Introduction: Framing the Questions

In the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings in London during the summer of 2005, one question seems to have bothered many of the journalists who wrote about this – how is it possible that ‘British’ people were able to carry out such atrocities in Britain? The reasons why these particular people became suicide bombers are no doubt complex and could be found in the particular biographies of these people as well as in some more general micro and macro social and political factors. I shall try and relate to some of these in Chapter 4 which looks at issues concerning religion, fundamentalism and contemporary politics of belonging. However, the theoretical question which is at the heart of the project of this book as a whole concerns the assumptions which led these journalists – and so many others in the general public in Britain and outside it – to feel that carrying a British passport, or even being born and educated in Britain, should have automatically made them belong with other British citizens and ‘immune’ from taking part in such an attack. In other words, why would people’s nationality be more important to them than their religious and political beliefs, and why should they feel more loyal to the British nation than to other political and religious collectivities? Are nationalist politics of belonging still the hegemonic model of belonging at the beginning of the twenty-first century? And if so, what kind of nationalism is this? And if not, what other political projects of belonging are now competing with nationalism? Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the 7/7 bombers who made a videotape that was shown by Al Jazeera (September 1, 2005), does talk about 'my people' in his statement, but he meant Muslims ‘all over the world’ and definitely not the British people.

The questions of belonging and the politics of belonging constitute some of the most difficult issues that are confronting all of us these days and this book hopes to contribute to the understanding of some of them. In these post 9/11 (and 7/7) times, ‘strangers’ are seen not only as a threat to the cohesion of the political and cultural community, but
also as potential terrorists, especially the younger men among them. The question of who is ‘a stranger’ and who ‘does not belong’, however, is also continuously being modified and contested, with growing ethnic, cultural and religious tensions within as well as between societies and states. Politics of belonging have come to occupy the heart of the political agenda almost everywhere in the world, even when reified assumptions about ‘the clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993) are not necessarily applied. As Francis B. Nyamnjoh points out (2005: 18), ‘in Africa, as elsewhere, there is a growing obsession with belonging, along with new questions concerning conventional assumptions about nationality and citizenship’. And Hedetoff and Hjort (2002: x) point out in the introduction to their edited book that ‘today belonging constitutes a political and cultural field of global contestation, anywhere between ascriptions of belonging and self-constructed definitions of new spaces of culture, freedom and identity’.

The aim of this chapter is to frame, both theoretically and contextually, the questions which are going to be explored elsewhere in this book. I aim to outline some of the main debates that have emerged both in academia and in the political arena around various major political projects of belonging. Alongside the hegemonic forms of citizenship and nationalism which have tended to dominate the twentieth century, the book also investigates alternative contemporary political projects of belonging that are constructed around the notions of religion, cosmopolitanism and the feminist ‘ethics of care’. Constructions and contestations of multiculturalism, multi-faithism, indigenous and diasporic political projects of belonging constitute only some of these debates. The effects of globalization, mass migration, the rise of both fundamentalist and human rights movements on such politics of belonging, as well as some of its racialized and gendered dimensions will also be investigated. A special place will also be given to the various feminist political movements that have been engaged as part of or in resistance to the political projects of belonging discussed in the book.

The analytical perspective which is used is intersectional, deconstructing simplistic notions of national and ethnic collectivities and their boundaries and interrogating some of the differential effects that different political projects of belonging have on different members of these collectivities who are differentially located socially, economically and politically. It is for this reason that the first part of this introductory chapter examines the notion of intersectionality.
Once this theoretical framework has been clarified, the chapter introduces the notions of belonging and the politics of belonging, the subject matter of the book, and the notions of social locations, identifications and values which are central for their understanding. It also illustrates some of the different relationships between different constructions of belonging and different political projects of belonging, using examples from related discourses in the UK.

This introduction then moves on to outline some of the general features of the contemporary globalization context, within which the various intersectional political projects of belonging discussed in this book operate. It discusses globalization, how states have been reconfigured under neo-liberal globalization and the ways in which mass migration and the discourse of securitization can affect and are affected by these processes.

The following chapters, a brief description of which ends this chapter, then explore some of the major contemporary political projects of belonging constructed around citizenship, nationalism, religion, cosmopolitanism and the feminist project of ‘ethics of care’. Given the limitations of space in this book, these chapters will mainly focus on various theoretical and political issues relating to these projects and their differential intersectional effects can only be pointed to rather than explored in detail. The final concluding chapter briefly sums up the subjects discussed in the book and highlights their normative, as well as emotional and analytical facets. The book ends with a short meditation on the notion of hope and the role it plays in transversal feminist politics.

**Intersectionality**

Lesley McCall (2005: 1771) and others would argue that intersectionality is ‘the most important theoretical contribution that women’s studies, in conjunction with related fields, has made so far’. Indeed, the imprint of intersectional analysis can be easily traced to innovations in equality legislation, human rights and development discourses. Amazingly enough, however, in spite of the term’s ‘brilliant career’ (Lutz, 2002), intersectionality hardly appears in sociological stratification theories (a notable exception is Anthias, 2005; see also Yuval-Davis, 2011a). So what is intersectionality?

Epistemologically, intersectionality can be described as a development of feminist standpoint theory which claims, in somewhat different ways, that it is vital to account for the social positioning of the
social agent and challenge ‘the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere’ (Haraway, 1991: 189) as a cover for and a legitimization of a hegemonic masculinist ‘positivistic’ positioning. Situated gaze, situated knowledge and situated imagination (Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002), construct how we see the world in different ways. However, intersectionality theory was even more interested in how the differential situatedness of different social agents affects the ways they affect and are affected by different social, economic and political projects. In this way it can no doubt be considered as one of the outcomes of the mobilization and proliferation of different identity groups’ struggles for recognition (Taylor, 1992; Fraser, 1995).

The history of what is currently called ‘intersectional thinking’ is long, and many pinpoint the famous speech of the emancipated slave Sojourner Truth (Brah & Phoenix, 2004) during the first wave of feminism as one early illustration of it. Sojourner Truth was speaking at an abolitionist convention and argued that, given her position in society, although she worked hard and carried heavy loads, etc., this did not make her less of a woman and a mother than women of a privileged background who were constructed as weak and in need of constant help and protection as a result of what society considered to be ‘feminine’ ways.

Indeed, intersectional analysis, before becoming ‘mainstreamed’, was carried out for many years mainly by black and other racialized women who, from their situated gaze, perceived as absurd, and not just misleading, any attempt by feminists and others, since the start of the second wave of feminism, to homogenize women’s situation and especially to find it analogous to that of blacks. As bell hooks, who chose Truth’s *crie du coeur* ‘Ain’t I a Woman’ as the title of her first book (hooks, 1981), mockingly remarked in the introduction to that book: ‘This implies that all women are White and all Blacks are men’. As Brah and Phoenix (2004: 80) point out, other black feminists fulfilled significant roles in the development of intersectional analysis, such as the Combahee River Collective, the black lesbian feminist organization from Boston, who as early as 1977 pointed to the need to develop an integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression were interlocking. Angela Davis, who has come to symbolize for many the spirit of revolutionary black feminism, published her book *Women, Race and Class* in 1981. However, the term ‘intersectionality’ was itself introduced in 1989 by another American black feminist, the legal and critical race theorist
Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), when she discussed the issues surrounding black women’s employment in the USA and the intersection of gender, race and class matters in their exploitation and exclusion.

However, what can be called intersectional analysis was developed roughly at the same time by several European and post-colonial feminists (e.g. Bryan et al., 1985; James, 1986; Essed, 1991; Lutz, 1991) as well. As Sandra Harding claimed, when she examined the parallel development of feminist standpoint theory:

…[F]eminist standpoint theory was evidently an idea whose time had come, since most of these authors worked independently and were unaware of each other’s work. (Standpoint theory would itself call for such a social history of ideas, would it not?) (Harding, 1997: 389)

This was obviously the case also with the development of intersectionality theory.

My own work in the field of intersectionality (although back then we called it ‘social divisions’) started in the early 1980s when, in collaboration with Floya Anthias (e.g. Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1983, 1992), we started to study gender and ethnic divisions in South East London and at the same time became engaged in a debate with British black feminists, organized then as OWAAD, on the right way to theorize what would now be called an intersectional approach.

As argued in my (2006b) article, some of the basic debates we had with them then still continue to occupy those who are engaged in intersectional analysis today, after it became ‘mainstreamed’ and came to be accepted by the United Nations, the European Union and other equality and equity policy organizations in many countries. Part of the differences among those who use intersectionality have resulted from the different disciplines and purposes for which it is being used; others differences have not.

Rather than engage in describing some of the historical debates around intersectionality, whether in Britain or in the UN (as I did in my (2006b) article, but see also Brah & Phoenix, 2004; Nash, 2008), I am going to outline below the main characteristics of the constitutive intersectional approach which is applied throughout this book. While doing so, however, I would also recognize the sense of discomfort that many feminists (including myself) share regarding the term ‘intersectionality’ itself.

1Organization of Women of African and Asian Descent
Intersectionality is a metaphorical term, aimed at evoking images of a road intersection, with an indeterminate or contested number of intersecting roads, depending on the various users of the terms and how many social divisions are considered in the particular intersectional analysis. As will be developed a bit further below, this can change considerably from two to infinity. In a lecture in 2008, Kum-Kum Bhavnani used the term 'configurations' as an alternative metaphor, wanting to emphasize the flowing interweaving threads which constitute intersectionality, which she found a much too rigid and fixed metaphor. Davina Cooper (2004: 12) also explains that she used the term 'social dynamics' rather than intersectionality, because she wanted her terminology to trace the shifting ways relations of inequality become attached to various aspects of social life. While agreeing with all these reservations, which are important for the theorization of intersectionality in this book, I do retain the term as being so widespread it evokes an intuitive understanding of the subject matter discussed in spite of all the reservations.

Three main positions in relation to the intersectionality approach used in this book need to be clarified here. The first relates to the division McCall (2005) makes between those approaches to intersectionality which she calls 'inter-categorical' and 'intra-categorical'; the second relates to the relationships which should be understood as existing between the various intersectional categories; and the third relates to the boundaries of the intersectional approach and thus the number of as well as which social categories should be included in intersectional analysis inter- or intra-categories?

