Principles of critical discourse analysis

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ABSTRACT. This paper discusses some principles of critical discourse analysis, such as the explicit sociopolitical stance of discourse analysts, and a focus on dominance relations by elite groups and institutions as they are being enacted, legitimated or otherwise reproduced by text and talk. One of the crucial elements of this analysis of the relations between power and discourse is the patterns of access to (public) discourse for different social groups. Theoretically it is shown that in order to be able to relate power and discourse in an explicit way, we need the ‘cognitive interface’ of models, knowledge, attitudes and ideologies and other social representations of the social mind, which also relate the individual and the social, and the micro- and the macro-levels of social structure. Finally, the argument is illustrated with an analysis of parliamentary debates about ethnic affairs.

KEY WORDS: access, critical discourse analysis, discourse, dominance, Great Britain, parliamentary debates, power, racism, social cognition, text

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses some principles, aims and criteria of a ‘critical’ discourse analysis (CDA). It tries to answer (critical) questions such as ‘What is critical discourse analysis (anyway)?’, ‘How is it different from other types of discourse analysis?’, ‘What are its aims, special methods, and especially what is its theoretical foundation?’ Also, it acknowledges the need to examine, in rather practical terms, how one goes about doing a ‘critical’ analysis of text and talk.

In general, the answers to such questions presuppose a study of the relations between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the discourse analyst in such social relationships. Since this is a complex, multidisciplinary—and as yet underdeveloped—domain of study, which one may call ‘sociopolitical discourse analysis’, only the most relevant dimensions of this domain can be addressed here.

Although there are many directions in the study and critique of social inequality, the way we approach these questions and dimensions is by focusing on the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance. Dominance is defined here as the exercise of social power by
elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality. This reproduction process may involve such different 'modes' of discourse–power relations as the more or less direct or overt support, enactment, representation, legitimation, denial, mitigation or concealment of dominance, among others. More specifically, critical discourse analysts want to know what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction.

This paper is biased in another way: we pay more attention to 'top–down' relations of dominance than to 'bottom–up' relations of resistance, compliance and acceptance. This does not mean that we see power and dominance merely as unilaterally 'imposed' on others. On the contrary, in many situations, and sometimes paradoxically, power and even power abuse may seem 'jointly produced', e.g. when dominated groups are persuaded, by whatever means, that dominance is 'natural' or otherwise legitimate. Thus, although an analysis of strategies of resistance and challenge is crucial for our understanding of actual power and dominance relations in society, and although such an analysis needs to be included in a broader theory of power, counter-power and discourse, our critical approach prefers to focus on the elites and their discursive strategies for the maintenance of inequality.

From a discourse analytical and sociopolitical point of view it is tempting to study the relations between discourse structures and power structures more or less directly. This will often be effective and adequate. For instance, we may assume that directive speech acts such as commands or orders may be used to enact power, and hence also to exercise and to reproduce dominance. Similarly, we may examine the style, rhetoric or meaning of texts for strategies that aim at the concealment of social power relations, for instance by playing down, leaving implicit or understating responsible agency of powerful social actors in the events represented in the text.

However, the relationships involved and the conditions on reproduction are more complicated than that. For instance, social inequality, at the societal level, is not simply or always reproduced by individual (speech) acts such as commands. This may be obvious from commands appropriately and legitimately executed in relationships of more or less 'accepted' everyday power relations, such as those between parents and children, between superiors and subordinates, or between police officers and citizens. Hence, special social conditions must be satisfied for such discourse properties to contribute to the reproduction of dominance. The same is true for all other properties of text and talk, and hence for all text–context relations. Apparently, what is involved in dominance are questionable conditions of legitimacy or acceptability, including what is usually called 'abuse' of power, and especially also possibly negative effects of the exercise of power, namely social inequality.

Another major complication we must address is the fact that typical macro-notions such as group or institutional power and dominance, as well
as social inequality, do not directly relate to typical micro-notions such as text, talk or communicative interaction. This not only involves the well-known problem of macro-micro relations in sociology, but also, and perhaps even more interestingly, the relation between society, discourse and social cognition. Indeed, we argue that in order to relate discourse and society, and hence discourse and the reproduction of dominance and inequality, we need to examine in detail the role of social representations in the minds of social actors. More specifically, we hope to show that social cognition is the necessary theoretical (and empirical) ‘interface’, if not the ‘missing link’, between discourse and dominance. In our opinion, neglect of such social cognitions has been one of the major theoretical shortcomings of most work in critical linguistics and discourse analysis.

This paper does not discuss the historical backgrounds and developments of critical perspectives in the study of language, discourse and communication. Nor does it provide a full bibliography of such work. Depending on the discipline, orientation, school or paradigm involved, these lines of development are traced back, if not—as usual—to Aristotle, then at least to the philosophers of the Enlightenment or, of course, to Marx, and more recently to the members of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Benjamin and others) and its direct or indirect heirs in and after the 1960s, among whom Jürgen Habermas plays a primary role (Geuss, 1981; Jay, 1973; Slater, 1977). Another line of influence and development, also more or less (neo-)marxist, is the one going back to Gramsci, and his followers in France and the UK, including most notably Stuart Hall and the other members of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Corcoran, 1989; Hall, 1981). Likewise, first in France, later also in the UK and the USA, we can trace the influence of the work of Althusser (1971), Foucault (see, e.g., Foucault, 1980) and Pécheux (1982), among others. Finally, we should emphasize the exemplary role of feminist scholarship in the critical approach to language and communication (for a bibliography, see Thorne et al., 1983).

Although often dealing with ‘language’, ‘text’ or ‘discourse’ in many (usually rather philosophical) ways, most of this work does not explicitly and systematically deal with discourse structures. We had to wait for the various contributions in critical linguistics and social semiotics, first and primarily in the UK and Australia, to get a more detailed view of the other side of the relationship, namely an analysis of the structures of text and image, even if such linguistics and semiotic approaches usually did not aim to provide sophisticated sociopolitical analyses (Chilton, 1985; Fairclough, 1989; Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1988; Kress and Hodge, 1979). From a different perspective, the same critical approach characterizes much of the work in some directions of German and Austrian sociolinguistics, e.g. on language use of/with immigrant workers, language barriers, fascism and anti-semitism (Dittmar and Schlobinski, 1988; Ehlich, 1989; Wodak, 1985, 1989; Wodak et al., 1987, 1989, 1990; Wodak and Menz, 1990), some of which goes back to the critical sociolinguistic paradigm of Bernstein (1971–5).
It is our ultimate aim, then, though not realizable in this single paper, to eventually contribute to a theoretical, descriptive, empirical and critical framework in which discourse analyses and sociopolitical analyses are deeply integrated and both as sophisticated as possible.

2. PRINCIPLES AND AIMS OF CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The questions raised above about the aims and the specific nature of CDA should be answered by a detailed technical discussion about the place of discourse analysis in contemporary scholarship and society. Such a discussion should specify, inter alia, the criteria that are characteristic of work in CDA. Instead, we shall simply, and perhaps naively, summarize such criteria by saying that in our opinion CDA should deal primarily with the discourse dimensions of power abuse and the injustice and inequality that result from it. Let us spell out some implications of such a lofty overall aim (see also Mey, 1985; O’Barr, 1984; Steiner, 1985).

First, the focus on dominance and inequality implies that, unlike other domains or approaches in discourse analysis, CDA does not primarily aim to contribute to a specific discipline, paradigm, school or discourse theory. It is primarily interested and motivated by pressing social issues, which it hopes to better understand through discourse analysis. Theories, descriptions, methods and empirical work are chosen or elaborated as a function of their relevance for the realization of such a sociopolitical goal. Since serious social problems are naturally complex, this usually also means a multidisciplinary approach, in which distinctions between theory, description and ‘application’ become less relevant. This focus on fundamental understanding of social problems such as dominance and inequality does not mean ignoring theoretical issues. On the contrary, without complex and highly sophisticated theories no such understanding is possible. Central to this theoretical endeavour is the analysis of the complex relationships between dominance and discourse.

Unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse analysts (should) take an explicit sociopolitical stance: they spell out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within their discipline and within society at large. Although not in each stage of theory formation and analysis, their work is admittedly and ultimately political. Their hope, if occasionally illusory, is change through critical understanding. Their perspective, if possible, that of those who suffer most from dominance and inequality. Their critical targets are the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice. That is, one of the criteria of their work is solidarity with those who need it most. Their problems are ‘real’ problems, that is the serious problems that threaten the lives or well-being of many, and not primarily the sometimes petty disciplinary problems of describing discourse structures, let alone the problems of the powerful (including the ‘problems’ the powerful have with those who are less powerful, or with those who resist it). Their critique of discourse
implies a political critique of those responsible for its perversion in the reproduction of dominance and inequality. Such a critique should not be ad hoc, individual or incidental, but general, structural and focused on groups, while involving power relations between groups. In this sense, critical discourse scholars should also be social and political scientists, as well as social critics and activists. In other words, CDA is unabashedly normative: any critique by definition presupposes an applied ethics.

However, unlike politicians and activists, critical discourse analysts go beyond the immediate, serious or pressing issues of the day. Their structural understanding presupposes more general insights, and sometimes indirect and long-term analyses of fundamental causes, conditions and consequences of such issues. And unlike most social and political scientists, critical discourse scholars want to make a more specific contribution, namely to get more insight into the crucial role of discourse in the reproduction of dominance and inequality.

