Introduction

The future is contested. What are the implications of the different social models that might come into being? What is progress? Is it being richer, living longer, reduced inequality, or more human rights? What is modernity? Is modernity over, or is the project of modernity not yet completed? Social theory is challenged to take account of complex inequalities beyond class: how can they be included so that they are central, not marginal? Globalization challenges the notion of separate societies: how do global processes change social relations? What difference does the inclusion of complex inequalities and global processes make to the analysis and to social theory? What difference does the inclusion of complex inequalities make to our view as to what constitutes progress? The aim of this book is not only to produce better accounts of social change in a global era, but also to rethink core concepts and theories. A key aid here is the development of complexity theory.

‘Progress’ is an essentially contested project. There are vigorous disputes over what the proper goals of global policy should be, over the priorities for action by governments and international bodies. The meaning of ‘progress’ is far from obvious, ranging from economic development to human well-being, equality and human rights. Protagonists vigorously disagree about which is more important, with implications for the goals of global as well as national public policy. How are such contestations conducted? Are they so rooted in values that are so deeply held that to debate is a challenge to fundamental aspects of people and cultures, or are they amenable to rational scientific debate over priorities? In practice, even deeply held values are challenged by appeals to internal inconsistency and empirical evidence about their effects when implemented. This book aims to clarify the
alternative framings of the notion of progress and to identify their implications. Does the evidence support or contradict deeply held convictions as to the best way forward? Which project emerges best, when subjected to social scientific scrutiny?

Modernity has been a key concept in classic sociology, used to address large-scale social transformation. The transition to modernity preoccupied many of the major social theorists, from Marx and Weber to Durkheim and Simmel. But is modernity still the best way to understand contemporary social relations? Or are we now living in a postmodern era? Challenges to the concept of modernity are aimed at its apparent assumption that there was a single unilinear process of development, and that it was good for everyone. Such a notion is clearly untenable, in view of the horrors of the descent into war and ‘ethnic cleansing’, the diversity of paths of development, and the uneven position of different social groups in the same country. Are we not yet modern, rather than postmodern, or are there multiple varieties of modernity?

Globalization is a challenge to social theory. It demands a re-thinking of the notion that there are societies constituted as separate bounded entities. It raises questions about the taken-for-granted equation of society and nation-state. Is globalization merely Westernization or Americanization, or does it hybridize all cultures, creating new commonalities? Is it eroding differences between cultures producing convergence? Globalization requires the analysis of new types of global processes, and the re-framing of many ostensibly local or national projects within a global landscape.

Social theory is challenged to address the multiplicity of social inequalities, not only that of class. The significance of diverse inequalities for social life is recognized, but building this insight into the core of social theory rather than remaining in specialist sub-fields has proved more difficult. Traditional social theory addressed class inequality, but had difficulty when trying simultaneously to address gender, ethnicity, age, religion, nation, sexual orientation and disability, and even greater difficulty in addressing their mutual constitution at points of intersection. Further, these social relations are more complex than class in that they involve not only inequality but also difference, thereby problematizing notions of a single standard against which to judge inequality. The challenge then is to include intersecting complex inequalities within the core of social theory.

In order to insert globalization and complex inequalities into the heart of social theory it is necessary to develop new concepts and to rethink how theories are put together. There is a need both to capture the distinctions, differentiations and nuances of complex inequalities that have been part of what has been driving the postmodern turn,
and to simultaneously keep the global horizon in sight. There is also a need to retain the conception of inter-linkages so as to be able to analyse the global level, while not falling into the mistaken simplicities of over generalization across cultures. Developments in complexity theory offer a new vocabulary on which social theory can usefully draw in developing concepts to meet these new analytic challenges. These offer the opportunity to build a more complex theoretical framework that enables the theorization of both large-scale connections and of sudden ruptures and non-linear processes. Complexity theory enables the re-thinking of the concept of social system to address, without reductionism, multiple systems of social relations.

This chapter addresses first, the contested issue of what progress might be; second, the challenge of theorizing multiple complex inequalities simultaneously; third, the conceptualization of plural forms of modernity; fourth, the challenge of theorizing global processes; and fifth, the usefulness of complexity theory in addressing these challenges in social theory.

What is Progress?

More money or a longer life?

Is it better to have more money or to live longer? People in the United States of America have more money but die sooner than those in the European Union. Americans have over 40 per cent more income than these Europeans, but live on average for two years less (World Bank 2006c).

Is increasing income a measure of progress? Or is living longer a better indicator? There are different ways of thinking about progress, so how should they be evaluated?

What kind of social arrangements produce progress, however it is defined? Is it the greater freedom of the market in the USA as compared with greater state regulation in Europe? Is it the greater inequality in the USA as compared with Europe? Or the more violent nature of the USA than Europe?

The two divergent goals of money and longevity are associated with two quite different conceptions of progress. The first takes the economic, especially money, as an effective summary indicator of progress and of what is good and desirable; it is often used by national and international bodies of financial governance. The second is focused on the outcome for human well-being, of our capacities and capabilities, of which longevity is an indicator. Further, framings of progress include
‘equality’ and ‘human rights’. Indeed many social and political projects have their own distinctive accounts of what constitutes the best social arrangements to produce the ‘good’ life.

Different social systems have different levels of success in converting economic resources into human well-being. The EU social system is more effective in this than the USA. It is the differences in social systems that are crucial to understanding the implications for individuals. The EU and US social systems link economic resources to human well-being in different ways as a result of differences in how their social systems have developed.

Different cultures prioritize different values. What is meant by progress and what are the preferred goals of public policy? Can there be a single notion of progress in the context of varying values? What kinds of social arrangements achieve progress?

Progress as a contested project

There is no simple answer to the question of what is progress. Rather, it is an essentially contested concept. Indeed so contested that some will give up all hope that it is a useful project to engage with.

There are three main approaches to the concept and project of progress. First, that modernity is progress. For classical sociologists, analysing the transformation of society that is associated with industrialization and urbanism, modernity was progress, but a development that many saw as double-edged, with a down side as well (as discussed in the next section). A second response is to deny the usefulness of the concept and project of progress: it is too simple, falsely universalistic, and ethnocentric. Rather than a universal ‘one size fits all’, there are a potentially infinite number of particular ways of thinking about what constitutes the ‘good life’ and how to get there that are rooted in different cultures. A third position sees progress as a contested project: there are alternative conceptions, but not an infinite number; it exists as a notion that is highly contested; it is argued over in politics and policy, philosophy and theory, data and analysis.

Within this third approach four key alternative goals of progress can be identified – economic development, equality, human rights, and human well-being – though there are others, including a respect for traditional or fundamental practices. The first is that human welfare is best advanced by economic growth and high levels of economic development. The second prioritizes equality. The third is human rights. The fourth has a focus on human well-being, which is more than just a high standard of living but includes education, health, and longevity.
These goals of progress are embedded in projects that are rooted in civil society. Sometimes these projects will become the foundation of governmental programmes. Finally, they may become embedded in practices in social formations. Today, two major competing projects claim in quite different ways to take forward some of these goals: neoliberalism and social democracy. They claim in varying ways to produce economic development, aspects of equality, human rights and human well-being.

Economic development

The first framing of progress focuses on economic development and economic growth. Economic development is expected to increase the average income of a person and thereby their standard of living. While this approach appears to treat economic development as an end in itself, it usually rests on the implicit assumption that economic development is a means to the delivery of an improved standard of living and a further additional assumption that this is a popular policy goal. The higher the rate of economic growth, the faster will the standard of living increase. Improved economic performance is assumed to mean a more effective utilisation of resources to deliver goods and services. The approach claims to be neutral as to the way in which this income is spent by people and regards this neutrality as positive. Economic growth and development is defended as the best approach to progress, on the basis that this constitutes an indication of the average standard of living of people in a country and that this is what people want because governments are repeatedly democratically elected on a mandate that prioritizes economic growth.

This approach to progress is embodied in many national finance ministries and in some parts of the global institutions of financial governance, such as the International Monetary Fund. It underpins the ‘Washington consensus’ on economic policy (Stiglitz 2002).

Within social science there is much debate as to the type of social arrangements that best deliver economic growth. A major focus of the discussion has been as to whether countries with the markets that are most ‘free’, or where markets are carefully regulated and subordinated to other social institutions, actually deliver on this. In particular, this involves analysing the contrasting nature and implications of different types of production, welfare, and regulatory regimes (Barro 1998; Hall and Soskice 2001; Kenworthy 2004). However, there are several challenges to this conceptualization of progress. These include whether untrammelled competition has social costs
that need to be set against the benefits of rapid economic growth, and whether it leads to happiness (Oswald 1997; Layard 2005). Is human well-being, equality, or human rights more important?

**Equality**

An alternative approach to progress is viewed through the lens of justice. This approach prioritizes justice, equality and human rights rather than material improvements in living conditions and welfare. Various traditions articulate this issue in slightly different ways, including: justice (Sandel 1998; Rawls 1999); equality (Phillips 1995; Holli 1997); rights (Paine 1984; Kymlicka 1991, 1995); human rights (Peters and Wolper 1995; Woodiwiss 1998); citizenship (Marshall 1950); equal opportunities and equity (Acker 1989; Shaw and Perrons 1995); freedom and capabilities (Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2000); democracy, political rights and civil liberties (Gastil 1982); and recognition (Taylor et al. 1994; Honneth 1996; Fraser 1997). While there are many approaches to the notion of progress that have a justice framing, it is possible to group many of them into two categories – equality and rights.

The framing of progress as equality is a key part of the socialist and social democratic tradition (Bobbio 1997). This is a more collective and less individualist framing of justice than the others, according less priority to the individual and more to groups and collectivities. There are variations within this frame including: whether equality is conceptualized as an opportunity or an outcome; which domains and practices are included; whether it is limited to ‘excessive’ inequality; and how difference is addressed.

Equality may be understood either as an outcome or as an opportunity. Equality of outcomes is the stronger programme; equality of opportunities addresses processes and procedures which may possibly, but not necessarily, lead to greater equality in outcomes. For example, the attempt to increase equality of opportunity by equal treatment laws may reduce discrimination but may also be insufficient to produce an equality of outcome in the absence of structural change (Hoskyns 1996). This equality of outcome usually requires the transformation of both social systems, and legal processes.

The principle of equality is often selectively applied. This equality may be regarded as a legitimate outcome in matters of longevity, where class and ethnic differences are often considered unjust. It is more commonly discussed in the economic domain, (for example, in the debates over narrowing the gender and ethnic pay gaps) than in civil society where diversity is more often preferred. Further, there are some issues for which equality is considered marginal rather than
important (Phillips 1999). Some forms of inequality are regarded as illegitimate because they are ‘excessive’. For example, social exclusion and poverty may be regarded as unjust because they are extreme or ‘excessive’, but not inequality in all its forms; social exclusion is a weaker understanding of inequality (Lister 1998).

Inequalities are often complexly entwined with differences. There is a question as to whether equality requires sameness and the use of a single standard, or equal recognition and the valuation of different contributions, or a larger and more profound transformation (Fraser 1997; Rees 1998). The equal valuation of different contributions is a step away from traditional interpretations of equality that involve a single universal standard. The notion of cosmopolitanism requires mutual respect for different ways of life rather than the adoption of a single universal standard as to what is best (Held 2004; Beck 2006).

Equality is potentially the most radical of the framings of progress. In practice, its application as a principle is often hedged with caveats and limited to specific processes, domains and practices.

Human Rights

In the rights-based approach to justice, every individual is regarded as having inviolable rights, the realisation of which constitutes a just society. Each person has an equal entitlement to a specific set of rights. The tradition is predominantly individualist, with the valuation of the rights of individuals positioned as more important than the average welfare of the society as a whole. It ranges from a relatively narrow focus on civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, and political rights, such as free elections (Gastil 1982), to a wider concept of citizenship, which involves socio-economic as well as political and civil rights (Marshall 1950). In its privileging of the individual over society rights can be interpreted as representing a Western, rather than a universal or global, approach to justice, although this is contested (Woodiwiss 1998).

The notion of rights itself has several variants, including human rights and civil rights (Ferree et al. 2002a), though today human rights predominate in political discourse. There are many theoretical and philosophical interpretations of the longstanding rights-based tradition of justice (Banks 1981; Paine 1984; Wollstonecraft 1992 [1790]). According to Rawls (1999), justice is the overarching framework for all conceptions of progress and the first virtue of social institutions. He considers that each individual has an inviolability that overrides everything else, including the average welfare of the rest of society. Rawls’s approach to justice involves a rejection of utilitarian theory in
which the justice of a larger number of people can outweigh the injustice and disadvantage of a few individuals. His approach requires that every individual receives the basics as an underpinning of justice. In this way Rawls's 'social contract' approach to justice prioritizes an equal minimum level for all over the welfare of a whole society.

In the current wave of globalization, the human rights interpretation of justice is becoming increasingly important. This draws on a longstanding rights tradition (Banks 1981; Berkovitch 1999; Paine 1984; Wollstonecraft 1992 [1790]) as well as on some components of the equality framework (Peters and Wolper 1995; Woodiwiss 1998). The most important current statement on human rights is that issued by the UN after the end of the Second World War, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948). This claim, endorsed by all governments in the world, states that these rights are in principle universal and not particular. However, as an early UN statement on human rights it has since been reinterpreted, extending and clarifying its content. The implementation of a rights-based (especially a human rights) approach to justice and progress is often made via a juridical framework. It is through the law, courts and lawyers that human rights are made available to individuals and groups of individuals.

