The end of the Cold War and globalization have led to renewed interest in the study of transnational relations and the impact of non-state actors on world politics. Some authors praise the emergence of a global transnational civil society (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Held et al., 1999), while others denounce an increasing transnational capitalist hegemony (Gill, 1995; Altvater and Mahnkopf, 2002). Both positions ascribe to nonstate actors an extraordinary influence on outcomes in international politics. It is certainly true that transnational actors – from multinational corporations (MNCs) to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) – have left their mark on the international system and that we cannot even start theorizing about the contemporary world system without taking their influence into account. Rather than analyzing transnational and interstate relations in zero-sum terms, however, it is more useful to study their interactions. This is the first point I make in this chapter.

The second point concerns a shift in the study of transnational actors and world politics. Up to the early 2000s, the main thrust of scholarship on transnational actors focused on the question how and under what conditions nonstate actors influenced international affairs in terms of interstate relations, be it international governmental institutions (IOs) or be it the interests or preferences of individual states, including major powers. This work continues, of course, and has recently been complemented by research on transnational social movements and the transnationalization of social protest. But from the 2000s on, the “governance turn” has reached the study of transnational actors, too. Currently, research is increasingly concerned with transnational governance, that is, the direct involvement in and contribution of nonstate actors to rule-making, on the one hand, and the provision of collective goods, on the other hand. Transnational governance ranges from “governance with governments” (e.g., public–private partnerships [PPPs]) to “governance without governments” (e.g., private self-regulation; see Zürn, 2000, on these distinctions). This reflects a major departure
from a still state-centered view according to which states are the only “governors” in international relations. In the 2010s, the state has got company and the “society world” (Czempiel, 1991) of nonstate actors is actively engaged in governance. In addition, states have become part of the problem rather than the solution in global governance, as the debates about failed and failing states or “limited statehood” reveal (Rotberg, 2003; Risse, 2011b).

Compared to these substantive trends, meta-theoretical orientations such as the divide between rational choice and constructivism or methodological differences such as the one between qualitative and quantitative work have largely receded into the background with regard to transnational studies. This review proceeds in the following steps. I begin with some definitional remarks followed by a brief intellectual history of theorizing about transnational relations in world politics. The main part of the chapter examines the role of transnational actors in world politics. This is the realm where most empirical research has been carried out in the past two decades and where we can make some empirically informed theoretical statements. I focus on the two ways mentioned above in which transnational actors impact world politics. First, they exert considerable influence on interstate relations, be it the foreign policies of states or be it international institutions. Second, they contribute directly to transnational governance by co-regulating international issues and providing collective goods, on the one hand, and by private self-regulation leading to the rise of private authority in global affairs, on the other. The chapter concludes with remarks on directions for future research.

DEFINING TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS

“Transnational relations” is a rather elusive concept. A good way to start is still the 1971 definition by Keohane and Nye, who refer to “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent …” (Keohane and Nye, 1971b, xii–xvi). Here, the concept encompasses anything as long as human agency is involved. Yet, cross-border capital flows, international trade, CNN media broadcasts, international migration, cross-border tourism, the diffusion of values and norms, transnational social movements, INGOs, and MNC are quite different phenomena. It is impossible to theorize about them in any systematic sense (for globalization and global governance in general, see Chapter 16 by Zürn in this volume; for transnational diffusion processes, see Chapter 18 by Gilardi in this volume).

This chapter does not deal with transnational relations in general, but takes an actor-centered perspective. This refinement still comprises a wide range of regularized transnational relationships, from networks exchanging material and/or ideational resources to INGOs and large organizations such as MNC. Some transnational actors operate globally (e.g., the Catholic church, the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]; Amnesty International; General Motors), while others are confined to specific regions of the world (such as the European Environmental Bureau, Asia Watch, or the European Trade Union Confederation). Some transnational actors concentrate on a single issue (such as the transnational campaign to ban landmines), while others such as religious organizations follow a multi-purpose mission.

In the following, I distinguish among transnational actors (TNAs) along two dimensions. The first dimension concerns their internal structure. Some TNAs are formal organizations (from MNCs to INGOs). Such organizations are usually characterized by a formal statute defining the roles, rules, and relationships among the members, a clear external boundary, and at least some degree of internal hierarchy in the sense of a decision-making body entitled to take binding
decisions for the members. Other TNAs are connected in a more loose and nonhierarchical fashion for which I use the term “network,” defined as “any collection of actors \(N \geq 2\) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another” in the absence of a central authority able to impose hierarchy upon them or to settle disputes (Podolny and Page, 1998, 59). Transnational networks still encompass a whole variety of actors, from loosely coupled advocacy networks sharing specific values, principled beliefs, and a common discourse (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 2) and knowledge-based epistemic communities (Haas, 1992b) to transnational coalitions “who coordinate shared strategies or sets of tactics to publicly influence social change” (Khagram et al., 2002a, 7) and – finally – transnational social movements engaging in joint and sustained social mobilization (ibid., 8).

The second dimension is orthogonal to the first one and differentiates between the constitutive purposes of the actors. Some TNAs – such as MNCs or transnational special interest groups – are primarily self-interested and try to promote the well-being of the organization itself or of the members of the networks. Others, such as INGOs, advocacy networks, or social movements are primarily motivated by promoting principled beliefs or what they see as a (global) “common good.” This differentiation roughly coincides with the distinction between the “for profit” and the “not for profit” sector as frequently found in the literature. However, it is useful to think of this distinction as a continuum rather than sharply divided classes of actors. The business-sponsored Global Climate Coalition certainly claims to promote the international public good, while some (I)NGOs seek to make a profit in the humanitarian action sector (for a “NGOs as firms” perspective, see Prakash and Gugerty, 2010). Moreover, the more both firms and INGOs engage in transnational governance, the more they become involved in rule-making and in the provision of collective goods irrespective of their original motivation (see below).

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS: A SHORT INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

Neither transnational relations nor theorizing about them started in the post–World War II era. Multinational corporations with dispersed investments and transnational production lines across several political jurisdictions date back at least to the medieval era. During the Renaissance era, “family businesses” such as the Medici in Florence or the Fugger in Augsburg held huge investments and production facilities across Europe and had agents in India and China by the end of the sixteenth century (Krasner, 1999, 221). From the sixteenth century on, the trading companies of the imperial powers such as the British East India Company and the Hudson Bay Company operated across continents (Held et al., 1999, 238–239). Similar observations hold true for advocacy groups held together by principled ideas and values. Precursors to modern transnational networks in the human rights and women rights areas include the campaign to end slavery in the United States during the early to mid-1900s (Kaufmann and Pape, 1999), the international suffrage movement to secure the vote for women in the late nineteenth century, and others (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, ch. 2). While these early transnational movements did not enjoy the Internet, their strategies were remarkably similar and sometimes no less effective than those of their modern successors.

