of national professional tournaments across Europe and South America during the interwar years. Germany was the most prominent dissident, with the national professional league only founded in 1963. When England abolished its maximum wage in 1961, a cluster of elite players raised their earnings markedly, although football remained a part-time profession at most lower league clubs. Only when football was embraced by commercial popular culture, notably pop music and television, did players acquire ‘star’ or celebrity status, with off-field activities exciting the mass media, notably in the iconic case of the brilliant George Best (sometimes known as the ‘Fifth Beatle’).

Third, international player mobility was highly uneven, but occurred most visibly when South Americans moved to southern Europe. At least 118 professionals from Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil held dual citizenship with Italy and so joined Italian clubs between 1929 and 1943 (Lanfranchi and Taylor 1999: 83). Post-1945, many leading central European and South American talents typically switched to Spanish and Italian clubs. British players seeking fortunes abroad ran into legal trouble when joining the breakaway *Di Mayor* league in Colombia, or commonly found their new environment too alien to settle (e.g. Baker, Law and Greaves in Italy in the early 1960s). However, in turn, national football cultures were often incubated by the banning of ‘foreign’ players, as a very definite response to wider globalization processes. In England, a ban was maintained for 45 years until the European Community’s intervention, and then Tottenham Hotspur signed the Argentines, Ardiles and Villa, in 1978. Spain banned the further importation of players from 1965 to 1973, as did Italy from 1964 to 1980. Less developed economies still established effective football systems with occasional high rewards. Brazil’s *estrelismo* (star system) reportedly enabled Pelé to become the world’s highest paid athlete, on around $340,000 annually, in the late 1960s (Lever 1969: 41).

Fourth, football coaches acquired an increasingly strong public persona, bringing ‘science’ to the game’s organization, and often imposing playing systems upon players through quasi-militaristic methods. Autocrats like Herbert Chapman (Arsenal), Major Frank Buckley (Wolves), and Matt Busby (Manchester United) dominated club operations and instituted many tactical innovations. Internationally, Vittorio Pozzo (Italy), Otto Nerz

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*For example in Austria (1924), Hungary (1926), Spain (1929), Italy (1930), Argentina (1931), France (1932), and Brazil (1933).*
(Germany), Karl Rappan (Switzerland), Helenio Herrera (Barcelona, Internazionale), and Alf Ramsay (England) successfully reshaped their teams, though often with a focus on risk control, to the detriment of highly skilled players like Fritz Szepan in Germany or Jimmy Greaves in England.

At national level, first, football helped to build national solidarity, but also disclosed forms of fissure and fragmentation. Many international fixtures were deeply nationalistic rituals that were intensively covered by national media. In the UK, the Home International championship dramatized sub-national rivalries while arguably strengthening the bonds between England and its smaller partners. In South America, international fixtures contributed massively towards the assimilation of immigrant populations, notably first- and second-generation Spaniards and Italians in major ports along the eastern coast. West Germany’s 1954 World Cup win was viewed by many as a founding moment for the new Federal Republic (Hesse-Lichtenberger 2003: 125). Korean post-occupation independence was honoured by the national team’s victory over Japan, to qualify for the 1954 World Cup finals.

In Europe and Latin America, military juntas and totalitarian regimes engaged football’s populist appeal. Under Mussolini, Italian athletes were national ‘warriors’, while in Brazil and Argentina, populist dictators Getúlio Vargas and Juan Perón institutionalized political manipulation of football (Bellos 2002: 38; Lever 1983: 62–3; Alabarces and Rodrigues 2000: 122–3; Mason 1994: 70; Scher 1996). In these contexts, and in Soviet states, vast modern stadiums were erected (cf. Inglis 1990).

The mass production and consumption of radio – then television – was integral to the nation-building process, in which football played a crucial part (cf. Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983). By the late 1920s, radio was broadcasting live fixtures in many European nations. As Hobsbawm (1990: 143) observes, when constructing national identity, ‘The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people’. He recalled listening, with several Austrians, to radio coverage of the Austria-England fixture in 1929: ‘I was England, as they were Austria … In this manner did twelve-year-old children extend the concept of team-loyalty to the nation’ (quoted in Beck 2003: 400). Subsequently, to illustrate television’s rapid spread in the wealthiest Western nations, the FA Cup final in England drew around 10,000 viewers in 1938 one million viewers in 1950, and perhaps 10 million in 1953 when, to national celebration, Stanley Matthews finally gained a winners’ medal (Banks 2002: 104).

