CHAPTER 5

Remembering Events

Learning Objectives

- Differentiate the declarative and nondeclarative forms of long-term memory.
- Explain the evidence supporting a distinction between semantic memory and the mental time travel of episodic memory.
- Understand the benefits of elaborative rehearsal in contrast to maintenance rehearsal for storage in long-term memory.
- Explain how levels of processing, distinctiveness, and relational processing influence long-term retention.
- Describe the encoding specificity principle and the kinds of evidence that supports it.

So far in this book, long-term memory has been described as if it were unitary. In the coming chapters, multiple systems of long-term memory are differentiated and described. Consider, for a moment, everything you need to know to be able to drive a car. You need to know what a car looks like, what a steering wheel does, and what the functions are of the two or three pedals on the floor, among other things. You need to know the rules of the road, the meaning of traffic signs, and the purpose of the solid and dashed lines on the streets. You further need several perceptual, motor, and cognitive skills to start the vehicle, put it in gear, steer, brake, and navigate your way to a destination. How does remembering any of this impressive array of knowledge depend on being able to recall the events that took place around you 5 minutes ago? Or events that were stored in long-term memory 5 or even 50 years ago? It turns out that long-term memory for such knowledge can be preserved even when memory for past events is severely impaired. Long-term memory seems to be partitioned into different systems that can function or fail independently of one another.

The present chapter considers how new events are learned—that is, how they are encoded and stored in long-term memory. Much is known about the operations that support the learning of new events. Next, the processes involved in retrieving or failing to retrieve events from long-term memory are discussed. Finally, the manner in which
retrieval cues enable the recollection of past episodes is addressed. Forgetting occurs when the available retrieval cues fail to activate available, but inaccessible, event representations. However, before beginning a detailed discussion of how events are remembered, the different types of long-term memory must be defined.

**TYPES OF LONG-TERM MEMORY**

Just as working memory involves more than one component, long-term memory does not appear to be unitary. Scholars disagree about the criteria that must be satisfied to conclude that there are multiple systems of long-term memory. Mathematical models, and related computer simulations, begin with the assumption that the fewer systems of memory, the better. Not only is a single long-term store a more parsimonious explanation of memory phenomena, but it surely is easier to model with the necessary precision of mathematics (Hintzman, 1990). The danger with the mathematical perspective is it overlooks the messy nature of biological organisms in the search for an elegant computer simulation.

From the perspective of evolutionary biology, however, fewer and better need not coincide at all. Different systems evolve precisely because they afford successful adaptations to the challenges posed by the environment. Just as with other characteristics of an organism, a novel system of memory shown by a subpopulation of a species will come to dominate if it aids, in some fashion, survival and reproduction. A separate memory system evolves when the functions of existing systems fail to meet the demands of a new environmental challenge (Sherry & Schacter, 1987). The danger with the biological perspective lies in needlessly cluttering our theories with a separate memory system for each seemingly separate memory phenomenon. The evidence favoring multiple systems is presented next, followed by some criticisms of how such evidence has been interpreted.

**Declarative Versus Procedural Memory**

Philosophers have distinguished between declarative and procedural knowledge—knowing what versus knowing how. Knowing the rules and traditions of baseball is not the same as being able to play baseball. Knowing how is often tacit or unconscious, whereas knowing what is explicit or conscious. As shown in Figure 5.1, memory theorists have proposed that the long-term memory store be divided into two major systems: declarative and procedural (e.g., Tulving, 1985; Zola-Morgan & Squire, 1990).

**Declarative memory** refers to knowledge of events, facts, and concepts—in short, knowing what the world presents to us. Declarative memory is sometimes referred to as explicit memory because one is consciously aware of the kinds of mental representations involved. It is possible to gain informational access to these representations and, in some cases, report on them verbally. In other cases, they are encoded as images that are difficult to verbalize but are consciously accessible nonetheless.

As shown in Figure 5.1, declarative memory, in turn, consists of two components. **Semantic memory** stores knowledge of concepts and facts. Knowing what a baseball is reflects conceptual knowledge. Knowing that Albert Pujols often hit baseballs over the
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outfield fence for a home run back when he played for the St. Louis Cardinals is factual knowledge stored in semantic memory. However, a memory of actually witnessing a home run by Albert Pujols during a particular game at a particular place and time is a memory of an event. **Episodic memory** refers to the recollection of events that took place at specific places and times in the past. Unlike semantic memory, the context of the memory is encoded in terms of visual-spatial and temporal relations.

Procedural or **nondeclarative memory** refers to the skills and conditioned responses that reflect knowing how to respond to the world. Procedural memory is sometimes called implicit memory because it uses mental representations that are not accessible to conscious reflection. Motor skills, such as running and typing, are familiar to all. One’s body knows how to run or type without the mind being consciously aware of the representations that do the work. In fact, attempting to become consciously aware of the steps involved in a motor skill, such as one’s tennis stroke or golf swing, can disrupt procedural memory. Thinking about it only gets in the way.

Not all skills are motor. Perceptual skills such as reading or appreciating the visual arts are also part of procedural memory. So, too, are highly cognitive skills such as writing or problem solving. In fact, procedural memory involves other kinds of behaviors in addition to motor, perceptual, and cognitive skills, such as conditioned responses (see Figure 5.1). A stimulus in the environment triggers a learned response, and this, too, is a form of procedural memory. Conditioned responses can be learned through operant conditioning, in which a response is associated with a stimulus by using rewards. A conditioned response can also be stored in procedural memory as a result of classical conditioning, in which a conditioned stimulus is associated with an unconditioned stimulus. For example, a classically conditioned fear response to lightning (conditioned stimulus) might develop because the thunder (unconditioned stimulus) that follows lightning automatically elicits fear (unconditioned response).
It appears that the different kinds of long-term memory are supported by different brain structures (Squire, 1992). For example, it is well established that the procedural memory pathways needed for classical conditioning of skeletal muscles are found in the cerebellum rather than in the hippocampal system used in the conscious recollection of events from episodic memory (R. F. Thompson, 2000). Furthermore, a rapidly growing body of research uses positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and lesion studies to isolate different brain regions for different kinds of nondeclarative memory. Learning sensorimotor skills (e.g., tracing a figure viewed in a mirror), perceptual skills (e.g., reading mirror-imaged text), and cognitive skills (e.g., solving problems) each involves a different neural substrate. Furthermore, the brain regions that mediate classical conditioning are different from those involved in operant conditioning.