Critical discourse analysis is far from easy. In my opinion it is by far the toughest challenge in the discipline. As suggested above, it requires true multidisciplinarity, and an account of intricate relationships between text, talk, social cognition, power, society and culture. Its adequacy criteria are not merely observational, descriptive or even explanatory (Fairclough, 1985). Ultimately, its success is measured by its effectiveness and relevance, that is, by its contribution to change. In that respect, modesty is mandatory: academic contributions may be marginal in processes of change, in which especially those who are directly involved, and their acts of resistance, are the really effective change agents. This has become particularly clear from large processes of change such as class struggles, decolonization, the Civil Rights Movement and the Women’s Movement. Yet, although occasionally marginal, academics have also shown their presence and contributions in these movements. Critical discourse analysts continue this tradition: the 1990s are replete with persistent problems of oppression, injustice and inequality that demand their urgent attention.

Such aims, choices and criteria of CDA have implications for scholarly work. They monitor theory formation, analytical method and procedures of empirical research. They guide the choice of topics and relevancies. Thus, if immigrants, refugees and (other) minorities suffer from prejudice, discrimination and racism, and if women continue to be subjected to male dominance, violence or sexual harassment, it will be essential to examine and evaluate such events and their consequences essentially from their point of view. That is, such events will be called ‘racist’ or ‘sexist’ if knowledgeable Blacks or women say so, despite white or male denials. There cannot be an aloof, let alone a ‘neutral’, position of critical scholars. Critical scholars should not worry about the interests or perspectives of those in power, who are best placed to take care of their own interests anyway. Most male or white scholars have been shown to despise or discredit such partisanship, and thereby show how partisan they are in the first place, e.g. by ignoring, mitigating, excluding or denying inequality. They condemn mixing scholarship with ‘politics’, and thereby they do
precisely that. Some, even more cynically and more directly, collude with dominance, e.g. by ‘expert’ advice, support and legitimation of the (western, middle-class, white, male, heterosexual, etc.) power elites. It is this collusion that is one of the major topics of critical discourse analysis.

Most of this has been said many times, in many modes and styles of formulation, both within and outside of science and scholarship. Yet, within the framework of this paper, within this special issue, and within this journal, it does not hurt to repeat such statements, which may be trivials for some, ‘unscientific slogans’ for others, and basic principles for us. What counts, henceforth, is only to draw the consequences for adequate critical research.

3. POWER AND DOMINANCE

One crucial presupposition of adequate critical discourse analysis is understanding the nature of social power and dominance. Once we have such an insight, we may begin to formulate ideas about how discourse contributes to their reproduction. To cut a long philosophical and social scientific analysis short, we assume that we here deal with properties of relations between social groups. That is, while focusing on social power, we ignore purely personal power, unless enacted as an individual realization of group power, that is, by individuals as group members. Social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge. Below we shall see that special access to various genres, forms or contexts of discourse and communication is also an important power resource (for further details on the concept of power, see, e.g. Clegg, 1989; Lukes, 1986).

Power involves control, namely by (members of) one group over (those of) other groups. Such control may pertain to action and cognition: that is, a powerful group may limit the freedom of action of others, but also influence their minds. Besides the elementary recourse to force to directly control action (as in police violence against demonstrators, or male violence against women), ‘modern’ and often more effective power is mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one’s own interests. It is at this crucial point where discourse and critical discourse analysis come in: managing the mind of others is essentially a function of text and talk. Note, though, that such mind management is not always bluntly manipulative. On the contrary, dominance may be enacted and reproduced by subtle, routine, everyday forms of text and talk that appear ‘natural’ and quite ‘acceptable’. Hence, CDA also needs to focus on the discursive strategies that legitimate control, or otherwise ‘naturalize’ the social order, and especially relations of inequality (Fairclough, 1985).

Despite such complexities and subtleties of power relations, critical dis-
course analysis is specifically interested in power abuse, that is, in breaches of laws, rules and principles of democracy, equality and justice by those who wield power. To distinguish such power from legitimate and acceptable forms of power, and lacking another adequate term, we use the term 'dominance'. As is the case with power, dominance is seldom total. It may be restricted to specific domains, and it may be contested by various modes of challenge, that is, counter-power. It may be more or less consciously or explicitly exercised or experienced. Many more or less subtle forms of dominance seem to be so persistent that they seem natural until they begin to be challenged, as was/is the case for male dominance over women, White over Black, rich over poor. If the minds of the dominated can be influenced in such a way that they accept dominance, and act in the interest of the powerful out of their own free will, we use the term hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Hall et al., 1977). One major function of dominant discourse is precisely to manufacture such consensus, acceptance and legitimacy of dominance (Herman and Chomsky, 1988).

The concept of hegemony, and its associated concepts of consensus, acceptance and the management of the mind, also suggests that a critical analysis of discourse and dominance is far from straightforward, and does not always imply a clear picture of villains and victims. Indeed, we have already suggested that many forms of dominance appear to be 'jointly produced' through intricate forms of social interaction, communication and discourse. We hope that critical discourse analysis will be able to contribute to our understanding of such intricacies.

Power and dominance are usually organized and institutionalized. The social dominance of groups is thus not merely enacted, individually, by its group members, as is the case in many forms of everyday racism or sexual harassment. It may also be supported or condoned by other group members, sanctioned by the courts, legitimated by laws, enforced by the police, and ideologically sustained and reproduced by the media or textbooks. This social, political and cultural organization of dominance also implies a hierarchy of power: some members of dominant groups and organizations have a special role in planning, decision-making and control over the relations and processes of the enactment of power. These (small) groups will here be called the power elites (Domhoff, 1978; Mills, 1956). For our discussion, it is especially interesting to note that such elites also have special access to discourse: they are literally the ones who have most to say. In our discourse analytical framework, therefore, we define elites precisely in terms of their 'symbolic power' (Bourdieu, 1982), as measured by the extent of their discursive and communicative scope and resources.

4. DISCOURSE AND ACCESS

We have suggested that one of the social resources on which power and dominance are based is the privileged access to discourse and communication. Access is an interesting but also a rather vague analytical notion
(Van Dijk, 1989b, 1993b). In our case it may mean that language users or communicators have more or less freedom in the use of special discourse genres or styles, or in the participation in specific communicative events and contexts. Thus, only parliamentarians have access to parliamentary debates and top managers to meetings in the boardroom. People may have more or less active or passive access to communicative events, as is usually the case for journalists, professors or bosses when writing for, or speaking to, a more or less passive audience. Similarly, participants may have more or less control over the variable properties of the (course of) discourse and its conditions and consequences, such as their planning, setting, the presence of other participants, modes of participation, overall organization, turn-taking, agenda, topics or style.

An analysis of the various modes of discourse access reveals a rather surprising parallelism between social power and discourse access: the more discourse genres, contexts, participants, audience, scope and text characteristics they (may) actively control or influence, the more powerful social groups, institutions or elites are. Indeed, for each group, position or institution, we may spell out a ‘discourse access profile’. Thus, top business managers have exclusive access to executive board meetings, in which the most powerful is usually associated with the ‘chair’, who also controls the agenda, speech acts (e.g. who may command whom), turn allocation (who is allowed to speak), decision-making, topics and other important and consequential dimensions of such institutional talk. At the same time, managers have access to business reports and documents, or can afford to have those written for them; they have preferential access to the news media, as well as to negotiations with top politicians and other top managers. Similar profiles may be sketched for presidents, prime ministers, political party leaders, newspaper editors, anchor(wo)men, judges, professors, doctors or police officers.

Similarly, lack of power is also measured by its lack of active or controlled access to discourse: in everyday life, most ‘ordinary’ people only have active access to conversations with family members, friends or colleagues. They have more or less passive access to bureaucrats in public agencies or to professionals (e.g. doctors, teachers, police officers). In other situations they may be more or less controlled participants, onlookers, consumers or users, e.g. as media audiences, suspects in court, or as a topic in the news media (but often only when they are victims or perpetrators of crime and catastrophe). Modest forms of counter-power exist in some discourse and communication forms, as is the case for ‘letters to the Editor’, carrying or shouting slogans in demonstrations, or asking critical questions in the classroom.

In the same way as power and dominance may be institutionalized to enhance their effectivity, access may be organized to enhance its impact: given the crucial role of the media, powerful social actors and institutions have organized their media access by press officers, press releases, press conferences, PR departments, and so on (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978). The same is more generally true for the control of public opinion, and
hence for the manufacture of legitimation, consent and consensus needed in the reproduction of hegemony (Margolis and Mauser, 1989).

In sum, for the purpose of the theory sketched here, power and dominance of groups are measured by their control over (access to) discourse. The crucial implication of this correlation is not merely that discourse control is a form of social action control, but also and primarily that it implies the conditions of control over the minds of other people, that is, the management of social representations. More control over more properties of text and context, involving more people, is thus generally (though not always) associated with more influence, and hence with hegemony.

5. SOCIAL COGNITION

Whereas the management of discourse access represents one of the crucial social dimensions of dominance, that is, who is allowed to say/write/hear/read what to/from whom, where, when and how, we have stressed that 'modern' power has a major cognitive dimension. Except in the various forms of military, police, judicial or male force, the exercise of power usually presupposes mind management, involving the influence of knowledge, beliefs, understanding, plans, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values. Ultimately, the management of modes of access is geared towards this access to the public mind, which we conceptualize in terms of social cognition. Socially shared representations of societal arrangements, groups and relations, as well as mental operations such as interpretation, thinking and arguing, inferencing and learning, among others, together define what we understand by social cognition (Farr and Moscovici, 1984; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Wyer and Srull, 1984).