Although there is a component of equality within the human rights approach, not least equality in accessing these rights since they are regarded as universal, this is a limited conception of equality. It is a minimalist and threshold conception – a relatively low threshold is set and must be passed. Beyond that, the framework has nothing to say.

However, the framing of human rights as universal and measured against a single standard is contested by notions of group rights, the equal valuation of different contributions, and by cosmopolitanism. Rights are not always and only linked to individuals: they may also be constituted as group rights, or as the right to a way of life, which intrinsically involves a group or community (Kymlicka 1991, 1995). This implicitly recognizes that there are different standards in relation to which rights can be claimed. The example used by Kymlicka is that of the First Nation, or aboriginal Indians, in Canada, and their collective rights to the use of certain tracts of land that differ from those belonging to the rest of Canada’s citizens. A parallel issue is articulated in theories of equal rights in relation to gender, where the concern to respect difference leads to such formulations as the equal valuation of different contributions. However, there is a question as to whether such respect implies an acceptance of practices that might be considered harmful to certain minorities. There is a tension between universalism and particularism in the specification of equality and human rights, even though the traditional interpretation of these has tended to imply a single universal standard.
Human development, well-being and capabilities

A further project, variously named human development, well-being or capabilities, challenges a focus solely on economic development and growth, but is equivocal about equality. This approach to progress replaces a focus on income with a broader conception of human development and well-being. The intellectual inspiration underpinning this approach is the work of Amartya Sen (1999), while broader support comes from practitioners in the international development community and more recently from academics. There is an increasing divergence within this approach between an outcome-oriented project rooted in the international development community and a philosophically-oriented project focused on the concept of capabilities which is separated from that of functionings.

When embedded in the United Nations Development Project (1990), this alternative approach to development promoted an approach to human well-being that required more than just income; outcomes of longevity and education were the preferred form of development. This challenge to the narrowness of the goal of economic growth that had been held up by the institutions of global financial governance such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was at least partly successful. The adoption of the UN Millennium Development Goals, which offer a synthesis of human and economic development, by the IMF, the World Bank and OECD among others, represents a modest global political success on the part of this challenge to neoliberal conceptions of economic growth.

Capabilities are the ‘substantive freedoms’ to ‘choose a life one has reason to value’, while functionings are ‘the various things a person may value doing or being’, according to Sen (1999: 74–5). The distinction between capabilities and functionings parallels the distinction between opportunities and outcomes. One of the strengths of the capabilities approach (that it is open to democratic attempts to name and prioritize capabilities) is also a weakness. The flexibility and openness to political pressure in the definition of the list of capabilities mean that a wide range of interpretations of capabilities is possible. The focus on capabilities rather than on functionings deliberately opens the door to choice, but thereby makes possible a choice of inequality as a way to obtain a difference. Opportunities, conceptualized as substantive freedoms and capabilities, are hard to operationalize and to measure. Because the door is deliberately opened to choice, it is thereby opened to the possibility that people may choose inequality through their choice of a form of difference.
that is linked to inequality. Choice is prioritized over equality. By
contrast, the UNDP approach to capabilities problematizes choice:
‘Real opportunity is about having real choices – the choices that come
with a sufficient income, an education, good health and living in a
country that is not governed by tyranny’ (UNDP 2006). In this way,
certain contexts are taken as key to providing capabilities. The focus
shifts to outcomes (rather than opportunities) which are easier to
measure against a common standard. The interpretation of this school
of thought as developed by the UNDP, with its focus on a wide range
of outcomes that are relevant to human development and well-being,
is the one preferred here.

Competition projects: neoliberalism
and social democracy

The different conceptions of progress – high personal income,
human well-being, equality and human rights – do not necessarily
contain accounts of the means to reach these goals. Sometimes they
are implied, but in many cases the means to reach these ends are
contested. Would prioritizing economic growth raise incomes most
effectively, even if at the expense of lesser equality or human
rights? Would deepening democracy most effectively promote
equality and human well-being, but at the expense of more rapid
economic growth? Are there trade-offs between the different goals,
or not? How are these combined in different projects in the world?

While there are many projects to reach these goals, neoliberalism
and social democracy are the most comprehensive in vision and the
most relevant today (Giddens 1998; Held 2004; Harvey 2005). While
neoliberalism and social democracy presume modernity, and disagree
over the form that modernity should take, other projects promote
some aspects of pre-modernity, as is often the case in religious funda-
mentalisms. Other projects include human rights. Some have partial
rather than comprehensive visions, for example feminism, cos-
mopolitanism (Beck 2006) and environmentalism (Yearley 1996;
Cudworth 2003). Some are hybrid projects – for example, the US
Bush Presidency, 2001–2009, combined neoliberalism with Christian
fundamentalism – while the ‘cosmopolitan universalists’ combine social
democracy with human rights (Held 2004), and the anti-globalization
movement combines anti-neoliberal capitalism, environmentalism
and feminism. This book focuses on the contrast between the two
major projects, neoliberalism and social democracy.

These projects sometimes become embedded in governmental
programmes and sometimes in actual social formations. The extent
to which these visions are institutionalised and implemented varies significantly. Projects can be primarily located in civil society, or may become embedded in governmental policy programmes or in actually existing social forms, both large and small. A civil society project usually aims to become the dominant state programme in order to shape actual social relations and institutions, although with varying degrees of success.

Neoliberalism elevates the notion of market effectiveness into a guiding principle for action and attempts to reduce the level of state intervention into the economy, prioritizing the individual over collectivism (Brenner and Theodore 2002; England and Ward 2007). As an intellectual project its current forms draw on the work of Hayek (1960) and Friedman (1962), which argued that freeing the market from state controls was the best way to ensure economic growth, which in turn was believed to deliver human well-being, freedom, democracy, and civil liberties. The project grew in strength during the 1980s, but has a much longer heritage; here the term neoliberal is extended back in time. In the 1980s the neoliberal programme was taken forward by the US and UK governments under Reagan and Thatcher and by global financial institutions, becoming known as the ‘Washington consensus’, and then spread globally as a result of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions on loans to poor countries including ‘structural adjustment’. The policies included cutting back state welfare expenditure; the reduction in or deregulation of worker protections and benefit payments for those out of employment; the privatization of publicly owned industries, utilities and services; the expansion of the market into previously non-marketised arenas of the global commons such as the genome; and the substitution of the market as an alternative form of governance to democracy in specific areas, for example welfare provision (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2003, 2005; England and Ward 2007). In practice, the record of neoliberalism on economic growth is contested (Stiglitz 2002). The drive to increase incentives to work shifts the balance of power, leading to increased inequalities which then compromise human-well-being (Oswald 1997; Wilkinson 2005).

Social democracy aspires to govern societies democratically, avoiding excessive inequality, promoting human as well as economic development, and enabling minorities as well as majorities to enjoy their human rights. Social democratic projects commit to the provision of education, health and care for those in need, in order to deliver human well-being for all, whether employed or not (Esping-Andersen 1990). There is a commitment to developing policies across a wide spectrum in order to deliver social justice and to reduce inequality. It is considered appropriate for the state to intervene in
the running of the economy through regulation not only to prevent market failure, but also to engage in redistribution; the state legitimately taxes and spends in order to deliver its policies.

Social democratic projects vary significantly in the extent to which they promote state or collective ownership as mechanisms to govern the economy, whether they adopt Keynesian macro economic management to reduce the severity of recessions or merely aim for stability. There has been both a retreat (Callaghan 2000) and a transformation (Kitschelt 1994) of social democratic projects into new forms as a response to the reduction in the traditional base of electoral support in male manual workers in manufacturing industries (Przeworski and Sprague 1986), dealignment in class voting practices (Crewe et al. 1977), and changing external circumstances such as globalization (Held 1995). There has also been a slow transition of the social democratic project towards the full inclusion of the concerns of gender and other minorities which is ongoing. Some forms of the project now include full employment for women and an end to discrimination against women and minorities, though a full engagement with ethno-national issues of citizenship and migration is far from complete. Neoliberal critics consider that state intervention compromises economic growth and thereby other goals.

This description of the projects of neoliberalism and social democracy has so far been a summary of ideal types and aspirations. The implications of the projects as they enter governmental programmes and become embedded in diverse social formations can be quite different.

While the self-description of neoliberalism focuses on diminishing governmental interventions into the economy, in contrast with social democracy, in practice neoliberalism is associated with the greater expansion of state interventions in other domains than social democracy. In particular, neoliberalism is associated with the greater development and deployment of state violence and associated forms of coercion than is social democracy, for example, in the propensity to go to war, the build up of military capacity, and the use of prisons to contain criminality and maintain social order. So while neoliberalism appears to laud a small state, this is only in relation to the economy; in practice neoliberal governments simultaneously develop a large coercive state to maintain the domestic social order and position in the global state system. In comparing neoliberalism and social democracy, it is important not to confine the analysis to the intersection of the polity with the economy, but also to include other domains including violence.

While there is widespread consensus that the USA is a major example of the neoliberal project and Sweden of the social democratic, the
boundary between neoliberalism and social democracy is contested, with some arguing that Britain’s New Labour government since 1997 constitutes a new form of social democracy (Giddens 1998) and others arguing that the extent of its use of the market principle means that it is effectively neoliberal (Arestis and Sawyer 2005). The debate concerns a number of issues regarding the state’s role in securing social justice. These include the shift away from state ownership of industries and services; away from direct provision of public services by the state to being merely guaranteed by the state but delivered by the market; the development of active labour market policies, such as compulsory counselling and targeted training, to achieve full employment; and away from a goal to reduce inequality to that of reducing social exclusion and the provision of equal opportunities. The move away from state ownership and the provision of goods and services to their regulation by the state (Majone 1996) is not necessarily inconsistent with a social democratic tradition, though the reduction in the role of the state is considered by some to be a move towards neoliberalism. The emphasis on the employment and education of individuals may be interpreted either as a shift to a neo-liberal accommodation to global capital (Taylor-Gooby 1997; George 1998; Brine 2006), a shift from a Keynesian welfare state to a Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop 1999), or in keeping with a social democratic tradition that prioritizes full employment (Giddens 1998, 2001; Crouch 1999), where an appropriate response to globalization is to invest in people’s human capital through state initiated training and education (Reich, 1993; Quadagno, 1999; Esping-Andersen 2002). These changes may well be an accommodation to a changing global environment, but full employment under decent conditions for all without coercion and state ensured access for all to education, health and care and a decent living standard are among the hallmarks of social democracy. The shift in the conceptualization of the goal of ‘equality’ to that of ‘social inclusion’ (Giddens 1998) potentially softens the core principles of the social democratic project (Lister 1998), as does reduced concern with increased inequality caused by the growth in high level earnings and wealth from housing capital, and the evasion of taxation and regulation by private equity forms of capital (Murphy 2007), although the attention to poverty somewhat mitigates this. On this range of concerns, the UK is best considered to be situated on the boundary between social democracy and neoliberalism.

A similar debate addresses whether the EU is best considered neoliberal (Young 2000) or social democratic, which is complicated by the narrower remit of this polity, which excludes welfare payments and the different construction of its democratic processes (Majone 1998). The conclusion of this debate drawn here is that the
major division in the world today is one between a more neoliberal USA and a more social democratic EU. The contest between the varieties of modernity of these two global hegemons is crucial for the future of global arrangements.

Contesting conceptions of progress

How is it possible to adjudicate between these contesting conceptions of progress: economic development, human well-being, equality and human rights? Are these issues to be determined by philosophers, or is it a matter of politics, with the strongest forces winning, or a matter of rational argumentation and evidence based research? Is there a single universal standard, or will there always be particular standards for different cultures and communities? The tension between universalism and particularism runs through all of these framings of progress: between a concept of progress that is universally applicable and one that always varies by social location. Is universalism merely a disguise for new forms of imperialism, colonialism, or Westernization? The postmodern critique of modernity argues that a universally relevant concept of progress is inherently impossible. However, it can also be argued that universal standards are needed, since exceptions can be manipulated by the powerful. How, in an emergent global era, might all voices be involved in determining what global standards should be?

Is there a philosophical grounding of the decision between either a universal or community-based grounding? On the one hand, liberalism and universalism appear to offer a plea to a free-floating form of reason that is universal, drawing on a Kantian heritage (Rawls 2005). There is a claim to universally valid truth, though this usually assumes a coherent individual as the seeker/knower. On the other hand, communitarianism appears to offer grounding in the particular standards of a specific community (Taylor 1994; Sandel 1998). The latter implies that truth is always partial and situated, that we are limited by the communities in which we are located, and that there is always social situatedness and a particularity of values and knowledge (Haraway 1988). In place of the Enlightenment tradition that made universal claims to knowledge, has emerged a postmodern scepticism of the validity and usefulness of the grand ‘metanarratives’ linking the knowledge and progress that constituted its core components (Lyotard 1984).

Of course, both polar extremes are untenable. Many have sought a resolution or compromise, either by refining the procedures for an assessment of justice claims (Habermas 1989, 1991; Benhabib 1992), or by integrating the concerns of the individual and the community
(Kymlicka 1991, 1995). Habermas (1989, 1991) seeks a resolution by attempting to establish universally valid procedures by which truth may be established, utilising the dynamics within an assumed desire to communicate to drive the process, and locating it within an idealised situation of equality of contribution. However, by such a location Habermas, despite his intentions, situates rather than universalizes the conditions for truth, since the conditions of free and equal contribution are actually socially specific, not least in their presumption of the implications of democratic involvement. Benhabib’s (1992) attempt at overcoming the same dualism by demanding a focus on the other has similar strengths and weaknesses to that of Habermas despite her attempt to move further on (Hutchings 1997). Benhabib seeks to avoid commitment to the communitarian stance, by making an appeal to the ostensibly universally valid criteria of judgement of recognizing the standpoint of the other. But the process of recognizing the standpoint of the other is not natural and automatic, but depends upon socially variable conditions. Thus Benhabib merely displaces the problem of universalism onto these new procedures for judgement, which are not sufficiently universal to be adequate to the task demanded of them. The act of ‘recognition’ requires a social process of assessment as to what constitutes the same as or different from oneself. By contrast, Bauman (1991, 1993) simultaneously rejects both poles and with them the search for certain foundations for contemporary ethics and political projects.