Yet post-war nation-building, and the emerging consumer society, could also vitiate football’s economic vitality. In England, for example, after a boom in attendances, crowds started to fall seriously in the early 1950s, and the Football League responded by banning match broadcasts (Walvin 1994: 161). In France after 1945, les trentes glorieuses (or thirty glorious years) of economic recovery and national modernization also witnessed the sharp decline of club and national football, as new urban citizens pursued alternative consumer lifestyles (Hare 2003: 43–44).
Inevitably, football enabled particular communities to contest forms of official nationalism. Most famously, in Spain, Barcelona symbolized Catalan separatism towards Franco; yet the dictator’s personal association with Real Madrid may have been craftily manufactured to restrict autonomist political expressions to the cultural field of football (Ball 2003: 121–2; cf. Burns 1999).

Second, throughout this phase, further tactical innovations were instituted by particular national football cultures. In the early 1950s Hungary perplexed opponents by playing a deep-lying (rather than advanced) centre-forward; according to team coach Gusztáv Sebes, this was a free-flowing, ‘socialist football’ style. Following earlier Paraguayan innovations, the Brazilian national team won the 1958 World Cup with the 4–2–4 formation that contained the first ‘flat back four’; Brazil withdrew another forward in 1962 to produce the 4–3–3 formation. England’s ‘wingless wonders’ sacrificed outside forwards to play an industrial 4–4–2 formation at the 1966 World Cup. Meanwhile, coach Helenio Herrera (born in Argentina but with French citizenship) had elaborated the sweeper system in Italian league football. Herrera’s Internazionale team, often playing 1–4–4–1, posted a libero (free man) behind the defence to snuff out attacks; off the field, the players were subjected to rigid social controls, while club officials allegedly bribed referees to secure victories (cf. Goldblatt 2006: 435–6). However, national playing styles owed much to processes of innovation and cross-cultural creolization. In Germany, for example, varied influences abounded: southern clubs adopted fluid passing styles from Austria and southern Europe, northern teams borrowed the English ‘Hussar’ style, eastern sides favoured Danubian aestheticism, and working-class western outfits yoked passionate commitment to tactical pragmatism, notwithstanding the technical artistry at Schalke 04 (Hesse-Lichtenberger 2003: 10).

The most intensive struggles for hegemony arose in international relations. First, during the 1930s, many sports were symbolically charged fields for the clash of nationalist ideologies. The four British football associations viewed football as their game and, despite separately and reluctantly joining FIFA before 1914, had always displayed deep misgivings towards the governing body’s status. The British associations disconnected themselves from FIFA’s emerging international society in 1920, rejoined in 1924 after ‘normal’ relations were resumed with old war foes, but then resigned again in 1928 over the issue of ‘broken-time’ payments to amateurs (Goldblatt 2006: 238–240). Crucially, in a pompous and myopic forfeit of parentage, the British associations remained outside FIFA until 1946, just as the governing body helped to foster the game’s exponential growth in international popularity and institutional development. In the interim, English political and football authorities exploited the game’s ideological and diplomatic functions through tough contests against Germany and Italy during the 1930s (Beck 2003).

Prioritizing international glory, Mussolini’s Italy assimilated top South American players like Orsi, Monti and Guaita as rimpatriati (the repatriated), to win the 1934 and 1938 World Cups (Lanfranchi and Taylor 1999: 76). The Soviet Union deployed football to promote domestic order and international...
diplomacy. Stalin’s security chief, Beria, and other Party leaders actively assisted the State-favoured Dynamo teams. Spartak Moscow, the most popular side, was consistently victimized for ‘bourgeois’ practices; its star players, notably the Starostin brothers, were arrested and sent into exile (Edelman 1993: 58–68). In 1945 the crack Moscow Dynamo side were filled with top Russian talents, and played four matches undefeated in Britain before almost 270,000 spectators (Downing 1999). Cold War diplomacy underpinned the sporting rationale for other overseas football tours in the post-1945 period, notably when European nations on East and West enthusiastically hosted visits by African teams (Hanzan 1987: 256).

Post-1945, occasional violent outbreaks at international fixtures reflected ascendant, instrumental tactics and wider cross-cultural antagonisms. The 1962 Chile–Italy fixture – the ‘Battle of Santiago’ – was partly ignited by pre-match Italian press articles. Argentinian and European teams often contested brutal fixtures: Europeans castigated Latino ‘dirty tricks’, but South Americans believed they were implementing modern professionalism (cf. Alabarces et al. 2001).