If the phenomenon of transnational actors is not particularly new, theorizing about them has its precursors, too. Yet, scholarship on transnational relations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was more normative and prescriptive than analytical and descriptive. Take Immanuel Kant, for example. His 1795 “Perpetual Peace” which has become the mantra of today’s literature on the democratic peace, contains ideas on transnational relations (Kant, 1795/1983). His statement that the “spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later this spirit dominates
every people” (Kant, 1795/1983, 125 [368]) has been among the first claims about the causal relationship between economic interdependence and world peace. Kant’s cosmopolitanism was rather common among liberal intellectuals during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

While these scholars related the democratic organizations of polities, transnationalism, and peace, liberal writers of the nineteenth century such as Adam Smith or John Stuart Mill took up Kant’s ideas about free trade and peace. Schumpeter’s “Sociology of Imperialism” constitutes perhaps the most elaborate statement of the interwar period on the causal relationship between liberal capitalism, economic interdependence, and peace (Schumpeter, 1919/1953). Schumpeter reacted primarily to Marxist theories of imperialism, particularly Lenin’s writings, which made exactly the opposite claim. Lenin argued that wars among capitalist states were inevitable in a stage of development “in which the dominance of monopoly and finance capital has established itself” (Lenin, 1917/1939, 89). The controversy about the precise relationship between economic interests, capitalism, and economic interdependence, on the one hand, and aggressive/imperialist foreign policies as well as peace and war, on the other, continues until today (see Chapter 23 by Levy and Chapter 29 by Milner in this volume).

With the emergence of international relations as a social science discipline, scholars increasingly employed analytical rather than normative arguments. David Mitrany argued in 1943 that technology and technical issues confronting the industrialized democracies in the twentieth century necessitated international cooperation along functional lines (Mitrany, 1966/1943). After World War II, regional integration theory (Haas, 1958) reformulated the argument, claiming that rational economic behavior not only leads to transnational interdependence, but also to the creation of supranational institutions as stable peace orders such as the European Community. Karl W. Deutsch and his colleagues argued that increasing transaction flows and cross-border communication as facilitated by trade, migration, tourism, educational exchanges, and the like, lead to a sense of community among people, to collective identification processes, and to the emergence of security communities (Deutsch et al., 1957; see Adler and Barnett, 1998).

Explicit analytical work on transnational actors and relations started during the late 1960s and early 1970s, both in the United States and in Europe (Cooper, 1968; Vernon, 1971; Kaiser, 1969). In 1971, the journal International Organization followed suit with a special issue edited by Keohane and Nye on “Transnational Relations and World Politics” (Keohane and Nye, 1971a). These and other works challenged the state-dominated view of world politics. James Rosenau, in particular, promoted the “transnationalization of world politics” (Rosenau, 1980).

The 1970s also saw a revival of critical political economy attacking transnational economic relations in general and the role of multinational corporations in particular with regard to the North–South relationship. Dependency theory argued against liberal free trade economists, claiming that underdevelopment results from the structural dependency and the integration of the developing world in the world economy (see Chapter 31 by Hönke and Lederer in this volume). Dependency theory constituted the first major contribution to the subject of transnational relations by Latin American, African, and Asian scholars, even though most of its propositions could not be confirmed empirically (see, e.g., Caporaso, 1978; Menzel, 1992).

But liberal arguments about transnational relations of the 1960s and 1970s claiming an end of the state-centered view of world politics did not survive the counterattack of realism. In the 1971 “Transnational Relations and World Politics” volume, Robert Gilpin had already argued that MNCs were primarily an instrument of American foreign policy and power, not the other way round (Gilpin, 1971, 1975). The late 1970s and
early 1980s then saw a revival of (neo) realist theory (Waltz, 1979). Hegemonic stability theory was the realist response to the liberal interdependence arguments. The result was rather profound, particularly in the United States. The original connection between transnationalism and international institution-building, according to which transnational interdependence had to be regulated by international institutions (e.g., Ruggie, 1983; Keohane and Nye, 1977), was lost during the early 1980s when regime analysis and neoliberal institutionalism took off. The main controversy between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism concerned the prospects of “cooperation under anarchy,” that is, of cooperation among states (Baldwin, 1993).

Two developments of the late 1980s re-opened intellectual space for theorizing about the cross-border activities of nonstate actors in the United States and Europe. First, the late 1980s saw the beginning of what would later be called constructivism or sociological institutionalism in international relations (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Wendt, 1987; Kratochwil, 1989). Kratochwil, Ruggie, and Wendt drew attention to the social and ideational rather than simply material structure of international relations (for the most comprehensive statement, see Wendt, 1999; see Chapter 5 by Adler in this volume). Second, the end of the Cold War should not be underestimated in its impact on international relations theorizing. It pushed many scholars away from structuralist theories such as realism and state-centered institutionalism to a renewed appreciation of domestic politics, on the one hand, and of transnational relations, on the other.

The 1990s saw a revival of theorizing about transnational actors, a trend which was further enhanced by the debate on “globalization.” Rosenau’s book Turbulence in World Politics constituted a sweeping statement on post-international politics (Rosenau, 1990, 11; also Rosenau, 1997). A 1992 special issue of International Organization elaborated the notion of knowledge-based transnational “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1992b). A 1995 volume (Risse-Kappen, 1995b) argued that the impact of TNA on outcomes depends on the domestic structures of the polity to be affected and the extent to which TNAs operate in an environment regulated by international institutions. Margret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink then developed the concept of transnational advocacy networks and explored their impact in the human rights and environmental areas (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

Compared to the attempts of the 1970s, these moves of “bringing transnational relations back in” (Risse-Kappen, 1995b) shared three characteristics:

1. While the empirical literature on transnational relations of the 1970s largely concentrated on MNCs, this focus on the international political economy has now been taken over by the literature on globalization (see Chapter 16 by Zürn in this volume). The transnationalism of the 1990s and early 2000s examines more thoroughly the transnational nonprofit sector, such as “epistemic communities,” value-based advocacy networks, INGOs, and transnational social movements.

