Introduction

The public sphere is both ideal and actual. The actuality is a good deal less perfect than the ideal of free and open debate that has policy consequences in a democratic polity.

Jürgen Habermas’ *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, originally published in 1962, identified the formation of a bourgeois public sphere in eighteenth-century Europe, especially in Britain and France. Prototypically, the London coffee houses were sites of disputation where everyone present – middle-class males, for once on a par with aristocrats – had their say, in principle, on the issues of the day. Thus, the bourgeoisie found its voice in the transition from feudalism to capitalism; and this was represented in the press and other forms of public communication, including the arts.

There was always a contradiction, of course, between the ideal and the actuality. Universalizing claims were made for equality and freedom of expression that were not realized in practice. It was not self-evidently in the immediate interests of bourgeois men to extend disputatious citizenship to women and subordinate classes. As it turned out, however, from the emergence of capitalism and liberal democracy onwards, the demands of the working class, women and colonial subjects for citizenship and self-determination were framed to practical effect by that contradictory amalgam of the ideal and the actual. They claimed for themselves the same rights as bourgeois men. Such claims not only involved bitter struggle but were, in a sense, logical and, therefore, difficult to argue against with consistency: this is the force of the better argument.

Young Habermas (1989 [1962]) told a tragic story about the rise and fall of the bourgeois public sphere. Press freedom and open debate were, he
argued, diluted and distorted by commercial considerations and public relations by the middle of the twentieth century. Moreover, radical demands had been incorporated, to an extent, by the welfare state. This resulted in a generalized quiescence, according to the disappointed Habermas. Grievances had been partly ameliorated, thereby neutralizing conflict, politics had become detached from popular struggle and the masses were becoming amused consumers, indifferent to the great issues of the day and preoccupied with their own everyday lives. That is exactly the kind of elitist imaginary that cultural populists are inclined to contest. For them, the meaningful practices of mundane existence are not signs of alienation but, instead, empowerment and ‘resistance’. To what precisely I am not quite sure.

It is important to note that Habermas (1996 [1992]: 329–87) was later to revise his earlier pessimistic conclusions. His latter-day ‘duice gate’ model of the public sphere awards primacy to social movements and campaigning organizations in forcing issues on to the public agenda that might not otherwise be there at all. Big business and big government would not of their own accord have addressed, for instance, environmental issues to anything like the current posture forced by public protest. Taking the argument further, the field of action for a social justice movement networked across the globe is the public sphere in its various forms and configurations, however much it is distorted by mainstream communications media and politics. Furthermore, inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1984 [1965]) celebration of the carnivalesque, Habermas (1992) came to appreciate popular cultural subversion of hierarchical relations and, in so doing, also registered his belated recognition of the feminist ‘personal is political’.

The theoretical value of the public sphere concept as a measure of democratic communications, then, is somewhat more complex than its use in the critique of news as propaganda (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). The news is indeed frequently, routinely and structurally propagandistic. This is undeniably so in many respects and must not be set aside by sophisticates as too familiar a problem to interrogate persistently. To take the most obvious contemporary example, the American and British news media’s role in obscuring the reasons for invading and occupying Iraq remains an issue.¹

Still, however, it would be grim indeed were there no space for dissent and disputation. Yet, because disputation is so often deflected on to questions of who said what to whom instead of addressing why something happened, it is vital to appreciate that argument alone is not evidence of an actualized public sphere in operation. Much of the time we are witnesses to what is rightly called a ‘pseudo’ public sphere, where politicians and docile journalists act out a travesty of democratic debate. No wonder, as Jean Baudrillard (1983) suggests, the masses are generally turned off by such ‘serious’ politics and turned on to something else that is much more entertaining. Nevertheless, it is necessary for ‘subaltern counter-publics’, as named by Nancy Fraser (1992: 109–42), to keep up the pressure. Otherwise the spin
doctors will have it all to themselves and there is then a frighteningly fascistic closure of discourse.