Second, international football precipitated strong processes of ‘relativization’: as national societies came into increasing contact with each other, so they were inspired to differentiate themselves, to sharpen their identity-markers, in relation to others. Moreover, international football provided global looking-glasses for national societies. In this sense, football fixtures functioned rather like international exhibitions, in allowing nations to advance the claim to ‘be the best’ so long as a wide range of outside challengers were competing. On the other hand, international defeats could provoke much soul-searching about generalized national entropy vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

For post-war Britain, football mirrored the old Empire’s global decline, feeding a broader national antiquation anxiety. England endured the heaviest blows, losing 1–0 to the USA in 1950, then thrashed 6–3 and 7–1 by Hungary in 1953; a year later, Uruguay annihilated Scotland 7–0. Up to Celtic’s European Cup win in 1967, British club and national teams struggled to match continental sophistication.

Similar traumas befell Argentina. Little international engagement had allowed Argentinians to hold unrealistic confidence in the standards of their national team. When Argentina were thumped 6–1 by Czechoslovakia at the 1958 World Cup finals, furious public debates were sparked, with football functioning as a partial mirror for the dilemmas of national politics: should the nation continue on its unique, indigenous, criollo path, or should it embrace the modern, industrial, European way (Archetti 1998: 174–5; Alabarces et al 2001: 237–8)? Notably, such disputes presaged more fundamental debates over ‘underdevelopment’ in Latin America during the 1960s.

Third, football’s international framework was transformed. Initially, relations between neighbouring nations were the nuclei of international affairs. For example, British isolationism towards FIFA reflected the importance placed upon fixtures between the Home Nations. In Central
Europe, the Mitropa Cup was founded in 1927 and featured Austrian, Czech, Hungarian, Italian and Yugoslav sides. The tournament’s salience declined sharply from the 1960s, as continental and world competition gained stature (Marschik 2001).

Football’s global system expanded dramatically. FIFA grew from 40 member nations in 1925 to 80 in 1954 and 133 by 1970; confirmed as the globe’s premier tournament, the World Cup grew to 53 entrants by 1966. Continental governing bodies were established: UEFA (Europe) and AFC (Asia) in 1954; CAF (Africa) in 1957; CONCACAF (North and Central America) in 1961; and OFC (Oceania) in 1965. UEFA’s foundation was partly intended to challenge South American influence inside FIFA, while AFC and CAF reflected the Third World’s growing political relevance. Britain’s role inside FIFA was preserved, with a shaky hegemonic bloc, by the presidency of the patrician Stanley Rous (1961–1974).

International club tournaments were established annual events and became hugely popular; the European Cup, founded in 1955, attracted at least 127,000 fans in Glasgow to the 1960 final. The Copa Libertadores, South America’s premier club tournament, began in 1960, as did the World Club Championship, contested by European and South American champions.

In regard to *humankind*, football tensions intensified internationalist or universalist discourses, and continuing dynamics of social marginalization. First, aided by greater mediatization of key tournaments, consciousness of a global football ‘family’ grew sharper. Most European nations enjoyed live televised fixtures from the 1954 World Cup, enabling global audiences to identify ‘world-class’ players and teams. By 1970, over 250 million television sets were distributed globally, 50 times the 1950 figure (Whannel 1992: 165). Through regular replays, football provided some ‘global moments’ that were sedimented as ‘world memories’ – for example, Pelé’s hat-trick in the 1958 World Cup final, or England’s disputed ‘goal’ in the 1966 final (see Smith 1990). In turn, football crystallized particular aesthetic forms whose status became globalized. Brazil and Di Stefano’s Real Madrid articulated ‘the beautiful game’ (a term attributed to Pelé), creating a highly refined style that humankind could witness on television, celebrate, and then endeavour to emulate.  

Second, systematic forms of social segregation were transposed into football, partly through the construction of rigid national solidarities. In Nazi Germany, Jews and Marxists were systematically excluded from the game from 1933 onwards. In Europe after 1945, players drawn from ethnic minorities typically endured racist or other discriminatory treatment. More broadly, players who sought to escape exploitative industrial control within their national football system endured strong dynamics of social exclusion. English recruits to the lucrative breakaway league in Colombia faced long domestic bans upon return. In post-war West Germany, players

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10 The popular romanticization of a balletic, fluent football style stands in major contrast to the cagey, highly instrumental, often violent play in Brazilian club football.
Exiting national ‘amateur’ leagues to play abroad were typically ignored for international honours.