**Types of Tests.** Explicit or direct tests require the conscious recollection of information—for example, when a person recognizes or recalls a past event. Implicit or indirect tests require the use of information stored in long-term memory, but not its conscious recollection, to improve performance (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Schacter, 1987). Perceptual priming is a good example of an implicit task that depends on nondeclarative memory. Priming is an increase in the accuracy, probability, or speed of a response to a stimulus as a consequence of prior exposure to the stimulus. In perceptual priming, a prior occurrence of the prime (e.g., the word chair) improves the chances of later perceiving a very brief exposure to the same word (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Repeating the typeface of a visually presented word similarly results in perceptual priming (Schacter & Tulving, 1994). One recognizes the word table more quickly if its prior occurrence appeared in lowercase letters (table) than if it appeared in uppercase letters (TABLE). Neuroimaging methods indicate that regions just outside the primary visual cortex in the occipital lobe support this kind of nondeclarative memory (Buckner, Goodman, et al., 1998).

**Interpreting Test Dissociations.** Tulving and Schacter (1990) argued that dissociations on implicit and explicit tests support the multiple-system viewpoint. To illustrate, one variable is the use of normal versus amnesic individuals. Amnesic patients forget recent or past episodic events, yet they still show priming effects right along with normal individuals (Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Shimamura, 1986). Warrington and Weiskrantz (1970) pioneered the use of a word completion test to reveal normal priming effects in amnesics. They first presented a printed list of words and tested the ability of amnesic and normal individuals to recall and recognize them correctly. They also asked the participants to complete a word fragment (cha__) with the first English word that came to mind. If chair appeared on the original study list and the individual completed the fragment as chair, then priming had occurred. Although the amnesic patients failed badly at recall and recognition, priming on word completion showed no decrement.
Milner (1965) discovered that H. M. could learn how to trace the outline of a shape while looking in a mirror rather than at the shape. Such motor-skill learning remained intact despite the anterograde amnesia for episodic events caused by H. M.'s brain surgery. Learning perceptual skills also may be preserved in amnesic patients (Moscovitch, 1982), as may learning a classically conditioned response (Weiskrantz & Warrington, 1979). When a flash of light is emitted just prior to the onset of a puff of air to the eye, both normal and amnesic individuals acquire a conditioned eye-blink response to the presentation of the light alone. Although the amnesic patients retained the conditioned response on a test 24 hours later, they had no conscious recollection of having gone through the conditioning experiment only 10 minutes after it was completed.

Drug-induced dissociations between implicit and explicit memory tests have also been documented. Drugs such as alcohol and scopolamine can produce amnesia for episodes that occurred during the altered state of consciousness. Despite this amnesia, the drugs leave unimpaired performance on implicit tests of procedural nondeclarative memory (Hashtroudi, Parker, DeLisi, Wyatt, & Mutter, 1984; Nissen, Knopman, & Schacter, 1987). Some controversial evidence even suggests that patients show priming effects for words presented to them while under general anesthesia. The words could not be recalled by the patients after the surgery. But when asked to free associate to a cue word, they responded more often with the words presented during anesthesia than did a control group not given the words (Kihlstrom, Schacter, Cork, Hunt, & Bahr, 1990).

A common characteristic of declarative memory is forgetting over time. Recognition of words presented in a laboratory setting shows significant forgetting over the course of 1 week. By contrast, priming in the word-fragment completion task showed virtually no decline in performance at all over this same retention interval. For pictures, which are generally remembered better than words, the duration of priming in nondeclarative memory is perhaps invulnerable to any forgetting over many years. In an extraordinary finding, Mitchell (2006) reported that a single exposure to a picture for 1–3 seconds in a laboratory caused reliable perceptual priming 17 years later! The implicit test required participants to identify a picture from seeing only fragments of it, similar to the word-stem completion task. Picture-fragment identification was more accurate for those who had briefly seen the picture once years in the past than for those for whom the picture was novel.

Episodic Versus Semantic Memory

To summarize (Figure 5.1), declarative memory consists of two subcomponents: remembering events and knowing facts and concepts (Tulving, 1985). Episodic memory concerns the recollection of events that took place at specific places and times in the past. Semantic memory concerns factual and conceptual knowledge about the world and the words used to symbolize such knowledge. Such memory makes no reference to specific episodes in time and space. Suppose that you spot a bicycle on campus. Recognizing the two-wheeled object as a member of a category illustrates the use of semantic memory; the concept and the word used to refer to the object are activated. If you begin to think about the properties of bicycles in general (e.g., they have two wheels, a seat, and handlebars), then you are still using semantic memory. If, however, you begin to recall the bicycle you received on your
sixth birthday, then you are using episodic memory. The specific memories you have of learning to ride it and the accidents you had with it are episodic memories located at places and moments in the past.

The anterograde amnesia case presented earlier in the chapter shows that episodic and semantic memory can be dissociated. H. M. showed a profound inability to store new episodic memories in long-term memory. However, his general knowledge of the world and his verbal abilities were not at all impaired. Intelligence tests provide a way to assess factual and conceptual knowledge along with word meanings. H. M. scored very well on an intelligence test, recording an IQ of 112; an average score is 100 (Milner, 1966).

Unlike H. M., most of us have the ability to store events from our lives in episodic memory and to retrieve those events later with reasonable accuracy. However, a highly unusual case of extraordinary episodic memory of autobiographical events has been discovered (Parker, Cahill, & McGaugh, 2006). For a woman identified as A. J., recollections of the past intrude on her daily existence in an uncontrolled manner. She spends large amounts of time recalling her past in great detail. For example, if given a date from, say, 15 years ago, A. J. can report what she was doing that day and the day of the week on which the date fell. She does this without using mnemonic techniques to improve encoding events into episodic memory (mnemonic techniques will be discussed later in this chapter). She does keep a diary to record her daily activities, but so do many others who do not show such a syndrome of heightened episodic memory.