Every now and again a really big issue does capture popular attention: famine, GM food, questionable reasons for pre-emptive war, global warming and so forth. It must be said, though, these are seldom the most compelling attractions for mass popular fascination. The ups and downs of a celebrity career, minor scandals of one kind or another, sporting success and failure, these are the kinds of topics that usually generate widespread passion and disputation. Such topics may, on the one hand, be viewed as trivial distractions from the great questions of the day or else perhaps, on the other hand, as representing deeper cultural concerns.

### The literary public sphere

In *Structural Transformation*, Habermas distinguished between the literary public sphere and the political public sphere. Although not separate from one another, their functions diverged in a significant manner. Speech and writing went hand in hand, but certain kinds of writing and literary comment transcended fleeting topics of conversation. The Parisian salons, for instance, were important sites of the literary public sphere, somewhere that women were at least present and writers could try out their ideas before committing pen to paper.

Consider, for example, the Lisbon tsunami of 1755 in which in excess of 20,000 people lost their lives. This was news indeed, a conversation topic and the object of what we might now think of as disaster management. Voltaire, however, went further in reflecting on the reasons for such an event in his picaresque novella, *Candide*, which was effectively an attack on both religion and uncritical rationalism. For the complacent ideologue Dr Pangloss, the earthquake was 'a manifestation of the rightness of things, since if there is a volcano at Lisbon it could not be anywhere else' (Voltaire, 1947 [1759]:35). Candide was left none the wiser by this explanation.

Ruthless questioning of conventional wisdom, whether in the guise of theology or what would become public relations in a later period (in effect, ideology), was at the heart of the Enlightenment project and was more likely to be found in an eighteenth-century novel than in a newspaper. Moreover, disquisition on the social role of literature and philosophical reflection in the broadest sense, according to Habermas, prepared the ground for legitimate public controversy over current events. The very practice of criticism was literary before it was directly political (Eagleton, 1984).

The literary public sphere was not about transient news – the stuff of journalism – that is the usual focus of attention for the political public sphere. Complex reflection on chronic and persistent problems of life, meaning and representation – characteristic of art – typically works on a different timescale. Critics tend to have a better memory than the producers
of distorted news events. Journalists are often agents of social amnesia, only interested in the latest thing. Old news is no news.

Social-scientific research must address treatment of the event while also putting it in the context of patterns of representation over time as a necessary corrective. Such research, however, is largely confined to cognitive matters and is neglectful of affective matters. It is concerned with the political agenda, selection of information and the framing of issues. The aesthetic and emotional aspects of life may be used to distort the news, but otherwise they are of little concern to critical social scientists. This is unfortunate as public culture is not just cognitive; it is also affective.

Should you wish to understand the culture and society of Victorian Britain, would you be best advised to read its newspapers, such as The Times, or its literary fiction, such as George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1871–1872) and Anthony Trollope’s The Way We Live Now (1875)? Admittedly, this is a rhetorical question. The great realist novels of the nineteenth century display sociological insight and enduring appeal unmatched by any Times editorial. It would be difficult to make the same claim for novels in the early twenty-first century. Again, however, Times editorials are unlikely to provide better insight. In any case, the value of affective communications is not confined to great literature. Perhaps, television soaps are the most reliable documents of our era. Affective communications are not only valuable, however, as historical evidence; they are themselves sites of disputation, an idea to which the history of the arts in general would attest.

**Art and politics**

Plato wanted to banish poets from the republic whereas Shelley claimed that they were the unacknowledged legislators. So, the overpoliticization of art goes back a long way in the European tradition, not only on the Left but also on the Right.

Since twentieth-century cultural politics is normally recalled as left wing, it is important to remember that it figured on the right wing of modern struggle as well. Indeed, in the 1930s, Nazism promoted the Aryan ideal in Germany, especially in its bodily form, and attacked ‘degenerate art’. Adolf Hitler, himself a failed artist, hated modernism and sought to establish an eternal classicism modelled on Hellenic culture as the official art of the Third Reich (Grosshans, 1983). Artists were bullied into compliance, sacked from their teaching jobs and forced into exile. The 1937 Exhibition of Degenerate Art (Entartete Kunst) in Munich held modern and Leftist art up to ridicule. After the exhibition had toured the country, ‘degenerate’ pieces of art were sold off at international market prices, including major works by ‘Auslanders’ such as Pablo Picasso, as well as exiles such as Paul Klee.