Football’s class connections varied significantly by nation and region. In Britain and some other parts of north-west Europe, elite groups distinguished themselves by practicing sports other than football, whereas the game’s cross-class appeal was evidenced in southern Europe and South America (Giulianotti 1999a). Supporter identities varied markedly between nations due to divergent club constitutions. In Iberia and Latin America, most clubs were private associations that allowed socios (members) to elect presidents and to use many sporting facilities. In the UK and Italy, private ownership prevailed, producing weaker owner–supporter bonds. Meanwhile, in the former British colonies and North America, football failed to dislodge rival ‘national sports’ – for example, American football, which was backed heavily by national education systems and mass media.

On ‘race’, non-white players and developing nations made some significant, albeit restricted advances. The small scattering of black players in European leagues encountered routine, unthinking racism across the football system. In the post-war era, South American teams, most obviously Brazil, widely recruited black and mulatto talents, but racial prejudices remained, notably in the coaches’ reluctance to play black goalkeepers (Leite Lopes 1997; cf. Wood 2007: 130–1). Some European nations exploited their colonial ties to claim elite talents, such as the Mozambicans Eusebio and Mario Coluna at Portugal, or the Algerian Rachid Mekloufi with France. Meanwhile, developing societies struggled to gain full inclusion in global football: only one side (North Korea in 1966) from Asia or Africa was admitted to the World Cup finals until 1970, while the racially stratified societies of South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) remained within FIFA. More commonly, local battles were fought by the indigenous peoples in Africa through football, to secure greater political independence within and beyond the game in relation to their colonial rulers (Martin 1991; Stuart 1996; Mazwai 2003). Under the apartheid system of South Africa, political prisoners on Robben Island ran a football league from 1966 until the prison’s closure in 1991. The league was mainly for recreational purposes, but also served to bring normal aspects of the outside world into the prison context, and to demonstrate the organizational capabilities of the prisoners (Korr and Close 2008).

Finally, all four elemental reference points were defined in masculine terms, reflecting the generalized marginalization of women. Individual identities and national cohesion were largely constructed through football according to masculine iconography and themes. In turn, across Western Europe, women’s football was often systematically repressed by the football authorities, and only initiated its modern organization in the late 1960s, through the founding of national associations or leagues, in nations like Sweden, Germany and England (Williams 2003; Pfister 2003; Hjelm and Olofsson 2003).
Fifth phase: ‘uncertainty’ – late 1960s to early 2000s

Football’s ‘uncertain’, fifth phase spans the late 1960s to the early 2000s, and was heralded by two broad international developments. First, non-European football societies – particularly Latin America, but also Africa and Asia – exercised greater political influence, culminating in Brazil’s João Havelange unseating of Sir Stanley Rous as FIFA President in 1974. Second, mass mediatization transformed international football, with the 1970 World Cup as the first finals widely televised in colour.

Throughout this period, intensified uncertainty marked interrelations between globalization’s four ‘reference points’. At individual level, vast differences and inequalities emerged between elite and grassroots football, in terms of the financial and symbolic rewards afforded players, coaches, officials and journalists. Elite European Union players enjoyed the greatest benefits. During the 1980s, several European nations relaxed recruitment restrictions on overseas players, leading to the ‘3+2’ system in club football from 1991 to 1995. The 1995 Bosman ruling tied football to European law, destroying ‘retain and transfer’ systems by enabling out-of-contract European players to move freely between clubs. Significantly empowering elite players, Bosman helped to raise salaries and signing-on fees; thus, within a few years, many European clubs were directing over 80 per cent of annual revenues into wages. International player mobility was fuelled further by huge new television revenues in top European leagues, the emergence of sports agents with global contacts, and the greater prestige of continental rather than national club tournaments.

Some economists identified dual labour markets emerging in Europe. On one hand, a small pool of outstanding players (superstars) was pursued assiduously by many football institutions, from clubs to merchandise corporations and other TNCs (Pujol and García del Barrio 2006; see Lucifora and Simmons 2003; Rosen 1981). From Pelé onwards, greater numbers of players experienced a status transmogrification, from hero to star, from sport-specific athlete to global signifier (cf. Andrews and Jackson 2001). Off-field earnings multiplied through diverse endorsement deals with TNCs that hypercommodified football’s most accomplished artists, particularly forwards rather than goalkeepers (Smart 2005; Walsh and Giulianotti 2006). On the other hand, for the vast remainder of players, a monopsony situation pertained, wherein a large supply of comparative mediocrity was available to a limited number of clubs offering modest rewards.