But despite the philosophical angst, there are nonetheless many projects that promote alternative conceptions of progress. How should they be understood? Are they best understood as predominantly political? There are protestors who oppose the priorities for globalization as proposed by the world’s financial institutions, who are met with organized state and police power, as in the Seattle riots (Klein 1999). There are political struggles within global institutions, for example, coalitions of poor countries preventing the World Trade Organization from adopting certain types of liberalisation of world trade that they consider would adversely affect the poor.

Today, many projects engage simultaneously with both knowledge and power, drawing on and deploying scientific research within and alongside political engagement. This can be understood as the development of ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992) or ‘public sociology’ (Burawoy 2005). ‘An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence ... an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge ... a shared set of normative and principled beliefs ... shared causal beliefs ... derived from their analysis of practices ... shared notions of validity ... and a common policy enterprise’ (Haas 1992: 3). Burawoy (2005) refers to the practice of public sociology, in contrast to professional sociology, critical sociology and
policy sociology. This is a sociology that engages with contemporary issues, researching questions that emerge in civil societal struggles, which draws on the other three sociologies, not least professional expertise, and is engaged in projects of social transformation, the pursuit of progress. There are many examples of the intermingled nature of politics and science, in which findings from research are central to the struggles over the pursuit of competing projects, including the best way to invest for development (Stiglitz 2002) and the dangerousness of emerging genomic technologies (Winickoff et al. 2005). These draw on the notion that truth is never permanently established even if it temporarily appears to be (Latour and Woolgar 1979), but is instead constantly subject to challenge and to doubt (Habermas 1987 [1981]).

In global arenas there have been several significant and successful challenges to the standards against which global progress is to be measured and in more than one direction. A change from economic growth towards a capabilities understanding of progress has been occurring within global institutions as a consequence of this mix of intellectual and political struggle. In the 1980s the clear goal of the world’s financial institutions was economic growth. By 2000, in the UN Millennium Declaration, the World Bank, IMF and OECD instead supported a capabilities approach. The eight Millennium Development Goals were to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental stability; and develop a global partnership for development (UN 2005). A change in the list of UN-recognized human rights occurred in 1993 as a result of a similar mix of political agitation and research-based evidence (Peters and Wolper 1995). This was to include violence against women as a violation of women’s human rights. The potent mix of a global feminist coalition and research on the extent of violence against women was crucial to this change in what were ostensibly ‘universal’ human rights.

With globalization, the definition of the good life and the policies to promote it are increasingly contested at a global level. Global institutions and the political and civil societal spaces they generate constitute an increasingly important terrain on which these struggles take place. There are appeals to both scientific evidence and to democratically expressed popular priorities as bases for the legitimacy of arguments. Global institutions around the UN have revised their stated goals as a consequence of these processes. There has been a shift in emphasis from a framing of progress as an increase in income to one of capabilities, while the definition of universal human rights now involves explicit reference to women’s human rights. At the same time, in a perhaps contrary direction, global financial institutions have
promoted economic growth, and military force has been deployed by
some polities in pursuit of particularistic goals.

Conclusions

One of the aims of this book is to adjudicate rival claims about
progress on the basis of evidence and theory that go beyond phi-
losophy. The concept of progress is not outmoded, as alleged by
some postmodern critics. Yet there is no single and universally
agreed upon definition of progress, rather there are many com-
peting framings of the project. Thus a search for a foundational
basis for a detailed list of the characteristics of the good life would
be in vain. While there is no single foundation for standards of
progress, the formulation, encoding and institutionalization of
concepts of progress in international conventions and agreements,
especially those orchestrated by the UN, proceed apace. This is
not the same as a global or universal agreement. Nevertheless,
these activities do have consequences. There are active processes
of claims-making about what constitutes progress and the proper
goals of public policy. In a global era there is renewed interest in
claims pitched at the level of the universal. In an era of global-
ization and increasing valuation and the practice of democracy the
contention over the content of the concept of progress is taking
new and more global forms. The contested choice of economic
growth, or capabilities and well-being, or with justice-based con-
siderations of equality or human rights, affects public policy at
both global and national levels.

Here, a complex realism is adopted, in which each knowledge
claim is underpinned by a set of theoretical and empirical com-
ponents, each of which is part of a network of knowledge claims. It
is a knowledge claim rather than a value claim because of this
underpinning. This is not a foundationalist claim, since the theo-
retical and empirical underpinning is contestable and challenge-
able. The ‘real’ can never be known for certain; not even if the best
scientific procedures are followed. The concept of complex real-
ism building on critical realism combines the notion that there are
procedures by which knowledge claims are contested (subject to
refutation) and can be improved with that of uncertainty, in that
they can never be known absolutely. In complex realism, the test-
ing of knowledge claims against a network of theories and empir-
ical evidence can lead to a reduction in the errors in knowledge.

Many issues ostensibly posed as ones of value often make
implicit claims as to how phenomena are interconnected. Many
claims made about the good life, progress, and human well-being are testable to a considerable degree by empirical evidence because they are claims about associations and connections between phenomena. One of the aims of this book is to assess the processes and types of social system that best realize the good life, according to different formulations and addressing its framing as economic growth, human development, equality and human rights. When do they map onto each other? When do they diverge? What forms of social organization and social development, which varieties of modernity, are associated with each? How general a set of arguments can be made, universal or particular? This book provides evidence of the implications of one dimension of social life inequality for another, thereby reducing the speculative element in some of the debates. Chapter 9 in particular uses comparative data to measure progress in a range of countries according to the different definitions identified here.

Multiple Complex Inequalities

Introduction

Equality matters not only because it is a major contemporary framing of justice and progress, but also because inequalities affect the different forms and speed of economic and human development. Key issues include: how to theorize multiple and intersecting social inequalities in addition to class; how to theorize the relationship between difference and inequality; and the implications of multiple complex inequalities for the analysis of progress and modernity.

Why multiple inequalities? Class is not the only significant inequality. Inequalities are also associated with gender, ethnicity, racialization, nation, religion, able-bodiedness, sexual orientation, age, generation, linguistic community, and more. These inequalities affect the differences between forms of modernity as well as the key dynamics of social change.

Why complex inequalities? Unequal social relations involve difference as well as inequality. Some aspects of the different activities may be positively valued, while others will be regarded as unjust. It is this complicated combination of inequality and difference that the concept of ‘complex inequalities’ is intended to capture. Complex inequalities are here defined as constituted by the simultaneity of difference and inequality, going beyond the conventional treatment of these as alternatives.
Multiple and intersecting inequalities

While class has traditionally been seen as the main axis of social inequality, this is insufficient. Gender and ethnicity are also important forms of inequality, as can be the case with disability, religion, age and sexual orientation (it is illegal to discriminate on grounds of gender, ethnicity, disability, faith, age and sexual orientation in the EU: see the European Commission 2007a). While the diversity of social inequalities is widely documented, they are infrequently integrated into macro level social theory. Specialist areas of social science have produced extensive descriptions and analysis of specific inequalities, for example, in the sub-disciplines of gender studies, ethnic and racial studies, and disability studies; however, these have not yet been fully integrated into social theory.

In order to include multiple complex inequalities in addition to class at the centre of social theory, several theoretical developments are needed. The conceptualization of each of the main institutional domains of economy, polity, violence and civil society needs to be re-thought so as to include and make visible complex inequalities in addition to class. Each of the complex inequalities needs to be theorized as a separate system of social relations, as a regime of inequality spelling out the ontological depth of these regimes. Class is not reducible to economics, nor ethnicity to culture; rather each regime of inequality involves the economy, polity, violence and civil society. The theorization of multiple regimes of inequality is a further challenge – to go beyond reducing one form of inequality to another, or restricting the account to description.

The concept of the economy, which is often restricted to marketised monetised activities, needs to be widened to include non-marketised non-monetised work if it is to capture gender and ethnic relations. If it is not broadened in this way, then other forms of economic activity, such as unpaid domestic care-work that is an important part of the constitution of gender relations (Oakley 1974; Becker 1981; Delphy 1984) and slavery that was an important part of the constitution of ethnic relations (Walvin 1992), will be omitted from the analysis. If the unit within which inequality is considered is widened from one country to the whole world and inequalities between generations are included, then new forms of inequalities become visible, such as global warming, which has had stronger effects on the poor South rather than the rich North of the world (Roberts and Parks 2007) and on future generations.

The inclusion of non-marketised economic sectors causes problems for some of the most frequently used measures of economic inequality, in particular income inequality. Comparing the income of employed
people is relatively straightforward, generating accounts of class, gender and ethnic economic inequality among workers, with measures of the wage spread and the gender and ethnic pay gaps. But how is an unpaid domestic care-worker, often but not always a woman, to be treated in such an approach to economic inequality? Is she to be ignored since she does not have her own earned income? Such an approach is obviously unsatisfactory but is implied in the quite common practice of comparing the income of households rather than individuals, thereby making invisible any gender inequalities within the household (as in most of the studies of economic inequality reported in Chapter 3). Is her domestic care-work left out of focus by centring the analysis on her earned income, asking what proportion of men’s earnings are earned by women (a measure used by the UNDP), thereby explicitly treating the lack of income from domestic care-work as a component of gender inequality? Should unpaid domestic care-work be treated as a positive valued activity in its own right? Or is it a key part of gendered economic inequalities?

The conventional concept of the state is too narrow to grasp some key forms of institutionalized politics and governance concerning gender and ethnicity. The broader concept of polity includes a wider range of entities, including trans-national polities such as the European Union, and also organized religions, which can be important in the governance of gender and ethnic relations. The conventional operationalization of the concept of democracy focuses on free elections, free political parties, free association, free speech, and the right to bodily integrity such as the right of habeas corpus (not to be subject to arbitrary detention). Using these criteria most, though not all, countries can be considered democratic today. However, effective access to power requires a presence in the key arenas of decision making, such as in parliament. If a presence in parliament were to be added to the operationalization of the concept of democracy, then women and minoritised ethnic groups do not have political equality as yet. If the right to bodily integrity were to make visible gender issues, such as women’s freedom to control their bodies in sexual and reproductive matters such as abortion and contraception, then there is not yet political equality for women.

Violence needs to be added to the conventional set of institutional domains of economy, polity and civil society, since it is so important in the structuring of gender, ethnic, national, and religious inequalities. Violence is not merely an instrument of power, but can also be constitutive of social relations. The processes of deployment and the regulation of violence in both collectively organised and in interpersonal forms have important implications. These forms
include not only the armies of the state but also domestic violence, sexual assault, harassment, lynching, ‘ethnic cleansing’, and terrorism. The use of violence by dominant groups against women and minoritised ethnic, sexual, and religious groups is a further indicator of inequality.

Civil society is a domain of social creativity, where there is a development of new ideas and social practices, including various forms of association, non-governmental organizations, social movements, and non-state forms of power struggle (Gramsci 1971) and intimacy. It includes but is not confined to issues of culture, including the media, the arts, sport, and knowledge creation. Whether different participation in these activities constitutes inequality or a valued difference is again an issue in these areas. Nevertheless, the imbalance between social groups in decision-making activities in civil society may often be considered an inequality. Who decides what constitutes news, which leisure activities are to be funded and put on prime-time television, and who makes decisions in trade unions and other associations?

**Complex inequalities: difference, inequality and progress**

In deciding what counts as inequality there is a troublesome complication: when is something a positively valued difference and when is it inequality? This issue lies at the heart of many disputes about what constitutes progress; what to some is a reduction of a negatively valued inequality, to others might constitute a reduction in a positively valued practice. Rather than forcing a choice, it is better to recognize that most social relations contain both inequality and valued differences. The term ‘complex inequality’ is used here to signify this simultaneous presence of inequality and positively valued difference.

Complex inequalities potentially constitute a challenge to the concept of progress insofar as there are multiple standards to evaluate what is progress. There are three ways of thinking about equality in this context. First, is to identify a single standard against which inequality is measured. A second position entails equally valuing different contributions. A third approach is that of transformation, whereby the whole system is changed, with all groups and the standards attached to them restructured.

The first position argues that there is or can be a single agreed standard against which to identify inequality. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that equality in accessing these rights should be universal, exemplifies this position.
A single standard of equality is often implied in monetary economic inequality, where differences in income and wealth are considered to be inequalities. It is implied in the concept of democracy, where the equality of each vote is considered important. Such a conception of equality measured against a single standard is common in the analysis of class relations, where matters of economic and political equality are often at the forefront of the analysis. The feminist vision of de-gendering (Lorber 2000, 2005) implicitly endorses this position, even though a question remains as to its universal application. In practice, the legal dimension of the equality strategy of the EU is based on ‘equal treatment’ thereby endorsing agreed standards. Indeed some standards, such as equal pay for women and men, may constitute standards that are already held by women as well as by men. While the identification of inequality may appear obvious through the lens of class analysis in relation to inequalities in income and wealth, in the case of complex inequalities other than class, such as ethnicity and gender, where inequality and difference are more obviously present simultaneously, this is not so simple. Some forms of variation are open to alternative interpretations as either difference or equality: for example, a segregated pattern of labour between domestic care-work and waged labour may be a valued difference or an unwelcome inequality or both.