It is particularly striking how successful the Nazis were at co-opting intellectuals to enact their cultural policies and organize and justify a massive theft of visual artworks for the greater glory of Germany (Petropoulis, 2000).
Curators, dealers, critics and artists themselves were in the main prepared to do the Nazis’ bidding. It was not only Josef Goebbels’ media propaganda in news, documentary and fiction film, denouncing Jews and others in the name of German purification, that convinced many ordinary Germans of Nazism’s ideological superiority. The Nazis also believed that Germany had the right to actually appropriate and possess the great European heritage of art since the Third Reich represented the pinnacle of civilization.

In Walter Benjamin’s (1970 [1955]) estimation, the Nazis had aestheticized politics with their showy displays and affective appeal. In this they left a lasting legacy, as anyone who saw Bill Clinton’s rock star presentation on television at the Democratic convention that adopted the hapless Al Gore as his successor might have recognized; and which ironically may have been a minor contribution to the election of George W. Bush. As they say in politics these days, presentation is everything.

For Benjamin, the point of oppositional art was to reverse the process, to politicize aesthetics. There is a bad history of that project on the Left, culminating in Stalin’s socialist realism and a suppression of experimental art and artists comparable to that of the Nazis. Yet, there was also an unorthodox – indeed heterodox – tradition of Western Marxism (Anderson, 1976), preoccupied with cultural questions and a quite different trajectory to orthodox Marxism–Leninism. It was much more open to new ideas and remains to this day residually influential.2 Debates in the 1930s about form and media of communication, subject matter and political stance, historical contexts and institutional settings were to inform the resurgence of left-wing cultural politics from the 1960s and 1970s.

There was a very pessimistic side to that Western Marxist engagement with art, culture and politics articulated by Habermas’ own mentors, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1979 [1944]). The great refusal of authentic art was eclipsed by the mid-twentieth century’s burgeoning culture industry and mass standardization, according to the Frankfurt School pessimists. In so arguing, they set themselves up as the perpetually elitist fall guys for populist cultural studies. Their insights, however, inaugurated lines of enquiry into the relations between culture and business that are vital to understanding the operations of the cultural field now.3 One of the distinctive features of recent development is not so much the marginalization of the artistic refusal but its incorporation. Just think of the appropriation of surrealism and other avant-garde art into contemporary advertising, not to mention the commercial nous and profit-making patronage of ‘Young British Art’.4

The commercialization of art is not, however, a novel phenomenon. Since religious, monarchical and aristocratic patronage were superseded by the art and literary markets – one of the salient features of ‘modernity’ – much of the great work of that comparatively recent past was produced in a commercial context. This is quite a different matter from the observation made by Raymond Williams (1980 [1960/1969]: 184) as long ago as 1960 that advertising had become ‘the official art of modern capitalist society’.
Despite the incorporation of art into advertising, it did seem as though everything was still up for grabs during the hegemony of social democracy in Britain; and not only on the counter-cultural margins. Public service broadcasting, for instance, as represented by the BBC in the 1960s and 1970s, provided some space for experimentation and critical argument. This was particularly so in the ‘progressive’ drama of The Wednesday Play and Play for Today. Williams (1977: 61–74) himself commented on one such production: Jim Allen, Tony Garnett and Ken Loach’s The Big Flame of 1969, which imagined a Liverpool dock strike turning into a political occupation.

With the lurch to the Right in the 1980s and 1990s, such exceptional work was considered outdated, the remains of a failed Leftism, and became increasingly rare. Already it had been argued that radical interventions from the Left were less significant than what was going on in the very heartland of television. An exemplary statement of this kind was Richard Dyer, Terry Lovell and Jean McCrindle’s (1997 [1977]: 35–41) paper, ‘Women and soap opera’, originally delivered at the Edinburgh Television Festival of 1977, where both Williams and Dennis Potter also delivered papers.