The ability to recall events from one’s personal past, even knowing the days and dates of specific autobiographical experiences, is called **Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM)**. This form of superior memory is unique in that it is limited to personal experiences and does not depend on the use of mnemonic techniques for encoding and storing the information. As will be discussed later in the chapter, mnemonic techniques employ visual imagery and forms of elaborative rehearsal that greatly boost the power of encoding information into long-term memory. Individuals who practice these techniques can memorize vast amounts of seemingly random facts, such as street maps of entire cities, long lists of words, and the nonrepeating string of digits that constitute the exact value of $\pi$ to more than 20,000 decimal places (LePort et al., 2012).

In addition to A. J., 10 more cases of HSAM have now been identified through an extensive screening procedure that assesses memory for autobiographical experiences. LePort et al. (2012) checked for the accuracy of these recollections by using memory for public events. For example, some questions asked for the date of a specific publicly known event, such as when Jimmy Carter won the Nobel Peace Prize. In other cases, the event was given and they were asked to recollect the date on which it occurred. Those who passed this test were further examined with a 10 Dates Quiz—10 dates between the individual’s 15th birthday and the present were randomly selected. To pass this test, the person had to recollect a specific memory from the randomly chosen date, with points awarded for knowing the day of the week, accurately providing a verifiable public event, or providing a personal memory. Not surprisingly, the 10 cases selected with this screening procedure scored extremely well on
a standardized test of autobiographical memory (e.g., memories of one’s first day of school or one’s 18th birthday) that could be verified through friends or relatives. However, the HSAM cases did no better than control participants on other kinds of tests typically used in memory experiments, such as the digit span test and learning associations between pairs of words. A variety of methods were then used to examine possible structural differences in the brain for those designated as HSAM and normal controls. Several differences were found. Of particular interest, a network of neural regions known from past research to be involved in autobiographical memory revealed differences between the two groups. These included gyri of the temporal lobe and its anterior aspect known as the temporal pole, together with the parahippocampal area located adjacent to the hippocampus and the anterior insula of the right hemisphere. The reader can skip ahead to Plate 16 introduced later in the book for a view of the insula; it is identified in Panel (c) of Plate 16. As will be seen later in the chapter, these same areas become active when a person recollects an emotionally charged past experience (Fink et al., 1996). Another finding of special interest is that the HSAM cases exhibit superior white-matter tracts connecting different parts of the brain involved in autobiographical encoding or retrieval. LePort et al. (2012) suspect that the transfer of information among the connected areas of the autobiographical network works more efficiently in HSAM cases compared with normal controls.

Whereas A. J. experiences exceptionally detailed episodic memory, another case study reveals a stunning total absence of autobiographical recollection of a personal past (Tulving, 2002). K. C. suffered serious head injuries at the age of 30 from a motorcycle accident; the medial temporal lobes were damaged along with other regions of his brain. As with H. M. and other amnesics, K. C. showed little or any impairment in his general intelligence and language abilities. He could read, write, and play chess and card games, and he retained his ability to play the organ. Like H. M., he suffered from severe anterograde amnesia and could not learn new episodic or semantic information. However, K. C. also suffered from a highly asymmetric form of retrograde amnesia. He could not recollect any personally experienced events from his past, even things that had happened on more than one occasion. Even so, his semantic knowledge was for the most part intact. His general knowledge of the world as well as his knowledge of history, geography, mathematics, and other things learned in school was fine. Oddly, he knew many semantic facts about his life, such as his date of birth, his childhood home address, and the names of schools he had attended. Despite this intact semantic memory, he could not recollect any specific personal events or situations from his past. K. C. denied any sense of recollection of the past even when provided with extensive, specific information about events that had been part of his life. The most he could recall about his personal past was what had occurred a minute or two ago.

Another form of evidence in support of the distinction between episodic and semantic forms of declarative memory comes from the dissociation of two kinds of judgments made on a recall test. Participants are asked to make judgments about whether they know an event occurred in the past or whether they remember its occurrence (Rajaram & Roediger, 1997). Remembering means having recollections of personal experiences from the past through mental time travel—that is, taking the self back in time to relive specific episodes. Thus, when you recall the day you graduated from high school, you can mentally travel back in time and recollect particular events, people, and interactions involving you personally. Knowing refers to being aware of facts and concepts in the absence of personally reliving
past experiences. Knowing can take the form of a feeling of familiarity about abstract concepts or of being aware that past events happened without the mental time travel of re-experiencing them. You may, for example, know that a speech was made at commencement exercises, but recollecting the speech, or the face or name of the speaker, might not be possible. Knowing reflects retrieval from semantic memory.

Consider an experiment in which participants are given a list of words and then a recognition test is administered. Half of the items on the test are new and half are old. For each item the participants decide is old, they then introspect about the conscious experience associated with this decision and indicate whether they remember the item or simply know that it was on the list. Tulving (1985) introduced this procedure in an effort to measure episodic memory directly with “remember” judgments and to measure semantic memory with “know” judgments.

It turns out that remembering and knowing judgments are affected differently by variables that influence memory. For example, if an item is repeated in a list several times in succession, then the number of “know” responses is high. However, if the repetitions are spaced out so that several items intervene between each repetition, then the number of “remember” responses is high (Parkin & Russo, 1993). As another example, alcohol (Curran & Hildebrandt, 1999) and the anti-anxiety drugs called benzodiazepines (Bishop & Curran, 1995) reduce the number of “remember” judgments given to old items on a recognition test. But the drugs have no effect on the “know” responses. If one assumes that “remember” judgments reflect episodic memory, whereas “know” judgments reflect semantic memory, then such dissociations strengthen the case for a separation of episodic and semantic memory (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000).