According to McCall, studies that have used an intersectional approach differ as to whether they have used an inter- or intra-categorical approach. By an inter-categorical approach she means focusing on the way the intersection of different social categories, such as race, gender, class, etc., affects particular social behaviours or the distribution of resources. Intra-categorical studies, on the other hand, are less occupied with the relationships among various social categories and instead problematize the meaning and boundaries of the categories themselves, such as whether black women were included in the category ‘women’ or what are the shifting boundaries of who is considered to be ‘black’ in a particular place and time.

Unlike McCall, I do not see these two approaches as mutually exclusive and instead would ask for an intersectionality approach which combines the sensitivity and dynamism of the intra-categorical approach with the more macro socio-economic perspective of the inter-categorical approach.
As will be elaborated below, I consider as crucial the analytical differentiation between different facets of social analysis – that of people’s positionings along socio-economic grids of power; that of people’s experiential and identificatory perspectives of where they belong; and that of their normative value systems. These different facets are related to each other but are also irreducible to each other (on the different ontological bases of the different social divisions please see my article – Yuval-Davis, 2006a). Moreover, although I consider intersectional analysis to be a development of feminist standpoint theory, I would also argue that there is no direct causal relationship between the situatedness of people’s gaze and their cognitive, emotional and moral perspectives on life. People born into the same families and/or the same time and social environment can have different identifications and political views. For this reason alone it is not enough to construct inter-categorical tabulations in order to predict and, even more so, to understand people’s positions and attitudes to life.

**The relationship between the social categories**

There is another reason for the inadequacy of using an inter-categorical approach on its own. Unless it is complemented with an intra-categorical approach, it can be understood as an additive rather than a mutually constitutive approach to the relationships between social categories.

Although discourses of race, gender, class, etc. have their own ontological bases which cannot be reduced down to each other, there is no separate concrete meaning of any facet of these social categories, as they are mutually constitutive in any concrete historical moment. To be a woman will be different whether you are middle class or working class, a member of the hegemonic majority or a racialized minority, living in the city or in the country, young or old, gay or straight, etc. Viewing intersectional analysis in this way links the interrogation of concrete meanings of categories and their boundaries to specific historical contexts which are shifting and contested, rather than just abstracting ontological and epistemological enquiries. However, simply assuming

---

\(^2\)In my previous work (e.g. Yuval-Davis, 2006a & 2006b) I related to these different analytical facets as different analytical levels. Cass Balchin drew my attention to the fact that the term ‘levels’ assumes a hierarchy. And indeed I do believe that the term is a remnant of the old Marxist infra-and super-structural levels. As I do not want to assume a presupposed hierarchy here I’m using the term ‘facets’. 
that any particular inter-categorical study would result in a full understanding of the specific constructions of any particular social category in any particular context, as McCall does, is also reductionist.

The boundaries of intersectional analysis and intersectional categories

Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989: 139) define intersectionality as ‘the multidimensionality of marginalized subjects’ lived experiences’. Other black feminists (e.g. Dill, 1983; Bryan et al., 1985) also remain within the triad boundaries of race, class and gender. Philomena Essed (1991) even limits this to the two dimensions of ‘gendered racisms’ and ‘racist genderisms’. Others have added the specific categories they were interested in, such as age (e.g. Bradley, 1996); disability (e.g. Oliver, 1995; Meekosha & Dowse, 1997); sedentarism (e.g. Lentin, 1999); or sexuality (e.g. Kitzinger, 1987). In other works, however, feminists attempted to develop complete lists and included in them much higher numbers – for example, Helma Lutz (2002) relates this to 14 categories while Charlotte Bunch (2001) has 16. Floya Anthias and I (1983, 1992; see also Yuval-Davis, 2006b; Yuval-Davis, 2011a) would strongly argue that intersectional analysis should not be limited only to those who are on the multiple margins of society, but rather that the boundaries of intersectional analysis should encompass all members of society and thus intersectionality should be seen as the right theoretical framework for analysing social stratification.

There is a parallel here with the struggle that many of us witnessed during the 1970s and 1980s to point out (what these days seems much more obvious), that everybody, not just racialized minorities, have ‘ethnicities’ and that members, especially men in hegemonic majorities, are not just ‘human beings’ but are also gendered, classed, ethnocized, etc.

In Gender Trouble (1990), Judith Butler mocks the ‘etc.’ which often appears at the end of long (and different) lists of the social divisions mentioned by feminists, and sees it as an embarrassed admission of a ‘sign of exhaustion as well as of the illimitable process of signification itself’ (1990: 143). As Fraser (1995) and Knapp (1999) make clear, however, such a critique is valid only within the discourse of identity politics where there is a correspondence between social positionings or locations and identifications with particular social groupings. When no such conflation takes place, Knapp rightly finds that Butler’s talk
‘of an illimitable process of signification’ can be reductionist if it is generalized in an unspecified way … [and] runs the risk of levelling historically constituted ‘factual’ differences and thereby suppressing ‘differences’ on its own terms. (Knapp, 1999: 130)

Knapp’s critique of Butler once again clarifies the crucial importance of the separation of the different analytical dimensions in which social divisions need to be examined as discussed above. Nevertheless, the question remains of whether there are, or are not, in any particular historical condition, specific and limited numbers of social divisions that will construct the grid of power relations within which the different members of the society are located.

As I mentioned elsewhere (Yuval-Davis, 2006b), I have two different answers to this question which are not mutually exclusive. The first one is that while in specific historical situations and in relation to the daily lives of specific people there are some social divisions which are more important than others in constructing their specific positionings relative to others around them, there are some social divisions, such as gender, stage in the life cycle, ethnicity and class which will tend to shape most people’s lives in most social locations, while other social divisions such as those relating to disability, membership in particular castes or status as indigenous or refugee people will tend to affect less people globally in this way. At the same time, for those people who are affected by these and other social divisions not mentioned here in particular historical contexts, such social divisions are crucial and thus rendering them visible needs to be fought for. This is a case where recognition – of the social power axes, not of social identities – is of vital political importance.

My second answer relates to what Castoriadis called the ‘creative imagination’ (1987; see also Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002) that underlies any linguistic and other social categories of signification. Although certain social conditions may facilitate this, the construction of categories of signification is, in the last instance, a product of human creative freedom and autonomy. Without specific social agents who will construct and point to certain analytical and political features, the rest of us would not be able to distinguish between them. Rainbows include the whole spectrum of different colours, but how many of these colours we distinguish will depend on our specific social and linguistic milieu. It is for this reason that struggles for recognition will always also include an element of construction and it is for this
reason that studying the relationships between positionings, identities and political values which, as can be seen below, I view as central to the study of belonging, is so important (and impossible if these are all reduced to the same ontological level). So what are belonging and the politics of belonging?

Belonging and the politics of belonging

It is important to differentiate between belonging and the politics of belonging. Belonging is about an emotional (or even ontological) attachment, about feeling ‘at home’. As Hage (1997: 103) points out, however, ‘home is an on-going project entailing a sense of hope for the future’ (see also Taylor, 2009). Part of this feeling of hope relates to home as a ‘safe’ space (Ignatieff, 2001). In the daily reality of the early twenty-first century, in so many places on the globe, this emphasis on safety acquires a new poignancy. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that feeling ‘at home’ does not necessarily only generate positive and warm feelings. It also allows the safety as well as the emotional engagement to be, at times, angry, resentful, ashamed, indignant (Hessel, 2010).

Belonging tends to be naturalized and to be part of everyday practices (Fenster, 2004a and b). It becomes articulated, formally structured and politicized only when it is threatened in some way. The politics of belonging comprise specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging to particular collectivity/ies which are themselves being constructed in these projects in very specific ways and in very specific boundaries (i.e. whether or not, according to specific political projects of belonging, Jews can be considered to be German, for example, or abortion advocates can be considered Catholic). As Antonsich (2010) points out, however, these boundaries are often spatial and relate to a specific locality/territoriality and not just to constructions of social collectivities. Of course, according to Doreen Massey (2005), space in itself is but an embodiment of social networks. However, as Carrillo Rowe (2005: 21) points out: ‘belongings are conditioned by our bodies and where they are placed on the globe’. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, diasporic and transnational belongings, especially those which use the virtual realities of the internet can, at least partially, transcend these limits.
of physical geography. Also bell hooks (1990) talks about ‘home-space’ as something which transcends the domestic. As Ulf Hannerz (2002) claims, home is essentially a contrastive concept, linked to some notion of what it means to be away from home. It can involve a sense of rootedness in a socio-geographic site or be constructed as an intensely imagined affiliation with a distant locale where self-realization can occur.

Belonging and the politics of belonging have been some of the major themes around which both classic psychology and sociology emerged. Countless psychological, and even more psychoanalytical, works have been dedicated to writings about the fears of separation of babies and children from the womb, from the mother, from the familiar, as well as the devastating – often pathological – effects on them when they cannot take belonging for granted (for more elaborate accounts of this, see, for example, Rank, 1973 [1929]; Bowlby, 1969, 1973). Similarly, much of social psychology literature has been dedicated to people’s need to conform to the groups they belong to for fear of exclusion and inferiorization and the ways people’s interpersonal relationships are deeply affected by their membership or lack of membership of particular groups – as well as their positions in these groups (e.g. Lewin, 1948; Billig, 1976; Tajfel, 1982).

In sociological theory as well, since its establishment, many writings have been focused on the differential ways people belong to collectivities and states – as well as the social, economic, and political effects of instances of displacement of such belonging/s as a result of industrialization and/or migration. Some basic classical examples are Tonnies’ distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (1940 [1935]), Durkheim’s division of mechanical and organic solidarity (1893) or Marx’s notion of alienation (1975 [1844]). Anthony Giddens (1991) has argued that during modernity people’s sense of belonging becomes reflexive and Manuel Castells (1996–98) has claimed that contemporary society has become the ‘network society’ in which effective belonging has moved away from civil societies of nations and states into reconstructed defensive identity communities.