The second position positively values difference (Spellman 1988; Young 1990) and diversity, and assumes the possibility of equally valuing different practices (Taylor et al. 1994). In the desire to move beyond the over-simplifying notion of a single standard against which to measure inequality, there has been a move to recognize and value difference (Young 1990; Taylor 1994; Tronto 1994; Calhoun 1995; Hobson 2000). Young (1990) argues for the recognition of cultural difference – the denial of respect for those who are culturally different and for their ways of life is a problem that needs a political remedy. She argues for the recognition of groups as the bearers of these cultures within the political system, rather than recognizing only the individual of liberalism. This theory of justice ontologically privileges groups over individuals. In contrast to Lorber’s (2005) call for de-gendering, Young argues for the deepening of institutions that promote respect for group differences. There are two main problems with this approach. First, in practice, the institutionalization of difference has often entailed inequality in some way. An example here is that of the performance of unpaid domestic care-work by women. This may be a highly valued activity (Tronto 1993), however, it can be inconsistent with the activities necessary to obtain equal pay under certain circumstances (Joshi and Paci 1998). Second, the strategy of
‘recognition’ has a problematic tendency to lead to the reifying, essentializing (Ferree and Gamson 2003), or ontologizing (Felski 1997) of difference. It can embed differences ever more firmly. The focus on specific identities makes it difficult to engage with change and cross-cutting inequalities. The dilemma becomes how to recognize difference while avoiding the trap of essentialism (Ferree and Gamson 2003).

There have been many attempts to reconcile, merge, hybridize, or otherwise go beyond the dichotomisation of sameness and difference approaches to equality (Scott 1988; Kymlicka 1995; Fraser 1997; Holli 1997). One resists a settled focus on identity (Braidotti 1994); a second focuses on sameness in some domains and difference in others (Council of Europe 1998); a third posits a process of transformation of existing standards and their associated institutions (Fraser 1997; Rees 1998). In the first approach, Braidotti (1994) emphasizes the fluidity and changeability of cultural forms by utilizing the metaphor of the ‘nomadic’ subject to resist settling into established modes of thought and behaviour. She prefers the perspective of difference in order to avoid simply embracing existing identities. However, such a distancing from actually existing social practices runs the risk of rendering the position too abstract to have much practical substantive meaning (Felski 1997; Squires 1999). A second approach allows for equality through sameness in one domain and equality with difference in others (Council of Europe 1998; Verloo 2001). Equality through sameness is specified in the ‘equal participation of women and men in political and public life’ and ‘the individual’s economic independence’, and education, while equality through equal valuation of different contributions is specified for the family and care-work. However, this is only possible if the links between different domains are loose. If the gender practices in different domains are coupled tightly, it may not be possible to have common standards in one domain and different standards in another.

The third approach to equality requires transformation (Fraser 1997; Rees 1998; Squires 2005). In this perspective, a transition from inequality to equality implies the transformation of the social institutions and standards in which the groups are involved. Transformation entails new standards agreed across diverse social groups that are themselves restructured. As social relations are transformed, then new standards develop. This is an approach that is classically adopted in socialism. There can be no significant practical restructuring of inequalities without the transformation of the social relations that themselves produce the standards against which equalities are measured.
Modernity? Postmodernity?
Not yet Modern? Varieties of Modernity?

Introduction

Are we now postmodern, rather than modern, or still pre-modern in some respects? Are there stages to modernity, so that we are now in high or late modernity (Giddens 1991), reflexive or second modernity (Beck 1992) or liquid modernity (Bauman 2000)? Are there multiple modernities, with quite different principles of modernity (Huntington 1998; Eisenstadt 2002)? Or varieties of modernity, sharing key features but with different paths of development (Hall and Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2006, 2007)?

The answers to these questions depend on the definition of modernity, whether complex inequalities are brought into focus, and whether different types of modernity can be distinguished. The definition of modernity used here draws on the classics, from Marx and Weber to Durkheim and Simmel, inflecting them with contemporary social theory. Bringing complex inequalities, and especially gender, into focus challenges conventional accounts of modernity. Rather than a singular modernity, varieties of modernity are identified.

It is necessary to reconsider the definition of modernity, to rebuild from its classic origins, and to address forms of inequalities that the classics did not fully consider. Five components of modernity are considered: free wage labour; the state monopoly of legitimate violence; rationalisation; individuation; democracy and human rights.

Modernity or postmodernity?

Is the concept of postmodernity more appropriate than that of modernity for the twenty-first century (Lyotard 1974; Harvey 1989; Kumar 2005)? Does postmodernity imply that knowledge is so situated and contextualised by particular social groups that no general social theory is possible? Does the inclusion of multiple complex inequalities and cultural diversity mean that the concept of modernity should be rejected as too simplistic and replaced by that of postmodernity? Does recognition of the divergent values and preferences of particular social groups and cultures challenge the vision of a universal conception of modernity (Taylor et al. 1994; Calhoun 1995; Felski 1995; Bhabra 2007; Schmidt 2007)?
Is it appropriate to link modernity with progress, or is the ‘Enlightenment’ confidence in the possibility of progress misplaced (Lyotard 1984)? Modernity is accused of bringing the Holocaust (Bauman 1989), the destabilisation of the environment, high levels of inequality, and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Is it better to reject any link between modernity and progress, and prefer instead an ethical position of distance from such a commitment, articulated as postmodern ambivalence (Bauman 1991)?

However, it was rare that classic social theorists simply equated modernity with progress. They were almost always ambivalent, aware of the negative as well as positive potential of any changes. The double-edged nature of modernity, providing both freedom and also new forms of disciplinary constraint, runs deep in much classic sociological theory (Wagner 1994). For example, Marx saw increased poverty before revolution and socialism, with free wage labour providing both freedom from personal bondage as well as increased discipline, while Weber saw rationality as not only the development of the human capacity for knowledge but also as an iron cage of bureaucracy which narrowed the human range of action. The conceptualisation of progress is highly contested and should not be equated with modernity, but classical social theory did not make this mistake.

The recognition of multiple forms of inequalities and differences has been absorbed into postmodernist criticism of modernist analysis. There are potentially many different baselines against which to measure equality. But it does not follow that postmodernism is the best answer to this analytic challenge. The multiplicity of inequalities is not new to a global era, indeed in Simmel’s work individuation resulting from diverse webs of affiliations was central to his understanding of modernity. The standards against which inequality and progress are measured are contested, but that is not the same as abandoning such a project as if there were incommensurability.

The challenges posed to social theory and to the simpler forms of modernisation theory need to be answered, but there are other ways. One is to re-work the concepts of modernity, moving beyond a false singularity, recognizing the still existing premodern, and theorizing the varieties of modernity. The challenge to the simpler concepts of social system needs to be addressed and the conceptual tools needed to do this can be drawn from complexity theory, as will be shown later.

**Late, second or liquid modernity?**

Also going beyond modernity is a series of writers who think we have reached not postmodernism, but a late stage in the development of modernity – late or high modernity (Giddens 1991), reflexive or
second modernity (Beck 1992, 2002) and liquid modernity (Bauman 2000). These writers have introduced issues of choice and reflexivity, intimacy and family, into the analysis of modernity.

According to Giddens and Beck, we are now more reflexive, more able to knowingly make the decisions that shape our lives. Rather than fixed traditional patterns, there is choice. This analysis is led from an interpretation of the changes in intimacy (Giddens 1992) and the family (Beck 1992, 2002), which are positioned more centrally to social changes than has been common in social theory. Giddens and Beck are right to name intimacy and the family as areas of significant social change, but their analysis of this abandons the approach that they have used for other social relations, neglecting much of the considerable social science work on gender relations that explains these changes in the same way as changes in any other set of social relations. Their move into the language of choice and reflexivity leaves behind much of the heritage of social theory. This is a mistake. Bauman (2000) similarly focuses on change for individuals, but is less focused on the family and intimacy, suggesting that in liquid modernity there is a change from solidly structured social relations to fluidly changing social relations. Bauman goes beyond Giddens and Beck in noting explicitly that the appearance of choice for individuals is not really choice in an unequal society. He is right to point out that choice is better addressed as a personal experience, a superficial appearance, rather than as a reduction in constraints.

All three, Giddens, Beck and Bauman, write as if there were a single modernity. There is no reference to differences between countries. In particular, there is no reference to the differences between the social democratic reorganization of gender and family relations and those in more neoliberal countries. Bauman writes as if all of modernity is becoming neoliberal. But there are differences, with the social democratic version of modernity different from that of neoliberalism. This book explores these differences rather than treating the West as if it were one.

**Multiple modernities?**

A further response to the challenge of diverse social forms and inequalities to the paradigm of modernity is that there are several forms of modernity, not just one. Much early work on modernization assumed that there was a single form of modernity, in which variations were minor and theoretically insignificant. The presumption of a singular form of modernity can be challenged without abandoning the concept of modernity. There are two ways of conceptualizing the
diversity of forms of modernity: multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2000; Huntington 1998) and varieties of modernity (Schmidt 2006, 2007).

The concept of multiple modernities rejects the notion of a single path of modernity (Eisenstadt 2000; Huntington 1998), rather there are multiple alternative modernities each with its own distinct set of values and practices. Modernity is not the spread of Westernisation during processes of globalization, but instead is autonomously developed in different locations around the world. The multiple modernities approach assumes a radical dissimilarity between the forms of modernity. These differences are seen to lie especially in the realms of culture and religion, with an incomparability of value systems between different cultures (Eisenstadt 2000) and different civilizations (Huntington 1998). These approaches aim to overcome a perceived ethnocentric bias in traditional analyses of modernity as emanating and derivative from Western social practices. However, in compensating for Western bias these authors postulate such radical discontinuities that they erode any common basis for the concept of modernity. This position articulates a relatively thin conceptualisation of modernity, rooted in cultural values at the expense of economic, political and scientific processes where greater commonalities in trajectories of change might be found (Schmidt 2006). The theorists of multiple modernities rely rather too much on the cultural dimensions of different modernities, neglecting commonalities such as the development of science and market economies (Schmidt 2006). This poses the question of the precise definition of modernity – how should it be characterized and distinguished from pre-modernity?

Not yet modern?

Some of the social forms that have recently come to be interpreted as variously postmodern or aspects of multiple modernities are instead better conceptualised as not yet modern. This is made clear when complex inequalities are brought into focus.

Many of the classical sociologists, including Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel, constructed dualisms of before and after modernisation, the pre-modern and the modern. This dualism was centred on industrialisation and its associated transformations in the organization of society. The transition to modernity was located variously with the development of the mode of production (Marx 1954); rationalisation (Weber 1948, 1968); differentiation (Durkheim 1984); and the increased complexity of the web of social relations (Simmel 1955). Modernity involves free wage labour (Marx), the monopolisation of legitimate violence by the state (Weber), rationalisation (education, scientific
development and secularisation) (Weber), individuation (Simmel), and democracy and human rights (Therborn).

In some important respects we are not yet modern, the project of modernity is not yet complete. This is because in several critical domains, for some sets of social relations other than class, the transition to modernity is not yet complete. When complex inequalities, especially gender, are brought into focus, no country is yet fully modern, but rather a mixture of premodern and modern elements. Where there is not yet free wage labour, as for example where there is domestic labour or forced labour, there is not yet modernity in the economy. When significant numbers of women are dependent housewives, there is not yet modernity. When the state does not have a monopoly of legitimate violence in a given territory, as when there is uncriminalised violence against women and ethnic and other minorities, then the state is not yet modern. No country as yet has free wage labour for all of women’s work, the effective criminalisation of gender-based and ethnic-based violence, and secularisation, though many are in the process of transformations leading in these directions. The argument that modernity has been achieved or surpassed rests upon the false assumption that there is one dominant axis of social inequality. Taking complex inequalities seriously challenges the classic approach to modernity. The simultaneous existence of modern and premodern social forms in the same country challenges conventional forms of social system analysis.

Varieties of modernity

Classic social theory, from Marx to Durkheim to Simmel, was often centred on a single transition to industrialisation and modernity. The debate on this issue has continued, both backward looking to these processes historically in the North and forward looking to these processes today in the South (Kerr et al. 1960; Lipset 1960), though with many refinements in the most recent texts (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003). While the impact of modernisation occurs across the whole range of social life (Wilensky 2002), from human development (Sen 1999) to citizenship (Marshall 1950), a key issue has been whether economic development leads to democracy. By contrast, a quite different sociological tradition has considered political events as key to the divergence between different paths of development (Esping-Andersen 1999), although it has not always been theorised using the concept of path dependency (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990). In this perspective, the nature of industrial societies is critically shaped by political
processes especially involving states, which lead to different paths of development. Rather than one unfolding process of modernisation, there are several paths to and through modernity. Indeed, it has been argued that there is no inevitability that economic development will necessarily lead to democracy, but rather that the form of political governance depends upon the balance of political, especially class-based, forces during industrialisation (Moore 1966).