World economic inequalities ossified the football systems beyond Western Europe. In the late 1980s, perestroika enabled Eastern Europe’s decaying communist systems to lift bans on players moving West in return for hard currency (Edelman and Riordan 1994: 276). Players

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11 The ‘3+2’ rule, agreed with the European Commission, enabled all UEFA-governed clubs to sign any number of European players, but only three non-nationals and two ‘assimilated’ players could play in each fixture.
in non-EU nations endured far less industrial emancipation: for example, in Brazil, the *passe* (player ownership) system was only partially reformed, and by 2000 nearly 90 per cent of 23,000 registered players still earned less than £100 per month (Bellos 2002: 21). More generally, various European football and legal authorities criticized the ‘slave-trade’ treatment of young African players by some European clubs and scouts.

The new pantheon of football celebrities enriched further circles of managers, directors, match officials, media figures, and player agents. In Western Europe, from the late 1980s onwards, patrician club owners lost ground to more commercially aggressive business figures (for example, Berlusconi at Milan, Tapie at Marseilles, Dein at Arsenal, Murray at Rangers). In Latin America, populist football officials (*caudillos*, or *cartolas* in Brazil) still exerted long-term political influence, notably Teixeira (at the CBF), Miranda (at Vasco da Gama) and Grondona (at the AFA). Some football analysts gained national prominence for their distinctive coverage of seminal fixtures on radio and television – prominent examples being Wolstenholme and Motson in England, Bjørge Lillelien in Norway, or (further back, in the 1950s) Herbert Zimmermann of West Germany. Player agents with global contacts increased the stream of clients into major European leagues.

Apropos the *nation-state*, the game maintained its relevance to national vitality. First, football continued to ritualize national solidarity, particularly within new or emerging football nations, for example with semi-finalists Croatia at the 1998 World Cup finals (literally kitted in the national coat of arms), or the 1990 quarter-finalists Cameroon (cf. NKWi and Vidacs 1997). Football assuaged the ingrained Japanese reluctance to celebrate national identity after reaching the 1998 World Cup finals. At international tournaments supporters were increasingly committed to highly visual national differentiation, through team-scarves, shirts and face-paint. National pride was further invoked when rival nations competed furiously to host tournaments, or to win ‘best behaved fans’ awards at major events.

Growing consciousness of ethno-national differentiation was revealed in football’s complex array of national referents. In the United States, millions of young, white, middle-class Americans came to play football, but at elite level the most committed followers tended to be first/second generation migrants with strong allegiances to ‘home’ nations. France’s 1998 World Cup victory was celebrated in Paris by citizens of long French descent, as well as those of North African and other extraction, some of whom paraded these alternative national flags to mark the winning players’ multicultural background. Conversely, Germany’s citizenship laws undermined football’s multicultural potential by complicating opportunities to hold dual citizenship, with particular consequences for Turkish *gasterbeiteurs*.

In some contested settings, club rivalries stretched the ethno-national and ethno-linguistic divisions within nation-states. In the former Yugoslavia, the violence at a fixture between Serbian and Croatian sides was one crucial ‘tipping point’ for the outbreak of civil war in 1991. In Spain, in 1976, a year after Franco’s death, two Basque sides, Real Sociedad and Athletic
Bilbao, entered the field carrying the Basque flag and then observed the Basque ‘national’ anthem. Yet intense rivalries and ill feelings still existed within these regions, such as between Sociedad (of San Sebastian) and Bilbao, over the right to symbolize these submerged nations (cf. Walton 2001; Ball 2003: 33–37).

National solidarity was stretched by the frequent eruption of ‘club versus country’ conflicts. Many clubs criticized national football fixtures for exhausting players and producing injuries that were barely indemnified through insurance. Following the deregulation of labour markets, national associations complained that clubs recruit too many non-national players, undermining the development of indigenous talents.

Third, supporter groups in most European and Latin American nations underwent further differentiation through the creation of young ‘militant’ fan groups associated with varying levels of violence. In the UK, ‘football hooliganism’ was more consciously thematized as a social problem and as an identity embraced by particular supporter formations. English fan violence overseas was particularly prominent, notably at the 1985 European Cup final between Liverpool and Juventus, when 39 Italian fans were fatally injured inside the stadium after fleeing attacks from English fans, causing a wall to collapse. Elsewhere, the ultrà spectator identity – rooted in colourful, vocal and sometimes violent backing for the club – spread from Italy across southern Europe. In Argentina, the militant hinchadas (supporters) were dubbed barras bravas by a critical media from the 1960s onwards (see Gil 1998, 2002). In Brazil, club torcedores (fans) had gained a distinctive, carnival identity through the Charanga groups (founded initially at Flamengo) in the 1940s, which were later supplanted by more critical and violent independent fan movements, beginning with the Gaviões da Fiel at Corinthians in 1969. National and regional differentiation occurred over techniques of social control at football matches. Relevant strategies included: proactive measures (notably intensive surveillance) and criminalization of violent fans in the UK; different community-work ‘fan projects’ in northern Europe (notably Germany, Holland, Sweden, Austria, Belgium); reactive riot-policing in much of Europe, notably Italy and Belgium; and the use of tear-gas, water-cannon and stadium moats in Latin America.