**Criticisms of Multiple Systems**

An important theoretical debate in cognitive psychology concerned challenges to the hypothesis of multiple systems of long-term memory. Different processes operating on a single declarative memory system can also give rise to dissociations (Hintzman, 1990; Jacoby, 1983; Johnson & Hasher, 1987; Roediger, 1984). For example, Roediger and Blaxton (1987) observed that learners often initiate top-down or conceptually driven processes, such as focusing on ways to organize new information. Bottom-up or data-driven processes are forced by the stimuli or data themselves, such as whether the modality of presentation was auditory or visual. It may be that implicit tests, such as perceptual priming, are more affected by data-driven processes, whereas explicit tests depend more on conceptually driven processes. Thinking about the meaning of stimuli during their encoding, as opposed to their perceptual appearance, could affect only explicit tests because such a difference in the level of encoding influences the functioning of conceptually driven processes but not data-driven processes. Perhaps amnesic patients demonstrate priming effects in a word-completion task because such priming reflects data-driven perceptual processes. Thus, the conceptual-perceptual distinction provides an alternative interpretation of the data cited in support of multiple systems theory.

Jacoby (1991) further observed that the implicit tests of memory are not pure measures of nondeclarative memory. It is possible that one recollects having seen a prime earlier in the task, and so part of the facilitation could reflect episodic memory. Nor are explicit tests
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a pure measure of only episodic memory. For example, on a recognition test, one might call an item “old” because it seems vaguely familiar rather than remember it as having actually been on the study list. When an individual intends to recollect an event and experiences a subjective awareness of remembering, consciously controlled processes are at work. Automatic processes of familiarity from past exposure can influence memory without intention or awareness.

To illustrate, Jacoby, Woloshyn, and Kelley (1989) demonstrated that familiarity with a name from a recent past exposure can automatically cause one to categorize the name as famous, even though it is unknown. Participants are first read a list of names, while they either give the names full attention or divide their attention with another task. Next, they are asked to judge whether the names on a second list are famous or not. Some of these names are famous, and some are nonfamous. Some of the nonfamous names are repetitions of names heard in the first part of the experiment. When distracted in the divided attention condition, participants were likely to mistakenly think that repeated nonfamous names were, in fact, famous. One brief and relatively unattended exposure was all it took to trigger an automatic influence on memory.

These were important criticisms of the view that long-term memory consists of multiple systems. Still, it is unclear whether the processing point of view can accommodate all of the data set forth to support multiple systems theory (Gabrieli, 1998; Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 2000). On the other hand, it could be that some combination of these two perspectives will ultimately prove the most compatible with the data. Instead of a few memory systems, there may be dozens of processing components associated with specific brain regions (Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013). These specific brain regions could be activated in different combinations depending on the specific demands of a memory task, such as the distinction between conceptual versus perceptual processing. For instance, Cabeza and Moscovitch (2013) note that some of the medial temporal lobe regions supporting the declarative (episodic) system can also be observed as active in implicit memory tests. This could imply that explicit memory is also being recruited in the implicit task, since no memory test is entirely pure, as Jacoby (1991) concluded. Or the neuroimaging findings could suggest the medial temporal lobe sometimes is involved in implicit memory, contrary to the prediction of multiple systems theory. For now, however, multiple systems theory will be adopted as correct, or at least as the consensus position of the discipline. The terms semantic declarative memory and episodic declarative memory are used in the remainder of the book and are contrasted with different kinds of nondeclarative memory.

Mental Time Travel

Thus far, episodic memory has been treated as a system for recollecting events from the past. Tulving (2002) hypothesized that this same system provides the means for envisioning future events. It does so by retrieving relevant past memories and then embellishing them into plausible scenarios of the future. Mental time travel refers to the use of episodic memory to recollect past events and envisioning future events through reconstructive retrieval processes. The concept emphasizes the subjective experience of traveling backward or forward in time when engaged in episodic recollection or imagination. The case study of K. C. documented that memories for autobiographical experiences from the past
can be lost to amnesia even though knowledge of facts and concepts are retained. Of interest, K. C. also had difficulty imagining any future autobiographical experiences (Tulving, 2002). His capacity to travel forward in time to envision the future was just as impaired as his ability to recollect his own past.

The Default Network

As introduced in Chapter 1, the default network of the brain underlies our capacity for mental time travel. When the brain is not required to think about performing a specific task at the moment, the mind wanders or defaults to recalling events from the past or imagining possible future events. The default network is shown in Plate 3. This network works together with the superior occipital gyrus to construct a visual-spatial context for experiencing a past or a future personal event (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). The hippocampal region of the brain in the medial temporal lobe is crucial for retrieving the temporal and visual-spatial relations of events. Together with posterior regions of the parietal cortex and the medial prefrontal cortex, fragments of past episodes appear to be combined into a simulation of what might occur in the future. Unlike other cognitive processes identified with the default network, such as moral reasoning, mental time travel requires the occipital cortex to visualize the remembered or imagined event. Although Tulving (2002) viewed mental time travel as the function of episodic memory, semantic memory may also contribute general knowledge about the properties of events and help to guide the construction of future scenarios (Schacter et al., 2007).

One study asked participants to remember a specific past event, such as a birthday party, or to imagine the same event occurring in the future (Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007). The superior occipital gyrus, together with the default network of the medial temporal lobe, the posterior midline region of the parietal lobe, and the medial prefrontal cortex, were showed as having heightened fMRI activation for both the past and the future events. These regions were far less active when the participants imagined events involving a famous person, Bill Clinton, rather than the self. Even though Bill Clinton was a familiar concept in semantic memory and easy to envision, the network for simulating personal events was not relied upon in envisioning Bill Clinton at a birthday party. Similarly, Szpunar, Chan, and McDermott (2009) found that the mental time travel network was activated for envisioning a personal event in a familiar setting (e.g., the library) but not in an unfamiliar one (e.g., a bull fight). To summarize, the mental time travel network involves the occipital lobe together with the brain’s default network to construct our autobiographical past and future.

PROSPECTIVE MEMORY

Thinking about the future is a highly adaptive function of memory. On a daily basis, we are confronted with the need to remember to take some action in the future. Examples include remembering to go to class on time, remembering to meet with friends at a specific place and time this coming weekend, remembering to keep an appointment with a doctor or dentist, and remembering to take medications according to an exacting schedule. **Prospective memory** is defined as remembering to take some action at a specific time in
the future (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). It involves a plan or intention to do something at a relatively distant point in the future as opposed to immediately. Note that prospective memory differs in a fundamental way from the retrospective kind of memory discussed so far in the book. With retrospective memory, there is some demand made to remember information from the past. A test of memory, in some form, prompts a person to retrieve information from the past. For example, seeing a person at a party prompts one to see if the person can be recognized. An essay test given in class prompts one to recall information from memory. In the case of prospective memory, one must remember to remember without any kind of prompting.