Discourse, communication and (other) forms of action and interaction are monitored by social cognition (Van Dijk, 1989a). The same is true for our understanding of social events or of social institutions and power relations. Hence social cognitions mediate between micro- and macro-levels of society, between discourse and action, between the individual and the group. Although embodied in the minds of individuals, social cognitions are social because they are shared and presupposed by group members, monitor social action and interaction, and because they underlie the social and cultural organization of society as a whole (Resnick et al., 1991).

For our theoretical purposes, then, social cognitions allow us to link dominance and discourse. They explain the production as well as the understanding and influence of dominant text and talk. The complex cognitive theories involved in such processes cannot be explained in detail here. Indeed, many of their elements are as yet unknown. We know a little about how texts are produced and understood, how their information is searched, activated, stored or memorized (Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). We know that knowledge plays a prominent role in these processes, e.g. in terms of knowledge structures such as 'scripts' (Schank and Abelson, 1977).
Control of knowledge crucially shapes our interpretation of the world, as well as our discourse and other actions. Hence the relevance of a critical analysis of those forms of text and talk, e.g. in the media and education, that essentially aim to construct such knowledge.

Unfortunately, we know very little about the structure and operations of the ‘softer’ (or ‘hotter’) forms of social cognition, such as opinions, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values. We shall merely assume that these ‘evaluative’ social representations also have a schematic form, featuring specific categories (as the schema men have about women, or whites have about blacks, may feature a category ‘appearance’: Van Dijk, 1987a). The ‘contents’ of such schematically organized attitudes are formed by general, socially shared opinions, that is, by evaluative beliefs. The general norms and values that in turn underlie such beliefs may be further organized in more complex, abstract and basic ideologies, such as those about immigrants, freedom of the press, abortion or nuclear arms. For our purposes, therefore, ideologies are the fundamental social cognitions that reflect the basic aims, interests and values of groups. They may (metaphorically and hence vaguely) be seen as the fundamental cognitive ‘programmes’ or ‘operating systems’ that organize and monitor the more specific social attitudes of groups and their members. What such ideologies look like exactly, and how they strategically control the development or change of attitudes, is as yet virtually unknown (see, however, e.g. Billig, 1982, 1991; Rosenberg, 1988; Windisch, 1985).

It is also increasingly accepted that concrete text production and interpretation are based on so-called models, that is, mental representations of experiences, events or situations, as well as the opinions we have about them (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Van Dijk, 1987b; Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). Thus, a newspaper report about (specific events in) the war in Bosnia is based on journalistic models of that war, and these models may in turn have been constructed during the interpretation of many source texts, e.g. of other media, key witnesses, or the press conferences of politicians. At the same time, such models are shaped by existing knowledge (about Yugoslavia, wars, ethnic conflict, etc.), and by more or less variable or shared general attitudes and ideologies.

Note that whereas knowledge, attitudes and ideologies are generalized representations that are socially shared, and hence characteristic of whole groups and cultures, specific models are—as such—unique, personal and contextualized: they define how one language user now produces or understands this specific text, even when large parts of such processes are not autobiographically but socially determined. In other words, models allow us to link the personal with the social, and hence individual actions and (other) discourses, as well as their interpretations, with the social order, and personal opinions and experiences with group attitudes and group relations, including those of power and dominance.

Here we touch upon the core of critical discourse analysis: that is, a detailed description, explanation and critique of the ways dominant discourses (indirectly) influence such socially shared knowledge, attitudes and
ideologies, namely through their role in the manufacture of concrete models. More specifically, we need to know how specific discourse structures determine specific mental processes, or facilitate the formation of specific social representations. Thus, it may be the case that specific rhetorical figures, such as hyperboles or metaphors, preferentially affect the organization of models or the formation of opinions embodied in such models. Similarly, semantic moves may directly facilitate the formation or change of social attitudes, or they may do so indirectly, that is, through the generalization or decontextualization of personal models (including opinions) of specific events. In our account below of some major features of critical discourse analysis, therefore, we need to focus on these relations between discourse structures and the structures of social cognition. At the same time, this analysis of both discursive and cognitive structures must in turn be embedded in a broader social, political or cultural theory of the situations, contexts, institutions, groups and overall power relations that enable or result from such ‘symbolic’ structures.

6. DISCOURSE STRUCTURES

Within the broad social and cognitive framework sketched above, the theory and practice of critical discourse analysis focus on the structures of text and talk. If powerful speakers or groups enact or otherwise ‘exhibit’ their power in discourse, we need to know exactly how this is done. And if they thus are able to persuade or otherwise influence their audiences, we also want to know which discursive structures and strategies are involved in that process. Hence, the discursive reproduction of dominance, which we have taken as the main object of critical analysis, has two major dimensions, namely that of production and reception. That is, we distinguish between the enactment, expression or legitimation of dominance in the (production of the) various structures of text and talk, on the one hand, and the functions, consequences or results of such structures for the (social) minds of recipients, on the other. Discursive (re)production of power results from social cognitions of the powerful, whereas the situated discourse structures result in social cognitions. That is, in both cases we eventually have to deal with relations between discourse and cognition, and in both cases discourse structures form the crucial mediating role. They are truly the means of the ‘symbolic’ reproduction of dominance.

Power enactment and discourse production

Understanding and explaining ‘power-relevant’ discourse structures involves reconstruction of the social and cognitive processes of their production. We have seen above that one crucial power resource is privileged or preferential access to discourse. One element of such complex access patterns is more or less controlled or active access to the very communicative event as such, that is, to the situation: some (elite) participants may
control the occasion, time, place, setting and the presence or absence of participants in such events. In other words, one way of enacting power is to control context. Thus, doctors make ‘appointments’ with patients, professors with students, or tax auditors with tax-payers, and thereby decide about place and time, and possible other participants. In some such situations, e.g. in parliamentary hearings, court trials or police interrogations, the presence of specific participants may be legally required, and their absence may be sanctioned.

A critical analysis of such access modes to communicative events pays special attention to those forms of context control that are legally or morally illegitimate or otherwise unacceptable. If men exclude women from meetings, whites restrict the access of blacks to the press, or immigration officers do not allow lawyers or social workers to interrogations of refugees, we have instances of discourse dominance, namely communicative discrimination or other forms of marginalization and exclusion. As well as in access patterns and context structures, such modes of exclusion are also apparent in discourse structures themselves. Indeed, some ‘voices’ are thereby censored, some opinions are not heard, some perspectives ignored: the discourse itself becomes a ‘segregated’ structure. Blacks or women may thus not only not exercise their rights as speakers and opinion-givers, but they may also be banished as hearers and contestants of power. Such exclusion may also mean that the less powerful are less quoted and less spoken about, so that two other forms of (passive) access are blocked.

Even when present as participants, members of less powerful groups may also otherwise be more or less dominated in discourse. At virtually each level of the structures of text and talk, therefore, their freedom of choice may be restricted by dominant participants. This may more or less acceptably be the case by convention, rule or law, as when chairs organize discussions, allow or prohibit specific speech acts, monitor the agenda, set and change topics or regulate turn-taking, as is more or less explicitly the case for judges, doctors, professors or police officers in the domain-specific discourse sessions they control (trials, consults, classes, interrogations, etc.: Boden and Zimmerman, 1991; Fisher and Todd, 1986). On the other hand, members of less powerful groups may also be illegitimately or immorally restricted in their communicative acts. Men may subtly or bluntly exclude women from taking the floor or from choosing specific topics (Kramaraz, 1981). Judges or police officers may not allow subjects to explain or defend themselves, immigration officers may prevent refugees from telling their ‘story’, and whites may criticize blacks for talking about racism (if they let them talk/write about it in the first place: Van Dijk, 1993a).

In sum, as we have defined power and dominance as the control of action, also discursive action may be restricted in many ways, either because of institutional power resources (positions, professional expertise, etc.), as for doctors or judges, or because of group membership alone, as for males and whites. All dimensions of discourse that allow variable choice, therefore, are liable to such forms of control, and participant
power or powerlessness is directly related to the extent of their control over such discourse variables. Illegitimate control of the course of discourse, therefore, is a direct and immediate enactment of dominance, while limiting the ‘discourse rights’ of other participants (Kedar, 1987; Kramarace et al., 1984).

From these contextual, interactional, organizational and global forms of discourse control, we may move to the more detailed, micro-level and expression forms of text and talk. Many of these are more or less automated, less consciously controlled or not variable at all, as is the case for many properties of syntax, morphology or phonology. That is, the influence of power will be much less direct and immediate at these levels. On the other hand, since communication is often less consciously controlled here, the more subtle and unintentional manifestations of dominance may be observed at these levels, e.g. in intonation, lexical or syntactic style, rhetorical figures, local semantic structures, turn-taking strategies, politeness phenomena, and so on.

Indeed, these more micro- or ‘surface’ structures may be less regulated by legal or moral rules, and hence allow more ‘unofficial’ exercise of power, that is, dominance. For instance, an insolent ‘tone’, e.g. of men, judges or police officers, may only seem to break the rules of politeness, and not the law, and may thus be one of the means to exercise dominance. It is also at this level that many studies have examined the incidence of more or less ‘powerful’ styles of talk, either in specific contexts (e.g. in court or the classroom), or by members of specific groups (men vs women), featuring, e.g., the presence or absence of hedges, hesitations, pauses, laughter, interruptions, doubt or certainty markers, specific lexical items, forms of address and pronoun use, and so on (among many studies, see, e.g., Bradac and Mulac, 1984; Erickson et al., 1978).