This type of approach is used in the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach to differences in the organizational form of market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001; Yamamura and Streeck 2003). It is also implicit in analyses of the implications of different political events in the transition to industrialisation, as in the work of Moore (1966) on the different implications of the balance of class forces during industrialisation for outcomes of either democracy or dictatorship, and subsequent scholarship on the implications of states and revolutions for the nature of class society (Skocpol 1979), and class alliances at critical moments for the form of welfare state (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990). Different routes through industrialisation generate different balances of social forces that can lead to divergent outcomes – temporality and sequencing make a difference. These may be the alternatives of dictatorship or democracy (Moore 1966), or different forms of welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen 1990). Rather than one unfolding process of modernisation, there is more than one path to and through modernity. In this perspective the nature of industrial societies is seen as critically shaped by non-economic processes, often political ones. The theorisation of this range of forms was taken forward by analyses of path dependent rather than unilinear forms of development (Moore 1966; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). The question of the significance of the distinctiveness and nature of the different varieties of modernity can then be addressed more clearly. This question is posed anew in the context of globalization, as to whether the differences between paths of development are eroded by global processes.

There is more than one way of identifying varieties of modernity. Within the varieties of capitalism school, Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. Within the welfare state literature, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) makes a three-fold distinction between liberal, conservative corporatist, and social democratic forms of welfare state regimes. Within the gendered literature on welfare states, Lewis (1992) makes a distinction based on the extent to which men are the breadwinners and women are the main carers. These typologies are based on different institutional locations: industrial relations, welfare state, gender relations. A more comprehensive typology needs to integrate not only these three, but also violence.
Here, the major varieties of modernity are neoliberalism and social democracy. In addition some social relations are not yet modern, so there is a need to retain the distinction between modern and premodern.

**Defining modernity**

In order to proceed further in the analysis of modernity, postmodernity, premodernity, multiple modernities, and varieties of modernity it is necessary to more precisely delimit what is meant by modern in each of the main areas of social organization: economy, polity, violence, and civil society.

**Free wage labour**

The development of free wage labour is a key aspect of modernity. Transforming labour power into a commodity that is sold on the market is a critical part of the development of capitalism (Marx 1954). The commodification of labour power is a key component of the transition from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production. The relations of production between serf and lord in feudalism were more personal in nature, embedded in a web of obligations and power, than those between proletarian and bourgeoisie.

The transformation of labour power into the commodity form involved a double-edged process of both increased discipline and increased freedom (Wagner 1994). It required increased discipline in following the routines of mass labour in the factory, for example longer hours of work increased the relevance of time-keeping (Thompson 1963). It increased and polarised social and economic inequality. Yet it increased some forms of freedom by narrowing the bonds tying the worker to the governing class to those of the sale of their labour power, releasing them from the personal bonds of servitude under feudalism.

The reduction in personal bonds to an employer increases workers' potential for the development of political consciousness and action. Workers have the civil societal and political space to develop alternative ideas and form the associations that underpin the development of various forms of collective action. Marx saw the development of capitalism as progressive, partly in itself and the new forces of production that were unleashed, and partly because of its potential for the next transformation of social relations to socialism and communism. The link between capitalist economic development and political action postulated by Marx is widely supported by contemporary social science (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).
been many nuances and subtle theoretical developments as to the nature of the link and the conditions under which it takes different forms (Habermas 1989; Gramsci 1971).

However, Marx restricted this analysis to class relations, leaving out of focus forms of inequality such as slavery and other forms of forced and non-marketised unfree labour together with the implications of the entry of women into free wage labour. Free wage labour is a hallmark of modernity, not only for class relations but also for gender relations and other complex social inequalities. Until labour is free wage labour, we are not yet modern.

State monopoly of legitimate violence
Weber's (1947) definition of the modern state is a body that has a monopoly over legitimate violence in a given territory. The modernisation of the state is a process during which the state accrues this form of power to itself, concentrating decisions over its utilisation in its increasingly centrally organized body, shifting away from the dispersal of this form of power among feuding barons and roving militias.

This definition of a modern state is widely adopted in contemporary social science (Giddens 1985). Indeed the development of states in Europe over the last thousand years can be described in terms of the de facto concentration of power, especially violence, in the state (Tilly 1990). This analysis runs parallel to Elias's (1994) theory of the civilizing process, in which there is a decreasing use of violence in civil society and a developing state monopoly as the civilizing process proceeds. Foucault (1997) goes further, suggesting that the use of brute force by the state is replaced by disciplining in the modern world.

However, the state does not have a monopoly over legitimate violence or all violence in the contemporary era. When complex inequalities, such as gender and ethnicity, are brought into focus it becomes clear that there are considerable amounts of violence over which the state neither has a monopoly nor seeks to have a monopoly. The existence of a considerable amount of gender-based violence, from domestic violence to rape (Krug et al. 2002), and ethnic-based violence, from racial harassment to ethnic cleansing (Mann 2005), which the state condones by failing to effectively criminalize it, contradicts the notion that contemporary states are modern. While the state does not have a monopoly of legitimate violence by its non-criminalization of significant amounts of gender-based and ethnic-based violence, the state is not yet modern.
Rationalisation

Rationalisation is key to Weber’s (1948, 1968) conception of modernity. Through this process, traditional and charismatic forms of authority give way to rational, legal, and bureaucratic forms. There is a process of disenchantment; a turning away from religion to secularism, an increase in education and in scientific knowledge.

Education is the field in which the process of rationalisation has occurred to the greatest extent around the world. The massive increase in educational institutions, the proportion of the population who are educated, and the length of time spent in education have been marked features of the last century. Increased education is a global phenomenon, even though there are significant differences in the content and amount between countries. The narrowing (and in some countries reversing) of the gender gap in education is a major reduction in one kind of complex inequality, though class and ethnic differences remain.

The development of scientific modes of knowledge production might be regarded as the best expression of the process of rationalisation in the modern world, as the most quintessentially modern way of thinking, but there are caveats. The constant critique and rejection of previous forms of knowledge are hallmarks of scientific method and this involves challenges to existing scientific claims as well. It is a form of rationalisation that takes a near global form (Schmidt 2006) and possesses enormous authority (Haraway 1997). The contemporary public questioning of science has been interpreted as a form of reflexive modernisation (Beck 1992); it is not a simple rejection of rationalism, but rather the bringing to bear of a range of forms of knowledge on the output of institutions dedicated to scientific development (Wynne 1996).

The decline in religion associated with secularisation has occurred in many developed countries, but not all (Bruce 1996; Norris and Inglehart 2004). While Europe has in general seen a decrease in religiosity, a decline in attendance at churches and an increase in secularism, this is not uniform (Gorski 2000). The USA by contrast, while developing an advanced economy and sophisticated institutions of education and science, has seen little fall in the religiosity of its population (Inglehart 1997). In some places there has been a shift in the content of beliefs away from traditional religions towards New Age spirituality rather than to conventional forms of secularism (Heelas and Woodhead et al. 2004). Further, the rise of various forms of fundamentalism within Christianity (especially in the USA), Islam, Hinduism and Judaism, likewise contradicts any simple rationalisation thesis (Marty and Scott 1993). The tenacity of religious belief systems raises serious challenges to the notion that contemporary Western
countries are all modern, if secularism is taken as a key feature of modernity. Nevertheless, despite the exceptions, there has been a decline in religiosity in developed countries. The difference between the USA and the EU in their levels of and trends in religiosity constitutes a significant divergence in trajectories within the West.

**Individuation**

Increasing individuation was seen by Simmel (1955) as the key to modernity. Simmel’s understanding of difference and inequality was not restricted to the great social cleavage of class. Rather, he envisaged modern social relations as highly complex and differentiated – instead of one dominant set of social relations there is a multiplicity. This gives rise to a highly individuated social order. However, this does not mean anarchic individualism. Instead there are complex webs of affiliation, with people connected to many others in myriad ways. Social life is conceived as a web of group affiliations.

Simmel differentiates between primitive and advanced thinking and forms of sociality. In the former the circumstances and affiliations due to family and kin are dominant, while in the second ‘each individual establishes for himself contacts with persons who stand outside this original group-affiliation, but who are “related” to him by virtue of an actual similarity of talents, inclinations, activities, and so on. The association of persons because of external coexistence is more and more superseded by association in accordance with internal relationships’ (Simmel 1955: 128). It becomes a matter of choice as to with whom one is affiliated. It becomes possible for intellectual and educational interests to bring together a new community. He suggests that while before the Renaissance social differentiation was based on either self-interest or emotion, afterwards intellectual and rational interests came to be the more common basis of groups. Higher, more modern, forms of association are those based on rationality rather than simple external characteristics. The modern person belongs to many groups (as compared with earlier times), this being a hallmark of culture. These groups include family, occupation, citizenship, social class, clubs, and many more. The more groups with which a modern person is affiliated, the more individuated this person becomes, because few if any other people are likely to have the same patterns of affiliation. The more groups of which a person is a member, the more attributes they possess. This gives rise to uncertainty rather than to the security of the previous mode. Conflicts between those groups of which an individual is a member encourage that individual both to make adjustments and also to become assertive.
While Simmel sees individuation as a general characteristic of modernity, some have seen this as restricted to Western modernity, while other modernities place the state, community and family above the individual, though this is perhaps most usually seen as the instrumentalisation of culture to defend political authoritarianism (Thompson 2000; Barr 2002).

Simmel (1955, 1984) notes that women are in the process of becoming modern, just reaching the point of experiencing the crossroads of affiliations at which individuality begins. The analysis of individuation is developed in the work of Giddens (1992) and Beck (2002), including the development of reflexive biographies as a consequence of changes in the economy and family, with implications for gender relations. But individuation for women is not yet complete.

**Democracy and human rights**

Democracy is not included in the classical texts of social theory, as since it was not fully developed at the time that they were writing it is unsurprising that it was not regarded as a marker of modernity. But in the twenty-first century, when democratic practices are widespread and the aspiration to democracy near-universal, democracy is widely regarded as a hallmark of modernity. A significant part of modernisation studies empirically investigated the links between economic development and social and political development, often finding a close association (Kerr et al. 1960; Lipset 1960; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004) although sometimes it was seen to be mediated by other factors such as the level of inequality (Bollen and Jackson, 1995; Muller, 1995a, 1995b) and the direction of the causality from economic to political has been challenged (Ersson and Lane 1996; Leftwich 1996, 2000).

However, the definition of what counts as democracy is highly contested, in particular the relationship between procedural practices and the representational outcome for social inequalities (Held 1995; Phillips 1995; Markoff 1996; Potter et al. 1997; Pitkin 2004). The conventional approach focuses on formal procedures, especially voting, rather than the outcome, such as the proportionate presence of social groups in parliament. Since the presence of women in parliaments makes a difference to the policy outcome (Thomas 1991; Norris 1996a; Wängnerud 2000), the conventional definition of democracy is in need of revision to include their parliamentary (or congressional) presence.

Human rights are likewise not included in the classical texts of social theory as markers of modernity for similar reasons, though they are noted in many texts on political philosophy from the eighteenth century onwards (Paine 1984 [1791]; Wollstonecraft
1992 [1790]). Human rights become a marker of modernity in the period after the Second World War, in the European rejection of the Holocaust and nationalist militarism that had overridden the interests of individuals in the name of purity of ethnic-nationhood (Therborn 1996). These are encoded in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a fundamental principle of all civilized nations (UN 1948). The interpretation of human rights is highly contested. Are they merely specific to Western countries with their individualistic ethos, or have they become hybridised so as to include Asian and other cultures that are traditionally less individualistic (Woodiwiss 1998)? Is their early formulation gendered, not universal (Nussbaum 2000)? Do they become inclusive of gender inequality insofar as they include sexual and reproductive rights and the right to be free from gender-based violence (Peters and Wolper 1995)? Today, democracy and human rights are markers of modernity, albeit that their meaning remains highly contested.

Globalization

Introduction

What is globalization? Are the distinctiveness of local social arrangements and the capacities of nation-states to act democratically being eroded? Is the world being homogenized into a single US-led modernity? Or are some political institutions resilient to these pressures? How does making multiple complex inequalities visible change analysis?

The conceptualization of globalization demands an engagement with the changing implications of spatiality and temporality, with space-time compression, an increased rate of flows of people, objects and symbols around the world, and the non-linearity of these processes. It requires re-thinking the concept of society, its boundedness and processes of formation, and the relationships between social systems in the world. Definitions of globalization are diverse and often encompass many different social processes. Globalization has been identified and conflated variously with internationalization, universalization, Westernization, supraterritoriality (Scholte 2000), Americanization, and neoliberalism. In particular, ‘globalization’ has often been treated as if it were effectively the same as the expansion of capitalist markets (Crouch and Strereek 1997). The conflation of globalization and capitalism is unhelpful
because it does not allow for the significance of any social relations other than capitalist ones and, further, precludes analysis of the political actions that might be facilitated by the increased global inter-linkages that might be in opposition to the growth in power of global corporations. It is better to have a definition that is minimalist in the sense that it does not include the causation nor name the processes involved. This is helpful in that it avoids conflating the causation of globalization with its definition and allows for the possibility of more than one wave of globalization with different causes.

Globalization is here defined as a process of increased density and frequency of international social interactions relative to local or national ones. This definition closely follows the definition of Chase-Dunn and colleagues (2000: 78): ‘changes in the density of inter-national and global interactions relative to local or national networks’. A more fulsome, though similar, definition of globalization is that used by Held et al. (1999: 16) ‘A process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power’. Globalization is a transformative process in which the units within the process change as well as the overall environment. Several dimensions can be distinguished: the extent of networks of relations and connections; the intensity of activities and flows through these networks; a temporal dimension of the speed of the interchanges; and the impact of these phenomena (Held et al. 1999).

While many focus on globalization as a predominantly economic or politico-economic project, it is important to consider violence and civil society as well. Rather than seeing globalization as a single process, it is more appropriate to distinguish between different types of global processes, including the global flows of capital, trade and people, the development of global institutions, networks and hegemons, and global civil societal waves.