Prospective memory is embedded in ongoing daily activities that demand attention. Thus, it is not usually possible to simply keep the intention to act in the focus of attention. Furthermore, everyday prospective memory provides a limited window of opportunity for initiating and completing the intended action. For example, the intention to pick up a child after school implies a window of several minutes in which the action must be taken. By contrast, an intention to pick up a prescription at the pharmacy allows a time frame of several hours. A failure of prospective memory can entail either forgetting the relevant time frame or forgetting the intention to act altogether.

How, then, do people remember to perform an action in the future? One possibility is that they continuously monitor for cues to take action. R. E. Smith (2003) had research participants make lexical decisions about whether letter strings presented on a continuous basis were either words (e.g., river) or nonwords (e.g., rovul). As a prospective memory task, they were asked to detect if the words matched any one of six predetermined targets. If monitoring for the targets consumed limited attention, then the lexical decision task should be slower. In fact, Smith observed lexical decision making was 300 milliseconds slower when engaged in prospective memory than when target detection was not embedded in with the lexical decision task. Monitoring puts one into an effortful retrieval mode to remember to act at the appropriate time. From a mental time travel perspective, one is always thinking about a specific future action.

Einstein and McDaniel (2005) observed that monitoring, while effective, is also costly to ongoing activities. They also noted that some participants in prospective memory tasks verbally reported that the intention to act just popped into mind at the moment needed. Because delays between forming intentions and the time frame when they must be carried out are often lengthy—days or even weeks—in everyday circumstances, focusing attention on continuous monitoring for opportunities to act as planned would seem maladaptive. A less effortful, spontaneous means of retrieval would avoid relying exclusively on monitoring. Several studies reported by Einstein and McDaniel showed that spontaneous retrieval provides another process by which to achieve prospective memory. It comes into play when attention is focused on the prospective memory target. For example, with only a single target word as opposed to six possible target words, lexical decision time was not slowed by a concurrent prospective memory task, and the target was correctly detected 86% of the time.

These two means of successfully remembering to implement intentions for future actions recruit distinct neural pathways. Holding an intention in mind and monitoring for the right moment to carry out a planned action requires top-down attentional control (McDaniel, LaMontagne, Beck, Scullin, & Braver, 2013). The anterior prefrontal cortex is
activated when a person is engaged in monitoring. By contrast, parietal and ventral regions of the cortex are associated with phenomena such as attentional capture, target detection, and episodic retrieval. These bottom-up processes underlie the passive route to prospective memory. Without attempting to keep the goal active and monitoring the environment, the intention to act just pops into mind. Some cue in the environment that had been linked with the intention to act can trigger prospective memory spontaneously. Brain regions that mediate the capture of attention, detecting stimuli in the environment, and retrieving information from episodic memory would support this bottom-up means of prospective memory.

Understanding and enhancing prospective memory can be applied to workplace settings. Serious mistakes in the workplace often stem from failures of prospective memory (Dismukes, 2012). In commercial aviation, for example, an alarm goes off in the cockpit in the event that the pilots forgot to set the wing flaps in the take-off position before advancing the throttles to gain speed down the runway. This warning averts an error of prospective memory that has been the cause of several airline tragedies. In medicine, failures to carry out an intended plan of action can have serious consequences. Dismukes (2012) cited the case of a surgeon closing an abdominal incision after a challenging operation; the patient returned weeks later to the emergency room with severe abdominal pain and an “X-ray reveal[ed] that one of the forceps used in the surgery was left inside the patient” (p. 215).

ENCODING AND STORING EVENTS

The three-store model assumes that encoding and storing events in long-term memory involves rehearsal. The nature of the rehearsal processes brought into play at encoding is critical, as suggested by Craik and Lockhart (1972). **Maintenance rehearsal** refers to recycling information within short-term or working memory by covertly verbalizing it. **Elaborative rehearsal** refers to linking information in short-term memory with information already stored in long-term memory. Elaborative rehearsal can take many forms. Organizing items into categories, associating items with other known information, and forming visual or auditory images of the items are examples of elaborative rehearsal. For instance, as noted in Chapter 4, it is easier to remember a list of words if one visualizes the object to which each word refers in addition to encoding the sound of the word itself (Paivio, 1971, 1983). Imagery works better for concrete objects that can readily be visualized (e.g., elephant) than for abstract concepts (e.g., gravity).

Mnemonic techniques designed to improve memory generally rely on elaborative encoding in the form of visual images (Bower, 1972; McDaniel & Pressley, 1987). Imagery has been recognized as crucial to memory from the time of the ancient Greeks. For example, the Roman philosopher Cicero recounted a story about the Greek poet Simonides, who delivered a long poem at a Roman banquet. On finishing, Simonides left the building just moments before catastrophe struck. The building collapsed, burying everyone in the rubble. According to legend, Simonides was able to survey the ruins and recall the names of the victims by first imagining where they had been seated.

The mnemonic called the method of loci (places) consists of identifying a sequence of familiar locations and then forming an image of each item to be remembered at each of...
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the locations. Once a clear image is formed, the locations provide a plan for retrieving the items. By imagining a walk to each of the locations in the sequence, one can remember the items (Bower, 1970). A demonstration of the method of loci is presented in Learning Activity 5.1.

Learning Activity 5.1 A Demonstration of the Method of Loci

The method of loci is a mnemonic technique that uses familiar locations as an aid to memory. To illustrate, first picture a sequence of 10 locations at home or on campus that you know well. Now, try to form an image with each of the following grocery items, placing one item at each location in order. For example, for the first item, you might imagine a banana peel on the front steps of your home. Try to create a distinctive image for each item and location.

Bananas  Olives
Lettuce  Bread
Crackers  Hamburger
Bacon  Tuna
Milk  Mustard

Now, close the book and try to recall the items by taking a mental walk to each of the 10 locations. Most people find it much easier to remember the 10 items when using this imaginal technique than when simply rehearsing the items repetitively using maintenance rehearsal. Recall from Chapter 4 how difficult it was to retain more than seven or so chunks of information. Yet most people find it easy to recall all 10 items using the method of loci, a type of elaborative rehearsal.