This introduction – as well as the rest of the book – does not attempt to sum up this vast literature in any way. Instead, it attempts to differentiate between and identify some of the major building blocks that a comprehensive analytical framework for belonging and the politics of belonging would require. To do so, the chapter first explores the notion of ‘belonging’ and the different analytical facets in which it needs to be
studied, and then focuses on the politics of belonging and how these relate to the participatory politics of citizenship as well as entitlement and status. It then illustrates, using examples from Britain, some of the ways in which different political projects of belonging relate to the different analytical facets of belonging. While the rest of the book uses illustrative examples from all over the world, I thought that remaining within the boundaries of one state and society might better clarify how different political projects of belonging can construct the same collectivity in different ways and with different boundaries.

Belonging

People can ‘belong’ in many different ways and to many different objects of attachment. These can vary from a particular person to the whole of humanity, in a concrete or abstract way, by self or other identification, in a stable, contested or transient way. Even in its most stable ‘primordial’ forms, however, belonging is always a dynamic process, not a reified fixity – the latter is only a naturalized construction of a particular hegemonic form of power relations. Belonging is usually multi-layered and – to use geographical jargon – multi-scale (Antonsich, 2010) or multi-territorial (Hannerz, 2002).

To clarify our understanding of the notion of social and political belonging, it would be useful to differentiate between three major analytical facets in which belonging is constructed. The first facet concerns social locations; the second relates to people’s identifications and emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings; and the third relates to ethical and political value systems with which people judge their own and others’ belonging. These different facets are interrelated, but cannot be reduced to each other.

Social locations

When it is said that people belong to a particular sex, race, class or nation, that they belong to a particular age group, kinship group or a certain profession, we are talking about people’s social and economic

---

1As will become clearer further on in the chapter, these facets can be reconstructed and reconfigured in many different ways by different political projects of belonging.
locations, which at each historical moment would tend to carry with them particular weights in the grids of power relations operating in their society. Being a man or a woman, black or white, working class or middle class, a member of a European or an African nation, people are not just different categories of social location, with different contextual meanings, they also tend to have certain positionalities along axes of power that are higher or lower than other such categories. Such positionalities, however, would tend to be different in different historical contexts and are also often fluid and contested. Sometimes, however, as Sandra Harding (1991) and Nancy Fraser (in Fraser & Honneth, 1998) have commented, certain differences would not necessarily have differential power positionings but are only the markers for different locations. This, again, can only be related to specific differences in particular historical moments and contexts.

Social locations, however, even in their most stable format, are virtually never constructed along one power vector of difference, although official statistics – as well as identity politics – would often tend to construct them in this way. This is why the intersectional approach to social locations is so vitally important.

Marxists and other sociologists have traditionally tended to prioritize class, even when recognizing other axes of social location, while feminists have tended to prioritize gender and those who are focused on issues of race and ethnicity have tended to prioritize people’s locations according to these categories. Indeed, in different historical moments, different systems of stratification tend to give differential weight to different intersectional categories of location and axes of power and they might operate in many different ways – hence the need for case studies using an intra-categorical research approach to complement more macro inter-categorical ones. Much depends on people’s ability to move up those grids of power and the extent to which locations ascribed at birth can be transcended, either by moving from one category of location to another, such as becoming ‘middle class’ while being originally ‘working class’, or – even more dramatically – being trans-gendered or becoming assimilated into a different national, ethnic or even racial collectivity. Different locations along social and economic axes are often marked by different embodied signifiers, such as colour of skin, accent, clothing and mode of behaviour. However, these should not be collapsed and automatically equated with subjective identifications and social attachments.
Identifications and emotional attachments

Identities are narratives, stories people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not) (Martin, 1995; see also Kaptani & Yuval-Davis, 2008b; Yuval-Davis, 2010). Not all of these stories are about belonging to particular groupings and collectivities – they can be, for instance, about individual attributes, body images, vocational aspirations or sexual prowess. However, even these stories will often relate, directly or indirectly, to self and/or others’ perceptions of what being a member of such a grouping or collectivity (ethnic, racial, national, cultural, religious) might mean. Identity narratives can be individual or they can be collective, with the latter often acting as a resource for the former. Although they can be reproduced from generation to generation, it is always in a selective way: they can shift and change, be contested and multiple. These identity narratives can relate to the past, to a myth of origin; they can be aimed to explain the present and probably; above all, they function as a projection of future trajectory.

Margaret Wetherell (2006) argues that identity narratives provide people with a sense of ‘personal order’. As will be discussed in greater detail elsewhere, I would argue that identities are not just personal – and in some way these are never just personal – and that collective identity narratives provide a collective sense of order and meaning. At the same time, as Cavarero emphasizes (1997: 3), ‘narration reveals the meaning without committing the error of defining it’. This is particularly important because, as Hall (1996) argues, the production of identities is always ‘in process’, is never complete, contingent and multiplex. In this sense, ‘order’ should not be seen as the equivalent of ‘coherence’, but rather as pointing towards the sense of agency and continuity that encompasses changes, contestations, even raptures within the identity boundaries of the individual and/or collective subject. At Gayatri Spivak (1994) pointed out, in her seminal essay ‘Can the subaltern speak?’, a narrative of identity is a necessary condition for any notion of agency and subjectivity to exist.

Identity narratives can be verbal, but can also be constructed as specific forms of practices (Fortier, 2000). While MacIntyre (1981: 140) conceives identity practices as ‘embodied narration in a single life’, I would argue that such ‘embodied narrations’ are even more crucial in the construction and reproduction of collective identities. Narratives
of identities can be more or less stable in different social contexts, more or less coherent, more or less authorized and/or contested by the self and others, depending on specific situational factors, and can reflect routinized constructions of everyday life or those of significant moments of crisis and transformation. They include both cognitive and emotional dimensions with varying degrees of attachment:

individuals and groups are caught within wanting to belong, wanting to become, a process that is fuelled by yearning rather than positing of identity as a stable state. (Probyn, 1996: 19)

In her Deleuzian analysis, Probyn (1996; see also Fortier, 2000) constructs identity as transition, always producing itself through the combined processes of being and becoming, belonging and longing to belong.

Of course not every belonging is important to people in the same way and to the same extent, and emotions, as perceptions, shift in different times and situations and are more or less reflective. As a rule, the emotional components of people's constructions of themselves and their identities become more central the more threatened and less secure they become. In the more extreme cases people would be willing to sacrifice their lives – and the lives of others – in order for the narrative of their identities and the objects of their identifications and attachments to continue to exist. After a terrorist attack, or after a declaration of war, people will often seek to return to a place of less 'objective' safety, as long as it means they can be close to their nearest and dearest, and share their fate.

The narrative approach to the understanding of identities is considered in the literature (e.g. Williams, 2000; Lawler, 2008) to be just one specific approach to the theorization of identities. As I elaborate elsewhere, however (Yuval-Davis, 2010), the narrative approach encompasses, as well as being implied in, other major approaches to the study of identity, such as the performative and the dialogical, which are, at the same time, also very different from each other in their understanding of the identity question.

As Bell (1999) and Fortier (2000) comment, following Butler (1990), constructions of belonging have a performative dimension. Specific repetitive practices, relating to specific social and cultural spaces, which link individual and collective behaviour, are crucial for the construction and reproduction of identity narratives and
constructions of attachment. It is in this way, as Sara Ahmed (2004) points out, that free-floating emotions 'stick' to particular social objects. However, as Butler clarifies in her later work (1993; see also Lovell, 2003), in the performative approach to identity theorization, identity narratives can be constructed within, counter and outside pre-determined social discourses, through subversive performances, such as drags. What is hardly discussed in performative theorizations of identity, however, is from where and how – except for repetition and an assumption of social power and authority – these discourses themselves become constructed. This has been the focus of a very different theoretical approach of identity theorizations which follows on from Bakhtin's work (1981, 1984) as well as the Chicago School of Cooley (1912) and Mead (1934). It emphasizes another aspect of theatre practice, i.e. dialogue, as the constitutive element of identity construction. To use Bakhtin's words:

to be, means to be for the other and through him, for oneself. Man has no internal sovereign territory, he is always on the boundary; looking within himself he looks in the eyes of the other or through the eyes of the other. I cannot do without the other; I cannot become myself without the other; I must find myself in the other; finding the other in me in mutual reflection and perception. (1984: 311–12; see also Williams, 2000: 90)

The dialogical construction of identity, then, is both reflective and constitutive. It is not individual or collective, but involves both, in an in-between perpetual state of 'becoming', in which processes of identity construction, authorization and contestation take place. It is important to emphasize, however, that dialogical processes, by themselves, are not an alternative to viewing identity constructions as informed by power relations – just the opposite: analyzing the processes by which identity narratives are constructed in the communal context is vital in order to understand the ways intersectional power relations operate within the group. Otherwise one can easily fall into the trap of an identity politics which assumes the same positioning and identifications for all members of the grouping, and thus each member can, in principle, be a 'representative' of the grouping and an equal contributor to the collective narrative – which, of course, is virtually never the case. It is for this reason that dialogical understandings of identity constructions often lead to studies of identity constructions via conversation or narrative analysis in which the
actions and interactions of ordinary people become the primary focus of direct enquiry (see, for example, Boden & Zimmerman, 1991; Silverman, 1998; Kaptani & Yuval-Davis, 2008a).

The issue, however, is not just the manner in which identity narratives are being produced, but also whether their production implies any particular relationship between self and non-self. Judith Butler (1993) argues that the construction of identities depends on excess – there is always something left outside, once the boundaries of specific identities have been constructed. In this sense all identities are exclusive, as well as inclusive.

One might argue that such a statement amounts to no more than a linguistic truism. However, an important counter-argument to that of Butler would be Jessica Benjamin's (1998) claim that by incorporating identifications into the notion of the subjective self, psychoanalysis has put in doubt the clear separation of self and non-self. It can be argued that similar reservations to the total separation between self and non-self are implied in the theorizations of the in-between 'becoming' of the dialogical approach. Charles Cooley (1912: 92) argues that 'Self and other do not exist as mutually exclusive social facts'. The way in which identities are perceived to be constructed within pre-determined discourses in the performative approach also throws doubt on the clear separation of self and non-self in the construction of the subject.