A critical approach to such discourse phenomena must be as subtle as the means of dominance it studies. Thus, an ‘impolite’ form of address (using first name or informal pronouns) may characterize many discourses of many people in many situations. Although such impoliteness may well ‘signal’ power, it need not signal social (group) power, nor dominance (Brown and Levinson, 1987). In other words, occasional, incidental or personal breaches of discourse rules are not, as such, expressions of dominance. This is the case only if such violations are generalized, occur in text and talk directed at, or about, specific dominated groups only, and if there are no contextual justifications other than such group membership. If these, and other conditions, are satisfied, an act of discourse impoliteness may be a more or less subtle form of sexism, ageism, racism or classism, among other forms of group dominance. The same is true for variations of intonation or ‘tone’, lexical style or rhetorical figures.

The socio-cognitive interface between dominance and production

While this is a more or less adequate description of the enactment of social power by the use of specific discourse structures, we should recall our
important thesis that a fully fledged theoretical explanation also needs a cognitive dimension. If not, why for instance does a white speaker believe that he or she may be impolite towards a black addressee, and not towards a white speaker in the same situation? In other words, what models and social representations link social group dominance with the choice of specific discourse forms?

According to the framework sketched above, this explanation may more or less run as follows: (1) A white speaker perceives, interprets and represents the present communicative situation in a mental context model, including also a representation of him/herself (as being white) and of the black addressee. (2) To do this, general attitudes about blacks will be activated. If these are negative, this will also show in the representation of the black addressee in the context model: the addressee may be assigned lower status, for instance. (3) This ‘biased’ context model will monitor production and, all other things being equal (e.g. if there is no fear of retaliation, or there are no moral accusations), this may result in the production of discourse structures that signal such underlying bias, e.g. specific impoliteness forms. Note that these socio-cognitive processes underlying racist discourse production may be largely automatized. That is, there is no need to assume that impoliteness is ‘intentional’ in such a case. Intentionality is irrelevant in establishing whether discourses or other acts may be interpreted as being racist.

These various mental strategies and representations of individual speakers are of course premised on the condition that white speakers share their attitudes and more fundamental anti-black ideologies with other whites, e.g. as a legitimation of their dominance. This also explains why in similar situations other whites may engage in similar behaviour, and how through repeated instances in various contexts blacks may learn to interpret specific discourse forms as being ‘racist’ (Essed, 1991).

Discourse structures and strategies in understanding

The enactment of dominance in discourse production is a complex but rather straightforward process, during which speakers feel entitled to break normative discourse rules and thereby may deny equal rights to speech participants. The ‘other side’ of the communication process, namely the reproduction of dominance through discourse understanding, is less straightforward.

One aspect of such understanding, however, we already encountered above, namely the interpretation of discourse as a dominant act by dominated group members. For instance, a black recipient may interpret both the text features (e.g. impoliteness forms) and the context (white speaker, no reasons to be impolite, etc.) in such a manner that a context model is constructed in which the white speaker is represented as acting in a racist way. In other words, understanding is pragmatic here, while focusing on the context (evaluation of the speaker and of the functions or effects of the discourse).
When addressed to members of the same group, however, such understanding may be very different. For instance, when whites speak about minorities to other whites (or men about women to other men), the enactment of white group dominance is not direct, as is the case when whites speak with blacks. The point now is that discourse properties must be geared towards the production or activation of an episodic mental model about ethnic minorities, in such a way that this model will in turn confirm negative attitudes and ideologies in the audience. Once established, such negative social representations may in turn be used in the formation of models that monitor discriminatory acts (including discourse, as shown above: Van Dijk, 1987a).

We have seen that this formation of general attitudes is a process we know very little about. We assumed that such attitudes consist of general opinions (like the racist opinion: ‘Blacks are less motivated to take a job than whites’ as part of a more general negative attitude about blacks). These may be acquired more or less directly, namely by generalized statements in discourse. They may also be acquired indirectly, namely after generalization and decontextualization of one or more models in which unmotivated blacks are being represented, as would be the case in biased storytelling or news reports. What we need to know, more generally, then, is how discourse structures affect the structures and contents of models, or the generalization process linking models with attitudes, in such a way that social representations are being formed that sustain dominance.

Although we need to know much more about the details of discourse-based attitude formation and change and about model–attitude relations, we may speculate about some of the overall features of these properties of discourse and social cognition. Thus, we have seen that the reproduction of dominance in contemporary societies often requires justification or legitimation: it is ‘just’, ‘necessary’ or ‘natural’ that we have privileged access to valuable social resources. Another strategy of the reproduction of dominance is that of denial: there is no dominance, all people in our society are equal, and have equal access to social resources. Such socio-cognitive strategies will also appear in discourse, e.g. in justifications and denials of inequality.

The justification of inequality involves two complementary strategies, namely the positive representation of the own group, and the negative representation of the Others. This is also what we find in white discourses about ethnic minorities. Arguments, stories, semantic moves and other structures of such discourse consistently, and sometimes subtly, have such implications, for instance in everyday conversations, political discourse, textbooks or news reports (Van Dijk, 1987a, 1991, 1993a). Thus, models are being expressed and persuasively conveyed that contrast US with THEM, e.g. by emphasizing ‘our’ tolerance, help or sympathy, and by focusing on negative social or cultural differences, deviance or threats attributed to ‘them’. If such ‘polarized’ models are consistent with negative attitudes or ideologies, they may be used to sustain existing attitudes or form new negative attitudes. One of the strategic ways to make sure that such gener-
eralizations are made is to emphasize that the current model is ‘typical’ and not incidental or exceptional, and that the negative actions of the Others cannot be explained or excused. Speakers or writers will therefore tend to emphasize that this ‘is always like that’, that ‘we are not used to that’, and that the circumstances do not allow alternative interpretations of the ‘deviant’ actions of the Others.

Given these assumptions about the formation of models of events and attitude schemata in which us and them are thus represented, we need to examine in more detail which discourse structures are conducive to such processes. We have seen that the most obvious case is simply semantic ‘content’: statements that directly entail negative evaluations of them, or positive ones of us. However, such statements also need to be credible, thus other persuasive moves are also needed, such as the following:

(a) Argumentation: the negative evaluation follows from the ‘facts’.
(b) Rhetorical figures: hyperbolic enhancement of ‘their’ negative actions and ‘our’ positive actions; euphemisms, denials, understatements of ‘our’ negative actions.
(c) Lexical style: choice of words that imply negative (or positive) evaluations.
(d) Storytelling: telling above negative events as personally experienced; giving plausible details above negative features of the events.
(e) Structural emphasis of ‘their’ negative actions, e.g. in headlines, leads, summaries, or other properties of text schemata (e.g. those of news reports), transactivity structures of sentence syntax (e.g. mentioning negative agents in prominent, topical position).
(f) Quoting credible witnesses, sources or experts, e.g. in news reports.

These and many other, sometimes very subtle, structures may be interpreted as managing the processes of understanding in such a way that ‘preferred models’ are being built by the hearers/readers. Depending on the ‘targets’ of such discursive marginalization of dominated groups, we may thus generally expect the structures and strategies of dominant talk to focus on various forms of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. In ethnic or racial affairs, this may involve, e.g., denial of white racism and discrimination, and a systematic association of ethnic minorities with problematic cultural differences at best, and more likely with illegal immigration and residence, illegal work, crime, welfare abuse, ‘positive discrimination’, and being a burden of all social resources, such as education, housing and employment. Sometimes this will happen in a blatant and overt way, and sometimes such attributions are much more subtle, typically so in more liberal elite discourse (Van Dijk, 1993a).

One of the ways to discredit powerless groups, for instance, is to pay extensive attention to their alleged threat to the interests and privileges of the dominant group: ‘we’ will get less (or worse) work, housing, education, or welfare because of ‘them’, and ‘they’ are even ‘favoured’, e.g. by special attention or affirmative action. Such a strategy is conducive to the formation of models that feature such well-known propositions as ‘We are the
real victims’, ‘We are being discriminated against, not they’. In socio-economic situations of white poverty or insecurity, it is of course easy to persuasively communicate such propositions, and to have them accepted as general opinions that will be part of more general negative attitudes about ethnic minorities. In other words, there are few general, interest-bound aims and values of white dominant group ideologies that are inconsistent with such opinions.

The liberal elites especially may also apply humanitarian norms and values to argue against ‘them’. By seemingly emphasizing ‘equality for all’, for instance, elites may thus discredit affirmative action programmes or employment schemes. And by denying or mitigating racism, they are able to marginalize those who claim the opposite. Recall that apart from the various semantic or other moves used in such discourse, the very access to such discourse is a crucial condition of power and counter-power: minorities or other dominated groups simply will hardly be allowed to provide a totally different version of the ‘facts’, or the white media or other elites will find a minority representative who agrees with their position.

Although each form of dominance has its own historical, social, political and cultural properties, and hence also different ways of discursive reproduction, we may assume that many of the observations made above also hold for the domains of gender, class, caste, religion, language, political views, world region or any other criterion by which groups may be differentiated and oppressed or marginalized. In production of discourse, notably when addressed to members of dominated groups, this will be most often the case through the direct enactment of power abuse, as we have examined above: breaches of discourse rules that presuppose equality, like free access to the communicative situation, free topic selection and turn-taking, politeness, and so on. In discourse understanding and reproduction by the (dominant) audience itself, therefore, we will generally expect the discourse to focus on the persuasive marginalization of the ‘Other’ by manipulation of event models and the generalized negative attitudes derived from them.

7. PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE ON ETHNIC AFFAIRS

To illustrate the general approach to critical discourse analysis sketched above, let us finally discuss some examples. These will be drawn from a study we did of the ways some western parliaments debate about ethnic affairs (Van Dijk, 1993a, ch. 3). This study is itself part of a project on ‘elite discourse and racism’ which seeks to show that the various elites (e.g. in politics, the media, academia, education and corporate business) play a prominent role in the reproduction of racism, and do so, sometimes subtly, through the respective discourse genres to which they have access. The project is part of our year-long research programme on discourse, communication and racism.

The study of parliamentary discourse focused on debates during the
1980s on immigration, ethnic relations, affirmative action and civil rights in the Netherlands, the UK, France, Germany and the USA. Such debates, unlike spontaneous conversations or arguments, usually consist of written depositions, with occasional spontaneous interruptions. Such statements are read and are intended for the parliamentary or congressional record, and are therefore heavily monitored. Except from extremist racist parties and arch-conservatives, therefore, explicitly and blatantly racist talk is exceptional for speakers of mainstream parties. On the contrary, the ‘rhetoric of tolerance’ in such debates is very prominent, and reflects underlying values of humanitarianism and civil rights, as is the case in the following examples from Germany and the USA. (All quotes are taken from the parliamentary records of the respective countries. Since some of the examples are translations, some details of a more subtle analysis of, for example, style must unfortunately be ignored.)

(1) I know no other country on this earth that gives more prominence to the rights of resident foreigners as does this bill in our country. (Germany, Herr Hirsch, 9 February 1990, p. 16279)

(2) This is a nation whose values and traditions now excite the world, as we all know. I think we all have a deep pride in American views, American ideals, American government, American principle, which excite hundreds of millions of people around the world who struggle for freedom. (US, Mr Foley, 2 August 1990, H6768)

Interestingly, all countries appear to make the same claim, namely to be the most tolerant one. For the discussion in this article it is especially important to emphasize that, besides the undeniable sincerity of many politicians and despite their humanitarian values, such nationalist rhetoric may also function as disclaimers that precede negative statements and decisions about minorities or immigrants. Indeed, in virtually all cases we examined, the decisions advocated by such speakers restrict the (immigration, litigation, residence, etc.) rights of immigrants or minorities. Similarly, all speakers, including the most racist ones, will emphatically deny that they or their country are racist. Even the leader of the Front National will say so:

(3) We are neither racist nor xenophobic. Our aim is only that, quite naturally, there be a hierarchy, because we are dealing with France, and France is the country of the French. (France, M. Le Pen, 7 July 1986, p. 3064)

There are many other versions of the classical disclaimer of the Apparent Denial: ‘I have nothing against X, but . . .’. Also Le Pen uses ‘only’ to show that his denial is only apparent, and that the rest of his talk will blatantly express French superiority. Conservative speakers similarly deny racism, although they do so with a number of characteristic strategic moves:

(4) The French are not racist. But, facing this continuous increase of the foreign population in France, one has witnessed the development, in certain cities and neighbourhoods, of reactions that come close to xenophobia. (France, M. Pascua, 9 July 1986, p. 3053)
Instead of an Apparent Denial, we here find an Apparent Concession. That is, although racism as such is denied, it is conceded that there is a problem after all. This concession, however, is multiply hedged and embedded in euphemism and indirectness. First, racism is redefined as less serious sounding ‘xenophobia’. Secondly, however, even this concession is hedged by the phrase ‘reactions that come close to’. Thirdly, xenophobia is restricted by localization: ‘in certain cities and neighbourhoods’, which usually implies poor white inner city neighbourhoods. That is, as usual, the elites transfer racism ‘down’ to the lower class. Finally, xenophobia is explained and thereby half-excused by the initial clause ‘facing this continuous increase of the foreign population in France’, a presupposition which incidentally is false: compared to previous decades the percentage of immigrants has barely increased. This, then, is a characteristic example of political discourse on ethnic relations: denial, apparent concession, mitigation and justification of racism.

Obviously, negative decisions must be rationally defended, and we may therefore expect extensive statements about all the negative properties of immigration, residence, cultural conflicts, the reactions of the majority, and so on, especially by racist representatives, as is the case for those of the Front National in France. However, mainstream politicians also will commonly engage in more subtle moves of inferiorization, problematization and marginalization. Here is a more blatant example from the British House of Commons:

(5) ... one in three children born in London today is of ethnic origin. ... That is a frightening concept for the country to come to terms with. We have already seen the problems of massive Moslem immigration ... unless we want to create major problems in the decades or the century ahead, we must not only stop immigration but must move to voluntary resettlement to reduce the immigrant population. (UK, Mr Janman, 20 June 1990, cols. 293–4)

Among the many other moves that characterize such parliamentary talk about ‘them’, we find those of apparent sympathy (we make these decisions for their own best interest), populism or apparent democracy (the people do not want more immigration) and blaming the victim (they are themselves to blame for, e.g., discrimination, unemployment, and so on) (see also Reeves, 1983). Overall, as in other forms of talk about minorities, also among the elites, we find a combination of positive self-presentation and many forms of negative other-presentation.

Within our present theoretical argument such examples may be analysed in different ways. Obviously, first of all, they are direct expressions of (political) power, by virtue of the special access representatives have to parliamentary debates (restricted only by the Speaker), and hence to the opinion formation of other parliamentarians, and indirectly to the media and the public. By expressing blatant prejudices, as does Mr Janman in example 5, such a powerful elite group member at the same time lends weight to the acceptability of racist opinions, and thereby directly enacts discursive discrimination against minorities and immigrants. Indeed, his
contribution to the dominance of the white group most crucially consists of his influence on the Tory party in power, which is able to (and actually does) further restrict immigration. His talk is part of the discursively based decision process itself, and this decision may be racist in its own right when it specifically applies to non-European immigrants. In other words, political discourse directly enacts racism when being part of the decisions for actions or policies that cause or confirm ethnic or racial inequality. Since parliament in a democratic country is (theoretically) ultimately responsible for such decisions, we here witness the enactment of racism at the highest possible level. According to our thesis of the top–down direction of racism, this also means that all ‘lower’ groups and institutions (e.g. the police) may feel similarly entitled to develop or maintain similar prejudices and similarly engage in discrimination. A most dramatic example of such top–down influence may be observed in Germany, where a protracted discussion by politicians and the press about refugees conditioned the ‘popular’ racist attacks by skinheads against refugee reception centres in 1991 and 1992.

In other words, the reproduction of racism in parliamentary discourse is not limited to the enactment of inequality by political decision-makers, but also consists in influencing others, if only because of the credibility and respectability of MPs. MPs not only express their own opinions, or those of their party or social group, but also try to persuade others, such as the opposition, to adopt them. Also, such expressions may be seen as a legitimation or justification of decisions. Most importantly, though, their discourse contributes to the reproduction of racism through their coverage in the media, which spread them among the population at large. If adopted by the media, as is often the case, the negative models of immigrants or minorities underlying such statements will eventually be persuasively presented to the audience of the mass media. We have already seen that due to a lack of alternative, anti-racist elite discourses and media, and because of their own best interests and corresponding ideologies and attitudes, many members of the audience will tend to adopt such models. Such processes of persuasion involve not only persuasive argumentation and rhetoric, or congenial opinions, but also the authority with which the politicians and the media are able to present such models. The media have their own rich repertoire of means to further enhance and ‘popularize’ the sometimes abstract and technical language and opinions of the politicians, e.g. by spreading scare stories about ‘massive’ illegal immigration, welfare ‘cheats’, housing and employment shortages attributed to minorities, perceived cultural deviance (e.g. Islam) and especially ‘black crime’ (drugs, mugging, violence).

In sum, the enactment of (political) power as part of white group dominance in western countries is not limited to political decision-making and directly restricting the rights of minorities, but also, and perhaps more importantly, justifies and legitimates such acts through the manipulation of public opinion, usually through the mass media. This means that the politicians speak not only for their colleagues, but also for other elite groups, especially the media, and hence for the white population at large. In both
cases the main aim is to form and change ‘ethnic models’ that may be used to make decisions or develop attitudes that may favour the unequal treatment of the Others, and thereby to reproduce white group dominance.

This is also the reason why politicians, as soon as they speak negatively about minorities or immigrants, will use the ‘facts’ that fit the stereotypical models that are derived from pre-existing popular attitudes they have helped to develop in the first place. Thus, they may invoke such prototypical model-events as refugees living in expensive hotels, increasing unemployment, inner city ‘riots’, cultural (religious) conflicts (Rushdie, young Muslim women who are forced to wear the veil, or South Asian women forced into arranged marriages), immigrants bringing in drugs (if not AIDS), welfare scroungers, minorities who lightly accuse ‘us’ (employers, etc.) of discrimination, affirmative action programmes in employment and education that will ‘favour’ ‘less qualified’ minorities, and so on.