One simple difference in approaches to globalization is between those who think that there is such a process and those who do not (Held and McGrew 2002). However, there are further important distinctions. Those who do not think that globalization is a useful framing of analysis include both those who think that there is already a global system and those who think that existing social institutions are effective in resisting such processes. There are four main approaches to globalization. First, that global processes are eroding the differences between societies and exacerbating inequalities. Second, that there are still separate societies that remain resilient in the face of
global pressures. Third, that the world is already global, and has been for a long time. Fourth, that global processes restructure social relations and co-evolve with trajectories of development. It is the last position that this book adopts and develops.

**Globalization as the erosion of distinctive and separate societies**

Globalization is frequently viewed as a process that is sweeping away differences between societies, thereby creating similarity or homogeneity. This is often seen as a negative process that corrodes culture and political autonomy and increases inequality (Martin and Schumann 1997), although there are some exceptions that see globalization as a positive force associated with economic growth and development (Ohmae 1990, 1995).

For Castells (1996, 1997, 1998) the development of globalization is associated with the rise of the information society, which he dates as appearing from the 1970s onwards. The origins of globalization lie in increasing global interconnections that are often linked to new information and communication technologies, such as computers and the internet (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998). These new forms of information flows change the nature of the world through their effects on the economy and the way that politics is organised.

Globalization changes the balance of power between capital and labour – capital is more mobile and can go ‘regime shopping’, potentially moving to whichever country offers the best opportunities, often seen as low taxation and low regulation (Traxler and Wöitech 2000). As a consequence, democratic states can lose their power to globally mobile capital, leading to a reduced capacity to set regulatory and welfare regimes in keeping with democratically expressed priorities. In this way, globalization is understood as a corrosive force that erodes and changes the nature of existing social and political entities, such as societies and states, and especially nation-states (Crouch and Streeck 1997). Globalization erodes, undermines, and reduces the capacity for the autonomous action of nation-states, especially over the provision of welfare, and hence their democracy (Cerny 1995, 1996; Held 1995; Martin and Schumann 1997), through the corrosive power of global financial markets (Strange 1996), and the new balance of power between capital and labour. Globalization exacerbates inequalities within and between countries.

Neoliberalism is a global wave of ideas, politics, and policy practices. This project, which promotes free markets and opposes state regulation of the economy in the pursuit of economic growth, has
come to dominate the powerful global financial institutions (Stiglitz 2002). It is a doctrine that favours private over public ownership, promoting the privatisation of public services and utilities such as water and private ownership of the information about genetics that underlies modern biotechnology, summarized by Harvey (2003, 2005) as ‘accumulation through dispossession’.

Globalization undermines some aspects of local and national cultures. Large multinational companies promote their products and associated cultures and undermine the distinctiveness of cultures and the authority of traditional ways of acting. For example, McDonalds spreads its fast food and associated unhealthy practices at the expense of local cuisines (Ritzer 1993). Hollywood shapes our cultural values. Globalization is here understood as a process that impacts on economies, polities and cultures; although they might resist or be resilient to this process.

While providing a powerful critique of recent changes, there are a number of limitations to this perspective. It tends to overstate the newness of these developments, which have a long history; it also tends to overstate the extent to which all polities are undermined; and it tends to underestimate the significance of political and civil societal responses to these processes.

Resistance to globalization

A contrasting approach suggests that political institutions and cultures can be resilient to global processes and that their paths of development have not always been significantly affected. This thesis has been articulated at the level of whole societies, and also at the level of specific political institutions.

It has been argued that the particularity of societies (Eisenstadt 2002), nation-states (Mann 1997) and civilizations (Huntingdon 1998) is resistant to erosion by globalization. Modernity does not take merely one form, there are multiple modernities with quite different forms. Neither industrialization nor globalization need lead to the erosion of differences (Eisenstadt 2002). Huntington (1998) argues that cultural and civilizational differences are durable, that rather than a homogenization of the world by economic development and increased communications, we are experiencing a ‘clash of civilizations’. There are several distinct civilizations whose basis is cultural and religious, with associated core states: Western, Latin American, African (possibly), Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist (barely), and Japanese. Huntington argues that while most civilizations are seeking to modernize, they are not necessarily seeking to
Westernize; that it is possible to have modern technology without social patterns that are perceived as Western, and that cultures deeply rooted in civilizations are robust enough to be able to resist Westernization as they modernize. Controversially, he identifies a fissure between the West and Islam, as a result of differences in core civilizational values. There are empirical weaknesses in his argument related to inconsistency in the application of his principles of the classification of civilizations. For example, he considers that the EU and the USA belong to the same Western civilization, but that Latin America does not because of its political culture even though it shares a Christian religion, compromising his classification system that is based on religion. Further, there are many countries that are economically and politically successful while having several ethnicities and religions, further undermining his argument about the centrality of civilizational divides.

A different approach to resistance to globalization is based on the resilience of some economic and political institutions. There are some forms of services that must be locally provided, so are not subject to pressures to send jobs abroad (Hirst and Thompson 1996). In some countries, the configuration of institutions including the democratic system, nature of group representation, structure of policy making, and structure of welfare provision mean that there is less change under pressure from global forces than in other countries. In the countries that are already more liberal, there have been further changes in that direction with a reduction of regulation and state welfare, while in the more social democratic countries of Europe there has been less change (Swank 2002). Further, in some countries there is an active building of new forms of partnerships, pacts, and coalitions in response to global pressures (Hanké and Rhodes 2001).

**Already global**

The thesis that the world is newly undergoing globalization is challenged by the view that the world became global a long time ago. This is not a challenge to the idea that we live in a global era, but only to the notion that this is new. This has been argued in different ways using world-systems theory and the world society thesis.

The global expansion of capital was described by Marx (1954; Marx and Engels 1967) in the mid-nineteenth century. The drive by capital for new terrains where commodities can be produced and sold has been a feature of the world capitalist system since its origins. Wallerstein (1974) argues that there has been an expanding
world capitalist system since the sixteenth century. Here capitalism is theorized as a world-system, in which states are merely nodes constituted by that system (Wallerstein 1974; Robinson 2001). The analysis centres on the world-system of capitalism as a whole (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989). This system has had a global reach since the sixteenth century, although the process of saturation of all the economic and social relations in the world is still ongoing. States are nodes within this world-system. There can be no concept of autonomous, free-standing societies here, since all social relations are inter-connected through the capitalist world-system, though there are social formations with varying degrees of differentiation from each other. This is both an ontological and empirical claim about globality. This is a theory that privileges the role of capital in explaining social relations and, since capital is global, the analysis of local social formations must also take into account the global formation. This is a theoretical approach that has never lost sight of the need to explain processes of development in the poorer and less industrialized countries of the world, conceptualizing such core-periphery relations as an integral part of the explanation of social relations anywhere.

There are several nuances within world-systems theory, especially in the relationship between the economy and states and the extent to which they are independently causal. World-systems theory started from the position that there was the possibility for a mobility of states up and down the hierarchy of an otherwise stable world-system (Wallerstein 1974). Dependency theory considers that there is no mobility of states within the world system but rather the reproduction of inequalities between the metropolitan and peripheral social formations, that is, the development of underdevelopment (Frank 1975). Robinson (2001) argues that globalization has already produced a developed global capitalist polity beyond specific states, while Chase-Dunn (1998) differentiates global hegemons within the world system. Global commodity chain analysis of the material inequality in a global system focuses on the micro level of the transactions that make up a global capitalist chain. The analysis is of the transfer of value through goods manufactured and distributed through the chain (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1993). The concept of a chain can be applied to care-work in the concept of ‘global care chains’ (Hochschild 2000), where the focus is on mobile caring labour (Yeates 2005), involving the mobility of people as well as the transfer of care.

There are variations in the extent to which different forms of capital are globalized. Finance capital is more globalized than industrial capital, because there is an electronic global marketplace for capital that is different from the relatively more fixed industrial capital. However, even finance capital has a territorial component in the
servicing of its workforce, often in global cities (Sassen 2001). Polities are not reducible to a world system; political processes involve pressure from locations in addition to capital; the competition between polities has consequences (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1999); globalization comes in historical waves linked to the rise of hegemons (Chase-Dunn et al. 2000).

World society theory also conceives of the world as already global, but, unlike world-systems theory, globalization is here seen to be led by culture. The dating of world society, around the 1930s or immediately post-war, is earlier than Castells’ globalization, but later than that of Wallerstein. The focus is on the similarities between societies, even though they are separate and independent. They note the increase in newly independent countries, and that each bears a stunning similarity to other countries in the organizational, governmental, educational, citizenship forms that they take. This includes, for example, the differentiation of government ministries, the form and notions of appropriateness of education, the conducting of a census, and the granting of citizenship to women. These are not driven by endogenous development, but rather by a world-culture which already exists. New independent nation-states replicate the same form as already existing societies. The similarities are too great to have been due to chance, and since the countries are at different levels of economic development this cannot be the cause (Meyer and Hannan 1979; Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997; Ramirez et al. 1997; Lechner and Boli 2005).

However, while there are some striking similarities between countries there are also major differences (Eisenstadt 2002). Not all countries have the same system of governance: there are non-democratic countries; not all countries allow women access to the vote; human rights are not universally achieved. There tends to be a missing component in the world society thesis – the mechanism by which the transfer of culture is accomplished. This might be a diffusion of ideas, or some form of pressure or coercion to align (Dobbin et al. 2007).

The most important critique of the thesis that the world is already global is that this varies significantly between social institutions. Some are already global, others are not.

**Coevolution of global processes with trajectories of development**

Here I shall show that globalization is not a single causative process, which might be more or less successfully resisted, nor irrelevant, nor
Globalization and Inequalities

42

an already completed process. Rather, there are several uneven global processes. There is a mutual adaptation of complex social systems within a changing global fitness landscape. The following components of global processes are proposed:

1. There are uneven global flows of capital, trade and people, an uneven development of global institutions, networks and hegemons, and global civil societal waves – not a single uniform process of globalization.

2. These flows, institutions, and waves involve the coevolution of economies, polities, violence and civil societies – there is no simple one-way impact of the economic on the rest that might be successfully or unsuccessfully resisted.

3. There is the restructuring rather than the annihilation of space.

4. There are emergent forms of global civil societal practices as well as glocalization in which cultures are framed by the global – not the homogenisation of culture.

5. Globalization has occurred before – it is neither only new nor only old, but it is taking new and deeper forms.

6. While some polities, especially states, are losing power to larger forces, this is not uniform – there are contesting global hegemons, especially the USA and the European Union, as well as the emergence of global institutions.

7. There are global civil societal waves – including neoliberalism, socialism, human rights, feminism, environmentalism, and religious fundamentalisms.

8. Neoliberalism is a powerful global project that has become embedded in some governmental programmes and social formations – it is not the same as globalization, nor is it fully hegemonic.

9. There are competing projects of societalization on a global scale, but none has overwhelmed the others – currently the most important are the contesting projects of modernity associated with the hegemons of the USA and the EU. Global societalization projects cannot be understood without their gender, ethnic, national, and religious components.

There are different kinds of global processes, involving economies, polities, violence and civil society. There are flows of capital, trade, and technologies (Castells 1996), of free and unfree workers (Cohen 1997), tourists (Urry 2002), students, refugees, and others, often along already established networks. There are global institutions, such as the UN, the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as more subtle forms of international regimes that depend upon mutual multi-lateral adjustments of
states (Keohane 1989; Risse 1999; Ruggie 1998). There are emerging and contesting global hegemons that dominate the rules of the global fitness landscape, such as the USA and EU. There are waves of political and civil societal practices (Berkovitch 1999; Moghadam 2005).

Rather than a simple one-way impact, social entities coevolve in a changing fitness landscape. Globalization involves complex interactive effects between economies, polities, violence, and civil societies. Globalization does not simply erode or undermine, produce resistance or resilience, but is a process of coevolution between a variety of entities. Current changes in the configuration of spatial relations are complex rather than simple and are not well captured by concepts of 'impact', 'erode', or 'resist'. Rather the notion of a 'coevolution' of complex adaptive systems, drawn from complexity theory (Kauffman 1993), better captures the mutual effects of these changes. The concept of coevolution enables us to include the specific phenomena within the wider concept (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1989; Robertson 1992; Ruggie 1996, 1998; Held et al. 1999). Coevolution includes competition and hostility as well as more cooperative forms of relations; there is a competition and contestation to establish the nature of the rules of the global landscape within which all operate.