2. The recent literature is much more about the interaction between states and transnational actors than about replacing a state-centered view with a society-dominated perspective. One indicator of this trend is the increasing replacement of traditional regime analysis with its focus on interstate institutions by a governance perspective emphasizing networks among public and transnational actors (see, e.g., Czempiel and Rosenau, 1992; Kohler-Koch, 1998; Cutler et al., 1999; O’Brien et al., 2000; Grande and Pauly, 2005; Schuppert and Zürn, 2008; Kahler, 2009b; Avant et al., 2010b).

3. As mentioned above, constructivism and sociological institutionalism have influenced scholarship on transnational relations. This resulted in work focusing on transnational actors promoting and diffusing causal knowledge (epistemic communities) and norms (advocacy networks). In 2010, the turf warfare between rationalism and constructivism was largely over, however, giving rise to more synthetic approaches from a variety of methodological orientations.
TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS AND INTERSTATE RELATIONS

There is an important difference between scholarly controversies of the 1990s and 2000s as opposed to those of the 1970s and 1980s. Most of the contemporary work in international affairs does not dispute that transnational actors influence international politics (compare, e.g., Waltz, 1979 with Krasner, 1999). Rather, current scholarship focuses on the conditions under which these effects are achieved, and most of the controversies center around the significance of these intervening factors.

I begin by discussing the TNA impact on traditional international relations as interstate affairs. First, I look at the controversy about MNCs as sources of policy convergence and of a “race to the bottom.”

Multinational corporations: race to the bottom or to the top?

As mentioned above, both the liberal and the critical-Marxist literature on transnational relations of the 1970s focused on the role of MNCs in world politics. At the time, the main controversies centered on the question of whether MNCs contributed to or hindered economic development (overview in Gilpin, 1987, ch. 6, 7). Realists argued that MNCs were irrelevant for development, since national government remained largely in control of development policies, even in the less developed world (e.g., Krasner, 1978). Liberals and modernization theory claimed that MNCs had an overall positive effect on economic modernization by guaranteeing an open world economy based on free trade and by exporting capital, know-how, and modern values into less developed countries (see Huntington, 1968 for an early statement). Critical theorists, particularly “dependistas,” maintained that, on the contrary, MNCs were among the main culprits of uneven development by essentially extracting resources from developing countries which were desperately needed for economic development (see Chapter 31 by Hönke and Lederer in this volume).

Twenty years later, this controversy has largely disappeared. The differentiation process among developing countries led to functionally equivalent paths to economic development (compare, e.g., the Latin American experience with South East Asia’s experience; see Menzel, 1992). In the 2000s, the Newly Industrializing Countries and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) can no longer be treated as the periphery of the industrialized North. As a result, it is impossible to sustain a unifying theory of MNC impact on economic development such as claimed by either modernization or dependency theorists. The MNC impact on development varies enormously depending on social, political, and cultural structures in target countries (Clark and Chan, 1995; see Chapter 31 by Hönke and Lederer in this volume).

As a result, the debate about the MNC impact on world politics since the 1990s has largely taken place in the context of discussions about “globalization” and internationalization (see Held et al., 1999, ch. 5). This controversy is far from over, since the very notion of “globalization” is heavily contested in the literature. There is widespread agreement that the ability of MNCs to shift production elsewhere and their capacity to allocate financial and other resources to places which promise the highest profit rates severely circumscribe the autonomy of national governments to take economic decisions. The more a national economy is integrated into global markets, the higher the costs of a national economic policy which is not oriented toward liberalizing markets but toward expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to create full employment. The result is a growing convergence of national economic policies toward neoliberalism and monetarism (Strange, 1996). Following this line of argument, the impact of MNCs on national policies and on international institutions would be to contribute to a regulatory
“race to the bottom” (e.g., Bhagwati and Hudec, 1996; Murphy, 2000; Lofdahl, 2002).

Critical theory in the neo-Gramscian tradition agrees with the overall description of these trends, but explains it differently. Gill and others see an emerging transnational “historic bloc” establishing the hegemony of transnational mobile capital and relevant capitalist classes. The industrialized nation-states have not been passive by-standers of these trends, but have actively encouraged and contributed to it through, for example, the liberalization of capital markets and the encouragement of foreign direct investments (FDI). At the same time and with the demise of Keynesianism, neoliberalism became the dominant ideology of how to run a national economy, shaping the worldviews of transnational elites, policy-makers, and other actors (Gill, 1995; Gill and Law, 1993). In the neo-Gramscian view, it is this confluence of modes of production (transnational), international and national institutions, and dominant ideas which constitutes transnational global hegemony.

The empirical literature on globalization and the role of MNCs in the international economy has started tackling these questions and, as a result, a more differentiated picture emerges. The scholarly discussion has moved toward specifying the conditions under which MNCs are likely to contribute to a regulatory “race to the bottom” or – on the contrary – might actually help in fostering social and environmental regulations in weakly regulated countries (e.g., Vogel, 1995; Flanagan, 2006). The latter literature argues that MNCs would seek higher rather than lower regulatory standards (overview in Börzel et al., 2011). Global firms increasingly operate in socially embedded markets and are confronted with customers and stakeholders who care about their social and environmental impact. At this point, the literature on the MNC impact on international relations connects with the scholarship on a different type of nonstate actors, namely, advocacy networks and NGOs.

The power of principles and knowledge: transnational advocacy networks and INGOs

In parallel to and accompanying the increasing institutionalization and legalization of world politics, we observe an enormous growth of the transnational NGO sector from about 200 in 1909 to more than 20,000 in 2005, while the number of NGOs with consultative status at the United Nations increased from a few dozen in 1945 to about 3,300 at the end of 2009 (data according to Transnational NGO Initiative, 2010, 2; also Sikkink and Smith, 2002). Most of the growth occurred from the 1970s on. Since the early 1990s, a consensus has emerged in the literature that transnational advocacy networks (TANs), (I)NGOs, transnational social movements (TSM), and other nonprofit actors make a difference in world politics, particularly with regard to the emergence, creation, and implementation of international norms.

The literature has moved toward specifying the conditions under which both domestic and transnational mobilization influence state policies, the creation of international norms, and the diffusion of these norms into domestic practices. At the same time, NGOs especially have become the subject of critical scrutiny. Scholars have begun to challenge the view that NGOs are simply “forces for good,” have criticized their legitimacy, have pointed out their potential harmful effects on global governance, and have identified them with Western hegemony in the global system (see, e.g., Brühl et al., 2001; Bob, 2005; Jaeger, 2007; Mendelson and Glenn, 2002; Kennedy, 2004). Moreover, and partly as a direct result of the events following September 11, 2001, there is a growing literature using the tools of research on advocacy networks and transnational social movements to investigate the “dark side of transnationalism,” that is, transnational terrorist as well as criminal networks (e.g., Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Kahler, 2009a; Kenney, 2007; Sagemann, 2004; Schneckener, 2006;
While these and other works provide evidence that the power of knowledge and of principled beliefs matters in world politics for better or worse, the interesting question is why and under what conditions? The scholarship can be grouped under two headings, namely

- organizational characteristics and strategies of transnational advocacy;
- international and domestic opportunity structures, including complex models linking the two levels.

