In the late twentieth century, massive developments in telecommunications and the ascendance of information industries led analysts and politicians to proclaim the end of cities. Cities, they told us, would become obsolete as economic entities. The growth of information industries allows firms and workers to remain connected no matter where they are located. The digitizing of both services and trade shifts many economic transactions to electronic networks, where they can move instantaneously around the globe or within a country. Indeed, from the 1970s onward, there have been large-scale relocations of offices and factories to less congested and lower-cost areas than central cities, as well as the growth of computerized clerical work that could be located anywhere—in a clerical “factory” in the Bahamas or China or a home in a nearby suburb. Although these trends may be sharpest in the United States, they are evident in a growing number of countries around the world. Finally, the emergent globalization of economic activity seems to suggest that place—particularly the type of place represented by cities—no longer matters.

But, as I argue in this book, the spatial dispersion of the economy is only half of the story of today’s global and digital age. Alongside the well-documented spatial dispersal of economic activities and the increased digitizing of the sphere of consumption and entertainment are the growing spatial concentration of a wide range of highly specialized professional
activities, top-level management, and control operations, as well as, perhaps most unexpectedly, a multiplication of low-wage jobs and low-profit economic sectors. More analytically, these trends point to the development of novel forms of territorial centralization amid rapidly expanding economic and social networks with global span.

Given the generalized trends toward dispersal—whether at the metropolitan or global level—and given the widespread conviction that this is the future, what needs explaining is that at the same time, centralized territorial nodes are growing. In this book, I examine why and how firms and markets that operate in multisited national and global settings require central places where the top-level work of running global systems gets done. I also show why information technologies and industries designed to span the globe require a vast physical infrastructure containing strategic nodes with hyperconcentrations of material facilities. Finally, I show how even the most advanced information industries, such as global finance and the specialized corporate legal and accounting services, have a production process that is partly place-bound: Not all of the activities of these industries circulate in electronic networks.

Once these place-centered processes are brought into the analysis of the new global and electronic economy, surprising observations emerge. These centralized territorial nodes of the digitized global economy turn out to be not only the world of top-level transnational managers and professionals but also that of their secretaries and that of the janitors cleaning the buildings where the new professional class works. Further, it is also the world of a whole new workforce, increasingly made up of immigrant and minoritized citizens, who take on the functions once performed by the mother/wife in the older middle classes: the nannies, domestic cleaners, and dog walkers who service the households of the new professional class also hold jobs in the new globalized sectors of the economy. So do truck drivers and industrial service workers. Thus emerges an economic configuration very different from that suggested by the concept of information economy. We recover the material conditions, production sites, and place-boundedness that are also part of globalization and the information economy. To understand the new globalized economic sectors, we actually need detailed examinations of a broad range of activities, firms, markets, and physical infrastructures that go beyond the images of global electronic networks and the new globally circulating professional classes.

These types of detailed examinations allow us to see the actual role played by cities in a global economy. They help us understand why, when the new information technologies and telecommunications infrastructures were introduced on a large scale in all advanced industries beginning in the
1980s, we saw sharp growth in the central business districts of the leading cities and international business centers of the world—New York, Los Angeles, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, São Paulo, Hong Kong, and Sydney, among others. For some cities, this era took off in the 1980s, and for others, in the 1990s and into the new century. But all experienced some of their highest growth in decades in the form of a vast expansion of the actual area covered by state-of-the-art office districts, high-end shopping, hotel, and entertainment districts, and high-income residential neighborhoods. The numbers of firms opening up in these downtown areas grew sharply.

These trends in major cities in the 1980s, 1990s, and onward go against what was expected according to models emphasizing territorial dispersal; this is especially true considering the high cost of locating a business enterprise in a major downtown area. Complicating the understanding of the new global economy and also often receiving most of the attention from the media and commentators was the fact that the departure of large commercial banks, insurance firms, and corporate headquarters was far more visible than the growth of smaller, highly specialized, and high-profit firms that was happening at the same time. This suggests that the growth trends were part of a new type of economic configuration. Thus, explaining the place of cities simply in terms of the departure of large corporate firms and the growing dispersal trends was evidently missing a key new component of the story.