There is a restructuring of the implications of space for social activities, rather than the annihilation of distance. Globalization involves a decline in the time and resources needed for travelling, transporting, or communicating over distance. There are changes in the spatial scale of social processes. There is an apparent compression of space and thus of the time needed to overcome it, or space-time compression (Harvey 1989). Rather than seeing globalization as annihilating space (Scholte 2000) and equating globalization with a process of de-territorialization, there is a need to consider the irreducible territorial element to human social practices. Most global processes touch down in particular territorial locations for some functions. These processes need to be located somewhere, to have some kind of territorial bases, in which certain sorts of functions can be carried out. Some services, such as key aspects of health, need to be close to where people actually live. Indeed many transnational corporations still have a national base even if they trade globally (Hirst and Thompson 1996). Even the most de-territorialized transnational corporation still need to have its headquarters somewhere, maybe in specialized ‘world cities’, and have to be serviced by both executives and cleaners who have homes somewhere (Sassen 2001). It is important not to equate the phenomenon of transnational corporations with the wider notion of ending all borders. Space is not made irrelevant, but reconfigured by processes of globalization. There are processes for the re-scaling of polities (Jessop 2002).
A simple notion of the homogenisation of world culture through globalization is untenable, though the spread of some cultural practices is increasing. Hollywood and McDonalds may have become more important for some peoples in some periods (Ritzer 1993), but not in a consistent way. A variety of conceptualizations attempt to capture the more subtle effects, including transformation (Held et al. 1999), glocalization (Robertson 1992), hybridization, and regime influence (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1989; Ruggie 1996, 1998). In glocalization, the globalization process is not a process of cultural homogenisation, but rather one in which cultures may see themselves relative to other cultures in the world, but nonetheless maintaining a discrete, if somewhat reformed, identity (Robertson 1992). Examples include the appeal to the doctrine of universal human rights to protect social practices authorised by religion by some Islamic minorities in the West (Soysal 1994), and the appeal to the Westphalian, now global, doctrine of the sovereignty of nation-states in order to resist external interventions on behalf of oppressed groups. Hybridity captures the two-way exchange that may be taking place, in which some entities are transformed as they merge so that something new emerges rather than merely the subordination of one to another (Gilroy 1993). This is important especially in discussing the extent to which certain political practices, such as the discourse of universal human rights, really are a global hybrid rather than a Western invention imposed on the rest of the world (Woodiwiss 1998).

Globalization has happened before: it is neither only new nor only old. It does not fully exist, rather it is still developing. Chase-Dunn et al. (2000) have identified three waves of globalization, each related to the development of a particular hegemon within a capitalist system, which established the conditions under which trade and travel could flourish. Current globalization is best regarded as a new phase of world integration, with new dynamics, but not as a sudden and completely new phenomenon, and the implications of previous, if less significant, waves of globalization being taken into account.

Although some polities are losing power as a result of global processes, other polities are increasing their capacities. While globalizing processes have often been considered to have a tendency to erode polities (Fukuyama 1992; Cerny 1995, 1996; Ohmae 1995), there is a more diverse range of relationships between globalization and political entities. These include: resistance to globalization (Castells 1997; Huntington 1998), the creation of nation-states by world society (Meyer and Hannan 1979; Meyer et al. 1997), the creation of globalization by hegemons as part of the securing of the conditions for world trade (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1999;
Chase-Dunn et al. 2000), as well as a broader global restructuring (Brenner 1999; Held et al. 1999). Some states win lose power, with their capacity to act circumscribed by changes in the global environment, as the greater mobility of capital than labour enables capital to go shopping for its preferred regulatory regime, although there are limits to this process due in part to the nature of the polity. However, not all polities lose power because of globalization. The European Union is a hegemon that has increased its powers, using perceived global threats to the small economies of Europe as a powerful legitimation of the development of its remit and regulatory capacity (Bornschier and Zeitlin 1999).

Globalization involves not only economies and states, but also non-state political processes. Global waves of social and political movements are part of the changes that constitute globalization. Some movements may appear to be opposed to globalization, but often they are primarily opposed to the form that globalization is taking. These include environmentalism, anti-neoliberalism, feminism and human rights. There are also constellations of actors that are pro-globalization, such as those constituting the current neoliberal wave. Social and political movements have arisen to contest particular aspects of globalization (Castells 1997). Their focus may involve the excesses of transnational corporations, the institutions of global financial governance such as meetings of the IMF and G8, as well as specific further targets (Klein 1999). They include global civil societal waves centred on equal rights, feminism, environmentalism, religious fundamentalism and neoliberalism, which become unevenly embedded in political institutions (Berkovitch 1999; Klein 1999; Johnson 2000; Moghadam 2005).

Neoliberalism is not the same as globalization. Neoliberalism emerged as a civil society project, which was taken up and embedded in political projects, becoming a global wave and then embedded in institutions and the programmes of governmental and global bodies (Brenner and Theodore 2002; England and Ward 2007). While neoliberalism is often rhetorically associated with globalization, it is but one of the projects that competes for hegemonic position. Although neoliberalism can be treated as a contemporary wave, it is continuous with an earlier project and practice of liberalism.

There are competing societalization projects at a global level. Societalization is a process in which a set of principles, or an identity, is generalized throughout a social system, so that the whole system becomes self-reinforcing. This concept, drawn from Weber (1968), is further developed as a sociological variant of the concept of autopoiesis developed in complexity theory to capture the self-organizing nature of systems. In social analysis it is necessary to make it clear that systems
are produced and not pre-given, that this takes place in a process that occurs over time that this is very probably contested by other societalization projects and thus is rarely fully completed. A societalization project may be built around a number of starting points, principles, or identity sources. These have included especially capitalism, various religions, and nation-building projects. Any given instance of the societalization process is usually interrupted by competing principles before it is fully completed. Globalization processes do not have unmediated effects, instead there are complex implications of changes in the overall environment or 'fitness landscape' as a consequence of changes in one or more component systems. The extent to which globalization is a process in which aspects of one societal model come to dominate others is an empirical question explored in the rest of this book.

Hegemons often have global societalization projects. Hegemons shape the global rules, or fitness landscape, so that they suit the characteristics of the dominant hegemon – while these rules are general to all players, the hegemon benefits most. The concept of hegemony is useful because it captures simultaneously notions of asymmetry, power, and yet consent (Gramsci 1971; Anderson 1976/7). It is helpful in grasping the setting of, and implications of, the regulations of many economic aspects of the global system, for example, the rules of international trade as set by the World Trade Organization. The power of the concept of the hegemon is further advanced if it is juxtaposed with the concept of the 'fitness landscape' derived from Kauffman (1993). The US hegemon, by ensuring that its rules are best represented by the WTO, has changed the fitness landscape to its own advantage, contesting the EU in the process. The hegemon not only has power over other countries, but also changes the landscape in which it competes in its own favour.

Rather than treating globalization as a single causative process there are several different global processes, including global flows of capital, trade, and people, the development of global institutions, networks and hegemons, and global civil societal waves. Rather than a process that might be more or less successfully resisted, global processes coevolve with the trajectories of development of specific countries and there is a mutual adaptation of complex social systems in a global fitness landscape.

**Implications of globalization for social theory**

Global processes make it clear that there are no neatly bounded, hermetically sealed 'societies', (if there ever were), but rather there
are inter-connections across national boundaries that must be assumed to be usual rather than exceptional. While globalization is not as new as is sometimes suggested, it is taking on new forms and increased significance.

The concept of society, and its conventional equation with the nation-state in modernity (Giddens 1990), needs to be re-thought in order to be able to address globalization. This book rejects the notion of bounded ‘societies’ – based on an idealised nation-state – as inadequate to deal with the social linkages in a global era and with the complexity of social divisions originating in many overlapping polities. It considers the ways in which social formations develop forms of self-organization and how this may be more fruitfully conceptualised in terms of projects of societalization, rather than as a completed process.

The boundaries of different forms of economy, polity and civil society rarely map onto each other in the way such a conflation of society and nation-state demands. In addition, the nature of global political processes goes far beyond the conventional relations between states. Globalization challenges the assumption in some forms of social theory that social processes can usually be analysed within a specific society and that in the modern era these can be effectively equated to nation-states.

Global processes do not simply undermine polities, rather there is coevolution between a variety of entities in a changing global fitness landscape. Globalization is not only associated with a neo-liberal version of capitalism, but is also more complex. Global conflicts cannot be understood without an understanding of the deep social fractures related to ethnicity, nation, religion and gender, as well as class. Globalization leads variously to new forms of universalism or the maintenance or invention of new particularisms. There is neither simple homogenization nor simple maintenance of differences, but rather the forming and re-forming of social differences and inequalities. The theorization of complex inequalities is key to these processes.

**Complexity Theory**

Complexity theory comprises a collection of work that addresses fundamental questions on the nature of systems and their changes. While sociology has had something of a hiatus in the development of concepts of systems since the rejection of simple forms of Marxism and functionalism (though with some exceptions such as Luhmann), other disciplines, influenced by complexity theory, have engaged in its revision so as to overcome the oft-mentioned problems of early
formulations of the notion of system. Complexity offers a new set of conceptual tools for social theory that are capable of resolving some of the classic dilemmas in social science, in particular the tension between the search for general theory and the desire for contextual and specific understandings (Kiser and Hechter 1991; Griffin 1993; Kiser 1996; Calhoun 1998; Haydu 1998), which lies at the heart of the tension between realist (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1997; Byrne 1998; Somers 1998; Sayer 2000b) and postmodern (Lyotard 1978; Cilliers 1998; DeLanda 2000) approaches. Complexity theory addresses the postmodern challenge to modernist metanarratives to confront issues of diversity without giving up the quest for explanation. Rather than the conventional sociological focus of developing the concept of system by engaging with the work of Luhmann, the approach here is to synthesize complexity theory with social theory more inspired by the heritage of Marx, Weber, and Simmel, than that of Durkheim and Parsons.

Complexity theory has developed powerful new ways of thinking that may be used to develop social theory. As a trans-disciplinary development (Capra 1997), it is important to carefully specify the nature of the translation of concepts and theories from different disciplines, especially between those based on mathematical abstractions and those complicated by empirical observations. While systems can share common features, they will differ according to their context, for example, whether this is biological, social, or physical, and therefore this needs due consideration. Although there have been some attempts to develop a unified theory of complexity (Holland 1995), the significance of the relationship of a system with its environment, ambiance, or context means that this project is fraught with difficulties (Chu et al. 2003). Sociology has often rejected the application of theoretical developments from the sciences on the grounds that they miss the particularity of what is human (Luhmann 1995). Not only this, but outside of the sub-discipline of social studies of science (Latour 1987; Law 1991; Pickering 1995; Haraway 1997), which, while well developed, is rather segregated from much of social theory, the view as to what constitutes scientific method is often far behind current developments, indeed, even located in a view of science as positivist (Harding 1986). The argument here is that recent developments in science, such as those around complexity theory, have produced concepts that are more sophisticated than most sociology imagines. There is much to be gained from the examination of the concepts, methods, and epistemology of complexity theory in order to see what insights they can offer for sociology, after a due process of re-specification to ensure an appropriate application.
Complexity theory offers new concepts for developments within social theory. These include: a renewed rejection of reductionism, drawing on the notion of emergence; a re-worked concept of system, that avoids the problems of stasis, for example using the concept of positive feedback; the system/environment distinction, which enables greater flexibility in thinking about the relations between systems; and concepts for addressing major changes, including the coevolution of complex adaptive systems and path dependency. The notion of system used in much of Sociology, following the Durkheimian tradition, is seriously flawed. It assumes that the social system has a tendency to regain equilibrium and that change is gradual. The traditional concept of system in sociology developed by Durkheim (1952, 1966, 1984) and Parsons (1949, 1951) presumes self-equilibration, in which the social system returns to balance after pressure to change. Despite refinements, most notably by Merton (1968) and Smelser (1959), to deal with criticisms that this framework dealt insufficiently with conflict, power, a lack of consensus and inequality, this functionalist school is widely regarded as discredited (though see Alexander 1982, 1984, 1998). From the perspective of complexity theory, some of the severe limitations of Durkheimian-influenced theory are as result of utilising an equilibrium conception of system, which Merton and Smelser did not substantially revise.

A common response to these theoretical pressures on the old concept of system was to abandon the concept of system altogether as part of the postmodern turn, which looked to discourse, deconstruction, and identity as ways out of this perceived theoretical impasse (Lyotard 1978; Barrett and Phillips 1992; Braidotti 1994). This turn was often associated with a prioritization of agency and a rejection of the tendency to ignore human action in many forms of structural or system-led explanations. For example, attempts to meld the analysis of gender with Marxism were sometimes alleged to become ‘abstract structuralism’ (Pollert 1996). Yet even though the concept of system has often been overtly rejected in Sociology, some nearly equivalent notion is often deployed though under a different name. There are many concepts in social theory that are similar to and parallel with system and which address both the issue of social interconnectedness and a social level that is not reducible to individuals. They include the concepts of ‘social relations’ (Emirbayer 1997; Somers 1998); ‘regime’ (Connell 1987; Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999); ‘network’ (Latour 1987; Scott 2000) and ‘dis-course’ (Foucault 1997). Some concept is often found necessary in order to address the conceptualization of social inter-connections. However, the negative connotations attached to the notion of
system have been sufficiently great that many prefer to use a term other than system, even while seeking to convey a similar meaning.

New forms of system theory have been developed within complexity theory that challenge old concepts of system in a different way. Within complexity theory the concept of system has been radically transformed so that while retaining a focus on relationships and connections it is able to grasp sudden change as well as the more gradual coevolution of systems. Complexity theory offers a new vocabulary to grasp issues of change, so that simple notions of uni-directional impact are replaced by that of mutual effect, the coevolution of complex adaptive systems in a changing fitness landscape, as well as by concepts to capture sudden non-linear processes of rupture, saltation, and path dependency. This facilitates a more subtle understanding of the diverse processes of social change in an era of globalization. The concept of a social system is necessary in order to be able to theorize complex social inequalities and global processes, but its traditional definition is subject to many challenges, in particular that it is too monolithic, rigid, falsely implies equilibrium, and cannot deal with the plurality of inequalities. It is necessary to revise rather than abandon the concept of system.

Central to the re-thinking of the concept of ‘system’ is the rejection of old assumptions about equilibrium in favour of analysing of dynamic processes of systems far from equilibrium and re-specifying the relationship of a system to its environment. This enables a more adequate theorization of diverse sets of social relations and the analysis of sudden, non-linear, social change. It thus provides a new framework for enquiries into complex inequalities and social change in a global era.