Reproducing racism in the British House of Commons

Finally, let us examine in somewhat more detail a longer example of such parliamentary discourse. This example was taken from a parliamentary debate held on 16 April 1985 in the British House of Commons and consists of several fragments from the leading speech by Mr Marcus Fox, Conservative representative of Shipley, about the so-called ‘Honeyford affair’. Honeyford was the headmaster of a school in Bradford (UK), who was first suspended, then reinstated but finally dismissed (with a golden handshake) because of what the parents of his mostly Asian pupils, the Bradford City Council and their supporters saw as racist writings, e.g. in the right-wing Salisbury Review and the Times Literary Supplement, on multicultural education in general, and on his own students in particular. The affair soon became a national issue, in which Conservative politicians as well as the Conservative press fulminated against the ‘race relations bullies’ (also a phrase used by Mr Fox in his speech), who ‘strike at the very root of our democracy ... the freedom of speech’. Here is how Mr Fox begins this adjournment debate in the British Parliament:

Mr. Marcus Fox (Shipley): This Adjournment debate is concerned with Mr. Ray Honeyford, the headmaster of Drummond Road Middle School, Bradford. This matter has become a national issue—not from Mr. Honeyford’s choice. Its consequences go beyond the issue of race relations or, indeed, of education. They strike at the very root of our democracy and what we cherish in this House above all—the freedom of speech.

One man writing an article in a small-circulation publication has brought down a holocaust on his head. To my mind, this was a breath of fresh air in the polluted area of race relations. . . .

Who are Mr. Honeyford’s detractors? Who are the people who have persecuted him? They have one thing in common—they are all on the Left of British politics. The Marxists and the Trots are here in full force. We only have to look at their tactics, and all the signs are there. Without a thread of evidence, Mr. Honeyford has been vilified as a
racist. Innuendos and lies have been the order of the day. He has been criticised continuously through the media, yet most of the time he has been barred from defending himself and denied the right to answer those allegations by order of the education authority. The mob has taken to the streets to harass him out of his job. . . .

The race relations bullies may have got their way so far, but the silent majority of decent people have had enough. . . . The withdrawal of the right to free speech from this one man could have enormous consequences and the totalitarian forces ranged against him will have succeeded. (Hansard, 16 April 1985, cols 233–6)

To examine the enactment of power and dominance in this speech, and conversely the role of this speech in the reproduction of such dominance, we systematically discuss its major discourse dimensions. Recall that for all the dimensions, levels or properties of this speech that we analyse (and this analysis is far from exhaustive), the reproduction of dominance has two major aspects: the direct enactment or production of dominance, on the one hand, and the consequences of this speech in the process of the management of the public consensus on ethnic affairs, on the other. For instance, discrediting Asian parents is itself an act of verbal discrimination, indirectly restricting the civil rights of minorities. At the same time, such a discursive act may contribute to the formation of negative models about Asian parents and (other) anti-racists, which may be generalized to negative attitudes which in turn may influence discrimination by members of the white group at large.

Note that although our first task is to systematically examine the many textual and contextual properties of the exercise of dominance for this example, and to provide explicit evidence for such an account, analysis is not—and cannot be—‘neutral’. Indeed, the point of critical discourse analysis is to take a position. In this case, we take a position that tries to examine the speech of Mr Fox from the point of view of the opponents of Honeyford, thereby criticizing the dominant groups and institutions (e.g. Conservative politicians and journalists) who defended Honeyford and attacked multicultural education.

The analysis begins with various properties of the context, such as access patterns, setting and participants, and then examines the properties of the ‘text’ of the speech itself, such as its topics, local meanings, style and rhetoric. Of the many possible properties of the text and context of this speech we focus on those that most clearly exhibit the discursive properties of the exercise of dominance. For detailed theoretical explanations of these properties and their relevance for critical analysis, the reader is referred to our other work quoted in this paper (see, e.g., Van Dijk, 1984, 1987a, 1991, 1993a).

Access. As indicated above, Mr Fox’s power as an MP is first of all defined by his active and more or less controlled access to the House of Commons and its debates.

Setting. The power and authority of his speech is also signalled and maybe
enhanced by elements of the setting, such as the location (the House of Commons) and its prestigious props, the presence of other MPs, and so on. Since television has recently entered the House of Commons, such symbols of parliamentary power are also relevant for the public ‘overhearers’ of parliamentary debates. Locally, Mr Fox’s power and influence coincides with his having the floor, marked not only by his speaking, but also by his standing up while the other MPs are seated.

Genre. Mr Fox also has special access to a genre only he and his colleagues are entitled to engage in, namely parliamentary debates. We have seen above that this is not merely ‘talk’, but constitutive of highest level political decision-making.

Communicative acts and social meanings. Besides these broader social or political implications, this speech fragment from the House of Commons locally expresses or signals various social meanings and categories of social interaction. At the interaction level itself, therefore, politeness is signalled by the formal modes of address (‘the Honourable Gentleman’), whereas political closeness may be marked by ‘my friend . . .’ Since the politeness markers are mutual here, social power relations in the House seem to be equal. Note, though, that Mr Fox is a member of a government party, which is able to control much of the parliamentary agenda, and which therefore is able to hold a parliamentary debate on Honeyford in the first place. That is, also among ‘equals’, political dominance may be at stake.

This is also the case at the semantic level, that is, relative to the social situation and events talked about by Mr Fox. By defending Mr Honeyford, Mr Fox attacks shared opponents, namely leftists or anti-racists. Because of his powerful position as an MP he adds considerable weight to the balance of this conflict between Honeyford and the parents of his students, as is also the case for the right-wing media supporting Honeyford. We see how the Conservative elites, who may otherwise be hardly interested in ordinary teachers, may take part in the struggle between racism and anti-racism, between ‘British values’ and the values of multiculturalism scorned by Mr Honeyford.

Indeed, rather surprisingly, Mr Honeyford was even personally received by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Number 10 Downing Street, which again signals the highest support for his case. Similarly, that a conflict of a headmaster becomes a topic of a parliamentary debate by itself already suggests the importance accorded to the conflict, and to the socio-political positions to be defended at all costs. Finally, by associating Honeyford’s opponents (mostly Asian parents) with Marxists and ‘Trots’ not only means that the case of his opponents is discredited within the framework of a largely anti-communist consensus, but also, more politically, that the Labour opposition to which Mr Fox’s speech is primarily addressed is thus attacked and discredited. Below we shall see how such attacks, marginalization, discrediting and other sociopolitical acts are enacted by properties of discourse. Here, it should be emphasized, how-
ever, that the ultimate functions of such a speech are not merely linguistic or communicative (expressing or conveying meaning), but political.

**Participant positions and roles.** Mr Fox obviously speaks in his role as MP, and as a member of the Conservative party, among several other social identities, such as being a politician, white and male. This position institutionally entitles him to put the Honeyford case on the parliamentary agenda if he and his party deem the issue to be of national interest. Hence, it is not only his role as Conservative MP that influences the structures and strategies of his speech, but also his identity as a member of the white dominant group, and especially his identity as a member of the white elites. Thus, his party-political position explains why he attacks Labour, and the Left in general, his being an MP influences his alleged concern for democracy and the freedom of speech, and his being white his collusion with racist practices and his aggressions against Indian parents and their supporters.

**Speech acts.** Most of Mr Fox’s speech consists of assertions, and also, at the global level of macro-speech acts, he primarily accomplishes an assertion. However, we have observed that, indirectly, he also accuses Honeyford’s ‘detractors’ of vilification, lying and intimidation. At the same time, he thereby accuses and attacks the Labour opposition, whom he sees as opponents of Honeyford. In parliament his accusations and allegations may be met with appropriate defence by his sociopolitical equals. Not so, however, beyond the boundaries of parliament, where his accusations may be heard (literally, over the radio) or read (when quoted in the press) by millions, who may thus be exposed to biased information about Honeyford’s opponents (most of whom are not Marxists or Trotskyites at all). For our CDA perspective, this means that the function and the scope of speech participants may largely define the effectiveness and ‘authority’ of their speech acts. Indeed, other supporters of Honeyford may legitimate their position by referring to such accusations in parliament.

**Macrosemantics: topics.** The topic of the debate in the British House of Commons, as signalled by Mr Fox himself (‘This Adjournment debate is concerned with . . .’), is clearly ‘the Honeyford case’. Propositionally, however, the topic may be defined in various ways, e.g. as ‘Honeyford wrote disparaging articles about his Asian students and about multicultural education more generally’, ‘Honeyford has been accused of racism’ and ‘Honeyford is being vilified by anti-racist detractors’. It is the latter topic that is being construed by Mr Fox. At the same time, however, topics have sociopolitical implications, and these implications are made explicit by Mr Fox: the debate is not only about Honeyford, or even about race relations and education, but about the ‘very root of our democracy’, namely about free speech. This example shows how events, including discourse about such events, are represented, at the macro-level, as a function of underlying norms and values, that is, within the framework of dominant ideol-
ologies. That is, Mr Fox and other supporters of Honeyford, including the Conservative media, interpret Honeyford’s racist articles and his attack on multicultural education as a ‘breath of fresh air’, and hence as an example of justified criticism, whereas his opponents are categorized as restricting free speech, and hence as being intolerant and undemocratic. This reversal of the application of values is well known in anti-anti-racist rhetoric, where those who combat ethnic and racial intolerance are themselves accused of intolerance, namely of the ‘freedom’ to ‘tell the truth’ about ethnic relations (for further detail, see also Van Dijk, 1991).

Relevant for our discussion here is that Mr Fox as an MP has the power not only to define and redefine the topics of debate, but also to define the situation. That is, the point is no longer whether or not Honeyford has insulted his students and their parents, or whether or not a teacher of a largely multicultural school is competent when he attacks the principles of multiculturalism, but whether the critique levelled against him is legitimate in the first place. By generalizing the topic even beyond race relations and education to a debate about democracy and free speech, Mr Fox at the same time defines both his and Mr Honeyford’s opponents—including Labour—as being against free speech and democracy, and hence as enemies of the British state and its fundamental values. By thus redefining the topic at issue, Mr Fox no longer merely defends Mr Honeyford, but also reverses the charges and attacks the Left. He thereby conceals the fundamentally undemocratic implications of racism, and manipulates his secondary audience, namely the public at large, into believing that Mr Honeyford is merely a champion of free speech, and that his opponents are attacking British values if not democracy in general. As we shall see below, most of his speech tries to persuasively support that topical ‘point’.