But this still leaves us with the question, if information technologies have not made cities obsolete, have they at least altered the economic function of cities—have cities lost some of their old functions and gained new ones we could not quite understand when this new phase was taking off? And if this is so, what does it tell us about the importance of place and its far greater mix of diverse economic sectors and social groups than is suggested by the prevalent imagery of high-level corporate economic globalization and information flows? Is there a new and strategic role for major cities, a role linked to the formation of a truly global economic system, a role not sufficiently recognized by analysts and policymakers? And could it be that the reason this new and strategic role has not been sufficiently recognized is that economic globalization—what it actually takes to implement global markets and processes—is not only about massive dispersal of operations around the world but also about thick places?

The notion of a global economy has become deeply entrenched in political and media circles all around the world. Yet its dominant images—the instantaneous transmission of money around the globe, the information economy, the neutralization of distance through telematics—are partial,
and hence profoundly inadequate, representations of what globalization and the rise of information economies actually entail for the concrete life of cities. Missing from this abstract model are the actual material processes, activities, and infrastructures crucial to the implementation of globalization. Overlooking the spatial dimension of economic globalization and overemphasizing the virtual information dimensions have served to distort the role played by major cities in the current phase of economic globalization.

A focus on cities almost inevitably brings with it recognition of the existence of multiple social groups, neighborhoods, contestations, claims, and inequalities. Yet this raises its own questions. Where does the global function of major cities begin, and where does it end? How do we establish what segments of the thick and complex environment of cities are part of the global? These issues are difficult to measure and determine with precision. But that does not mean that we can overlook them and simply focus on the economic core of advanced firms and the households of top-level professionals. We need to enter the diverse worlds of work and social contexts present in urban space, and we need to understand whether and how they are connected to the global functions that are partly structured in these cities. This requires using analytic tools and concepts that come from the scholarship on class and inequality, immigration, gendering, the politics of culture, and so on. These are scholarships not easily associated with the prevalent imagery about the information economy. At the same time, these kinds of inquiries also help us specify the question of globalization in more than its economic forms and contents. They help us specify the fact of multiple globalizations—economic, political, and cultural. Cities are good laboratories for these types of inquiries because they bring together vast mixes of people, institutions, and processes in ways that allow us to study them in great detail. Few, if any other places, contain such a mix of people and conditions and make their detailed study as possible as cities do.

One way of addressing the question of where the global begins and ends in this dense urban environment is to focus in detail on the multiple shapes and contents of globalization rather than assuming it consists of global firms and global professionals.

Beginning in the late 1970s and taking off in the mid-1980s, there have been pronounced changes in the geography, composition, and institutional framework of the world economy. Although cross-border flows of capital, trade, information, and people have existed for centuries, the world economy has been repeatedly reconstituted over time. A key starting point for this book is the fact that in each historical period, the world economy has consisted of a distinct configuration of geographic areas, industries, and
in institutional arrangements. One of the most important changes in the current phase has been the increase in the mobility of capital at both the national and especially the transnational levels. This transnational mobility of capital has brought about specific forms of articulation among different geographic areas and transformations in the role played by these areas in the world economy. This trend in turn has produced several types of locations for international transactions, the most familiar of which are export processing zones and offshore banking centers; these began to be developed in the late 1960s, precisely a time when national states exercised strong regulatory powers over their economies. One question for us is, then, the extent to which major cities are yet another type of location for international transactions in today’s world economy, although clearly one at a very high level of complexity compared with those zones and centers.

A key focus in studies of the global economy has been the increased mobility of capital, particularly in the shape of the changing geographic organization of manufacturing production and the rapidly expanding number of financial markets becoming part of global networks. These are critical dimensions, and they emphasize the dispersal of firms and markets worldwide. What such studies leave out is the fact that this dispersal itself generates a demand for specific types of production needed to ensure the management, control, and servicing of this new organization of manufacturing and finance. These new types of production range from the development of telecommunications to specialized services—legal, accounting, insurance—that are key inputs for any firm managing a global network of factories, offices, and service outlets, and for any financial market operating globally. The mobility of capital also generates the production of a broad array of innovations in these sectors. These types of service production have their own locational patterns; they tend toward high levels of agglomeration in cities with the needed resources and talent pools. Thus, the fact itself that a manufacturing multinational firm produces its goods partly in export processing zones in ten, twenty, or even thirty countries creates a demand for new types of accounting, legal, and insurance services. It is these increasingly specialized and complex services that can benefit from the many state-of-the-art firms and experienced professionals concentrated in cities.