**Organizational features and strategies of transnational mobilization**

The first group of factors which scholars have identified as determining the impact of advocacy networks and organizations on state policies and international politics in general pertains to organizational characteristics and strategies of these transnational actors themselves. This is an area in which we can observe a growing convergence among different theoretical approaches, particularly moderate social constructivism, sociological institutionalism, and various rational choice concepts.

As to organizational features, institutional capacity as well as material and ideational resources are crucial factors in determining the effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks and movements. First, Keck and Sikkink pointed out that transnational advocacy networks “operate best when they are dense, with many actors, strong connections among groups in the network, and reliable information flows” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 28, 206–207). At the same time, centralization appears to be a mixed blessing. On the one hand, networks with strong central nodes and hierarchically organized NGOs (such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International) are able to react quickly to changed environmental conditions and to commit resources rapidly to new causes (Lake and Wong, 2009; Martens, 2005). On the other hand, research on transnational social movements (e.g., Della Porta et al., 1999; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow, 2005) demonstrates that, on the contrary, decentralized movements with many nodes are rather flexible to adapt to new circumstances. Research on transnational criminal and terror networks has also shown that these groups have adapted to state counterterrorism and anticrime strategies by quickly decentralizing, making it harder to fight them effectively (Kahler, 2009a; Kenney, 2009).

Second, professionalization is hugely important. The times are long gone in which (I)NGOs and TANs were mostly volunteer organizations, even though some of the most successful (I)NGOs such as Amnesty International combine the advantages of employing a professional staff (lawyers, country experts, etc.) on the one hand with a large membership of volunteers on the other (Clark, 2001). While service-providing NGOs have professionalized from the beginning, the same holds true today for more advocacy-oriented organizations, too (see, e.g. Martens, 2005; Prakash and Gugerty, 2010). One of the consequences of this professionalization is that both service-providing NGOs and advocacy networks tend to pursue more reformist rather than radical agendas geared toward a fundamental transformation of the international system. This trend is exacerbated by the fact that many more NGOs are services providers rather than pure advocacy organizations (see Transnational NGO Initiative, 2010; Lecy et al., 2010).

Third, material resources matter, of course. Funding for (I)NGOs and TAN is limited, be it public finances, foundation support, or donations from private citizens. Research adopting a collective action perspective shows that (I)NGOs especially tend to adopt product differentiation strategies and particular marketing strategies (e.g., “branding” and the development of core identities) in order to compete in a market of scarce resources (Barakso, 2010; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Gill and Pfaff, 2010). In some cases, this can have perverse consequences...
when, for example, NGOs become too dependent on foreign donors and lose contact with their local constituencies (see Henderson, 2010; Mendelson and Glenn, 2002 on the case of Russia). Moreover, many INGOs are more directly dependent on the “state world” than they would admit. Particularly in the issue-areas of international development and humanitarian aid, funding for the grassroots activities of INGOs originates to a large extent from public sources (see Hulme and Edwards, 1997, 6−7).

Thus, funding necessities might corrupt the primary mission of (I)NGOs and TANs to advance principled beliefs and international norms in search of funding. However, there is a “market correcting” mechanism in place if transnational advocacy groups or networks fail in their primary mission. If they are accused of making profits instead of pursuing their primary goals or if they compete too much over scarce public or private resources, this is likely to result in reputation loss which can have immediate financial consequences.

This leads to the fourth feature, ideational resources, which are constitutive for (I)NGOs and TANs and crucial for their effectiveness. The reputation of these actors and, as a consequence, their power and influence stems primarily from two sources, moral authority on the one hand and their claims to authoritative knowledge on the other. In the case of epistemic communities, it is primarily the latter which adds to their effectiveness (Haas, 1992b). With regard to advocacy networks, the two resources – moral authority and knowledge – go together and cannot be separated. Moral authority is directly related to the claim that these groups represent the “public interest” or the “common good” rather than private interests. The example of Transparency International (TI) indicates that ideational resources and knowledge might overcome a lack of material power and organizational capacities. TI was a tiny INGO with initially only few professional staff members which almost single-handedly put corruption on the international agenda, thereby creating a new international anticorruption norm (Galtung, 2000). The ability to convert moral authority and excellent knowledge of the issue-area into ideational power explains to a large degree why transnational advocacy networks sometimes win against materially far more powerful actors such as MNCs or national governments. At the same time, TANs and (I)NGOs can quickly lose their credibility if they are identified with special economic or political interests or if they manipulate knowledge claims.

Last but not the least, the effectiveness of transnational advocacy groups and activists depends crucially on the strategies used. Transnational networks as moral and knowledge entrepreneurs rely on social mobilization, protest, and pressure. On the one hand, they use strategic constructions such as the framing of issues or shaming in order to mobilize people around new principled ideas and norms (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998). Shaming strategies remind actors such as national governments of their own standards of appropriateness and collective identities and demand that they live up to these norms (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 23–24; Liese, 2006). Here, the logics of consequences and of arguing overlap (on the latter, see Habermas, 1981; Risse, 2000). Framing an issue constitutes a strategic construction, since language is used for instrumental purposes. The literature on transnational social movements in particular has emphasized that the effectiveness of framing depends to a large degree whether it resonates with prior beliefs of the target audience (Tarrow, 2005, ch. 4; Della Porta et al., 2006, ch. 3; in general, Gamson, 1992; Checkel, 2001). Resonance, however, requires that a frame be persuasive. Here, the “power of the better argument” comes in. Advocacy networks and epistemic communities need to justify their claims and give reasons in order to persuade their audience to change their interests and policies. Ideational resources such as moral authority and authoritative claims to knowledge are crucial in that they enhance the persuasiveness of arguments. This discursive
power is key to understanding the effectiveness of TANs and (I)NGOs in shaping global norms.