Williams and Potter, in their different ways, wanted a further radicalization of television drama in the single play slot. Alternatively, Dyer and his colleagues wanted appreciation of the actually existing television serial from a feminist perspective. The most popular programme on British television, the archetypal British soap opera Coronation Street, made by the commercial company Granada, put into the foreground the problems and capacities of women in everyday life. Was this a site of the cultural public sphere?

The cultural public sphere

Soap opera is a melodramatic genre. It deals with personal crises and the complexity of everyday relationships. In the form of a continuous serial of overlapping and fragmented narratives, it artfully corresponds to the haphazard flow of events and messy irresolution in lived reality. The genre offers multiple subject positions for men as well as women to identify with.

In order to amass huge and heterogeneous audiences, there is usually something on offer for everyone. Viewing may be a casual distraction from domestic labour or of passionate intensity, a special and sacred moment. You can keep up without paying much attention. Alternatively, the current episode may be the highpoint of the day in some households. Above all, for the lonely, physically or mentally isolated viewer – such as single parents, widowed elders and anguished teenagers – soap opera produces a vicarious sense of urban community, a mundane albeit degraded utopia (the rural setting of Yorkshire TV’s Emmerdale is a comparatively rare exception to the general rule). This is especially notable in the leading and long-running British soaps – Coronation Street (1960 – ) and EastEnders (1985 – ) – that conjure up the nostalgic myth of the ‘traditional’ working-class neighbourhood, set ostensibly in actual places, respectively Salford in Greater Manchester and Cockney London.
The makers of *Coronation Street* were originally inspired by Richard Hoggart’s (1957) founding text of cultural studies, *The Uses of Literacy*. Idealized representations of working-class community maintain a residual yet powerful appeal for the British television viewer. Latterly, in Britain, the genre has evoked multicultural harmony and downplayed racial tension. Soap opera typically ignores public controversy in the world beyond the immediate context of imagined community.

Jostein Gripsrud (1992) has commented on the historical role of melodrama in the public sphere. He points out that nineteenth-century theatrical melodrama dealt with moral dilemmas and problematic social life. These are also characteristic features of twentieth-century Hollywood melodrama – ‘movies for women’ – and the variants of television soap.

Melodrama performs not only an entertainment but also an educational function, which is true of tabloid journalism too: ‘Today’s popular press ... teaches the audience a lesson, everyday’ (Gripsrud, 1992: 87). The lessons taught are not so much cognitive – to do with knowing – but, rather, emotional – to do with feeling. It is a sentimental, rather than a critical, education that is thus provided. According to Gripsrud, sentiment has its place in the public sphere.

This argument is perhaps offensive to the more solemn Habermasian who is concerned with rational–critical debate and just as much troubled by distracting sentiment and ‘infotainment’ as selective distortion. It is not unknown to figure the difference in attitude as between feminine and masculine sensibility, that there is a communicative gulf between women’s heart-felt emotion and men’s cold logic; as a popular advice book puts it, ‘men are from Mars, women are from Venus’ (Gray, 1992).

That difference is theorized with much greater depth and sophistication in feminist psychology. Carol Gilligan (1993 [1982]) has questioned Lawrence Kohlberg’s cognitive and ethical universalism, which influenced Habermas’ own discourse ethics. She invokes the notion of an ‘ ethic of care’ that is sensitive to particular life experiences and is more typical of feminine than masculine responses to personal and social problems. Gilligan treats the difference as contingent and socially constructed, not essential and naturally given.

As Gripsrud argues, however, it is a mistake to simply map the difference between feminine and masculine sensibility onto the difference between the affective and cognitive dimensions of the public sphere. After all, there is nothing particularly feminine or caring about the discourse of tabloid journalism.