We will want to ask whether a focus on the production of these service inputs illuminates the question of place in processes of economic globalization, particularly the kind of place represented by cities. In fact, specialized services for firms and financial transactions, as well as the complex markets connected to these economic sectors, are a layer of activity that has been central to the organization of major global processes beginning in the 1980s. To what extent is it useful to add the broader category of cities as
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key production sites for such services for firms to the list of recognized
global spaces, that is, headquarters of transnational corporations, export
processing zones, and offshore banking centers? These are all more nar-
rowly defined locations compared with cities. But I show in this book that
to further our understanding of major aspects of the world economy’s
organization and management, we cannot confine our analysis to these
narrow and self-evident “global” locations. We need to enter and explore
the more complex space where multiple economies and work cultures
come together to produce the complex organizational and management
infrastructure necessary to handle the running of global operations. Further,
we need to understand the new types of tensions, segmentations, and inequal-
ities that are generated in this process and become visible in the space of
the city.

However, this way of thinking about cities as a site for empirical research
about economic, political, and cultural globalization has tended to fall
between the cracks of existing scholarship. On the one hand, much of the
research on cities focuses on internal social, economic, and political condi-
tions, and it views cities as parts of national urban systems. International
matters have typically been considered the preserve of nation-states, not of
cities. On the other hand, the literature on international economic activi-
ties has traditionally focused on the activities of multinational corpora-
tions and banks and has seen the key to globalization in the power of
multinational firms and the new telecommunications capabilities. This leaves
no room for a possible role for cities. Finally, the scholarship on interna-
tional relations has confined itself to a focus on states as the key actors in
the global realm.

All of these approaches contain much useful and important empirical
and analytical material. But they are not enough to allow us to understand
cities as strategic global sites. Twenty years of empirical and theoretical
struggles by a small but growing number of researchers from many parts
of the world have now produced a novel type of scholarship that gets pre-
cisely at this issue. Usually referred to as the world cities or global city
scholarship, it provides many of the materials examined and discussed in
this book.

Including cities in the analysis adds three important dimensions to the
study of globalization. First, it breaks down the nation-state into a variety
of components and thereby allows us to establish whether and how, some
of these components are articulated with global processes, and others
are not at all. Second, our focus is not only on the power of large corpora-
tions over governments and economies but also on the range of activities
and organizational arrangements necessary for the implementation and
maintenance of a global network of factories, service operations, and markets; these are all processes only partly encompassed by the activities of transnational corporations and banks. Third, it contributes to a focus on place and on the urban social and political order associated with these activities. Processes of economic globalization are thereby reconstituted as concrete production complexes situated in specific places containing a multiplicity of activities and interests, many unconnected to global processes. As with other production complexes—mines, factories, transport hubs—the narrowly economic aspects are only one, even if crucial, component. The organization of labor markets, their gendering, new inequalities, and local politics can variously be part of this new urban production complex. Including these dimensions allows us to specify the micro-geographies and politics unfolding within these sites places. Finally, focusing on cities allows us to specify a variety of transnational geographies that connect specific groups of cities—depending on economic activity, migration flows, and the like.

Bringing all of these elements together is a central thesis organizing this book: Since the 1980s, major transformations in the composition of the world economy, including the sharp growth of specialized services for firms and finance, have renewed the importance of major cities as sites for producing strategic global inputs. In the current phase of the world economy, it is precisely the combination of, on the one hand, the global dispersal of factories, offices, and service outlets, and on the other, global information integration—under conditions of continued concentration of economic ownership and control—that has contributed to a strategic role for certain major cities. These I call global cities (Sassen [1991] 2001), of which there are by now about seventy worldwide, covering a broad variety of specialized roles in today’s global economy. Some of these, such as London, Amsterdam, Mumbai, and Shanghai, have been centers for world trade and banking for centuries. Others have not, notably São Paulo, Singapore, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Today’s global cities are (1) command points in the organization of the world economy, (2) key locations and marketplaces for the leading industries of the current period—finance and specialized services for firms, and (3) major sites of production, including the production of innovations, for these industries as their products are not simply a function of talent but are made. Several cities also fulfill equivalent functions on the smaller geographic scales of both trans- and subnational regions. Furthermore, whether at the global or the regional level, these cities must inevitably engage each other in fulfilling their functions, as the new forms of growth in these cities partly result from the proliferation of interurban networks. There is no such entity as a single global city.
Once we focus on places, whether cities or other types of places, rather than whole national economies, we can easily take account of the fact that some places even in the richest countries are becoming poorer, or that a global city in a developing country can become richer even as the rest of the country becomes poorer. An analysis of places rather than national indicators produces a highly variable mosaic of results. Alongside these new global and regional hierarchies of cities lies a vast territory that has become increasingly peripheral and is excluded from the major processes that fuel economic growth in the new global economy. Many formerly important manufacturing centers and port cities have lost functions and are in decline, not only in the less developed countries but also in the most advanced economies. This is yet another meaning of economic globalization. We can think of these developments as constituting new geographies of centrality that cut across the old divide of poor versus rich countries, or, as in my preferred usage in this book, the global South versus global North divide. But there are also new geographies of marginality cutting across the poor–rich country divide, as growing numbers of people in global cities of both the north and the south are now poorer and work in casual rather than unionized jobs.