Fourth, football playing formations were less nationally defined and became evermore varied, for example 4–4–2, 4–2–3–1, 3–5–2, 4–3–2–1, 4–3–3, and 4–5–1. Moreover, football’s public spheres also evidenced increasing reflexivity regarding the ‘invention of traditions’, particularly at national levels. Perhaps most notably, many Dutch football followers viewed the mythology surrounding the 1974 team, and its world-renowned ‘Total Football’ style, purely as that: a myth that had only limited basis in actual playing strategies (Lechner 2007).

Football’s realm of international relations expanded with three particular consequences. First, FIFA’s membership rose rapidly from 136 members in 1970 to 204 by 2000 (more than the United Nations). Growth
was largely attributable to post-colonial independence in Africa and Asia, 
post-Communist revolutions and nationalist struggles in Eastern Europe 
and Asia, and greater integration of small Pacific and Caribbean states.

Second, as noted, the emerging nations gained political influence partic-
ularly through President Havelange, who reciprocated through the alloca-
tion of seats on important committees and the foundation of development 
projects. In 1998, Sepp Blatter succeeded Havelange, with strong support 
from outside Europe, amidst allegations of corruption and cronyism.

Third, emerging football nations enhanced their competitive participation 
in world football: allocated World Cup finals positions rose from two of 16 
competing teams (including the first African one) in 1970, to four of 24 
emerging football powers in relatively rich consumer markets – notably the 
United States, South Korea and then Japan – were set to become regular 
qualifiers. A world rankings system established by FIFA in 1993 evaluated 
results over an eight-year period, and functioned to position the emerging 
nations highly, despite the rarity of their encounters with European or South 
American sides.

Fourth, football was a recurring theatre of struggle between rival ide-
ologies. The extraordinary 1974 World Cup fixture between West and 
East Germany, won 1-0 by the East, was cross-cut by diametrically 
opposed political (capitalist vs communist), intra-national (German vs 
German) and football (favourite vs underdog) themes (cf. Hesselmann 
and Ide 2006: 41-43). The cynical realpolitik of football’s elite engendered 
the toleration and occasional embrace of military regimes, notably in 
Latin America. The 1978 World Cup finals were awarded to, and hosted 
by Argentina, then under a military junta that was ‘disappearing’ up to 
30,000 people. The USSR were ejected from the 1974 World Cup for 
refusing to play Chile, where the Pinochet regime had been torturing and 
executing people inside football stadiums. In Brazil and Argentina, the 
military regimes sought to ingratiate the leaders with the game’s most 
prominent players, notably the victorious 1970 Brazilian side (Levine 

Fifth, since 1990, football’s political management became both more 
complex and more closely integrated within the broader international sys-
tem. Political influence was pursued by a wider array of institutional 
actors, such as governing bodies (global, continental and national), media 
and merchandise TNCs, organized labour (especially the professionals’ 
world union, FiFPro), player agents, international federations (especially 
the EU), the world’s top clubs, and supporters’ organizations. Each partic-
ipant category became increasingly reflexive towards both greater global 
interconnectedness within football and the complexity of competing inter-
ests across these stakeholders.

The reference point of humankind was thematized in cross-cutting ways. 
First, and in later years, the social marginalization of ethnic minorities and 
women was given some significant political focus. In the UK, for example,
wider societal racism was routinely reflected through the abuse of black players by crowds and club officials. Institutional racism typically funnelled local black players out of academic education and into sport and then, when playing for teams, racial stereotypes saw Afro-Caribbeans allocated outside positions to exploit their ‘natural’ speed (Back et al. 2001; Giulianotti 1999a; Hill 1989; King 2004). From the late 1980s onwards, however, anti-racism initiatives gained strong ground, notably among non-white players and new social movements in football, and racist abuse inside stadiums was ultimately criminalized. Meanwhile, wider debates focus on broader forms of ethno-national abuse and exclusion, as affecting overseas players at UK clubs or Asian minorities (Finn and Dimeo 1998). Similar processes – entailing generalized racism, followed by anti-racism initiatives – occurred across Europe and with subsequent backing from the game’s international governing bodies. Elsewhere, the game encapsulated wider political struggles centred on ‘race’. The racist states of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa were ejected from FIFA during the 1970s. Domestic football pointed to future societal transformations when, for example, in South Africa, the all-white league system finally collapsed in 1977, while the black national league boomed throughout that decade (Mazwai 2003).