While consideration of the conventional polarities of femininity and masculinity may illuminate the gender differentiation of dramatic genres, it does not account satisfactorily for what distinguishes the cultural public sphere from the political public sphere.

Gripsrud identifies the provenance of the contemporary cultural public sphere as popular alienation from public life. This argument is consistent with Habermas’ (1987 [1981]) binary opposition between lifeworld and
system. Habermas was worried that the instrumental and strategic rationalities of capital and the State were colonizing the lifeworld, which is the site of communicative rationality, mutual respect and understanding. On the other side of the divide, it is understandable for people to turn inwards, to cocoon themselves, out of a sense of powerlessness. Preoccupation with the dilemmas of everyday life and personal satisfaction is undoubtedly more pronounced than active citizen engagement with the systemic processes of business and government.

In a similar vein to Gripsrud, Peter Dahlgren (1995) has called into question the division of labour in media research between attention to cognitive communications with regard to the public sphere problematic and attention to affective communications with regard to the pleasures of popular culture. He says, ‘rational communication is necessary, but if our horizons do not penetrate beyond the conceptual framework of communicative rationality and the ideal speech situation, we will be operating with a crippled critical theory’ (Dahlgren, 1995). Furthermore, Dahlgren suggests that no representational form is entirely cognitive and rational, not even television news, in spite of its pretensions. The whole array of television genres across fact and fiction programming, in practice, combines affective and cognitive elements in variable mixtures.

Accuracy of information and conditions favourable to dissent and dialogic reason are normative requirements of genuine democracy. Nevertheless, a solely cognitive conception of the public sphere has serious limitations. If democracy is to be more than a legitimizing myth in a highly mediated world, then citizens should indeed be properly informed about serious issues and be able to participate in rational–critical debate that has policy consequences.

That is not the whole of life, however. Why should people be expected to treat official politics, where they have so little power to influence what happens, with the same passion that they devote to their own personal lives and lived or imagined relationships with others? In actual fact, though, keen popular engagement in something like a public sphere, when it does happen, more often than not takes a predominantly affective mode, related to the immediacy of lifeworld concerns, instead of the cognitive mode normally associated with experience of a remote, apparently unfathomable and uncontrollable system. The concept of a cultural public sphere may go some way to explaining what is going on in this respect.

In the late-modern world, the cultural public sphere is not confined to a republic of letters – the eighteenth century’s literary public sphere – and ‘serious’ art, classical, modern or, for that matter, postmodern. Rather, it includes the various channels and circuits of mass popular culture and entertainment, the routinely mediated aesthetic and emotional reflections on how we live and imagine the good life.

The concept of a cultural public sphere refers to the articulation of politics, public and personal, as a contested terrain through affective – aesthetic and emotional – modes of communication. The cultural public
sphere trades in pleasures and pains that are experienced vicariously through willing suspensions of disbelief; for instance, by watching soap operas, identifying with the characters and their problems, talking and arguing with friends and relatives about what they should and shouldn’t do. Images of the good life and expectations of what can be got out of this life are mediated mundanely through entertainment and popular media discourses. Affective communications help people to think reflexively about their own lifeworld situations and how to negotiate their way in and through systems that may seem beyond anyone’s control in the terrain of everyday life. The cultural public sphere provides vehicles for thought and feeling, for imagination and disputatious argument, that are not necessarily of inherent merit but may be of some consequence.

One such vehicle was the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997 (see Chapter 2). The public response was extraordinary in terms of extravagant expressions of grief and loss. Most significantly, the eventful life and sudden death of ‘the People’s Princess’ engendered public debate on the role of the monarchy and, also, more generally, as Beatrix Campbell (1998) argued, relationships between men and women.

Diana’s estrangement from the Royal Family and her divorce from Prince Charles provoked much popular disputation. Her glamorous celebrity and charitable reputation contrasted sharply with the Windsors’ haughty noblesse oblige. The Royals survived that moment of recrimination but, as Campbell put it, sexual politics had shaken the very institution of monarchy in Britain. The Royal Family was revealed, yet again, to be a distinctly inadequate model of personal conduct and intimate relations, which had been its ideological, if not constitutional, raison d’être.