One reason for the superior recall produced by the method of loci and related techniques is that mental images provide a second code, in addition to the word itself, for the memory system (Paivio, 1971, 1983). Without forming a mental image of the words to be remembered, one is left with only a verbal code. Further investigation of imagery and mnemonics suggests that the imagery makes an event in memory more distinctive and, hence, easier to recall (Marschark, Richman, Yuille, & Hunt, 1987; McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). Mnemonics also benefit memory by providing a set of retrieval cues that match the cues encoded with the to-be-remembered material (Bower, 1970). Taking a mental walk with the method of loci is a retrieval plan as well as an encoding plan. Each location visited at the time of retrieval allows one to reconstruct the event originally stored there with relative ease.

Maintenance rehearsal refers to recycling information within short-term or working memory by covertly verbalizing it. Elaborative rehearsal refers to transferring information to long-term memory by linking it with information already stored there.
Craik and Lockhart (1972) made the strong claim that only elaborative rehearsal results in permanent long-term learning because of the need to analyze broadly and deeply the features of the stimulus. Because maintenance rehearsal merely recycles items in working memory, it presumably does not result in improved recall. Although early experiments supported this claim (Craik & Watkins, 1973), it became clear through further research that maintenance rehearsal helps memory to some extent, albeit much less than does elaborative rehearsal (Darley & Glass, 1975; Greene, 1987).

Levels of Processing

In Chapter 2, we examined how sensory and semantic features are analyzed during pattern recognition. Data-driven and conceptually driven processes rapidly and accurately identify the objects, events, and symbols of our environment. These perceptual processes operate automatically when attention is devoted to a stimulus and occur to some degree even when the stimulus is unattended. In memory research, levels or depths of processing refer to a memory superiority for events attentively processed at a semantic level as compared with a sensory level.

The usual procedure directs a person to attend carefully to either sensory-level features (e.g., Is the word in capital letters? Does the word rhyme with blue?) or semantic features (e.g., Does the word fit the sentence “He slipped on his ________”?). In answering these orienting questions about the word shoe, the focus of attention would be visual, acoustic, or semantic features. These three conditions reflect increasing levels or depths of processing. Recognition or recall of the target words is then tested. The results showed that visual and acoustic encoding is inferior to semantic encoding on memory tests (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Craik and Tulving (1975) interpreted this level of processing difference in terms of elaborative rehearsal. Semantic encoding produced a more elaborate representation of the target words in memory, which supported superior recall and recognition.

Is there an orienting task that produces maximal elaboration and memory? Some research suggests that processing the information in relation to our self-concept is superior, a finding called the self-reference effect. Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) found that when people asked whether a word applied to themselves (e.g., ambitious), later recall rose above that obtained for even the semantic-orienting task. The recall results for physical, acoustic, semantic, and self-reference levels of processing are shown in Figure 5.2. Of interest, the same outcome occurs when people make judgments about consumer products shown in advertisements (D’Ydewalle, Delhaye, & Goessens, 1985). Answering the question “Have you ever used this product?” supported greater recall of brand names than did a semantic-orienting task. Other evidence indicates that the key ingredient in this effect involves relating the information to highly developed representations in long-term memory, providing many links with well-ingrained information (Bellezza, 1986).
Recent findings suggest that self-reference may not be the single most effective way to encode a list of words. Nairne, Thompson, and Pandeirada (2007) proposed that long-term memory may have evolved in the ancestral past of human beings to retain information relevant to survival. Study participants were asked to pretend that they were stranded in the grasslands of a foreign country, without supplies needed for survival. They then rated the words presented in a list for their relevance to finding a source of food and water and to protecting them from predators. This survival-orienting task was then compared to a deep-encoding task that invokes emotional reactions to words (ratings of how pleasant the words are to the person) and to the self-reference task. A surprise free-recall test of the rated words showed an advantage for the survival processing compared with both the pleasantness and self-reference task. These results are intriguing and suggest that further examination of the adaptive function of long-term memory and its evolutionary origins is a promising direction for future research.

**Transfer-Appropriate Processing**

The principle of transfer-appropriate processing holds that test performance hinges on engaging in an encoding process that is compatible with the demands of the test. For
example, different kinds of studying may be called for depending on the nature of the test. Practice at generating and organizing ideas would be a highly appropriate way to prepare for an essay test, but such preparation might transfer less well to a multiple-choice test.

Morris, Bransford, and Franks (1977) found that the typical levels of processing effect can be reversed by picking a test that is appropriate to visual- or acoustic-orienting tasks. They showed that the overlap between encoding and retrieval processes mattered more than the nature of encoding, per se. For example, in one condition, participants were tested for recognition of words based on whether they rhymed with a word presented earlier, rather than on recognition of the identity of the word, as is typical. The authors found that rhyme encoding supported better rhyme recognition than did semantic encoding. Because rhyme encoding is appropriate for the rhyme-retrieval test, it transfers better than semantic encoding. The fact remains, however, that recalling or recognizing an event depends critically on its meaning—its semantic features. Because remembering an event requires the retrieval of semantic information, it is semantic encoding that transfers well to standard recall and recognition tests.

**Distinctiveness**

Plainly, the extent to which one stores information in an elaborate manner predicts how well it will be remembered. But why should elaboration have this effect? One part of the answer is that elaborative rehearsal results in learning the distinctive features of items (Hunt & Einstein, 1981; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). This kind of processing is concerned with item-specific information. **Distinctiveness** refers to how the items to be learned are different from one another and from other items already stored in memory. A highly distinctive representation is one that can be discriminated easily at the time of retrieval. The more the item stands out in memory, the easier it is to find.

Suppose that you are asked to memorize a list of nonsense syllables and one odd item: a number. People rarely forget the isolated distinctive number, an effect named after its German discoverer, von Restorff, and described in English by Koffka (1935). The power of distinctiveness can be seen in Eysenck’s (1979) variation on the levels of processing effect, in which he compared sensory- versus semantic-orienting tasks. His sensory task entailed attending to the sounds of words. In a distinctive encoding condition, Eysenck used unusual pronunciations of the words designed to produce a highly distinctive, albeit sensory, level of processing. Because the unique pronunciations stood out in memory, they were remembered just as well as the words processed with a semantic focus. Typically, semantic encoding produces greater elaboration, which in turn increases the likelihood of storing a distinctive code. Eysenck’s finding shows that it is distinctiveness, per se, that ultimately matters.