The most powerful of these new geographies of centrality binds together the major international financial and business centers: New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Chicago, Seoul, Hong Kong, Shanghai, São Paulo, Mumbai, Zurich, Amsterdam, Sydney, and Toronto, among others. But this geography now also includes cities such as Buenos Aires, Shenzen, Kuala Lumpur, Istanbul, and Budapest. The intensity of transactions among these cities, particularly through financial markets, flows of services, and investment, has increased sharply, and so have the orders of magnitude involved. At the same time, there has been a sharpening inequality in the concentration of strategic resources and activities between each of these cities and others in their respective countries. For example, Paris now concentrates a larger share of leading economic sectors and wealth in France than it did as recently as 1980, whereas Marseilles, once a major economic center, has lost some of its share in France’s economy. Frankfurt’s financial center has gained sharply over the other six financial centers in Germany; given the rather decentralized political organization of this country, we might have expected to see multiple equally strong financial centers. Some national capitals, for example, have lost central economic functions and power to the new global cities, which have taken over some of the coordination functions, markets, and production processes once concentrated in national capitals or in major regional centers. A case in point, São Paulo has gained immense strength as a business and financial center in Brazil over Rio de
Janeiro—once the capital and most important city in the country—and over the once powerful axis represented by Rio and Brasilia, the current capital. This is one of the consequences of the formation of a globally integrated economic system.

These economic dynamics are partly constituted in social and cultural terms. For example, foreign or native migrant workforces supply the new types of professional households with nannies and cleaners; these same migrants also bring cultural practices that add to a city’s life, and they bring political experiences that can help with union organizing. Further, the new economic dynamics have often sharp and visible effects on urban space, notably the expansion of luxury housing and office districts at the cost of displacing lower-income households and low-profit firms. The city brings together and makes legible the enormous variety of globalities that are emerging and the many different forms—social, cultural, spatial—they assume.

More generally, what is the impact of this type of economic growth on the broader social and economic order of these cities? Much earlier research on the impact of dynamic, high-growth manufacturing sectors in developed and developing countries shows that these sectors raised wages, reduced economic inequality, and contributed to the formation and expansion of a middle class. There is less research on the distributive outcomes of the new economic sectors that dominate global cities, partly because these are still relatively new processes. But the available evidence does show much more inequality than that associated with dynamic manufacturing-based economies. Indeed, much of the new prosperity in China originated from the rapid growth of manufacturing.

These somewhat hidden features of the globalized core in complex cities become legible when we emphasize the material conditions for and the work of producing the specialized services that are a key component of all such cities. It means, as indicated earlier, bringing into the analysis nonprofessional workers and work cultures: for example, bringing in the truckers that deliver the software, not only the high-level professionals that use it. Such an emphasis is not typical in research on these specialized services; they are usually seen as a type of output: high-level technical expertise. Thus, insufficient attention has gone to the actual array of jobs, from high paying to low paying, involved in the production of even the most sophisticated and complex services. A focus on production displaces the emphasis from expertise to work. Services need to be produced, and the buildings that hold the workers need to be built and cleaned. The rapid growth of the financial industry and of highly specialized services generates not only high-level technical and administrative jobs but also low-wage unskilled jobs.
This is one type of inequality we are seeing within cities, especially within global cities. Since this same inequality is also evident in global cities of developing and even poor countries, it contributes to the formation of new geographies of centrality and marginality that cut across the North–South divide and exclude the increasing numbers of poor in both the North and the South.