In this way, the popular debate around Diana manifested what Anthony Giddens (1992) calls ‘life politics’, whereby people try to work out how to live in a detraditionalized moral universe where the old conventions are in question. Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (1995 [1990]) have similarly discussed the negotiated relationships and chronic decisionmaking of personal life under the disconcerting conditions of reflexive modernity. These are not just theoretical issues for social and cultural analysis but also ordinary features of everyday life in ‘Western’ culture and society today.

The popularity of even the Big Brother television series can also be explained as a vehicle for reflecting on appropriate conduct when traditional assumptions are no longer taken for granted and people are confused about how best to carry on. Contestants are judged in weekly nominations for eviction within the house and by the voting public outside with greater enthusiasm than is usually evident in casting votes for candidates to public office. This has encouraged some to argue light-headedly that official politics should learn from game shows like Big Brother and adopt their popularizing techniques. Still, there is a political point to these shows. The appropriateness of the contestants’ behaviour in an artificially constructed situation is under perpetual surveillance, dull moment by dull moment,
and, in the drama of narrative summary, providing the material for critical interrogation. In effect, *Big Brother* is a modern morality play.

**Spaces of action**

In conclusion to this chapter, I want to identify three broad stances regarding the politics of the cultural public sphere:

- uncritical populism
- radical subversion
- critical intervention.

I associate *uncritical populism* with populist cultural studies, the credibility of which derives not so much from its intellectual acuity but its affinity with currently conventional wisdom. The domain assumption here is that consumer capitalism is culturally democratic. Consumer sovereignty goes unquestioned. What we get is what we want. The consumer is consulted and permitted to speak. In any case, consumption is an active phenomenon. Consumers are not the passively manipulated recipients of commodity culture and mediated experience: they choose; and woe betides any business that fails to respond efficiently to its customers’ demands.

I read in *The Guardian* (Ward, 2003: 13) of a conference on 1950s culture at which a young academic remarked of the coffee bar scene so bemoaned by Hoggart at the time: ‘It provided both male and female sites for dress, dance, display, discussion and democratisation’. Was the coffee bar of the 1950s, then, a democratic advance on the eighteenth-century coffee house as a site for the public sphere? The idea of the coffee house or, in latter-day nominations, the coffee bar or the coffee shop as places of cultural subversion and critical questioning has been revived in a bizarre manner recently by the pernicious Starbucks’ hosting of public debates in association with the Royal Society for Arts. Postmodern or what?

It is an established protocol for populist cultural studies to endlessly seek out instances of really existing cultural and consumer democracy, not only in the past but also now. Occasionally, such discoveries are even related to the problematic of the public sphere, though rarely in cultural studies as narrowly defined. The work of social psychologists Sonia Livingstone and Peter Lunt (1994) on the much-derided television genre of audience participation talk shows is exemplary. Incidentally, it is also much more successfully grounded in empirical research than most cultural studies in this vein. Political theorist John Keane (1998) has argued a similar case for really existing cultural and consumer democracy in contemporary civil society when he distinguishes between micro (subcultural), meso (national) and macro (global) public spheres.

The value of uncritical populism – the kind of position that would regard *Big Brother* as a vehicle of the public sphere – is its debunking of the critical...
idealization of a public sphere that is never present but always absent in
culture is a manifestation of the paradox of egalitarian democracy, the promise that
everyone can make it but few actually do so. Public figures are the source of
incentive for a 'realistic' attention to what actually goes on. As with Big Brother,
public controversy today is very much associated with questions of identity,
celebrity and scandal. Chris Rojek (2001) suggests that celebrity culture is
Nothing is so fascinating as a soaring star as a falling one. Manuel Castells
(2004a [1997]) argues that public interest in official politics is largely
mediated by scandal. The conduct of political leaders is constantly under
scrutiny, their moral failings amplified and sometimes secretly admired.
Interestingly, observes Castells, '[c]orruption per se seems less significant
than scandals (that is, corruption or wrongdoing revealed) and their political

Radical subversion finds all this deplorable. From such a perspective, the
democratizing claims of uncritical populism are part of the problem rather
than part of the solution. Currently, radical subversion is most closely
associated with the cultural practices of the global movement for social
justice, especially in its anticapitalist and antiglobalization manifestations.
Parts of the movement draw on the kind of DIY culture that came to
prominence in the 1990s with roads protests and raves in Britain.