**Picture Memory.** It has long been known that people can recognize with a high degree of accuracy a long series of complex pictures, even if they have viewed each picture in the series for only a few seconds. People can discriminate old pictures from new ones nearly perfectly when there are hundreds (Shepard, 1967) or even thousands of pictures (Standing, 1973). The reason seems to be that the pictures used in these studies contained many highly distinctive features, allowing observers to discriminate one from another. However,
suppose that you must differentiate a picture of a particular $20 bill from a thousand other such pictures. When the pictures all relate to the same schema, there is no distinctiveness, and so recognition suffers (Mandler & Ritchey, 1977; Nickerson & Adams, 1979). This point is revisited after a discussion of the role of schemas in retrieval.

**Flashbulb Memories.** An especially intriguing phenomenon may also shed light on the power of distinctiveness. A flashbulb memory is a vivid recollection of some autobiographical event that carries with it strong emotional reactions (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Pillemer, 1984). Depending on your age, you might be able to recall clearly exactly what you were doing, seeing, hearing, and feeling on receiving the news that President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, that an attempt was made on the life of President Reagan in 1981, that the space shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986, or that the World Trade Center was destroyed by a terrorist attack in 2001. As Pillemer (1984) noted, “images of only a tiny subset of specific episodes—death of a loved one, landing a first job, getting married, hearing about public tragedies—persist over a lifetime, with little subjectively experienced loss of clarity” (p. 64). One explanation for why flashbulb memories are so well recalled is that they are highly distinctive events in long-term memory (McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988).

Some researchers have challenged whether so-called flashbulb memories are really more accurate than normal memories. For example, 2½ years after the Challenger explosion, participants in one study confidently recalled many details about the incident, but many of these recollections were inaccurate (Neisser & Harsch, 1992). Similarly, memories of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have not proven to be more accurate than memories of nonemotional events occurring about the same time (Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Others, however, have confirmed that flashbulb memories can, indeed, be real for many people so long as the precipitating events had strong personal impacts on them (e.g., Conway et al., 1994).

A recent comprehensive study of 3,000 people from seven cities in the United States examined 9/11 memories 1 week, 11 months, or 35 months after the attacks. The results seemed to resolve the controversy (Hirst et al., 2009). The study concluded that the rate of forgetting for flashbulb memories is similar to the rate of forgetting for normal memories regarding details of the event; both slowed after 1 year. During the first year, the loss rate was 20% or more, but thereafter the loss rate fell to only 5%–10%. In other words, episodic memory for the event—whether it was a flashbulb recollection or not—stabilized after a year. This finding indicates that, although the two kinds of recollections differ in vividness, they both are mediated by the same memory system. Furthermore, the investigation revealed that the strong emotional reactions of flashbulb memories do not hold up well over time; nonemotional features, such as where one learned about the attacks, were retained better than emotional features. The role that emotion plays in memory will be returned to later in this chapter and in the next.

**Synesthesia.** A bizarre demonstration of the power of distinctive encoding came from a famous case study. Over a period

Distinctive memory representations can be discriminated from other related memories. Strong recognition of distinctive pictures, and possibly flashbulb memories, illustrates the power of distinctiveness in enhancing memory.
of 20 years, Luria (1968) studied the memory abilities of an individual referred to as “S.” He tested S’s memory span for a variety of materials and found it remarkable and seemingly without limit. In Luria’s words,

I gave S. a series of words, then numbers, then letters, reading them to him slowly or presenting them in written form. He read or listened attentively and then repeated the material exactly as it had been presented. I increased the number of elements in each series, giving him as many as thirty, fifty, or even seventy words or numbers, but this, too, presented no problem to him.

The experiment indicated that he could reproduce a series in reverse order—from the end to the beginning—just as simply as from start to finish, that he could readily tell me which word followed another in a series, or reproduce the word which happened to precede the one I’d name. He would pause for a minute, as though searching for the word, but immediately after would be able to answer my question and generally made no mistakes. . . . It was of no consequence to him whether the series I gave him contained meaning words or nonsense syllables, numbers or sounds; whether they were presented orally or in writing. . . . As the experimenter, I soon found myself in a state verging on utter confusion. An increase in the length of the series led to no noticeable increase in difficulty for S., and I simply had to admit that the capacity of his memory had no distinct limits; that I had been unable to perform what one would think was the simplest task a psychologist can do: measure the capacity of an individual’s memory. (pp. 9–11)

Further testing only compounded Luria’s (1968) confusion, for it turned out that the duration of S.’s memory, as well as its capacity, seemed to have no limit. Some tests revealed error-free recall of word lists presented 15 years earlier! Moreover, S. could recall the context in which a list had been presented, describing the place in which Luria had read him the words, the chair in which Luria had sat, and even the clothes Luria had worn.

From early childhood, S. had experienced synesthesia, or cross-talk among sensory modalities so that sounds, for example, were experienced visually as well as aurally. Normal individuals experience mild degrees of synesthesia in that colors are reliably associated with specific pitches of sounds (Marks, 1987). The bright colors of yellow and white elicit high pitches, whereas the dark colors of black and brown echo low pitches. But S. experienced an extreme form in which tones and noises would be apprehended as “puffs” and “splashes” of color. He would perceive the “color” of a speaker’s voice, and each speech sound assumed a visual “form” with its own “color” and “taste.” Plainly, these images added a unique distinctive code to memory.

Relational Processing

Clearly, then, learning how items to be remembered differ from one another is critical for good memory. But there is more to good memory than item-specific processing. Relational processing refers to how the items to be learned are related to one another and to other items stored in memory (Hunt & Einstein, 1981; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). Instead of
detecting differences, relational processing looks for similarities. It has long been known that well-organized information is better remembered. A learner must discover the relations among items or, when none is apparent, create his own subjective relations.