Public communication as a crucial factor in explaining the effectiveness of transnational actors is also the decisive difference between advocacy networks, on the one hand, and transnational criminal and terrorist networks, on the other (see Kahler, 2009a; Kenney, 2009; Sikkink, 2009 for the following). Criminal networks are profit-seeking, and the condition for their success is their secrecy. For transnational terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, matters are more complex. On the one hand, carrying out terrorist operations requires utmost concealment in order to evade law enforcement. On the other hand, terrorist networks share with advocacy coalitions that they want to advance principled beliefs as a result of which they need to communicate in public. Establishing a global Ummah, for example, requires persuading at least parts of the (disenfranchised) public in the Islamic world. Terrorist acts are communication strategies directed both at the declared enemies and at audiences which one wants to persuade.

**International and domestic opportunity structures**
The effectiveness of transnational advocacy and campaigns not only depends on organizational features and strategies of transnational actors themselves, but also on international and domestic conditions. Social movement research calls this “opportunity structures” (Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam et al., 1996; Tarrow, 2005, ch. 2). I now turn to scholarship which has investigated both the international and domestic scope conditions under which transnational advocacy achieves its objectives.

To begin with, realist-inspired authors essentially argue that only great powers enjoy the ability and capacity of affecting outcomes in world politics, as a result of which transnational actors need to influence their decisions and policies in order to make a difference (e.g., Krasner, 1995). While it certainly helps if the governments of great powers start promoting the goals of transnational advocacy networks, this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for their impact. On the contrary, there are many instances in which transnational advocacy has been successful in creating and establishing new international norms by aligning with small states rather than great powers. Prominent examples include the 1984 international Convention Against Torture (Clark, 2001; Korey, 1998), Simmons, 2009, ch. 7), the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Holzscheiter, 2010; Simmons, 2009, ch. 8), the 1997 Ottawa Treaty Banning Anti-Personnel Mines (Price, 1998), the 2000 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (Deitelhoff, 2006, 2009; Busby, 2010), the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (Petrova, 2007), and others.

These examples also point to a significant international opportunity structure enabling transnational advocacy to have an impact. I have argued in my earlier work (Risse-Kappen, 1995a) that TANs are expected to increase their political influence the more they act in an international environment, which is heavily structured by international institutions (see also Tarrow, 2005, ch. 2). International organizations, for example, provide arenas enabling regular interactions between advocacy networks and state actors. In some cases, they actively encourage (and even finance) INGOs and other transnational coalitions. The European Commission, the World Bank, and the developmental sector in general are cases in point (Chabbott, 1999). The collaboration between the World Bank and the INGO world did not result in a less contentious relationship between the two, even though sharp divisions among INGOs emerged concerning how far one should cooperate with the World Bank (O’Brien et al., 2000). The United Nations system provides another arena for INGO participation. The UN World Conferences in particular have served as important focal points for the activities of transnational advocacy networks (Clark et al., 1998; Joachim, 2003, 2007;
Weiss and Gordenker, 1996). Moreover, the UN and its various organizations increasingly serve as fora where transnational actors and state officials regularly meet and interact (see, e.g., Willetts, 1996; Finger, 1994).

We need to differentiate among various phases in the international policy cycle, such as agenda setting, international norm creation, and norm implementation. It is safe to argue that ceteris paribus the influence of transnational advocacy networks has always been greatest during the agenda-setting or “norm emergence” phase of a “norm life cycle” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Since TANs and (I)NGOs provide moral authority and knowledge about causal relationships, they are particularly crucial when it comes to paradigm shifts on the international agenda. One can probably go as far as to argue that there has rarely been a new normative issue on the international agenda which has not been promoted by transnational advocacy coalitions, INGOs, or epistemic communities. In the international political economy, for example, an epistemic community put Keynesian ideas of “embedded liberalism” on the international agenda during the negotiations establishing the Bretton Woods system and the GATT (Ikenberry, 1993). In the environmental area, examples include the protection of the ozone layer, global warming, deforestation, wildlife conservation, and other questions (Haas, 1992a; Hurrell, 1992; Keck and Sikkink, 1998, ch. 4; Raustiala, 1997; Ringus, 1997; Litfin, 1994; Busby, 2010). Concerning human rights, the origins of almost every single post–World War II international human rights agreement can be found in the activities of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, ch. 2; see Chapter 33 by Schmitz and Sikkink in this volume). Examples from international security include the Geneva conventions, the nuclear test ban debate, and the treaty banning landmines (Finnemore, 1996, ch. 3; Adler, 1992; Price, 1998).

Yet, agenda setting does not equal norm creation. When it comes to international rule creation and international treaty making, national governments and IOs assume center stage again. During this stage of the process, INGOs and TANs need to work through governments or international organizations. In recent years, however, we have seen more and more attempts at directly including transnational actors in the very process of international treaty making. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is a case in point (Senghaas-Knobloch et al., 2003), but there are many more transnational PPPs engaged in rule making (Schäferhoff et al., 2009). I discuss this “rise of private authority” (Cutler et al., 1999) in global governance below.

As to multilateral interstate negotiations, the available evidence points to three potential pathways through which transnational advocacy networks influence them:

- through lobbying activities in the domestic society of powerful states such as the United States, thus exploiting “two level game” mechanisms and changing state preferences (see Busby, 2010, for a sophisticated argument on the success and failure of transnational advocacy networks);
- through coalitions with IOs, thus pressuring states “from above” and “from below”;
- through coalition building with smaller states, providing the latter with knowledge and “informational power” (see above).

Once international rules and norms are created and international regimes have emerged, these normative commitments need to be implemented in the domestic practices of states and societies. This is by no means an automatic process as numerous studies about rule compliance (or the lack thereof), and rule effectiveness reveal (Raustiala and Slaughter, 2002; Börzel et al., 2010; see Chapter 14 by Simmons in this volume). Transnational advocacy networks, epistemic communities, and (I)NGOs once again assume center stage during rule implementation. There are three reasons for this. First, the legalization process of international norms increases the legitimacy of those actors who demand compliance with them. International institutions and the rules emanating from them empower both domestic
and transnational actors in a differential way, thereby enhancing their moral and knowledge power. Second, IOs and state agencies often rely on the monitoring and information capacities of transnational networks and INGOs, because the former are bound by rules of sovereignty and of “non-interference in internal affairs,” while the latter can move more freely. This dependence on TNA expertise and information-gathering capacities is particularly pronounced in issue-areas such as human rights and the environment and probably most relevant concerning international regimes that lack adequate, detailed, and intrusive verification procedures (Haas, 1992b; Peterson, 1997; Smith, 1997).