Identity theories often emphasize that identities are relational, the necessary 'excess' mentioned by Butler above. However, highlighting the fact that this relationality is not homogeneous and can be very different in nature is of vital importance for any theorization of identity, belonging and their constructions of boundaries. While a lot of the literature talks about the relationship between 'self' and 'other/s', there are many ways in which these relationships can be constructed. In my (2010) work, I've discussed four generic relations of the self and non-self in which recognition has very different implications: 'me' and 'us'; 'me'/us' and 'them'; 'me'/us' and 'others'; 'me' and the transversal 'us/them' (for a more detailed discussion of these issues see Chapters 5 and 6 in this volume). However, whatever kinds of boundaries are constructed between the 'me' and the 'not me', it is necessary to emphasize that not only are those boundaries shifting and contested, but also that they do not have to be symmetrical. In other words, inclusion or exclusion is often not mutual, depending on the power positionality and normative values of the social actors as well as, and in relation to, their cognitive and
emotional identifications. Constructions of self and identity can, in
certain historical contexts, be forced on people. In such cases, identi-
ties and belonging/s become important dimensions of people's social
locations and positionings, and the relationships between locations and
identifications can also become more closely intertwined empirically.
This still does not cancel out the importance of the differentiation
between these analytical facets of analyzing belonging. On the contrary,
without this differentiation, there could be no leverage and possibility
of struggle and resistance. Biology – or belonging – would become des-
tiny when there would not be any space for alternative imaginings. As
Fanon (1967) crucially argued, politics of resistance need to be directed
not only towards oppressed people's social and economic locations, but
also against their internalizations of forced constructions of self and
identity.

Ethical and political values
Belonging, therefore, is not just about social locations and construc-
tions of individual and collective identities and attachments, it is also
concerned with the ways these are assessed and valued by the self and
others, and this can be done in many different ways by people with
similar social locations who might identify themselves as belonging
to the same community or grouping. These can vary not only in how
important these locations and collectivities seem to be in one's life and
that of others, but also in whether they consider this to be a good or
a bad thing. Closely related to this are specific attitudes and ideolo-
gies concerning where and how identity and categorical boundaries
are being/should be drawn, in more or less permeable ways, as different
ideological perspectives and discourses construct them as more or less
inclusive. It is in the arena of the contestations around these issues
where we move from the realm of belonging into that of the politics
of belonging.

The politics of belonging
The politics of belonging involves not only constructions of bound-
aries but also the inclusion or exclusion of particular people, social
categories and groupings within these boundaries by those who have
the power to do this. But what are these kind/s of power?
Politics involves the exercise of power and different hegemonic political projects of belonging represent different symbolic power orders. In recent years, the sociological understanding of power has been enriched by the theoretical contributions of Foucault (e.g. 1979, 1991a) and Bourdieu (e.g. 1984, 1990). Traditionally, power was understood and measured by the effects those with power had on others. However, feminists and other grass-roots activists, following Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970), promoted a notion of ‘empowerment’ in which people would gain ‘power of’ rather than ‘power on’. While this approach has been used too often to cover intra-communal power relations and the feminist ‘tyranny of structurelessness’ with which Jo Freeman (1970) described the dynamics of feminist politics, the notion of empowerment does fit with alternative theoretical approaches to power which focus on symbolic power.

Max Weber’s (1968) classical theory of power, which differentiated between physical and charismatic powers – those dependent on individual resources and those emanating out of legitimate authority – has been supplemented, if not supplanted by, other theoretical frameworks which have sought to explain what is happening in the contemporary world where social, political and economic powers have become more diffused, decentralised and desubjectified. The most popular of these new approaches have been those by Foucault (1979, 1986 [1969], 1991a) and Bourdieu (1984, 1990; see also Bourdieu & Nice, 1977). Foucault constructed a notion of a ‘disciplinary society’ in which power increasingly operates through impersonal mechanisms of bodily discipline and a governmentality which escapes the consciousness and will of individual and collective social agents. Under such conditions, power, as was formerly known, starts to operate only when resistance occurs.

However, as Cronin (1996: 56) points out, while Foucault’s genealogical perspective of power is of crucial importance in understanding contemporary politics, it is too radical and monolithic, and therefore ‘it is impossible to identify any social location of the exercise of power or of resistance to power’. This is where Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, while sharing some of Foucault’s insights, such as the role of body practices as mediating relations of domination, can serve us better. For Bourdieu the subject is both embodied and socially constituted. His theory of practice (in which there is a constant interaction between the individual symbolically structured and socially inculcated dispositions of individual agents which he calls
Symbolic powers are of crucial importance when we deal with political projects of belonging, although more often than not, they are the focus for contestations and resistance. Adrian Favell (1999) defined the politics of belonging as ‘the dirty work of boundary maintenance’. The boundaries the politics of belonging are concerned with are the boundaries of the political community of belonging, the boundaries which, sometimes physically, but always symbolically, separate the world population into ‘us’ and ‘them’. The question of the boundaries of belonging, the boundaries of the Andersonian (1991 [1983]) ‘imagined communities’ (see the discussion in Chapter 3), is central in all the political projects of belonging examined in the following chapters. The politics of belonging involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers (within and outside the community), but also their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents. It is important to recognize, however, that such political agents would struggle both for the promotion of their specific position on the construction of collectivities and their boundaries as well as using these ideologies and positions in order to promote their own power positions within and outside the collectivities.

The politics of belonging also include struggles around the determination of what is involved in belonging, in being a member of such a community. As such, it is dialogical (Yuval-Davis & Werbner, 1999) and encompasses contestations both in relation to the participatory dimension of citizenship as well as in relation to issues related to the status and entitlements such membership entails. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 on the state citizenship question, although it also arises in all the other chapters which discuss citizenship, i.e. membership of political communities, as constructed by other political projects of belonging than the so-called ‘nation-state’.

In order to understand some of the contestations involved in different constructions of belonging promoted by different political projects of belonging, we need to look at what is required from a specific person in order for her/him to be entitled to belong, to be considered as belonging, to the collectivity. Common descent (or rather the myth of common descent) might be demanded in some cases, while in others it might be a common culture, religion and/or language.
Loyalty and solidarity, based on common values and a projected myth of common destiny, tend to become requisites for belonging in pluralist societies. In other words, in different projects of the politics of belonging, the different facets of belonging – social locations, identities and ethical and political values – can become the requisites of belonging and the delineation of boundaries.

Requisites of belonging that relate to ‘ascriptive’ social locations – origin, 'race', place of birth – would be the most racialized and the least permeable. Language, culture and sometimes religion are more open to a voluntary, often assimilatory, identification with particular collectivities. Using a common set of values, such as 'democracy' or 'human rights', as the signifiers of belonging can be seen as having the most permeable boundaries of all.

However, these different discourses of belonging can be collapsed together or reduced down to each other in specific historical cases. Moreover, some political projects of belonging can present themselves as promoting more open boundaries than they actually do. In the next section I shall illustrate this by briefly outlining three different political projects of belonging in the United Kingdom that have utilized discourses relating to different facets of belonging. However, such contesting political projects exist virtually everywhere, whether it is the contestation in India between its being a pluralist secular society in which belonging is defined by being born in the country or a Hindutva nation; or whether it is if aboriginals can be part of an Australian nation or need their own self-determination as a 'first nation'; or whether it is if Afrikaners can be considered 'indigenous' people in the South African context rather than 'settlers'.

Three British political projects of belonging

The first British political project of belonging to be discussed here was articulated by Enoch Powell, a major Conservative political figure in post-Second World War Britain. He can be seen as the first ‘public intellectual’ who tried to establish boundaries to British or, rather, English belonging in the post-imperial era. He understood early on that the empire was a lost cause and called for a return to and a strengthening of the homeland itself: ‘Englishman, go home!’ (Barker, 1981). Although, as a minister in the Conservative government of the day, he was responsible for the importing of black British
citizens from the Caribbean islands to work in England, he excluded them by definition from any possibility of belonging to the English national collectivity. He argued that ‘the West Indian does not by being born in England, become an Englishman’ (Powell, 1968).

For Powell, descent was the ultimate criterion for belonging. Moreover, he collapsed descent and cultural and political identification. He was eventually expelled from the Conservative Party when he argued that, unless those who did not belong were returned to their ‘proper’ countries, there would be ‘rivers of blood’ in England, as people who originated in different countries and cultures could not, by definition, become part of the same integrated society.

About ten years after Powell was expelled, another Conservative minister, this time in Margaret Thatcher’s government, Norman Tebbit, promoted in 1990 another British political project of belonging that is popularly known today as the ‘Cricket Test’. One of the Conservative election posters under Thatcher presented a picture of a young black man with the subtitle ‘Labour claims he is Black, we claim he is British’. In this way, the Thatcherite political project of belonging distinguished itself from Labour’s political project of belonging which was built around the notion of multiculturalism, as well as tackling skin-colour, descent-based racism, and the focus of the political project of belonging of the extreme right. This was in spite of the fact that during her original election campaign Mrs Thatcher did speak about her worry that newcomers would ‘swamp’ the local people and their culture. However, as the Thatcherite neo-liberal project crystallized, its discourse opened the door, at least rhetorically, to black middle-class assimilationism (see the discussion on the citizen as consumer in Chapter 2).

Norman Tebbit’s contribution to the Thatcherite project was to establish the boundary of belonging not only in terms of assimilation and economic contribution, but also in terms of identification and emotional attachment. He claimed that if people watched a cricket match between Britain and a team from the country from which they or their family had originated and cheered that latter team, this meant that those people did not really ‘belong’ to the British collectivity, even if they had formal British citizenship, and had been born and reared in it.