Radical subversion has complex roots in the 1960s American counter-
culture, French situationism and older traditions of international anarchism. Such radicalism places special emphasis on symbolic contest, acting out various
forms of carnivalesque subversion in order to disrupt, for instance, the City of
London in June 1999 and the meeting of the World Trade Organisation in
Seattle towards the end of that year (Cockburn, St Clair and Sekula, 2000).

Kalle Lasn's (1999) manifesto for radical subversion, Culture Jam: The
uncooling of America, is representative of this form of cultural politics. The
remedy for the American cultural malaise is, according to Lasn, 'a rebranding
strategy – a social demarketing campaign unfolding over four seasons' (Lasn, 1999: xvi). In the autumn, the question is asked: 'What does it mean when
our lives and culture are no longer shaped by nature, but by an electronic
mass media environment of our own creation?' (Lasn, 1999: xvii) In the
winter, 'the media–consumer trance of our postmodern era' is criticized
and a further question posed: 'Can spontaneity and authenticity be restored?' In the spring, the fundamental question is put: 'Is oppositional
culture still possible?' In the summer, 'the American revolutionary impulse
regenerates'. All of this – theory and practice – is meant to lead to a Debordian
detournement – a perspective-jamming turnabout in your everyday life'.

Culture Jam is a book inspired by the critique of 'the society of the
spectacle' and the subversive tactics of French situationism (Debord, 1994
[1967]). It also derives inspiration from the USA’s own revolutionary
tradition of independence and participatory democracy. It wishes to
challenge the value and values of the most powerful culture and society in
the world: the American consumerist way of life and its global reach.
Culture jamming is a form of 'semiological guerilla warfare', in Umberto Eco's phrase. As Eco (1987 [1967]: 135) argued in the 1960s, 'Not long ago, if you wanted to seize political power in a country, you had merely to control the army and the police. ... Today a country belongs to the person who controls communications'. Culture jammers, however, are unlikely to take control of the communications media in the USA. Their tactics in producing 'subvertisements' that attack capitalism, and in anti-media campaigning generally, are those of guerilla skirmishing in the space of signification, which on their own are unlikely to bring the whole edifice of postmodern culture and consumerism tumbling down. The battle is conducted at the level of signification, ridiculing the dominant system of meanings with the aim of rendering 'cool' uncool. In a volatile culture where fashion is constantly overturning itself and sudden reversals of meaning occur, counter-discourse may act like a virus entering the symbolic bloodstream of the body politic. Well, that's the theory anyway.

Radical subversion is the exact obverse of uncritical populism. Instead of apologetics, it offers total transformation whether people want it or not. In this sense, it is elitist and, to many, either downright offensive or simply unintelligible.

The third position regarding politics and the public sphere – critical intervention – combines the best of uncritical populism – an appreciation of the actually existing cultural field – with the best of radical subversion, producing a genuinely critical and potentially popular stance.

Television is at the heart of contemporary mass popular culture. It remains central to everyday life despite the Internet, though digitalization does indeed bring about a convergence of media and there are many more channels of communication these days, including interactive media. Most people still, however, turn to the box in the corner – or perhaps now the screen on the wall – for information and entertainment. Public service principles have been seriously eroded in recent years. Even such an august institution as the BBC mimics commercial populism in order to justify its license fee in a 'competitive market'. Yet, occasionally, even now, television – at least in Britain – affords a space for critical argument. This is a precious space and one that should be cherished and safeguarded.