Third, the vulnerability of states to transnational (and domestic) pressures increases the more they commit to international legal norms. Of course, international legal obligations such as the ratification of international treaties do not automatically lead to compliance, as numerous studies have pointed out (Hathaway, 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; for a systematic assessment, see Risse et al., 2013). But commitment does increase “target vulnerability” in cases of rule violations because of reputational concerns. States or international organizations become vulnerable to transnational pressures, because they want to be members of the international community “in good standing.”

The discussion about compliance already points to the fact that transnational networks not only target international institutions and IOs, but more often than not national governments and their policies. One prominent proposition which has been evaluated extensively claims that differences in domestic structures explain the variation in transnational policy influence (Risse-Kappen, 1995a; Evangelista, 1997; see also Tsebelis, 1999 on the role of veto players).

Note that the domestic structure argument is not synonymous with the distinction between liberal democracies and autocratic systems. Democratic systems certainly provide ample opportunities for transnational actors to get access and to flourish. But they also have comparatively high requirements for winning coalitions to shape policies. Take the case of the United States as one of the most open and pluralist democracies on the globe. One of the most comprehensive and global advocacy campaigns – the transnational campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines – was crucial in bringing about an international treaty (Price, 1998). But it failed miserably to change U.S. policies in its country of origin. The same holds true for the International Criminal Court (Deitelhoff, 2006; Busby, 2010). In contrast, transnational advocacy networks promoting nuclear arms control and disarmament had enormous difficulties to gain access to the Communist Soviet Union. After the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev, however, they helped shaping the policies of the new leadership and thus to bring about the end of the Cold War, as Matthew Evangelista has documented in detail (Evangelista, 1999).

But domestic institutional structures do not tell the whole story about transnational impact, since some networks operating in the same institutional context succeed, while other do not (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 202). Constructivist insights help solving the puzzle of why some transnational advocacy successfully influences changes in state policies, while others fail, despite similar institutional conditions. A “resonance” hypothesis has been developed by students of international norms trying to explain their differential diffusion in domestic practices (e.g., Checkel, 2001; Cortell and Davis, 2000; Busby, 2010); The more new ideas promoted by transnational coalitions resonate with preexisting collective identities and beliefs of actors, the more policy influence they will have. Cornelia Ulbert has used this proposition to show why ideas about climate change resonated much more with preexisting beliefs about environmental change and the precautionary principle in Germany than in the United States (Ulbert, 1997), while Anja Jetschke has made a similar argument in her study of human rights changes in the Philippines as compared to Indonesia.
(Jetschke, 1999, 2010; see also Evangelista, 1999, about the differential impact of transnational advocacy networks between Brezhnev and Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union).

But the “resonance hypothesis” is not unproblematic. Most transnational advocacy coalitions are in the business of framing and strategic constructions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 269–275; see above). They deliberately make new ideas and principled beliefs “resonate” with preexisting and embedded norms and collective understandings. It is very hard to predict beforehand which of these new ideas will carry the day. Joshua Busby’s book about “moral movements and foreign policy” develops a potential way out by combining framing theory with Tsebelis’ argument about veto players (Busby calls them “gatekeepers”; see Busby, 2010, ch. 2). Busby suggests that transnational advocacy is more likely to succeed the more their frames and strategic constructions resonate with the values of a given society and the less gatekeepers have to be persuaded in a political system. He thereby combines a constructivist approach with the domestic structure argument mentioned above.

**Toward complex models of transnational advocacy impact**

Recently, scholars have advanced complex models of TAN and (I)NGO impact integrating international and domestic levels. This work is particularly relevant for the study of transnational influence on norm implementation and compliance. Scholars have started specifying the conditions and causal mechanisms by which transnational advocacy networks manage to link the “global” and the “local” levels. Keck and Sikkink have pioneered this work by introducing the so-called “boomerang effect” to show how domestic and transnational social movements and networks unite to bring pressure “from above” and “from below” on authoritarian governments to accomplish norm change (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 12–13; similarly Brysk, 1993; Klotz, 1995; see Chapter 33 by Schmitz and Sikkink in this volume). A “boomerang” pattern of influence exists when domestic groups in a repressive state bypass their government and directly search out international allies to bring pressure on their states from outside. National opposition groups and social movements link up with transnational networks, which then convince international human rights IOs and Western states to pressure norm-violating states.

Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink have developed a five-phase dynamic model of human rights change consisting of several “boomerang throws” (Risse et al., 1999; see also Risse et al., 2013) and specifying the conditions under which links between domestic opposition groups and transnationally operating networks produce change toward domestic norm implementation and compliance. The “spiral model” of human rights change claims that the mobilization activities of transnational advocacy networks are particularly significant in the early stages of the process when domestic groups in the repressive state are too weak or too oppressed to constitute a serious challenge to the regime. The more the government is under pressure “from above” and “from below” and forced to make tactical concessions to its critics, the more the center of activities shifts from the transnational to the domestic level. The spiral model has been successfully evaluated for the issue-areas of human rights and the international environment and has been applied to multinational corporations, too (Jetschke and Liese, 2013; Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2013; Kollman, 2008). Moreover, the “quantitative turn” in human rights research has recently corroborated the findings of such complex models linking the international and the domestic levels (e.g., Simmons, 2009, 2013; Clark, 2013).

Work on these micro-mechanisms and TAN strategies has evolved considerably over the past fifteen years. Methodologically, it has brought together comparative case study work and large-N quantitative studies. Theoretically, it has overcome the divisions between rational choice approaches and those
committed to social constructivism and/or sociological institutionalism. But the “dependent variable” of this scholarship has remained the same: It investigates the impact of transnational advocacy on state policies and international institutions and is thus committed to a rather traditional view of international relations in which the main actors are states and international (interstate) organizations. This view has changed in recent years.

TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN WORLD POLITICS

Probably the most important innovation in research on transnational actors since the mid-1990s focuses on their direct participation in global governance, understood here as the various institutionalized modes of regulating social issues and/or of providing collective goods (Mayntz, 2002; see also Benz et al., 2007; Czempiel and Rosenau, 1992). This “governance turn” in international relations shows transnational actors as active “governors” in world affairs (on this term, see Avant et al., 2010a). It represents a rather fundamental challenge to the prevailing view in the field of international relations, which has long treated states and their interactions as the primary governance mechanisms in world politics. The research reviewed above focuses on transnational actors, but without questioning that states are the ones doing the governing in global affairs. The “governance turn,” while not denying that states remain significant actors in world politics, sheds new light on the governance contributions of nonstate actors.