Another political project of belonging was developed by New Labour, although some of its characteristics were partially overlapping the Thatcherite one, and continues to be developed by Cameron’s Conservative–Lib Dem coalition government. David Blunkett, for
instance, as Home Secretary in Tony Blair’s New Labour government a decade later, was careful not to use the cricket metaphor, but football matches were often mentioned in his various papers which emphasized the importance of social cohesion and social solidarity. New Labour also wanted to distance itself from the multiculturalism that had become the official policy of the Labour Party since the 1960s. The multiculturalist political project of belonging was basically aimed at post-imperial Britain and the non-assimilatory integration of coloured British citizens who had come to live and work in post-war Britain from its previous colonies, but over the years there has been a growing critique of multicultural policies not only from the right but also from the left, as essentialist, homogenizing, reifying boundaries and inherently linked to Britain’s empiric past (see e.g. Cohen & Bains, 1988; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; May, 1999; and the discussion on multicultural citizenship in Chapter 2). New Labour attempted to tackle multiculturalism after the 2001 riots in the north of England when Cantle’s Report basically claimed in the same year that multiculturalist policies had gone too far and had effectively caused, at least in northern England, social segregation between the English and the ethnic minority communities, made up mostly of Muslim South Asians. Multiculturalism was declared ‘dead’ and social and community integration became the new goals of the British politics of belonging. The British people, in this political project, which was so often articulated by David Blunkett, are not constructed out of a common descent or culture, but their solidarity and loyalty have to be to the British state and society. In his 2002 White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Blunkett even encouraged people from South Asian communities to find marriage partners for their children from other families living in Britain rather than in their countries of origin, so that such cultural and social cohesion would be easier to achieve. Learning English became a requirement for attaining formal citizenship under the new legislation, again in order for such social cohesion to be facilitated. However, while this political project of belonging is primarily based on the identificatory and emotional facet of belonging, it also assumes an adherence to the specific political and ethical values that are seen as inherent to good democratic citizenship (Crick, 1998). The emphasis on democracy

---

and human rights became much stronger with British involvement in the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and came to be presented as a signifier not only of British belonging for its citizens but also of its mission in the world. This political project had been promoted mostly by Gordon Brown when he was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Shortly before he became Prime Minister, he suggested the establishment of a ‘Patriotism Day’ to cement British political loyalty and, significantly, proposed ‘Liberty, Responsibility, Fairness’ as the British equivalent to the French political values of ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’. Although many in the media saw in this politics of belonging project a way for the Scottish Brown to strengthen overall British identity at a time when the devolution of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland had weakened it, and thus legitimize his claim to becoming the next Prime Minister of Britain, this political project was linked much more centrally to the overall political project of New Labour.

In several speeches Brown emphasized values rather than origins or social and political institutions, as what he saw as constituting ‘the sense of shared purpose, an idea of what your destiny as a nation is’. For Brown, the ‘common qualities and common values that have made Britain the country ... [are] our belief in tolerance and liberty which shines through British history. Our commitment to fairness, fair play and civic duty’ (Brown, 2005a). This view of Britishness and British history has led him to declare, on other occasions (Brown, 2005b), that ‘the days of Britain having to apologize for its colonial history are over’ and that ‘we should be proud ... of the Empire’ (Brown, 2004). In New Labour’s politics of belonging, human rights and democratic civic values were part of what Britain had to offer not only to its citizens but also to the world at large. The re-elevation of the British Empire to becoming an occasion for British national pride, in spite of all the terrible chapters in its history (see Milne, 2005), goes hand in hand with the contemporary ‘civilizing mission’ of the humanitarian militarism in which Britain, alongside the United States, is playing a central role (see Chandler,

---

*This emphasis on shared liberal values as the basis for national cohesion and culture also continues under the Conservative-Lib-Dem government. In his speech on ‘muscular liberalism’ (5/2/20-11) Cameron declared that the values of ‘Freedom of speech; freedom of worship; democracy; the rule of law; equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality’ are ‘what defines us as a society; to belong here is to believe in these things’ (http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference-60293).*
Introduction: Framing the Questions

2002; and the discussion in Chapter 5), and which has often had terrible consequences for the people it is supposed to liberate. This is an issue that all human rights activists, as well as all those who promote, unproblematically, a cosmopolitan world government in which the moral values of human rights are dictated from the top down, have to confront these days (see Held, 1995; Kaldor, 2003; and the discussion in Chapter 5). Emancipatory ethical and political values can be transformed, under certain conditions, into the inherent personal attributes of members of particular national and regional collectivities (Britain, the West) and, thus, in practice, become exclusionary rather than permeable signifiers of boundaries.

These different British political projects of belonging mentioned above – which are, of course, far from representing the full range of British political projects of belonging – construct differential boundaries as well as a different ‘essence’ of Britishness. Each of them is anchored in a different facet of belonging – the Powellian one of social location, Tebbit’s emotional identification, and Brown’s normative values – although each of them at the same time also utilizes discourses that have been borrowed from the others. In this they illustrate how various political projects of belonging can target the same collectivity but construct it in different ways so as to promote their legitimate representativeness and thus leadership of the collectivity. As such, these political projects of belonging represent different symbolic power orders and locate, in least potentially, the same people in different positionings along the intersectional social and political axes in the society at each particular moment.

It is vitally important, therefore, to remember, that in order to understand these political projects of belonging, it is not enough to discuss the hegemonic political discourses such as in government documentation or the popular media. The ways different members of the collectivity experience the implications of these discourses as well as interpret them can differ vastly, according to their intersected situated locations, identifications and normative value systems.

The political projects of belonging discussed above, and the others mentioned briefly earlier on in the chapter, are nevertheless small examples of the contested ways in which different states and societies are trying to grapple with what Stuart Hall has called ‘the multicultural question’:

What are the terms for groups of people from different cultural, religious, linguistic, historical backgrounds, who have applied
to occupy the same social space, whether that is a city or a nation or a region, to live with one another without either one group (the less powerful group) having to become the imitative version of the dominant one – i.e. an assimilationism – or, on the other hand, the two groups hating one another, or projecting images of degradation? In other words, how can people live together in difference? (Hall with Yuval-Davis, 2004)

According to Hall, the multicultural question is ‘the question that globalization has unconsciously produced’ (Hall with Yuval-Davis, 2004). I would argue that it is not only the multicultural that needs to be seen in this perspective, but also the contemporary politics of belonging as a whole – hence the focus on globalization in the next contextual section of the chapter.

Globalization and glocalization

Globalization and – as discussed below – glocalization, need to be seen as the context within which contemporary contesting political projects of belonging are taking place. However, they are in themselves ongoing contesting and shifting processes which are continuously being modified by various internal and external factors in which political projects of belonging play significant roles. The tendency, therefore, to see globalization – and the growing inequalities attached to it – as a ‘natural’ development, an unshifting reality which has been so hegemonic even among many who are on the left, especially before the start of the major economic crisis in 2009 (Peterson, 2010), needs to be resisted. Any generalization as a result would need to be assessed as contingent at best. This, however, does not diminish the crucial import of globalization and glocalization for understanding contemporary politics of belonging, the subject matter of this book.

Globalization, especially in its neo-liberal format, has become increasingly visible in the post-Cold War period, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the rule of Ronald Reagan in the USA and Margaret Thatcher in the UK. As Scholte (2005) claims, however, harbingers of globality can be traced back hundreds, if not thousands, of years. Colombus was definitely not the first ‘foreigner’ to ‘discover’ America, even if we do not accept Gavin Menzies’ controversial (2002) thesis that a huge Chinese fleet had visited America
already in 1421. Raiders, and before them traders, have continuously advanced routes of (often unequal) exchange and communication across different parts of the globe.

Notable transworld connectedness existed from the middle of the nineteenth century. However, the greatest expansion of transplanetary relations has transpired since the middle of the twentieth century and the 'Bretton Wood’ agreements that established the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Saskia Sassen (2006: 17) points out that internal transformations in nation-states, which enabled globalization ‘proper’, started in the late 1970s. She sees globalization as ‘an epochal transformation, one as yet young but already showing its muscle’ (2006: 1).

There is only loose agreement about what actually constitutes globalization. Part of the confusion relates to different theories defining or emphasizing different elements as characterizing globalization as well as its connections with neo-liberalism. Wallerstein (1976, 1980, 1989), who first put forward the model of the 'world system', described it basically in terms of the development of a world economy in which unequal relationships existed between the centre and periphery. Other models of globalization (e.g. Meyer, 1980; Robertson, 1992; and Beyer, 1994), have added to this model aspects of a global polity, global culture and global society.

Scholte (2005), however, claims that most of the characteristics that are usually counted to typify globalization – i.e. internalization; liberalization; universalization and westernization – have existed previously. Only the ‘respatialization with the spread of transplanetary social connections’ (Scholte, 2005: 3) is distinctive and key to contemporary historical development (although, no doubt, the sense of respatialization occurred in each age in which major new transport and communication technologies have been introduced). This time/space compression, the specific respatialization of the present globalization, has been possible as a result of the micro-chip revolution, revolutionary changes in speed and the cost of global transport (Dicken, 2003; Rodrigue, 2006), and even more so in global communication, especially the internet (Block, 2004), creating what Castells calls ‘information societies’: ‘social organization in which information generation, processing and transmission become fundamental sources of production and power because of new technological conditions emerging in this historical period’ (Castells, 2000 [1998]: 21). These developments – and the differential access to them by different
populations and segments of a population—have been crucial in shaping and structuring some of the central characteristics of contemporary politics of belonging.

The contemporary rise of transplanetary and supraterritorial connectivity has by no means brought an end to territorial geography and associated economies, governments and identities. Global and territorial spaces coexist and interrelate in complex fashions. I would also argue that to strip the description of the specificity of contemporary globalization from its neo-liberal political and economic context is a gross misrepresentation, although this political and economic homogenization in itself, as I shall detail more below, is misleading, and in recent years—especially since the global economic crisis of 2007—major shifts have started to gain momentum.

It is not only descriptions but also explanations of the phenomenon that vary. In some ways there is collusion between Marxist and liberal economic theories which see in globalization a natural continuation of the development of the logic of capitalism and the market economy since the nineteenth century. The Soviet Union, the Cold War and the resultant welfare social democratic states are seen, from this perspective, as a temporary aberration that camouflaged, interrupted and distorted this development until the global political

6The internet, which originally was invented in the USA as a mode of national defence against Soviet nuclear attack during the Cold War, created a global space which is infinitely extensible, adaptable and, at least in principle, non-hierarchical when, in 1992, the World Wide Web was released for general use. The role of the internet in nationalist, diasporic and cosmopolitan projects of belonging is explored later on in the book. Here, however, it is important to point out that unlike predictions during early days of the internet that it would promote the English language as a universal language, the reality, like that of globalization in general, has proven to be more nuanced. Although 80% of the interactions over the internet are carried out in English, it has also provided a virtual space not only for other major languages, such as Spanish, Arabic or Chinese, but also for specific local dialects like Catalan, and the preservation/reproduction of dying languages, like Yiddish.