For example, every two years, the BBC turns its resources over to Red Nose Day – the telethon organized by the Comic Relief charity. What is very significant about Comic Relief is not just the money it raises for projects in Africa and Britain – though that is not insignificant for the people who benefit – but also the combination of entertainment with critical agitation concerning poverty and deprivation. This mass popular television event is made up of comic turns and documentary material on the parlous conditions of life in African villages and British inner cities. The audience is, of course, guilt-tripped into donating a few pounds over the phone with their credit cards.9

Comic Relief is hardly the cutting edge of critical intervention in the mainstream. Other examples from British television are closer to the edge, such as Channel Four's satire show Bremner, Bird and Fortune. In the run up
to the latest Gulf War, impressionist Rory Bremner and the two old-stagers of British satirical television – John Bird and John Fortune – poured mockery on the British and American governments and examined the real reasons for bringing about ‘regime change’ in Iraq. When official hostilities ceased, a special edition of Bremner, Bird and Fortune (following on from the earlier, Between Iraq and a Hard Place) devoted to the issues of war (this programme entitled Beyond Iraq and a Hard Place) was transmitted (11 May 2003). It examined the current and historical background to the USA’s neo-imperialistic agenda and the human costs of the war. The programme offered a much more radical analysis of the meaning of the assault on Iraq than you would have found anywhere else in British mainstream media. Perhaps it was permitted because comedy is not serious.

Around the same time, the BBC televised The Day Britain Stopped (13 May 2003), a successor to a great tradition of British documentary drama stretching back to Jeremy Sandford, Ken Loach and Tony Garnett’s Cathy Come Home in the 1960s and including Barry Hines’s Threads and Rob Ritchie’s Who Bombed Birmingham? in the 1980s.

Set in the near future, The Day Britain Stopped imagined what might happen if a disastrous chain reaction occurred in Britain’s decrepit transport system. It started with a one-day rail strike in response to a crash at Edinburgh’s Waverley station. Safety on the railways has been severely undermined over several years as a result of profiteering privatization, which is, to say the least, common knowledge. The Day Britain Stopped told a ‘What if…?’ story, tracing gridlock on the roads to a mid-air plane crash at Heathrow. It told the story through individuals and families caught up in the chaos, interleaved with expert opinion and documentary-style footage.¹⁰

It is troubling that there was no great outcry against Bremner, Bird and Fortune’s seditious comedy or the plausible but alarmist The Day Britain Stopped. Nevertheless, these are critical interventions in public debate from which there is much to learn. It is especially important to value such interventions and be clear about what actually constitutes a critical intervention. This is not necessarily measurable in terms of social impact. Neither of the two examples given here had much direct impact on contemporary politics, but they did articulate widespread dissent and, in so doing, contributed to an enduring tradition of independent criticism of dominant power and ideology in the cultural public sphere.

Notes

2. See, for instance, Bloch et al., 1977.
5. I have noted the correspondence between populist cultural studies and free-market ideology on several occasions; see, for instance, McGuigan, 1992 and 1997a. Also, see Frank, 2001.


7. See my discussion in McGuigan, 2004b, pp. 54–8.


10. In my opinion, *The Day Britain Stopped* was a more incisive intervention in the cultural public sphere than David Hare’s much celebrated National Theatre play that was also broadcast on BBC Radio 3 (14 March 2004), *The Permanent Way*, for a number of reasons. Hare’s play looked specifically at trouble on the railways and was a form of theatrical journalism or documentary based on interviews with various interested parties, their words spoken by actors. Rather than a dramatized documentary, *The Day Britain Stopped* was a documentary-style drama, which combined factual material with a fictionalized and tragic dramatization of a chain reaction throughout the whole transport system – trouble on the railways, gridlock on the roads and a mid-air plane collision. It represented what might happen through typical characters and experiences, where chaos suddenly engulfs everyday life in a hypothetical and interlinked set of circumstances. The presence of *The Day Britain Stopped* in a popular medium – terrestrial and public service television – also attracted a larger and probably much more diverse audience socially than would normally be so of the National Theatre and Radio 3’s audiences.