When nonstate actors become involved in governance, they directly participate in norms making and rule making or in the provision of public services – be it through various cooperative arrangements with state actors (e.g., PPPs, see Börzel and Risse 2005; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Rosenau, 2000) or through private regulations (see Cutler, 2003; Cutler et al., 1999; Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Noortmann and Ryngaert, 2010). The following figure depicts these various forms – ranging from co-optation of nonstate actors in public decision making via public–private co-regulation to private self-regulation (see Figure 17.1). It is important to note in this context that private self-regulation without any public involvement is still the exception rather than the rule in transnational governance (e.g., in standard setting, see Prakash

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**Figure 17.1** Forms of transnational governance. (Source: Börzel and Risse, 2005)
and Potoski, 2010; Internet governance, see Cowhey and Mueller, 2009; merchant law, see Cutler, 2003; or aspects of global financial regulations, see Mosley, 2009). Far more common are various forms of public–private co-regulation or co-provision of public services and common goods.

The early literature on transnational governance took a rather normative view on the subject matter, either praising the inclusion of nonstate actors in governance as substantial progress in world affairs (e.g., Reinicke, 1998; Kaul et al., 1999) or condemning it as another example of the pervasive nature of privatization and the deregulation of (world) politics in general (e.g., Altvater and Mahnkopf, 2002; Brühl et al., 2001; Levy and Newell, 2002). In the meantime, a more differentiated picture is emerging and scholars increasingly explore scope conditions under which nonstate actors can contribute to the effectiveness and problem-solving capacity of transnational governance. This scholarship includes studies on transnational security governance, including private military companies (Krahmann, 2005; Avant, 2005; Bailes and Frommelt, 2004; Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010; Singer, 2003; Hauffler, 2010), environmental governance (Andonova et al., 2009; Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009; Prakash, 2000; Kollman and Prakash, 2001; Prakash and Potoski, 2006), human rights, particularly social rights (Alston, 2005; Clapham, 2006; Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2013; Hurd, 2003; Jenkins et al., 2002; O’Rourke, 2006), public health (Buse and Harmer, 2007; Schäferhoff, 2011), and development in general (Beisheim et al., 2008; Bull and McNeill, 2007; Dingwerth, 2008; Liese and Beisheim, 2011; Prieto-Carron et al., 2006) – and this is just a small sample of an ever-growing literature.

Despite all these scholarly efforts, we still know little about the effectiveness of transnational governance, especially when compared with traditional interstate regimes. Moreover, we know much more about successful examples of transnational governance such as the World Commission of Dams (Khagram, 2004; Dingwerth, 2007), the Forest Stewardship Council (Dingwerth, 2008; Cashore et al., 2004), ISO 14001 (Prakash and Potoski, 2006, 2007), or the Global Reporting Initiative (Flohr et al., 2010, 190–194) than about transnational governance failures. Nevertheless, these and other studies show at least that transnational governance involving nonstate actors matters increasingly in world affairs.

In addition, preliminary findings are worth mentioning here which particularly pertain to the governance contribution of firms, especially multinational corporations. The commitment of companies to global norms in the environmental, development, and human rights areas pertains to international “soft law,” including self-regulatory arrangements. Most firms are adamantly opposed to binding international treaties committing them to transnational governance. At the same time, corporate social responsibility has become a global norm over the past twenty years in that more and more firms subscribe to some form of voluntary arrangements in transnational governance. For example, 110,000 production facilities in 138 countries had received ISO 14001 certification in 2005 (Prakash and Potoski, 2010, 75), while more than 6,000 companies in 135 countries have signed up to the United Nations Global Compact (GC), among them a large percentage of the world’s largest multinational corporations.

The Global Compact commits firms to voluntary compliance with ten normative principles, including human rights, labor rights, environmental protection, and the fight against corruption. It has received its fair share of criticism for lack of effectiveness in the literature (e.g., Brühl, 2007; Bruno, 2002). More recently, a more nuanced analysis has emerged from various detailed empirical studies (e.g., Rieth, 2009; Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010; Mwangi et al., 2013). In general, these studies show that signing up to the UN Global Compact does increase the likelihood that firms – mostly multinational corporations with headquarters in the West, particularly Europe – develop human rights policies, particularly when they participate in national GC networks.
A study of more than 20 PPPs to implement the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) confirms the “legalization” hypothesis (Goldstein et al., 2000) according to which high levels of obligation, precision, and delegation of the respective norms should lead to better performance and effectiveness. Rule-setting and service-providing PPPs especially have been found to reach their goals more effectively the more institutionalized the arrangements are at the transnational level (Liese and Beisheim, 2011; Beisheim et al., 2008). Moreover, studies of transnational governance and voluntary self-regulation in the European Union (EU) show that these arrangements work particularly well in the “shadow of hierarchy” (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008; Héritier and Rhodes, 2011; Börzel, 2010), that is, if either states or the EU threaten nonstate actors with hard regulation.

However, there appear to be functional equivalents for either high degrees of institutionalization or the “shadow of hierarchy” induced by the state or by supranational institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2010). Studies of fighting HIV/AIDS and of controlling pollution in South Africa revealed that self-interested firms are likely to contribute to governance if their investment in human resources is otherwise threatened (as in the case of HIV/AIDS), if they produce for high-end markets (in the case of environmental protection), and if they cannot rely on the state to take care of the problem (Börzel et al., 2011; Thauer, 2009; Hönke, 2010). These and other studies show (e.g., Flohr et al., 2010; Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010; Zimmer, 2010; Sage, 1999) that multinational firms in particular are likely to contribute to governance and the provision of collective goods

- if they sell brand name products which benefit from strict social and environmental standards;
- if their major markets and home countries are highly regulated (Western) countries;
- if they see an economic advantage in having regulatory standards imposed on their competitors in a globalized market;
- or if they or their industry sector have been exposed to social mobilization and campaigns by transnational advocacy groups or NGOs.

Moreover, the laws and regulations of a multinational corporation’s home country often produce a “spillover” effect into weakly regulated host countries. A study by Prakash and Potoski showed that foreign direct investments from countries with high levels of ISO 14001 certification lead to high levels of such certifications in the host countries (Prakash and Potoski, 2007). Another study showed similar results for labor rights (Greenhill et al., 2009), which indicates some sort of “California effect” with regard to transnational governance (see above).

This emerging scholarship shows that the inclusion of nonstate actors in global governance is neither a panacea for curing all the world’s problems nor is it part of a neoliberal conspiracy to privatize international politics. Rather, a more nuanced picture emerges focusing on both scope conditions under which nonstate actors contribute to more effective global governance and on the causal mechanisms that produce these effects.