At the same time, it is also important to remember that the democratic, decentralized face of the internet is, to a large extent, misleading. The UNDP in 1999 pointed out that while 26% of Americans were using the web, only 3% of Russians, 0.4% of the population in South Asia and 0.2% of African states were doing so. Since then the percentages of use among the latter have grown significantly, as 25.6% of the world population had been using the internet in 2009. However, the unequal distribution of resources and power continue to exist. While in North America 74.2% of the population are using it, only 6.8% are doing so in Africa and in Asia 19.4%. In Europe as a whole, 52% of the population are now using the internet (Internet World Stats, 2009). Moreover, there is evidence of more and more states trying to block internet use, admittedly with varying amounts of success, from China and Iran to the USA (and the Wikileaks).
balance of power shifted towards the time of the fall of the Soviet Union. For others, the post-Second World War period prepared the grounds for globalization with the development of various regulatory apparatuses which were provided through a host of state, suprastate and private governance mechanisms that have since brought about these new epochal changes, enhanced by the changing political context and the scientific and technological developments which changed basic relations and the mode of production.

As Sassen (2006) argues, the capabilities required for globalization developed within the context of (western) nation-states and reached tipping points in which they were transformed by and became part of the new assemblage of the global economic and political order. Globalization reshaped and expanded capitalism, i.e. the economy, which is centred on surplus accumulation. The growth of transworld spaces has encouraged major extensions of capitalist production, including in the areas of information, communications and finance biotechnology. Notable shifts occurred in the ways that processes of surplus accumulation operate – e.g. offshore arrangements and transworld corporate alliances – towards what Sassen calls ‘hypercapitalism’.

‘Hypercapitalism’, or ‘neo-liberalism’, however, is driven by the same impulses that drove nineteenth-century imperial capitalism, and it has found new fields for the ‘primitive accumulation of capital’ with the appropriation of capital and goods from the public sector – spectacularly, in the ‘post-communist’ countries but also in the spreading control of neo-liberal market norms in more and more sectors of the state, both in the so-called ‘developing world’ as well as in the West.

The notion of the ‘global’ is usually constructed as opposite to that of the ‘local’. Local communities can have different relationships with the globalization process. They can, to a certain extent at least, still exist outside the globalization processes; they can coexist with the global environment/influence; and they can also be constituted as a reaction to the processes of globalization and become a site of resistance to it. As Swyngedouw (1997) argues, glocalization relates to

---

7These regulatory apparatuses and mechanisms, while enabling the progressive growth of neo-liberal globalization, were not strong enough to contain and prevent the systemic crisis within the global economic system. The extent to which they would be able, in the long term, to facilitate overcoming that crisis has still to be seen, as is the differential effects this crisis would have on different localities, different states and societies and people who are differentially located, socially, economically and politically.
transformations in the international political economy and urban geography – the parallel shifts towards global and local scales of political relationships, such as the rising influence of the EU and G8 on the one hand, and the proliferation of local economic partnerships and initiatives on the other. There is an important role here for metabolises in connecting the local, the national and the international.

However, we should not necessarily assume that naturalized and harmonized relationships always exist between the local and the global. The complex connection/relation between them does not necessarily imply mirroring but can also produce conflict and resistance. Silva and Schwartzman (2006), for instance, discuss the different and contradictory ways in which affirmative action policies were received in Brazil. Rather than being perceived as anti-discrimination policies based on human rights, they were seen by many as the cultural imperialism of the USA, which threatened, under the different conditions in which affirmative action policies were carried in Brazil, certain constructions of ‘local essence’.

It is for this reason that Robertson (1995), who developed the notion of ‘glocalization’, argued that successful glocalization does not simply produce or reproduce random forms of cultural heterogeneity. It also registers the ‘standardization of locality’ so that various localities may possess very similar structures, reference points and symbolic textures or contents. The local becomes globally institutionalized. This will be crucial when we examine the glocal nature of various contemporary political projects of belonging.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that globalization equals homogenization. Jan Pieterse (1995) points out that globalization is instead developed more by the fluid and critical engagement of local social actors and results more in the processes of creolization and hybridization. Talal Asad (1986) has introduced within that context the important notion of ‘translation’, which is much wider than the linguistic one. Even McDonald’s, which has been used by Barber (1995) and others to illustrate the impact of the commodification and standardization of globalization, in spite of the universal golden M, conducts local market surveys and adapts its menus to local demands. Moreover, the local meaning of McDonald’s can vary hugely, given its specific historical context. While in Moscow the arrival of McDonald’s in 1990 was hailed as a welcome signifier of the opening of the Soviet Union to the big wide world, there was for quite some years a fierce local resistance to establishing a McDonald’s in Paris.
Resistance to (as well as incorporation into) western-dominated, neo-liberal globalization has been conducted on different levels, both by states, e.g. the Chinese state-controlled economic globalization or the Latin American globalizing economic anti-imperialism led by leaders such as Chavez and Morales, and by non-statist movements, networks and organizations, such as the World Social Forum (which started as an anti-Davos event) and the anti-globalization movement as a whole (discussed in Chapter 5). Other movements of resistance have been the fundamentalist Islamist groups and organizations loosely coordinated by the Al-Qaeda network. (These will be discussed along with fundamentalist movements and organizations from other religions in Chapter 4.)

**States and neo-liberal globalization**

The transformation of state apparatuses under neo-liberal globalization is usually constructed as their 'modernization' – a discourse which was aggressively promoted, for instance, by Tony Blair and others under British New Labour (but see also, for instance, the [2007] paper on governance, written for the EU by Petr Vymtal of the University of Economics in Prague).

States, in various forms and scales, from cities to empires, have existed since ancient times in different parts of the world. Since the French revolution, although empires have continued to exist and grow (including, at certain times, the French empire), states have come to be seen as 'nation-states' in which, to use Max Weber's classical definition (1948 [1947]: 78), 'a human community (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory'. This definition assumes a particular 'human community', the nation, with particular boundaries, that is living in a particular territory, the 'homeland', with particular borders, that is governed by a state which assumes a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force to police that state within and fight its enemies without. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia assumed this to be the basic legitimate form of geopolitical organization and it was hegemonic in international relations, at least in Europe itself, until the late twentieth century (Brenner et al., 2003: introduction).

This 'holy trinity' of people, territory and state was always more fiction than fact, as both collectivity boundaries and territorial borders
have been continuously contested by both state and non-state agencies, and there have been more often than not blurred edges to what passed as the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force by the state.

In Chapter 3 these questions will be explored in relation to the various constructions of nations and homelands. Here I would like to examine some of the issues relating to states’ governability and how these have been affected by processes of globalization that are dominated by the spread of the neo-liberal market.

With the growing hegemony of neo-liberal ideologies and policies and the strengthening of neo-liberal global market forces, more and more agencies and apparatus of the state, in more and more countries, have been privatized partially or fully (e.g. Panitch, 1994; Jessop, 2002; McBride, 2005). This raises the same old question of what constitutes the specific sphere of ‘the state’ to differentiate it from the sphere of ‘civil society’ (which itself needs to be subdivided into economic, social and domestic spheres) (see my discussion of these issues in Yuval-Davis, 1997a: 12–15). In one pole of the debate we have the classical Weberian definition in which the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical power (1948 [1947]), and on the other we have the Foucauldian perspective (e.g. Foucault, 1979, 1991b), according to which no such specific powers can be seen universally as the exclusive property of the state.

Part of the difference between these two perspectives stems from their different theorizations of the meaning of power. However, part of the difference between the two, is also, I believe, a result of the different historical times in which Weber and Foucault wrote their theorizations of the state. As Foucault pointed out (1991b), late modernity brought with it new technologies of governance, a ‘governmentality’ in which much of the work was done within the subjectivities of the citizens, rather than by the state exercising the external powers in its disposal. Given the number of civil wars throughout the globe, in which the military and other power sources of the state are used against particular sections of the population, such a Foucauldian portrayal of contemporary states seems however, though partial at best, to lean much too heavily on the liberal fiction of the individual relationship between an abstract non-embodied citizen and the state – as will be discussed more in the next chapter.

A related question is whether, under globalization, the state as the ‘container of power’ (Giddens, 1985; Taylor, 2003), is ‘withering away’ – becoming weaker and less able to impose its power on
the other social, economic and political carriers of power. This is an important question, whether or not we believe in the Weberian definition of the power of the state (1948 [1947]), a diluted version of it (as when Floya Anthias and I, for example, argued that the state has the intentionality of having the monopoly of legitimate power: Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989), or the Foucauldian or Bourdieuvian ones (Foucault 1991b; Bourdieu and Nice, 1977).

Saskia Sassen (2007) argues that rather than weakening overall the state has changed internally and that the executive powers have strengthened on account of the legislative branches of the state. With the privatization of the state, a lot of the regulative tasks of the legislative have been lost, and at the same time, it is virtually exclusively the executive branch which negotiates with other national and supranational governance executives (such as the EU, the UN, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization [WTO]) as well as with private, national and especially transnational corporations.

This is an important observation which can explain some of the growing alienation of individuals from the state (discussed in Chapter 2). This disenchantment is particularly important in countries where voting in elections is only in order to elect members of parliament, rather than also the head of the executive. At the same time, as in parliamentary democracies, the formal endorsement of particular parties to have the right to rule the state is what gives that state legitimacy, hence the growing worry by governments about the lack of involvement by the electorate in these processes. (This worry about legitimacy also often drives ruling powers in non-democratic states to force citizens to vote, in order to get a formal endorsement – often in percentages close to 100%.8)

I would argue, however, that Sassen's position is somewhat over-optimistic, and that states have not only shifted their internal balance of powers overall, but are also suffering a certain depletion of their power overall. As the recent economic crisis has shown, with the growing entanglement and dependency not only of local and global markets but also of the local private and public institutions, various states have been forced to bail out banks9 and large corporations for fear of a total

---

8For quite a comprehensive picture regarding the rates of votes in different countries as well as where voting is compulsory or not, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter_turnout#Compulsory_voting

economic collapse while at the same time the governability of state agencies to reinforce regulations on that same private sector is highly limited. It is not that such regulations are impossible – and indeed, some of these regulations, such as the reintroduction of the separation between retail and investment banking, might well be introduced as well as further bank levies. It is more because of the basic legal relationships between corporations and states in which companies have the status of fictional citizens which enable the people who run these companies to escape responsibility for the results of their corporations’ action – the famous ‘LTD’ affix. In a time of globalization, companies’ ability – and that of the people who run them – to change locations and thus escape having to bear the social, economic, environmental and other consequences of their actions is becoming clear in the North and not just in the South, as was the case in the past, the prosecution of BP for the oil leak in Florida in 2010 notwithstanding. Moreover, while states were forced to bail out banks to avoid major economic collapses, states themselves – such as Ireland, Greece and others – found themselves forced to cut their state budgets severely, against the interests of their citizens, because they had become dependent on their credit assessment by the global financial market. However, as Bichler and Nitzan (2010) point out, one can also detect major systemic fears among the most successful, contemporary, global neo-liberal corporations. Part of the explanation for this, probably, is that the two largest commodities traded globally – i.e., oil and arms – have an inherent instability as well as complex relationships with states in both the North and the South and might prove to be unsustainable in the long term under the present globalized political and economic system.