Superstructures: text schemata. One major form of text schema is argumentation. In Mr Fox’s speech, as in parliamentary debates in general, argumentation plays a prominent role. As we have seen above, his main political point coincides with his argumentative ‘position’, which consists of his opinion that an attack against Honeyford is an attack against democracy and the freedom of speech. How does he support such a position? His first argument is a negative description of the facts: one man who writes in a ‘small-circulation’ publication has brought a ‘holocaust’ on his head. In other words, whatever Honeyford has written, it was insignificant (while published in a ‘small-circulation’ publication), and the reaction was massively destructive (a ‘holocaust’). Moreover, what he wrote was also a ‘breath of fresh air in the polluted area of race relations’ and hence not only not reprehensible, but laudable. For Mr Fox, it follows that a massive attack against laudable critique is a threat to the freedom of speech, and hence to democracy.

We see that we need several steps to ‘make sense’ of Mr Fox’s argument, and that such a reconstruction needs to be based on the subjective arguments and attitudes of the arguer. After all, Mr Honeyford was able to speak his mind, so that the freedom of speech was not in danger. To equate
criticism or even attacks against him with a threat to the freedom of speech and to democracy is, therefore, from another point of view, hardly a valid argument, but a hyperbole, a rhetorical figure we also find in the insensitive hyperbolic use of the term ‘holocaust’. To fully understand this argument, however, we need more than a reconstruction of Mr Fox’s attitudes. We need to know, for instance, that anti-racist critique in the UK is more generally discredited by right-wing politicians and media as a limitation of free speech, because it does not allow people to ‘tell the truth’ about ethnic relations in general, or about multicultural education in particular. Hence the reference to the ‘polluted area of race relations’.

The second sequence of arguments focuses on Honeyford’s ‘detractors’, by whom Honeyford has been allegedly ‘vilified as a racist’. By categorizing such opponents as ‘Marxists and Trots’, and by claiming they have been engaged in lies and innuendo and even ‘harassed him out of his job’, Mr Fox details how, in his opinion, free speech is constrained, while at the same time discrediting Honeyford’s opponents as communists, and as ‘totalitarian forces’, that is, in his view, as the enemies of freedom and democracy. A third component in this argumentative schema is the claim that Honeyford is helpless and is not allowed to defend himself. He even ranges the media among the opponents of Honeyford, although most of the vastly dominant Conservative press supported him.

In sum, the argument schema features the following steps (propositions or macropropositions), of which the implicit arguments are marked with square brackets:

**Arguments:**
1. Honeyford wrote an original and deserved critique of multicultural education.
2. His opponents attacked and harassed him massively.
   2.1. [Massive attack and harassment of critics is an attack against free speech]
2.2. His opponents are totalitarian communists.
   2.1.1. [Totalitarian communists are against freedom and democracy]

**Conclusion:**
3. By attacking Honeyford, his opponents limit the freedom of speech and attack democracy itself.

Interestingly, the argument, if valid, would also apply to Mr Fox’s argument itself, because by thus attacking from his powerful position as an MP, and given the massive attacks against Honeyford’s opponents in the right-wing press, we might conclude, probably with much more reason, that the freedom to criticize racist publications is delegitimated, if not constrained. That is, Honeyford’s opponents hardly have access to the mass media as Honeyford and his supporters had. Indeed, their arguments, if heard at all, are usually ignored or negatively presented in much of the press. On the other hand, Honeyford got the unusual privilege to explain his opinions in several long articles he was invited to write for the *Daily Mail*.

The validity of Mr Fox’s argument itself, however, hinges upon his
definition of the situation, which is not only biased, but also unfounded: Honeyford’s critics are not Marxists and Trotskyites (at least, not all or even most of them), they did not prevent him from writing what he wanted to write, and, apart from protests, demonstrations and picketing of his school, they did not harass him. Moreover, the majority of the press did not attack him, but supported him. What happened, however, was that he was suspended because he had publicly derogated his Asian students and their parents, and thus, for the education authority, he had failed as a headmaster.

From our CDA perspective, the point of this brief analysis of the argumentative schema of (part of) Mr Fox’s speech is that a powerful and influential speaker, namely an MP, whose arguments may be quoted in the media, may misrepresent the facts, discredit anti-racists as being undemocratic and against free speech, while at the same time supporting and legitimating racist publications. Unless his audience knows the facts, and unless it knows the opponents of Mr Honeyford and their arguments, it may thus be manipulated into believing that Mr Fox’s argument is valid, and thereby associate those who oppose racism with ‘totalitarian’ methods. This indeed is very common in the press, not only on the Right, and Mr Fox reinforces such a negative evaluation of the struggle against racism. Ultimately, therefore, Mr Fox legitimates racism and enacts the dominance of the white group, not only by marginalizing anti-racism, but also by discrediting multicultural policies in education. His political power as an MP is thus paired with his symbolic, discursive power consisting in controlling the minds of his (secondary) audience, namely the media, other elites and finally the public at large.

Local meaning and coherence. Few levels of analysis are as revealing and relevant for a critical analysis as the semantic study of local ‘meanings’, including the propositional structures of clauses and sentences, relations between propositions, implications, presuppositions, vagueness, indirectness, levels of description, and so on. We have seen that, in general, dominance is semantically signalled by positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation or derogation. We may expect, therefore, that the various semantic modes of meaning also reflect such an overall strategy, e.g. by concealing negative properties of the own group (racism), and emphasizing or inventing those of the Others (the ‘intolerance’ of anti-racism).

(a) Level of specificity and degree of completeness. In a semantic analysis, discourses may be studied as describing events at several levels of specificity (in general abstract terms or in lower level details), and—at each such level—more or less completely. Irrelevant or dispreferred information is usually described at higher levels and less completely, and preferred information in over-complete, detailed ways. One of the most conspicuous forms of over-completeness in discourse is the irrelevant negative categorization of participants in order to deligitimize or marginalize their opinions or actions. This also happens in Mr Fox’s speech, where (at least
from the point of view of the Asian parents) he irrelevantly categorizes Honeyford's critics as Marxists or Trotskyites. For him and much of his anti-communist audience this implies an association of the political-ideological enemy (the communists) with his moral/social enemy (the anti-racists). At the same time, Mr Fox's argument, as we have seen, is also seriously incomplete, because (in this fragment) it says nothing about the nature of what Mr Honeyford has written. It does, however, detail the many alleged negative actions of his opponents. He does not summarize their actions by saying that Honeyford was 'criticized' or even 'attacked', but mentions lies, vilification, harassment, etc. In this case, thus, incompleteness is a semantic property of argumentation, but also a more general move of concealment and positive self-presentation: Honeyford's racist articles are not discussed in detail, but only positively described, at a higher level of specificity, as 'a breath of fresh air'.

(b) Perspective. Little analysis is necessary to identify the perspective and point of view displayed in Mr Fox's speech: he defends Honeyford openly, supports his view explicitly, and severely attacks and marginalizes Honeyford's opponents. However, Mr Fox also speaks as an MP—he refers to 'this House'—and as a defender of democracy. Using the politically crucial pronoun 'our' in 'our democracy', he also speaks from the perspective of a staunch defender of democracy. This identification is of course crucial for a right-wing MP and for someone who openly supports someone who has written racist articles. Finally, he claims to be the voice of the 'silent majority of decent people', a well-known populist ploy in Conservative rhetoric. This also means that the parents of the Asian children in Bradford do not belong to this majority of 'decent people'. On the contrary, they have been categorized as, or with, the enemy on the Left.

(c) Implicitness: implications, presuppositions, vagueness. Spelling out the full presuppositions and other implications of Mr Fox's speech would amount to specifying the complex set of beliefs about the Honeyford case (the Honeyford-model of Mr Fox, and those of his audience and critics), as well as the general opinions on which his evaluations and arguments are based, as we have seen above. Hence, we only mention a few examples. If the matter has become a national issue 'not from Mr Honeyford's choice' this strongly implies that others, namely his opponents, have made a national issue of it, whereas it also (weakly) implies that Mr Honeyford's publication in a widely read national newspaper (Times Literary Supplement) and later in the Daily Mail did nothing to contribute to the national issue. The use of 'small-circulation' as a modifier of 'publication' implies that, given the small audience of the publication (he probably refers to the extremist right-wing Salisbury Review), the publication is 'insignificant' and hence 'not worth all the fuss' and certainly not worth the ensuing 'holocaust'. The major presupposition of this speech, however, is embodied in Mr Fox's rhetorical question: 'Who are the people who have persecuted him?', presupposing that there actually were people who 'persecuted' him. Finally, important for the political power-play in parliament are the implications of his categorization of Honeyford's opponents as
being ‘all on the Left of British politics’, which immediately addresses Mr Fox’s opponents in the House of Commons: Labour. By vilifying Honeyford’s opponents, and anti-racists generally, as communists, as undemocratic and as enemies of free speech, he implies that such is also the case for Labour.