Football culture in Europe and Latin America was slower than other commercialized public domains in softening its patriarchal codes and conventions to facilitate women’s participation. Perhaps the strongest advances were made in Brazil where women’s football had been banned by law until 1979, but by 1988 the national team had risen to third-placed position in the International Championship staged in China (Votre and Mourão 2003: 254). Through the 1980s and 1990s, grassroots women’s football flourished in more socially democratic societies (such as across Scandinavia) or emerging nations (particularly the USA and China). Recognizing the social and marketing possibilities, FIFA inaugurated the Women’s World Cup in 1991. Notwithstanding the old strategy (such as in Italy) of embedding telegenic female presenters on television’s football shows, women gradually penetrated the game’s mainstream culture as advanced commercialization, from the late 1980s onwards, inspired clubs and leagues to embrace a lucrative, untapped ‘reserve army’ of consumers. In some societies, such as Italy and Argentina, forms of gender emancipation enabled noticeable numbers of young women to join ‘militant’ supporter groups.

Second, the status and participation of established working-class supporter groups came under critical analysis in many football nations. Established football systems experienced significant drops in attendances, for example, in Germany from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, in England and Brazil through the 1980s (Hesse-Lichtenberger 2003: 204; Goldblatt 2003: 106; Helal 1994). Explanations for such declines focused in part on declining ties between clubs and local communities, decrepit stadium facilities (particularly in England), and perceived threats of fan disorder.
The commercial reinvention of European football during the 1990s was viewed by some critics as exacerbating the social exclusion of working-class fans, through high ticket-prices and growing intolerance of informal participatory fandom (cf. Conn 1997; Wagg 2004; Giulianotti 2007).

Third, football’s universalistic possibilities were explored through numerous development initiatives since the early 1970s. Governing bodies – notably FIFA and continental federations – developed partnerships with humanitarian NGOs and major corporations to supply football equipment, coaching clinics and other technical advice to developing football nations, particularly in Africa and Asia. These issues are explored more fully in Chapter 5.

**Sixth Phase: ‘Millennial’ – Early 2000s Onwards**

In recent articles, Robertson (2007a, 2007b) has identified a contemporary, sixth, **millennial** phase of globalization that dates particularly from September 11, 2001. The millennial phase takes the more pessimistic strains of the uncertainty phase into new realms, principally with reference to the transnational impact of religio-cultural forces. The apocalyptic declarations of Jewish, Christian and Islamic groups are prominent in millennial thinking, though there has been a more generalized spread and darkening of climates of fear across other socio-cultural realms, as expressed through anxieties over personal security, national identity and the global environment. The millennial phase serves also to reverse old modernization arguments regarding the perceived remorseless advance of secularization across the world.

The sixth phase is defined largely through fresh constructions of the four elemental reference points. In regard to **individuals**, millennial thinking is evidenced through more intensive governmental regulation of hitherto ‘private’ or personal space. Personal concerns regarding risk encounters have been concretized, whether through the fear of identified hazards or, as in some forms of postmodern leisure, in the hedonistic pursuit of dangerous experiences. Millennial thinking is evidenced further in northern societies through the mass market diffusion of ideals regarding the ‘perfect body’ or ultimate lifestyle, while the project of self- or identity-reconstruction is promoted through the booming cosmetics and ‘makeover’ industries (Jones 2008).

The millennial phase is marked by the ‘increasingly complex opening and closing’ of **national societies** (Robertson 2007a: 413). Nation-states are evermore concerned with ‘managing’ the perceived problems of security and alterity, at least with partial reference to increasing migration and transnational connectivity. On one hand, there has been a well-known boom in surveillance and ‘dataveillance’, at both public and private levels, in part (but far from solely) as a consequence of 9/11. The riskiness or failures of these information-gathering systems increase the temperature of climates of fear, for example when internet hackers break into...
online bank networks, or whenever stolen computer disks and laptops are revealed to contain intimate information on millions of citizens. On the other hand, there is a curious revelling in this culture of surveillance, a public and commercial celebration of ‘being watched’ across national societies, as reflected by the global popularity of ‘reality television’ shows. Websites such as Facebook or MySpace enable individuals to reveal themselves to the world, through kinds of ‘reality self-mediatization’, while building friendship or contact networks across the world.