This new urban economy is in many ways highly problematic, particularly in global cities, where it assumes its sharpest forms given the large concentrations of high-profit firms and high-income households. The new growth sectors of specialized services and finance contain capabilities for profit making vastly superior to those of more traditional economic sectors. Many of these more traditional sectors remain essential for the operation of the urban economy, including the new globalized core, and for the daily needs of residents, but their survival is threatened in a situation in which finance and specialized services can earn super-profits. This sharp polarization in the profit-making capabilities of different sectors of the economy has always existed. But today it is much sharper, and it is engendering massive distortions in the operations of various markets, from housing to labor. We can see this effect, for example, in the unusually sharp increase in the earnings of high-level professionals in the corporate sector and in the falling or stagnating wages of low-skilled manual and clerical workers. We saw the same effect in the retreat of many real estate developers from the low- and medium-income housing market in the 1980s and 1990s as the rapidly expanding demand for housing by the new highly paid professionals rose and delivered higher profits through overpricing. These trends are all evident in cities as diverse as New York and Dublin, Oslo and São Paulo, Shanghai and Istanbul.

The rapid development of an international property market has made this disparity even worse. It means that real estate prices at the center of New York City are more connected to prices in central London or Frankfurt than to the overall real estate market in New York’s metropolitan area. In the 1980s, powerful institutional investors from Japan, for example, found it profitable to buy and sell property in Manhattan or central London. In the 1990s, this practice multiplied, involving a rapidly growing number of cities around the world. German, Dutch, French, and US firms invested heavily in properties in central London and in other major cities. Increasingly, the city itself became the object of investment. And even after the attacks of September 2001 and the financial crisis of 2008, New York City real estate has been bought by a growing number of foreign investors, partly due to the weak dollar, which made these acquisitions profitable. These practices generally forced prices up because of the competition
among very powerful and rich investors and buyers. Because much of the purpose was to sell at a profit rather than actually to use the property, it further raised prices. How can a low- or medium-profit local commercial operation compete with such powerful investors for space and other resources, no matter how long and successful its record in the older economy?

The high profit-making capability of the new growth sectors, of which finance is emblematic, rests partly on speculative activity. The extent of this dependence on speculation can be seen in the regular crises in many developed countries. Notable is the crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s that followed the unusually high profits in finance and real estate in the 1980s. That real estate and financial crisis, however, left the basic dynamic of the sector untouched, and we saw prices and stock market values reach new highs by the mid-1990s—only to have yet another crisis in 1997–98, though by then most of the highly developed countries had learned how to protect themselves, and the costs of the crisis were largely borne by countries that had been considered emerging markets for financial investments. As had happened before, this crisis was followed by enormous increases in profits, only to be followed by yet another series of crises in the 2000s, culminating in the massive crisis of 2008. These crises do generate a temporary adjustment to more reasonable (i.e., less speculative) profit levels, but for only brief periods of time. The overall dynamic of polarization in profit levels in the urban economy remains in place across these various crises, as do the distortions in many markets, well illustrated by super-profits in finance and simultaneous massive unemployment in most global North economies.

The typical informed view about the global economy, cities, and the new growth sectors does not incorporate the multiple dimensions examined in this book. Elsewhere, I have argued that the dominant narrative or mainstream account about economic globalization is a narrative of eviction (Sassen 1996). In the dominant account, the key concepts—globalization, information economy, and high-level professional outputs—all suggest that place no longer matters and that the only type of worker that matters is the highly educated one. That account favors (1) the capability for global transmission over the concentrations of material infrastructure necessary to make that transmission possible; (2) information outputs over the workers producing those outputs, whether they be specialists or secretaries; and (3) the new transnational corporate culture over the multiplicity of cultural environments, including reterritorialized immigrant cultures within which many of the other jobs of the global information economy take place. In brief, the dominant narrative concerns itself with the upper circuits of
capital, not the lower ones, and with the fact of hyper upward mobility while ignoring downward mobility and deepening inequalities.

This narrow focus in the mainstream account has the effect of excluding the place-boundedness of significant components of the global information economy; it thereby also excludes a whole array of activities and types of workers from the story of globalization that in their own way are as vital to that story as are international finance and global telecommunications. Failing to include those activities and workers ignores the variety of cultural contexts within which the advanced sectors function. That diversity is as present in processes of globalization as is the new global corporate culture. When we focus on place and production, we can see that globalization is a process involving the corporate side and the immigrant economies and work cultures, the new importance of craftworkers, the cultural sector, and global tourism evident in global cities. And all these sectors include lowly paid workers and low-profit-making firms.