10See http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/86277/business-organization/21818/History-of-the-limited-liability-company. Interestingly, although in medieval Europe limited liability was given to members of monasteries and trade guilds, the first capitalist companies that enjoyed the protection of limited liabilities were those like the East India Company which worked as an unofficial arm of the state or empire. Gradually, however, since the mid-nineteenth century, the ‘ltd’ expanded to all shareholders, and more recently also to managers of capitalist companies in order to encourage investments in an expanding market.

11On the other hand, it is important also to realize that ecological concerns have not just been the focus for political and policy concerns but also one of the major new lucrative (or potentially lucrative) areas into which the global neo-liberal market has been expanding – whether it is the manufacture of cars using environmentally friendly fuels or handling and recycling refuse.

A sense of belonging, as was argued above, is about feeling 'at home', feeling 'safe', and if not necessarily feeling in control, at least feeling able enough generally to predict expectations and rules of behaviour. It is not surprising, therefore, that under such conditions, many people feel that their entitlements as citizens who belong are under threat, or are even already being taken away from them. The discourses in which these frustrations are being expressed can follow very different directions. We shall explore in the next chapter how various constructions of contemporary citizenship have grown as a result of and in resistance to these developments. Here, however, I want to expand on another facet of contemporary globalization – mass international migration – which, in addition to the growing pressure on citizens as a result of the reconfiguration of the state and citizens' social rights, has affected and changed people's politics of belonging, whether they choose to migrate or stay in their countries of origin.

**International migration**

The relationship between citizens and their states is constructed as a permanent if not a static one. However, such an image is currently being challenged and technologies of governance have to be reinvented when in various states large numbers of people move in or out for a variety of economic, political, social and ecological reasons. In their by now classic book, *The Age of Migration* (2003), Castles and Miller claim that the contemporary era is the 'age of migration'. They argue that as a result of the transport and communication revolutions, the deregulation of the neo-liberal global market as well as the growing numbers of local wars and natural disasters, there are unprecedented numbers of people who are searching for a better future for themselves and their children, both as economic migrants and as asylum seekers. Some would be settling in other countries, some would be returning to their homes and/or their countries of origin after several years, and many would be developing transnational identities and lifestyles by carrying on travelling between the different locations. On the other hand, there are those, like Hein De Haas (2005), who would argue that the above picture is a myth – that these days, the percentage of international migrants in the total world population is almost on the same level as it was a century ago (about 2.5–3%).

This statistical picture, however, covers over a much more complex reality. First, given the huge growth of the global population during the
last century, the actual number of people moving these days is much larger – about 150 million\textsuperscript{13} – even if the percentage has remained more or less the same. Secondly, and even more importantly, while the percentage of migrants has largely remained static, the direction of migration has largely changed. A century ago, most of the migration was directed towards ‘the New World’: colonies and settler societies and countries dominated by the West in America, Australia, Africa, and to a lesser extent Asia, in which a growing economy, as well as other social, political and military factors, depended on more immigration. ‘Populate or perish’ was a popular slogan in the Australia of these days. However, this slogan was also accompanied at the same time by what is known as White Australia immigration legislation, guided by the principle that the immigrant population had to be of ‘the right kind’. For example, the ‘yellow peril’ from the Pacific rim countries was kept away by force for many years until both the economic demands and a lack of alternative migrant power, as well as the rise of international anti-discrimination human rights legislation, have now changed the formal rules dominating Australian as well as other western racialized immigration legislation into these becoming a bit more open, at least on the surface (deLepervanche, 1980).

Today, most of the migration is not from Northern to Southern countries but the other way around (with the exception of ‘tiger economies’ like India or the Gulf oil countries), unless it is to the ‘near abroad’ countries, as is the case with most of those who are fleeing war and famine (UN, 2008\textsuperscript{14}; Athukorala & Manning, 2009).

In western countries like Britain and France, although the popular slogan among anti-immigration restriction campaigners is that ‘we are here because you were there’ is much too over-simplistic, the interdependencies that have developed between European powers and their ex-colonies have played important parts in the development of new ethnic communities in western countries. Similar phenomena also happened in other European and industrial countries in which migrant workers were brought in to fulfil specific economic needs in post-Second World War Europe and were never envisaged to become permanent parts of the society. Many arrived under visas which constructed them as ‘guest workers’, which entitled them to

\textsuperscript{13}See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1003324.stm

\textsuperscript{14}UN Trends in Total Migrant Stock: the 2008 revision, http://esa.un.org/migration
work for a specific time in specific places and then go back to their countries of origin. However, the reality has been that many of these people have remained, ‘permanently temporary’ – some getting local citizenships, many bringing in other family members and many establishing a transnational lifestyle of movement between countries, as long as the political and economic situation has allowed it.

Many others arrived under refugee and asylum-seeking legislation. While in many countries there has been a long tradition of giving sanctuary and refuge to persecuted minorities (Marfleet, 2011), the formal international protection of refugees was produced in the post-Second World War period but was heavily constructed in the West, and especially in Germany, towards accepting refugees from the Eastern Bloc. With the growing number of asylum seekers from the South, especially in the post-Cold War period, we can see paradoxically that, on the one hand, the Refugees and Asylum Act becomes part of domestic legislation in Europe in the 1990s, but on the other hand, more and more regulations were passed that were making applications for refugee status increasingly difficult. In the post-9/11 era, when often anyone resisting their government was constructed as a potential terrorist, the legal status of a refugee has become more and more difficult to achieve (Fekete, 2009).

It is important to point out, however, that the legal dichotomy which is so often made in the literature and official statistics between economic and asylum types of migration is based on a falsehood. The drive for migration, which is never taken lightheartedly, is most often spurred on by a generic aspiration to have a better chance of the good life, especially for children. To a great extent this upward mobility of aspirations works, especially relative to those in the South who have not migrated, even when, in terms of local class structure in the North, these migrants and refugees remain at the bottom of the scale, given the average income gap between North and South. Moreover, in order to be able to migrate to the West, rather than just to camps in the ‘near abroad’, there is usually a need for migrants to have extra personal – or familial – economic resources which would enable them to arrange transportation to the West – often in indirect and illicit ways, and involving a lot of personal hardship. Therefore, rather than a bi-polar typology, voluntary and forced migration need to be seen as two extremes of the one long continuum.

Similarly, it is difficult to draw a clear line between legal and illegal migration. With the tightening up of both asylum legislation
as well as that of work permits, it has become much more difficult to immigrate by legal means. On the other hand, in the deregulated neo-liberal economic markets, a lot of the leisure industry, from waiters to sex workers, as well as other unskilled branches of the economy, have come to depend on illegal migrants who are prepared to work for under the minimum wage and in extremely exploitative conditions (EWCO, 2007).

One also cannot often differentiate easily between countries of immigration and countries of emigration. In all European countries, for example, there is, on the one hand the immigration of both unskilled workers as well as professionals, especially in the high-tech and service and care industries for Europe’s aging population. On the other hand, there is emigration of ‘ex-pat’ experts, the retired and other people who are attracted by the chance to live in other warmer and cheaper countries in Europe and outside it (Knoweles & Harper, 2010). The BBC quotes a 2006 study which started that more than 5.5 million Brits were living abroad,15 4 million Americans16 and 2 million French.17

One of the characteristics of ‘the age of migration’ that Castles and Miller (2003) talk about is ‘the feminization of migration’. The International Organization for Migration website says ‘Women account for 49.6 per cent of global migrants’, quoting the United Nations’ Trends in Total Migrant Stock, the 2005 Revision.18 This includes women who migrated as family dependents – either with their husbands or following them – as well as the growing number of women who migrated on their own, whether they were leaving behind them families of their own in their countries of origin or not. Again, the dichotomy between women workers and family dependents which has existed in official statistics is fictitious, as so many of the women who migrate as family dependents both want and need to work. The situation is similar concerning women asylum seekers and refugees. Often both husband and wife have been politically active, but only the husband receives the status of refugee. As a result there have been many cases in Britain, for instance, when the husband had died and the legal protection of the refugee status has been

---

15http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6210358.stm
16http://www.shelteroffshore.com/index.php/living/more/americans_living_abroad/
18http://esa.un.org/migration
taken away from the family whose immigration status then becomes precarious (Bhabha & Shutter, 1994). The whole question of the rights of family members to immigrate when one of them is granted such a right has been central in many debates concerning migration and reflects contesting ideologies about the importance of the family, whether it is always the duty of the wife to follow the husband or also the other way around, and probably most importantly, what is the family and what are its boundaries? This also covers whether elderly parents could be allowed to accompany their adult children, whether extended family are also family for the sake of migration, whether common-law families have such rights and, of course, whether partners of the same sex can be constructed as a family in migration legislation. All these questions have been paradoxically affected by, on the one hand, the tightening rules and regulations of migration and, on the other hand, the growing hegemony of formal anti-discrimination legislation.

With the growing trend of ‘people on the move’ and the economic and social interdependencies on migration, there is an increasing blurring of the line for ‘insiders – outsiders’, those who are considered ‘indigenous’ citizens, those who are naturalized, those who are on work permits, those who are applying for asylum, those who receive ‘exceptional leave to remain’, those who are on temporary contracts of work, which may or may not be open for extension, as well as the many who enter a country on a tourist visa and do not leave afterwards, remaining in the country after their asylum application has been rejected, etc. Probably one of the most confusing and problematic ways of dealing with migrants who want to stay permanently has been the recent British proposal of ‘earned citizenship’ (discussed in the next chapter). As Gordon Brown, as British Prime Minister, stated in his speech, when announcing a further tightening of immigration controls in the UK, the case for managed and controlled migration is not ‘an issue for fringe parties nor a taboo subject’ but about ‘what it means to be British’ (Mulholland, 2009).