Complexity theory facilitates a re-revision of those old forms of systems theory that have been rightly faulted for false assumptions of stability, consensus, and rigid nested hierarchies of structures (Capra 1997; Byrne 1998). These problems have been part of the reason that many reject systems thinking along with metanarratives and many large-scale forms of theorising. However, an understanding of globalization requires concepts that grasp notions of interconnections on a large scale (Benhabib 1999). There is a new conceptual vocabulary available within complexity theory that enables fresh thinking on the conceptualization of the varied ways in which processes are interconnected, including that of systems. This involves, for example, notions of the coevolution of complex adaptive systems (Kauffman 1993); of non-linear processes (Prigogine 1997); of emergence (Holland 1995, 2000); of punctuated equilibria (Eldredge 1986); and the re-specification of the system/environment distinction (Maturana and Varela 1980). These enable
much more fluid, complex and subtle ways of addressing old theoretical dilemmas.

The use of these new concepts is beginning to develop within social science including, economics, with work on increasing rather than diminishing returns (David 1985; Arthur 1989); political science, on critical turning points (Pierson 2000) and international relations (Jervis 1997); legal studies, on global law (Teubner 1997); management science, on complex adaptive systems (Mitleton-Kelly 2001) and coevolution (Koza and Lewin 1998); as well as sociology (Luhmann 1995; Byrne 1998; Gilliers 1998; Medd and Haynes 1998; Urry 2003). In this book these developments in complexity theory will be used to develop the analysis, especially in relation to social science concerns with path dependency and critical turning points (Mahoney 2000), and the significance of temporality and sequencing (Abbott 2001).

That systems are self-reproducing is definitional of a system. The work of Maturana and Varela (1980) has inspired much work on the conceptualisation of systems as self-organizing (Capra 1997). The process of self-reproduction of a system is self-organizing and self-defining. The system has internal processes that internally connect and reproduce the system. These features are called autopoietic by Maturana and Varela. Autopoiesis is a network of processes in which each element participates in the production or transformation of other elements in the network. In this way the network or system reproduces itself over and over again. The system is produced by its components and in turn produces those components. This includes the creation of a boundary that specifies the limits and content of the system’s operations and thereby defines the system as a unit. The system reproduces itself.

The problem of explaining order in the world is shared across many disciplines from the social (Alexander 1982; Lockwood 1992) to the physical and biological sciences. As Bertalanffy (1968) notes, there is a contradiction between, on the one hand, Kelvin’s second law of thermodynamics and the tendency to disorder, to the dissipation of energy, and, on the other hand, Darwin’s account of the evolution of ever higher order species, where the living world shows a transition not towards disorder and homogeneity but towards a higher order, heterogeneity, and organization. The implication of this contrast is one of the starting points of complexity theory on the nature of systems (Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Kauffman 1993, 1995; Capra 1997). There is a tendency for self-organization to take place where there was previously an absence of such organization. For Kauffman (1995: 23) the extent of the development of order rather than disorder is a sign of the existence of underlying laws of
emergence. We as human beings are ‘at home in the universe’, the consequence of the emergence of self-organizing systems, rather than having developed as the chance result of atomic and molecular interactions. It is this tendency to order that lies at the heart of the notion of the emergence of order and the notion of systems as self-organizing and is key to many of the more empirical-based analytic developments associated with complexity theory from biology (Kauffman 1993, 1995) to political science (Jervis 1997) to legal studies (Teubner 1997).

Complexity is not a single coherent body of thought but is constituted by a range of different traditions and approaches (Thrift 1999). For example, complexity theory has inspired at least two main ways of addressing the issue of change and diversity. The first involves the concept of the coevolution of complex adaptive systems, where the concept of coevolution replaces any simple notion of a single directional impact. The second involves the notion of saltation, of sudden critical turning points, in which small changes, in the context of complex systems, give rise to bifurcations and new paths of development that are self-sustaining. These may be understood either as competing accounts of change reflecting the tensions between the different branches of complexity and chaos theory, the first associated with the Santa Fe school and the second with the Prigogine school, or, ultimately, as reconcilable.

The interpretation of complexity theory by social scientists is varied, not least because the concept of a social system is treated quite differently in different forms of social theory. On the one hand, Cilliers (1998) and DeLanda (2000) emphasize the unknowability of the world, with Cilliers taking complexity theory as a defence of the postmodern as opposed to modern perspective on the social world, and DeLanda, full of suggestive metaphors loosely derived from complexity theory, emphasizing the non-linear and a lack of equilibrium in history. On the other hand, Byrne (1998) uses complexity theory as a defence for realism to support the modernist argument about the deterministic nature of the world, arguing that complexity accounts are foundationalist. Much of the criticism of the turn towards complexity theory in social theory has focused on Prigogine-inspired accounts, with an emphasis on the difficulty of interpreting key concepts such as non-linearity (McLennan 2006) and leaving out of focus the more systems-oriented development of complexity theory in social theory.

Perhaps the most developed and widely cited example of the use of complexity notions in social theory, especially in relation to the concept of system, is that of Luhmann (1985, 1990, 1995, 2000). Luhmann (1995) synthesizes functionalism and phenomenology
with the insights of early complexity theory (Knodt 1995) and thereby challenges the simpler versions of the critique of functionalism. Luhmann (1990, 1995) attempts to integrate the concepts and insights of complexity theory into sociology, with modifications to make them suitable for a social rather than a natural system. He especially developed those concepts concerned with systems, such as the system/environment distinction of Bertalanffy, and drew out their epistemological implications. He applied his systems analysis to specific social systems, including those of law (Luhmann 1985) and of art (Luhmann 2000). Key to Luhmann’s approach is the simplifying assumption that each system takes all others as its environment. It is this that enables him to move beyond the rigidities of conceptions of systems in terms of parts and wholes. Luhmann is thus one of the first sociologists to draw on and demonstrate the advantages of the new complexity theory for social theory.

However, problems result from Luhmann’s integration of insights from complexity theory with both Parsonian functionalism, especially notions of system and of function, and phenomenology, especially the focus on communications (Knodt 1995). The heritage of Marx is relatively absent, as is seen in Luhmann’s lack of interest in analysing power, inequality, and the economy. The priority accorded by Luhmann to communication leaves these forms of materiality and power out of focus. Further, the work is highly abstract and, despite attempts at application to specific social systems such as law and art, remains devoid of much content about changing forms of social inequality. Thus Luhmann’s work, while a rare and important development of systems thinking in recent Sociology, is limited in its direct relevance to analyses of changes in social inequality. It is unable to adequately integrate, as matters of central rather than marginal concern, issues of conflict, inequality, materiality, and agency. As such, Luhmann is perhaps at best an uninspiring ambassador of complexity theory for much contemporary Sociology, at worst a distraction that slowed the utilization of the larger toolkit of complexity thinking within social theory.

More promising is the range of attempts to take a Marxist (or Weberian) inspired Sociological heritage and either synthesize or inflect with complexity theory (Byrne 1998; Jessop 2002; Urry 2003; Winicoff et al. 2005). In many ways the Marxian heritage is more open to complexity notions because of its interest in theorizing the sudden ruptures of political upheavals and in dynamic systems far from equilibrium (Reed and Harvey 1992; Urry 2003). Although these writers share an interest in social inequality and injustice, they do not however address the issue of the intersection of multiple social inequalities. Marx saw capitalism as a system in
a more complex way than Durkheim, theorizing both institutions and social relations, as well as processes of change that included both gradual evolution and processes of sudden transformation (Reed and Harvey 1992; Urry 2003). Unlike the Durkheimian and Parsonian tradition, Marx’s (1954) conception of a social system did not involve the assumption of static equilibrium. Marx’s (1963, Marx and Engels, 1967) theory of change included both long periods of gradualist development and the modernisation of the forces of production which are interrupted by revolutionary upheavals led by a self-conscious politically motivated and self-organized class, during which the system abruptly changes into a new form. Marx’s conception of a social system is more consistent with complexity theory than that of Durkheim because it does not presume a self-balancing form of equilibrium, but instead allows that the social system may be far from having this equilibrium, generating a sudden change to the path of development.

Jessop (2002) incorporates some of the insights of complexity theory developed by Luhmann into Marxist theory, as interpreted by Gramsci and Poulantzas. He utilizes these developments in system theory in his own distinctive version of regulation theory, successfully replacing the ideational focus of Luhmann’s work with the historical materialism of Marxism. Jessop’s theorization of the capitalist state thereby locates it within a capitalist system in a non-reductionist way. He develops the concepts of societalization and ecological dominance, drawing on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. The simple notion of the economic system being determinant in the last instance is replaced by the notion that the economic system has ecological dominance in the capitalist system. The concept of societalization is interpreted as bourgeois societalization, a process in which the bourgeoisie attempts to spread their power and influence in the social formation, against resistance.

Urry (2003, 2005) provides a different melding of complexity theory with Marxism, which avoids the influence of Luhmann, by going directly to the complexity scientists. Here there is a greater focus on non-linearity, of sudden changes, of the unpredictability of changes in systems that are on the edge of criticality and far from equilibrium, though balanced with an analysis of glacial change in systems at other times. One example is the path-dependent development of the automobility system, in the context of a wider appreciation of the significance of mobilities in the contemporary era (Urry 2007), in which cars cannot be understood outside of a system that includes assemblages containing roads and the motor industry.

Although the synthesis of social theory and complexity theory offered by Luhmann is the one that is most often adopted, this is a
mistake; the better approach is one that draws on a social theory that takes as its central interest issues of power and inequality and finds place for materiality and politics. However, it is also necessary to go beyond the syntheses offered by Jessop and Urry, which leave out of focus multiple complex inequalities. The utilisation of complexity theory here is not a simple adoption of concepts from other disciplines, but an active process of selecting insights that can be synthesised with social theory, rather than imported or transplanted in their entirety. This hybridisation of complexity theory with social theory is positioned within the tradition of social theory inspired by Marx and Weber rather than that of Durkheim and Parsons, the forerunners of Luhmann.

It is time for a paradigm change in sociological theory, in the sense intended by Kuhn (1979) and Lakatos (1970). The old concept of social system is widely discredited. The attempt to build social theory without (at least implicitly) using the concept of social system has failed. Complexity theory offers a new toolkit with which a new paradigm in social theory is being built. A new concept of social system is possible that, linked with a range of associated concepts, more adequately constitutes an explanatory framework. The analytic strategy is to break down some of the overly unified and homogenised elements in traditional concepts of social system, in order to address multiple and nuanced forms of inequalities, but then to develop new ways to theorise their linkages, so the end product of the deconstruction is not mere fragmentation, but rather more subtle and nuanced ways of addressing their complex interlinkages.

This involves a fundamental re-thinking of the concept of system, of the ways in which entities are inter-related and of processes of change. These complexities can be better understood if our vocabulary of concepts is extended and developed, including 'coevolution' of 'complex adaptive systems' rather than simple one-way impacts; 'fitness landscapes' to take account of the changing global environment; 'societalization' to capture the process of moving towards the synchronization of economy, polity, violence, and civil society, but rarely reaching a full mapping of these in the same territory; 'path dependency' to capture the multiple rather than single trajectories of development; and 'waves'. The concept a ‘wave’ is particularly important for grasping some of the new ways in which social processes developed in one space and time are disembodied and re-embedded in a new one, capturing the non-linear spatiality and temporality of such processes. The concept is deployed in order to get a grip on phenomena that simultaneously display temporality, spatiality, sequencing, and non-linearity while lacking a
consolidated embedded institutional form. These are often marked by considerable energy yet have relatively few deeply embedded institutions. Waves are very important in the movement of civil societal ideas and practices from one country to another in a global era.

The Book

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reconfigures social theory in order to be able to address the central significance of multiple complex inequalities and globalization. It draws on the insights of complexity theory to re-work and develop the concepts of social system, path dependency, coevolution, global fitness landscape and wave.

The next set of chapters address in turn each of the main institutional domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society. In each case the conceptualization of the institutional domain is developed so as enable a full consideration of multiple complex inequalities and globalization and to identify the main path dependent developments of varieties of modernity. Violence is introduced as a fourth institutional domain alongside the conventional trilogy of economy, polity, and civil society. The last chapter in this group addresses the constitution of the main regimes of inequality, addressing their internal cohesion, their varieties, and the implications of their intersection.

The final set of chapters demonstrate the usefulness of these theoretical reformulations for practical and especially comparative analysis. Chapter 8 searches for and identifies varieties of forms of modernity, especially in employment, welfare, violence, and the gender regime, both globally and among the rich countries of the OECD in the global North. Chapter 9 assesses the ‘progress’ of these countries according to the different framings of progress identified in this introduction, considering the implications of different ways of approaching these issues, and assessing associations between the different forms of progress and different varieties of modernity. Chapter 10 compares the development of the path-dependent trajectories of varieties of modernity of contrasting countries (the USA and three members of the EU: Sweden, the UK, and Ireland). These are selected in order to facilitate a comparison between the routes into neoliberalism and social democracy; the transition from domestic to public gender regimes; between greater and lesser inequality; and more and fewer human rights. Chapters 8 and 9 draw on descriptive statistics from global and OECD datasets in the search for patterns among large numbers of countries, while
Chapter 10 draws on qualitative and historical material that enables a consideration of the significance of the temporality and sequencing of events.

The penultimate chapter, 11, investigates the emerging contestation between the hegemons of the USA and the EU in setting the rules for the global order or fitness landscape of the future within which all countries have to operate. This draws together the implications of the comparative analysis for the theoretical arguments of the book, as well as setting out a vision of the critical contestation for the future of the globe. It shows the importance of complex inequalities and globalization for understanding and theorizing the varieties of modernity and the contested project of progress.