**CONCLUSIONS**

This survey of more than forty years of empirical scholarship on transnational actors demonstrates that the significance of cross-border interactions involving nonstate actors – multinational corporations, INGOs, epistemic communities, and advocacy networks – is no longer contested in an age of globalization. But it would be premature to proclaim the end of the interstate world as we knew it.

Three developments are noticeable in the course of the past fifteen to twenty years of research on transnational actors:

1. With (neo-)realism having lost its hegemonic position in – particularly – American International Relations, the study of transnational actors is no longer framed in terms of a society-centered
versus a state-dominated view of world politics. The contemporary literature focuses instead on complex interactions between transnational actors on the one hand and state actors on all levels of supranational, international, national, regional, and local governance on the other.

2. While the earlier literature on transnational actors – of the 1970s and then again of the 1990s – concentrated on documenting their impact on the interstate world, the more recent scholarship focuses on the inclusion and contributions of nonstate actors to global governance. Yet, the much-acclaimed (or much-criticized) "rise of private authority" in world politics is probably an overstatement. Private rule making and self-regulation of nonstate actors, especially companies, still represents the exception rather than the rule in world politics, while complex and cooperative governance institutions which include both nonstate and state actors are definitely on the rise.

3. The literature on INGOs, advocacy networks, and epistemic communities of the 1990s was strongly influenced by the simultaneous constructivist turn in International Relations theory. This changed during the 2000s. Transnational advocacy is no longer the domain of constructivist scholarship, but the contemporary literature on transnational actors uses both constructivist approaches and insights from rational choice. Moreover, studies of transnational governance are more often than not influenced by bridge-building efforts across paradigmatic divides (see Chapter 9 by Checkel in this volume). Similar bridge building can be observed with regard to methodology: During the 2000s, large-N quantitative as well as comparative case studies were employed to study the role of transnational actors in world politics.

As a result of these developments, the study of transnational actors has reached a mature stage of scholarship. It has become “normal (political) science.” In this context, I see three directions for future research: First, the study of transnational governance can learn from the earlier work on the impact of transnational actors on interstate relations and international institutions, especially with regard to the shift from explaining the emergence of international norms to the study of compliance (see Chapter 14 by Simmons in this volume). We still know relatively little about the effects of transnational governance arrangements that include nonstate actors on world politics and on problem solving on the ground. This calls for the study of scope conditions and causal mechanisms based on carefully selected comparisons, whether through large-N or case studies.

Second, an equally difficult problem concerns the legitimacy of the new modes of transnational governance (for different viewpoints, see Benz and Papadopoulos, 2006; Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Keohane, 2003; Wolf, 2000). This debate has a long history, starting with the first liberal thinkers on transnational relations, for whom these interactions were an unproblematic ingredient of liberal democracy and a guarantee for peaceful international relations. But, as Karl Kaiser had pointed out already in 1971 (Kaiser, 1971), it constitutes a problem for democratic accountability if transnational governance includes private actors – be they MNCs or INGOs – who are not elected and, therefore, not accountable except to their shareholders or their members. This issue has an empirical and a normative component. The empirical challenge is to investigate PPPs and voluntary self-regulation by non-state actors with regard to the degree to which they allow stakeholder input and participation (for preliminary findings, see Dingwerth, 2007; Schäferhoff et al., 2009, 465–468; Andonova and Levy, 2003) and to compare the results to the democratic legitimacy of conventional interstate institutions. The normative challenge is to evaluate the emerging transnational governance arrangements against standards of legitimacy and accountability of governance beyond the nation-state (see Chapter 3 by Hurrell and MacDonald in this volume).

Last but not the least, even the most society-centric work on transnational actors still takes consolidated statehood with full domestic sovereignty for granted, defined as the ability of the state to implement and enforce central decisions and the monopoly over the means of violence (see Krasner,
We might be puzzled by the rise of “private authority” in international affairs, but we assume that nation-states fully enjoy the ability to rule hierarchically and to enforce decisions. What, however, if “limited statehood,” that is constraints on the state’s ability to exert domestic sovereignty, constitutes the rule rather than the exception in the contemporary global system (see Risse, 2011b, for the following)? Fragile, failing, and failed states are only the tip of the iceberg with regard to “limited statehood” (Rotberg, 2003; Schneckener, 2004). There are very few failed states in the international system, but areas of limited statehood abound in that a majority of countries do not control at least parts of their territory or are unable to enforce rules and decisions in various policy-areas. Even the BRICS belong to this category (e.g., the Brazilian government has little authority in the Amazon region, while the Chinese government is unable to enforce its own environmental laws).

Yet, areas of limited statehood are not simply ungoverned territories or policy areas (see Krasner and Risse, in prep.; Lee, Walter-Drop, and Wiesel, in prep.). There is huge variation in the degree to which governance is taking place and collective goods are provided under conditions of limited statehood. Empirical evidence indicates that various governance configurations – which usually include external as well as transnational actors – provide these services. As a result, major distinctions of Western modernity start blurring in areas of limited statehood, for example, the distinctions between “public” (aka state) and “private” (aka nonstate) actors (see Risse, 2011a). In many instances, non-state actors contribute to the public good, while governments primarily work for private profits. “State building” as such does not do the trick in these circumstances, as the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan document. Rather, governance promotion should assume center stage in areas of limited statehood (Brozus, 2011). In sum, while the turn toward global governance in the field of international relations challenges the state-centered view of world politics “from above,” the problematic of limited statehood questions it “from below” – with major consequences for our theoretical, methodological, and empirical tools.

NOTES

1 For comments and critical inputs to this article, I thank Tanja Börzel, Beth Simmons, Christian Thauer, as well as the participants in my graduate seminar on “Transnational Actors and World Politics” at the Freie Universität Berlin during the summer term of 2011.

2 See my contribution to the first edition of this handbook (Risse, 2002).

3 On the “global governors,” see Avant et al., 2010b.

4 The literature on networks is huge (overview in Börzel, 1998) and usually distinguishes between networks, markets, and hierarchies.

5 I keep the following discussion short, since it is tackled in more detail by Zürn’s chapter (Chapter 16) in this volume.

6 See, e.g., Avant et al., 2010b; Arts et al., 2001; Boli and Thomas, 1999; Clark, 2001; Evangelista, 1999; Joachim, 2007; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002b; Klotz, 1995; Martens, 2005; O’Brien et al., 2000; Price, 2003; Risse-Kappen, 1995b; Risse et al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013; Simmons, 2009; Smith et al., 1997; Tarrow, 2005; Willetts, 1996.

7 ISO 14001 is the most widely accepted voluntary environmental management standard worldwide.


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