‘Earned citizenship’ is but one extreme technology among many others which have developed in recent years in numerous countries in order to maintain some stability and control of the citizenship boundaries of belonging. Part of the reason for this – especially in the case of welfare states – is the state duty to provide various public services to migrants, from housing to health to education, as well as to monitor their incomes for tax purposes. Part of the reason for this development, however, has been as a result
of a nationalist and racist autochthonic anti-immigration discourse (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). In Israel, for example, the extreme right has co-opted the discourse of some on the left who have been calling for a one-state solution in which both Jews and Palestinians would have equal rights, but are also demanding that the Palestinians would not only swear allegiance to the state but would have to wait for up to twenty years to prove their loyalty and good citizenship.19

Moreover, with the growing number of migrants, the changing nature of economy and society, and especially after 9/11, technologies for regulating migration have become part of the growing discourse of ‘securitization’, in which (some) people’s belonging to their state of residence and even citizenship has become more and more contingent (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2002).

The ‘securitization’ discourse

During the late 1980s and 1990s, the privatization of many branches of states started to take place. This happened as a result of conservative governments’ decisions, the conditions of the structural adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF, and the dismantling of the post-communist states after the fall of the Soviet Union. During that period, as part of the ‘dividends of peace’, military budgets were reduced all over the globe.

Various military and policing agencies in western states tried during that period to find themselves a new raison d’être. This was the time when the securitization of international borders against undocumented migrants started to intensify and the notion of environmental security was also born.

‘Terrorism’ is a strategy for radical groupings all over the world and of various persuasions, from extreme right to extreme left, secular and religious. It has been used throughout the world, including in the West, well before 9/11 (even if we discard its popularity in Russia in the nineteenth century), during anti-colonial struggles and by Irish and Palestinian resistance movements, as well as various others, including Al Qaeda. It was also used by extreme right organizations, like those behind the 1995 Oklahoma bombing in the USA or the Tokyo subway train attack by a member of the

---

Aum Shinri Kyo (Supreme Truth Sect) in the same year. However, the scale of the hit and the targeting of the US Pentagon and the twin towers of the World Trade Center in 9/11, and especially the timing, given the political needs of the US administration and other western governments at the time, have legitimized the rise of securitization as a primary political discourse both locally and globally and pushed some alternative official political discourses which developed in the post–Cold War political reality (including that of ‘human security’, discussed in Chapter 5 on the cosmopolitan question) aside. The military–industrial complex has found a much more lucrative outlet. While no doubt Bichler and Nitzan (2004) are right in claiming that much, if not most, of the profits during this era have been the result of an indirect manipulation of the market, the domination of the White House by the extreme neo-cons has opened up the arena to a whole new field of privatization, one which touches – and threatens – the heart of contemporary politics of belonging in the West, as well as in the rest of the world.

Naomi Klein (2007) and others have drawn attention to the growth in private militias and ‘armed security contractors’ at an unprecedented scale during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, although their role had expanded in importance even before that in other conflict areas such as in Africa.

Mercenaries are nothing new in inter- as well as intra-military conflicts. In some ways, since the end of the citizen–soldier in many western countries in the post-Vietnam war period, most of the soldiers in regular armies are not there because of their national citizenship duty but because of the pay and other ‘career opportunities’. The main difference between state-controlled professional armies on the one hand and individual mercenaries who volunteer to fight for a particular state (as in the case of the Foreign Legion in France) or for particular leadership contenders (such as the failed coup which involved Mark Thatcher, the son of the ex-British Prime Minister in Equatorial Guinea in Africa) on the other hand, is that today mercenaries mostly work for companies which are run along the lines of other corporations, with shareholders and annual profits. As with many other new corporations that appeared as a result of states ‘outsourcing’ their services in particular areas, states (especially the USA in the case of Blackwater USA, for instance) have helped the extreme profitability of such companies not only by buying their services in bulk but also by subsidizing the building of their infrastructure.
This applies not only to military conflicts. Blackwater USA, for instance, was also centrally involved with the emergency and security services after hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.20

However, much of the profitability of this sector is not necessarily in providing privatized human power but in the mass development of security devices. As Naomi Klein (2007) pointed out, the securitization discourse has created a massive new market for various surveillance devices. She highlights the leadership role Israel has had in this industry and how the Palestinian occupied territories have become a global laboratory for technological innovations of this kind, especially in various surveillance technologies, which are also used more widely in civic areas of our lives, from border checks to public transport to poor housing estates.

Obama’s entry into the White House and the global economic crisis which has saddled western governments with unprecedented levels of debt might curtail somewhat the continuation of the mass expansion of this market (as has been hinted at by Obama’s decision to cut the ‘Star Wars’ programme). Nevertheless, it seems that in other areas of militarization, relating to the war in Afghanistan and NATO’s expansion in the south of Europe towards Iran and the Middle East, Obama’s rule in the White House has perhaps intensified this expansion rather than reduced it (Chomsky, 2009).

Overall, however, if globalization has been characterized by huge movements of goods, capital and people across the globe, it is the movement of people which has been constructed as one of the major security risks for which so many new technological devices have been produced and marketed. The effects of international migration on states’ modus operandi and contemporary constructions of citizenship go far beyond the securitization of borders and affect the constructions of citizenship and belonging of all residents of the state, especially its racialized minorities, who might or might not have legal citizenship.

The technology for profiling the population, from school age upwards, for instance in terms of ‘potential home grown terrorists’, cannot but affect the differential sense of belonging of citizens.

20See http://blog.mises.org/archives/004852.asp. However, with the growing complexity and risk of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Blackwater changed its name to Xe, and shifted its business focus to training facilities (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021303149_pf.html).
At the same time, as will be discussed in the next chapter, there are also growing sentiments of anxiety and resentment among members of the hegemonic majority, especially among the relatively less well off, that they ‘don’t count’ any more. This leads to them feeling more alien and less attached to the state and other sections of civil society.

While part of the explanation of this growing disenchantment with the state and political parties relates to the centrality in these societies of ‘the multicultural question’ (Hall with Yuval-Davis, 2004) and the growing ethnocization of states (which will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3), part of this change can also be seen as a result of internal shifts within the state apparatus and the relative power of various branches of the state which affects the relationship between citizens and the state and their sense of accessibility and claim on it, as well as the contestations which arise out of the presence of contesting political projects of belonging among various members of the same society.

There are many contemporary political projects of belonging, and this book is not even trying to be exhaustive. I believe, however, that the clusters of such projects that focus (often in a non-mutually exhaustive fashion) around notions of citizenship, nationalism, religion and cosmopolitanism, constitute the heart of the political projects of belonging agendas in the contemporary world. I leave the task of discussing others – such as, for example, political projects of belonging constructed around issues of youth, sexuality, ecology, work and consuming cultures – to others. However, as a feminist, I am interested in particular in feminist political projects of belonging, and therefore will discuss briefly, at the end of each chapter, specific feminist projects that are linked to these. In addition, the penultimate chapter of the book will be dedicated to the ethics of care, which many would argue is the feminist political project of belonging.

Outline of the book

After the contextual introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2, on the Citizenship Question, explores the notion of state citizenship as well as the major kinds of rights which have been commonly associated with it – civil, political, social, cultural, and what I call spatial security rights. The chapter examines some contemporary constructions of citizenships which denote various political projects of belonging, some inspired by the state and some more demotic, emerging from the grassroots. The main ones to be discussed in this context are
active/ivist citizenship, ‘intimate’ citizenship, consumerism as citizenship, multicultural citizenship, and multi-layered citizenship. The chapter then turns to discuss some of the main technologies that states have been using in order to define who belongs and who does not in their citizenship body, including official statistics, the registering of births and deaths as well as the use of the passport.

Modern states are usually constructed as ‘nation-states’, although the boundaries of both are virtually always not completely overlapping. Chapter 3, on the National Question, examines the ways in which constructions of nations and nationalist rhetoric have changed in the growing processes of separating national and citizenship belonging. Discourses of autochthony, indigeneity and diasporism as alternative nationalist discourses will also be explored.

Modern theorists of nationalism have often tended to see nationalist ideologies as replacing religious ones. This has never been completely the case, but in recent years, religion has been becoming more explicitly a major principle around which both national and transnational political projects of belonging are being organized. This is going to be discussed in Chapter 4, on the Religious Question, which explores the role of religion in contemporary politics of belonging and how this relates both to globalization and neo-liberalism. Notions of secularism, fundamentalism and multi-faithism are examined, as are the roles that religious organizations play in civil societies as well as in state legislations and policies, particularly in relation to women, sexual and ethnic minorities. The relationships between religion and culture and both of these to constructions of collective boundaries which affect people in differential ways will be highlighted.

However, Chapter 5, on the Cosmopolitanism Question, focuses on what seems to many to be the political project of belonging under globalization, i.e. cosmopolitanism. The chapter focuses on the relationships between various discourses of cosmopolitanism and their ‘others’, and explores notions of situated cosmopolitanism, vernacular, visceral and ‘rooted’. It then examines the notions of ‘human rights’ and ‘human security’ as specific technologies of cosmopolitan governance as well as discourses of resistance to inequalities of recognition and distribution.

While each chapter briefly discusses specific feminist political movements which have been constructed in association with or in resistance to the specific political projects of belonging discussed there, Chapter 6, on the Caring Question, focuses on what can be seen
as the feminist political project of belonging, i.e. ‘the ethics of care’. ‘Ethics of care’ aim at constructing an alternative model of social and political relationship to the neo-liberal discourse of self-interest. Unlike other political projects of belonging, the ethics of care do not focus on if/where the boundaries of belonging should exist, but rather on the ways people should relate to each other. However, the chapter argues that while this question has been central to feminist, especially transversal feminist politics, it is a general question which concerns the relationships between the political, the normative and the emotional.

The concluding chapter of the book sums up some of its main arguments, returning to the question of the relationship between the political, the emotional and the normative, and ending with some thoughts relating to the role of hope in emancipatory feminist and non-feminist politics.