*International relations* have been defined in recent times by the self-declared globalist ‘crusade’ of the American Bush administration against ‘Islamic militants’ or the ‘axis of evil’. Some analysts are beginning to understand these processes in systemic terms, as a portent of global fascism or totalitarianism. Other impending crises may be identified in the chronic diminution of oil and water reserves.

Finally, *humanity* is a critical focus for global millennialism. Fears of impending ecological catastrophe and the obliteration of non-industrial ways of life have crystallized further in recent years. Greater consciousness of human–animal relations has contributed to concerns over the impending extinction of many endangered species. Millennial global politics are evidenced in the crystallization of a ‘global civil society’, and in the associated struggles involving IGOs, NGOs, NSMs, and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) divisions of TNCs, for example regarding human rights and development. Millennial thinking also underpins the proliferation and growth of ethno-national or religious fundamentalist movements which advance their own specific or absolute solutions to transnational problems and dilemmas.

Although the sixth phase is only in its preliminary stages, we identify some ways in which it takes root within football. In *individual* terms, personal lives are increasingly managed by state bodies or football’s governing authorities, notably through the legal regulation and monitoring of behaviour inside and outside stadiums, and through the constant promotion of messages by public agencies and private corporations regarding good/bad types of supporter or player identity. More broadly, the game is a focus for the expression of millennial emotionality, for example as goals are celebrated in evermore joyous and choreographed ways by players and supporters.

On *national societies*, there have been greater debates over the impact of migration and transnational finance upon specific football cultures, for example regarding the possible diminution of national traditions (such as playing styles, or the psychology and professionalism of players), or the perceived need among nations to modernize their coaching infrastructures. On surveillance issues, the ubiquitous media coverage of the celebrity lifestyles of players aggregates into a form of reality television, and is typically played out before national audiences. Meanwhile, nations imbue leading football competitions such as the World Cup finals with increasingly millennial hopes and aspirations, if not in victory then at least in terms of participation.
In regard to international relations, there has been extensive apocalyptic talk regarding the 'inevitable' wholesale transformation of football, to create, for example, a European Superleague that will either deplete or destroy national competitions. Security issues surrounding major tournaments, such as the World Cup finals or European Championships, have intensified greatly since 9/11, engendering highly sophisticated techniques of spatial control and surveillance that often bypass or infringe established civil liberties. We may anticipate future concerns over the 'carbon footprints' that are imprinted by the global movement of peoples when attending these major championships.

Finally, in regard to humankind, sport is increasingly understood by many national and international bodies as having unique, universalistic qualities that both transcend civilizational differences, and which may even be harnessed to heal intersocietal wounds. Thus, for example, football and other sports have been engaged by the United Nations and numerous NGOs to promote the 'Millennium Development Goals', and to implement grassroots projects that foster peace and reconciliation between communities that have been divided by warfare. Such millennial thinking in regard to football is neatly instanciated by the global 'Football For Hope' programme which is driven by FIFA through partnerships with international NGOs. Millennial thinking is also instanced in the particular interaction of football and forms of transnational religiosity, for example through the centrality of evangelical Christianity among elite Brazilian players.

**Concluding Comments**

Clearly, football has been a significant component of globalization processes and, arguably, the game’s relevance has intensified throughout the ‘uncertainty’ and ‘millennial’ phases. The game’s genealogy is closely interwoven with broader globalization processes, from British international trading influences, through periods of intensified and militarized nationalism across the world, to the growing interpenetration of cultural realms like football by economic institutions and ideologies.

Moreover, if we briefly consider the elemental reference points, the game may be seen further to have contributed much to the making of the global field. Individual selves and social consciousness of ‘the world’ have intensified through, for example, the centrality of club allegiances or solidarities to the personal and collective identities of many millions of football followers. The changing crystallization and differentiation of national societies have been underpinned by the complex symbolism and contested discourses that are attendant upon national football teams. The concretization of international society has been assisted and, at times, accelerated with football, notably for example through the extensive participation of the Global South within the game’s political and competitive realms. And, the thematization of humankind has been increasingly apparent within football,
through mobilizations in regard to class, ethnicity, and gender, and also through discourses and policies concerning the game’s unique universalism.

Through some adaptation, Robertson’s six-phase model of globalization provides an appropriate framework for the historical analysis of football. The model departs in particular from alternatives that pin globalization to Western modernization processes. Thus, as a component of a ‘global globalization’ standpoint, the six-phase model highlights the historical complexity and transnational unevenness of global processes within football – from the reluctance of North American nations to embrace or adapt football, to the highly divergent legal and economic positions of professional players in Europe and South America. We consider such issues concerning cross-cultural matters more fully in the next chapter.