These new empirical trends and theoretical developments are making the study of cities prominent once again for a growing number of social scientists and cultural theorists. Cities have re-emerged not only as objects of study but also as a lens for research and theorization on a broad array of major social, cultural, economic, technological, and political processes central to the current era: (1) economic globalization and international migration, (2) the emergence of specialized services and finance as the leading growth sector in advanced economies, (3) new types of inequality, (4) the new politics of identity and culture, (5) new types of politically and ideologically radicalizing dynamics, (6) the urbanizing of a broad range of high-technology systems, and (7) the politics of space, notably the growing movement for claiming rights to the city.

Many of these processes are not urban per se, but they have an urban moment; in many cases, the urban moment has become increasingly important and/or capable of illuminating key features of the larger process involved. In this context, it is worth noting that we are also seeing the beginning of a repositioning of cities in policy arenas. Two instances of this recent trend stand out in particular. One is the programmatic effort to develop analyses that can show how important urban economic productivity is to macroeconomic performance; in the past, economic growth was measured simply in terms of overall national and regional indicators. The other is the explicit effort by the leadership of a growing number of cities to bypass national states and gain direct access to global investment and tourism markets as well as to recruit firms, cultural projects (such as international festivals and science exhibitions), sports events, and conventions. The mayors of a growing number of cities worldwide have set up offices for
foreign economic affairs in multiple countries and appear increasingly interested in dealing directly with the mayors, firms, and cultural institutions of other countries.

The subject of the city in a world economy is extremely broad. The body of literature on cities is enormous, but it focuses mostly on single cities and on domestic issues; further, international studies of cities have leaned toward the comparative. Lacking until recently was a transnational perspective on the subject: that is to say, one that takes as its starting point a dynamic system or set of transactions that by their nature entail multiple locations involving more than one country. This contrasts with a comparative international approach, which focuses on two or more cities that may have no connections to each other.

This book focuses particularly on recent empirical and conceptual developments because they are an expression of major changes in urban and national economies and in modes of inquiry about cities. Such a choice is inevitably limited and certainly cannot account for the many cities in the world that may not have experienced any of these developments. This book’s focus on the urban impact of economic, political, and cultural globalization; the new inequalities among and within cities; and the new urban socio-spatial order is justified by the major characteristics of the current historical period and the need for social scientists to address these changes.

Chapter 2 examines the key characteristics of the global economy that matter for an understanding of globalization and cities. In many cities, these global presences are weak or nonexistent. But they are becoming increasingly strong in a growing number of cities. Understood as tendencies, they reveal new formations and indicate future trends. Chapter 3 analyzes the new interurban inequalities, focusing on three key issues: (1) the diversity of urbanization patterns across continents, (2) the impact of globalization, particularly the internationalization of production and the growth of tourism, on so-called primate urban systems in less developed countries, (3) the impact of economic globalization on so-called balanced urban systems, and (4) the possible formation of transnational urban systems, including the emergence of hundreds of cities across the world with significant immigrant populations. Chapter 4 focuses on the new urban economy, where finance and specialized services have emerged as driving engines for profit-making. One important aspect examined in this chapter is the sharp increase in the linkages binding cities that function as production sites and marketplaces for global capital. Chapter 5 explores these issues in greater detail through case studies of the turning point that led some cities into global city status from the 1980s to the 1990s. It further examines a more recent set of turning points in the 2000s, illustrated through very diverse cases: Hong Kong
and Shanghai, the Gulf city-states, and the repositioning of a 3,000-year-old imperial capital, Istanbul, in the re-emerging global East–West axis. Chapter 6 focuses on new urban social forms resulting from growing inequalities and segmentations in labor markets and urban space. The effort here is to understand whether the changes documented in this book are merely a quantitative transformation or also a qualitative one. Is it simply a matter of more poor and more inequality, or are we seeing emerging types of poverty and inequality that constitute new social forms? Chapter 7 takes one particular case as a lens to get at a more detailed and focused account of the issues introduced in Chapter 6: women immigrants who increasingly constitute global care-chains as they become the nannies, nurses, maids, and sex workers in global cities. Chapter 8 considers the larger transnational social, cultural, and political dynamics that are becoming mobilized through the variety of processes examined in this book.

Note

1 The city of Detroit, Michigan, once a hub of automobile manufacturing and now in economic decline, is one prime example.