(d) Local coherence. There is one interesting coherence feature in Mr Fox’s speech, namely when he begins a new sentence with the definite noun phrase ‘The mob’. Since no mob has been mentioned before in his text, we must assume either that this phrase generically refers to an (unspecified) mob, or that the phrase corefers, as is clearly his intention, to the previously mentioned discourse referents (Honeyford’s detractors, etc.). Such coreference is permissible only if the qualification of previously identified participants is presupposed. In other words, Mr Fox, in line with right-wing news reports about Honeyford’s critics, implicitly qualifies Honeyford’s opponents as a ‘mob’, and presupposes this qualification in a following sentence. This is one of Mr Fox’s discursive means to derogate his opponents. In other words, coherence may presuppose ideologically based beliefs.

**Style: variations of syntax, lexicon and sound.**

(a) Lexical style. Mr Fox’s lexical style is characteristic not only of parliamentary speeches, featuring technical political terms such as ‘Adjournment debate’, or of ‘educated’ talk in general, as we see in ‘intellectual’ words such as ‘innuendo’, ‘detractors’, ‘totalitarian forces’ or ‘vilified’. He also uses the well-known aggressive populist register of the tabloids when he characterizes his and Honeyford’s opponents as ‘Trots’, ‘mob’, and especially as ‘race relations bullies’. That is, Mr Fox’s lexicalization multiply signals his power, his political and moral position, as well as his persuasive strategies in influencing his (secondary) audience, namely the British public.

(b) Syntactic style. The syntax of Mr Fox’s speech shows a few examples of semantically controlled topicalization and other forms of highlighting information. Thus, in the fourth sentence, the object of the predicate ‘to strike at’, namely ‘the freedom of speech’, is placed at the end of the sentence, after its qualifying clause (‘what we cherish in this House above all’), in order to emphasize it—a well-known strategy of syntactic and rhetorical ‘suspense’. Conversely, ‘without a thread of evidence’ is fronted somewhat later in his speech so as to specify from the outset of the sentence that Honeyford’s vilification was without grounds. Note also the agentless passives: By whom, indeed, was Honeyford continuously criticized in the media? Surely not by Marxists and Trotskyites, who have no access to mainstream publications in Britain.

(c) Anaphora and deictics. In our discussion of the perspective and point of view in Mr Fox’s speech we have already suggested his multiple political and social ‘positions’ and with whom Mr Fox identifies. Position and identification also determine the use of pronouns and deictic expressions (like ‘this’ in ‘this Adjournment debate’, which signals Mr Fox’s participation in
the debate). Most significant in this fragment, however, is the use of ‘our’ in ‘our democracy’, a well-known political possessive pronoun in much Conservative rhetoric. Obviously, Mr Fox signals himself as participating in ‘our democracy’, which may refer to British democracy, or western democracy, or the kind of democracy as it is interpreted by Mr Fox. The rest of his argument, however, clearly shows that the Left, and especially Marxists, Trotskyites, and the supporters of Mr Honeyford, are excluded from this definition of democracy, because they allegedly violate the freedom of speech.

**Rhetoric.** Within the ecological domain, Mr Fox finds both a contrastive comparison and two metaphors to identify Honeyford’s original ideas (‘breath of fresh air’) and the ‘polluted’ atmosphere of race relations. Again, after associating Honeyford’s opponents with Nazis, he now associates them with polluters, a new officially certified enemy. Interestingly, as we have seen earlier, we may interpret such qualifications also as reversals, since it is precisely the extreme Right that is politically more inclined to condone fascism and industrial pollution, and not the radical Left Mr Fox is speaking about. That is, in attacking the Left, right-wing speakers often make use of classical accusations of the Left itself, simply by ‘inverting’ them, and as if to deny their own lack of a democratic zeal, for instance in supporting someone who writes racist articles.

Also the rest of the speech makes full use of the usual tricks from the rhetorical bag: rhetorical questions (‘Who are Mr Honeyford’s detractors?’ etc.), parallelisms (the repeated questions), alliterations (‘full force’), and especially contrasts between us and them, as in ‘race relations bullies’ and ‘the majority of decent people’, in general, and between the lone hero (‘One man . . .’) and his opponents (Marxists, Trots, totalitarian forces, mob, vilification, lies, etc.), in particular. These rhetorical features emphasize what has been expressed and formulated already at the semantic, syntactic and lexical (stylistic) levels of his speech, namely the positive presentation of Honeyford (us, Conservatives, etc.), on the one hand, and the negative presentation of the Others (the Left, anti-racists, Asian parents), on the other.

**Final remark.** Hence, the dominance expressed, signalled and legitimated in this speech does not merely reside in the political realm of the House of Commons, for instance in Mr Fox’s role of MP, and as representative of a government party that is entitled to hold a debate about the Honeyford affair in parliament. Similarly, by attacking the Left he not only attacks Labour, as may be expected from a Tory speaker. Rather, the dominance involved here extends beyond parliament, namely to the media and especially to the public at large when Mr Fox uses his political influence to publicly support a teacher of students whose parents think he writes racist things, and especially in order to discredit and marginalize both these parents and their supporters. Indeed, the rest of this speech, not analysed here, sketches in more detail what he sees as a wonderful teacher, while at
the same time denying, as is common in much elite discourse, the racist nature of Honeyford's writings. That is, Mr Fox's power, authority and dominance is not merely that of being an influential MP. Rather, his authority, namely in establishing what racism is, is that of a member of the white elite. It is in this way, therefore, that such a speech indirectly supports the system of ethnic-racial dominance, that is, racism.

8. CONCLUSIONS

There are many ways to do 'critical' discourse analysis. Paradigms, philosophies, theories and methods may differ in these many approaches, and these may sometimes also be related to 'national' differences, e.g. between 'French', 'German', 'British' or 'American' directions of research. Unfortunately, this is also one of the reasons why there has been much mutual neglect and ignorance among these different approaches. International, theoretical and methodological integration would obviously benefit the realization of a common aim, namely to analyse, understand and combat inequality and injustice.

Against this background, this paper discusses some of the more general properties of what we see as a viable critical discourse analysis. In order to avoid paradigm controversies as well as superficial eclecticism, we therefore first of all argued for a multidisciplinary and issue-oriented approach: theories, methods or disciplines are more relevant if they are (also) able to contribute to the main aim of the critical approach, namely the understanding of social inequality and injustice. This means, among other things, that we presuppose a serious analysis of the very conditions and modalities of inequality, e.g. in terms of social power, dominance and their reproduction. In a critical study, such an analysis is not limited to a sociological or political-scientific account of dominance or patterns of access to social resources. Rather, positions and perspectives need to be chosen, for instance, against the power elites and in solidarity with dominated groups, as we have tried to illustrate in our analysis of the speech of Mr Fox in the British parliament. Such choices influence virtually all levels of theory and method.

Critical discourse analysis can only make a significant and specific contribution to critical social or political analyses if it is able to provide an account of the role of language, language use, discourse or communicative events in the (re)production of dominance and inequality. We have tried to show that there are two major dimensions along which discourse is involved in dominance, namely through the enactment of dominance in text and talk in specific contexts, and more indirectly through the influence of discourse on the minds of others. In the first case, dominant speakers may effectively limit the 'communicative rights' of others, e.g. by restricting (free access to) communicative events, speech acts, discourse genres, participants, topics or style. In the second case, dominant speakers control the access to public discourse and hence are able to indirectly manage the
public mind. They may do so by making use of those structures and strategies that manipulate the mental models of the audience in such a way that ‘preferred’ social cognitions tend to be developed, that is, social cognitions (attitudes, ideologies, norms and values) that are ultimately in the interest of the dominant group.

Both cases show the relevance of a socio-cognitive interface between discourse and dominance: it is theoretically essential to understand that there is no other way to relate macro-level notions such as group dominance and inequality with micro-level notions as text, talk, meaning and understanding. Indeed, the crucial notion of reproduction, needed to explain how discourse plays a role in the reproduction of dominance, presupposes an account that relates discourse structures to social cognitions, and social cognitions to social structures.

We illustrated our argument with a brief analysis of the ways in which racism is being reproduced in western societies through parliamentary discourse. Although seldom blatantly racist, such more or less ‘moderate’ discourse may nevertheless enact white group power, e.g. through the authority of MPs, while at the same time manipulating the public mind in such a way that ethnocentric or racist policies can be legitimated. Such a critical analysis is primarily geared towards the demystification of the self-proclaimed ethnic and racial tolerance of the elites, and the challenging of their widespread denial of racism.

To conclude, a few words of caution and hesitation are in order. We have stressed that, facing the real issues and problems of today’s world, discourse analysis, whether critical or not, may not make much difference, unless we are able to contribute to stimulating a critical perspective among our students or colleagues. To do that, we should persuade them not merely by our views or arguments, but also with our expertise. Although many studies in critical discourse analysis have shown that our results so far are encouraging, our expertise is still very limited.

Finally, this paper has sketched a rather simplified picture of power, dominance and their relations to discourse. Although we stressed that actual power relations are often subtle and indirect, and not simply top-down, the thrust of our argument has been to focus on the elites and their discourses. This choice is not motivated by the wish to picture these elites as the villains in a simplistic story of social inequality, but rather to focus on the unique access of these elites to public discourse, and hence on their role in the discursive management of the public mind. That is, they are the most obvious target of the critical approach in discourse analysis.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am indebted to Norman Fairclough, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak for critical comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to the participants of the workshop on Critical Discourse Analysis, held in Amsterdam (24-5 January 1992), for their discussion of some of the points raised in this article. That not all agreed on all of my points shows that also among critical scholars there is no consensus on the politics, theories or methods of critical inquiry.

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