**Category Cues.** Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) showed the power of organization in their comparison of free and cued recall. The participants studied a list of 48 words that came from several categories, such as tools, fruits, and vehicles. The words occurred in a random order, but the learners noticed the organization of the items nonetheless (see Bousfield, 1953). When asked to recall as many words as possible with no hints or cues (free recall), the participants clustered related items together—for example, apples, oranges, and grapes. More interesting, if the participants remembered a single item from a category, then they likely remembered most of the others. Conversely, if they forgot an item, such as “truck,” then the other examples of vehicles also were forgotten. In other words, the category served to organize their recall.

But only about a third of the words were remembered in free recall. Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) also provided some participants with the category names as retrieval cues. Remarkably, the cues roughly doubled the number of words successfully recalled. This result for cued recall shows the powerful effect of organization as an aid to retrieval. It also shows that events may be available in memory but inaccessible to recollection without the right retrieval cues. More is said about retrieval cues later in the chapter.

**Subjective Organization.** The tendency to cluster items from the same semantic category is, perhaps, not surprising. Yet organization plays a critical role in recall even when a clear basis for it is lacking. Tulving (1962) presented people with lists of unrelated words and tracked their free recall over a series of trials. As participants studied the words and attempted to recall them in whatever order they wished, each participant adopted a consistent pattern of output. That is, each person imposed a subjective organization on the words, recalling clusters of items in the same manner trial after trial, even though the clusters themselves were purely idiosyncratic. The more categories people used in organizing the study items, the better they did on both recall tests and delayed recognition tests (Mandler, Pearlstone, & Koopmans, 1969).

Organization (i.e., encoding the relations among events and prior knowledge) benefits both learning and remembering. First, the events may be chunked together during their storage (Mandler, 1979). Just as finding meaningful groupings increases learning on tests of short-term memory, the same effect may be seen in long-term memory. Second, organization provides retrieval cues that are vital to remembering (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). The categories imposed by the materials or by the learner serve as highly effective retrieval cues.

A detailed understanding of the neural networks underlying episodic memory is now beginning to emerge (Ranganath, 2010). As shown in Plate 8, the hippocampus, as noted
above, is a critical structure for the encoding and storage of new events. The information of items to be stored is represented in a specific context—at a time and a place. These representations appear then to be broken down into their components within a second structure within the medial temporal lobe. The perirhinal cortex is presumably dedicated to processing the specific items, while the parahippocampal cortex specializes in representing the contextual information. Together, these comprise the entorhinal cortex, which lies adjacent to the hippocampus in the medial temporal lobe. The representations from the two parts of the entorhinal cortex are then fed forward to the prefrontal lobe of the brain. The ventral lateral prefrontal cortex processes the item-specific information, while the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex handles the relationships among items. Thus, the item-specific processes that underlie the power of distinctiveness and the relational processing involved in the effects of organization on memory appear to be mediated by distinct networks within the prefrontal cortex.

**Emotion and Memory Storage**

Adjacent to the hippocampus is a brain structure called the amygdala. Following an emotional experience, the amygdala modulates the consolidation process through the action of adrenal stress hormones and several kinds of neurotransmitters (McGaugh, 2004). This occurs regardless of whether the emotion triggered by the experience is unpleasant or pleasant. In either case, the outcome is superior long-retention of emotional experiences. The amygdala achieves this effect by activating the hypothalamus, which in turn produces a cascade of hormonal responses that culminate in the release of stress hormones from the adrenal glands. These stress hormones in turn modulate or enhance the consolidation processes underway in the hippocampus. Research with the rat brain has provided a detailed animal model of how the amygdala strengthens the long-term retention of events that are emotionally arousing.

Neuroimaging studies in human beings have confirmed that the degree of activation of the amygdala during encoding and the early stages of consolidation is predictive of how well emotional stimuli are later remembered (Phelps, 2006). Recall that consolidation itself takes place over a long period of time and continues after the immediate effects of the emotional arousal and activity of the stress hormones. In a particularly intriguing study, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was taken while research participants viewed pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral pictures (Dolcos, LaBar, & Cabeza, 2004). The activity revealed by the fMRI was then compared for pictures that the participants were able to subsequently recall versus those that were forgotten. The activation patterns showed a neural marker for the successful encoding of the pictures into memory. Specifically, this marker was larger in the amygdala and hippocampus for the emotionally arousing pictures (pleasant and unpleasant) compared with the neutral pictures. The momentary interaction of neural activity in the amygdala and hippocampus led to the superior encoding and consolidation of the arousing pictures. As Phelps (2006) observed, the elegant experiments with animals strongly suggest that consolidation is affected by emotion, but relatively few studies with human beings have tried to tease apart the influence of emotion on consolidation, per se, independent of its beneficial effects on encoding. Furthermore, emotion seems
to facilitate the encoding of certain kinds of event features but not others, a topic that will be returned to in the next chapter in the context of memory distortions. For example, an eyewitness to a crime is often under emotional duress, which can produce a complex pattern of episodic recall rather than enhanced memory for the entire event. Also, as discussed in the next section, emotion influences the retrieval process of memory, which also must be considered.

RETRIEVAL PROCESSES

Forgetting may be caused by an inability to retrieve information that is available in memory. Such forgetting may reflect a temporary or even permanent lack of accessibility of information. This could arise because of interference from similar competing information stored in memory or because of a failure to activate the retrieval cues associated with the forgotten information. Contemporary research has focused on the cue-dependent nature of remembering and forgetting. It has emphasized how the context and knowledge related to material in memory play pivotal roles in successful retrieval.

To illustrate, recalling an event from episodic memory, such as one’s 10th birthday party, requires retrieval of the time, the place, and the circumstances of stored information. Retrieval can be an active process of reimagining the perceptions, the feelings, and possibly the thoughts about the event and its context. Being provided with a cue, such as a photograph taken at the party, can trigger a chain of recollections that at first seemed lost from memory. The cue activates related knowledge in long-term memory that eventually allows one to retrieve, or perhaps reconstruct, the needed information. What one knows about birthday parties in general affects both how one’s 10th birthday party was encoded and how it will be retrieved later.

Retrieval Mode

Retrieval involves at least two kinds of subprocesses (Moscovitch, 1992). On the one hand, there are the general operations involved in attempting to remember an event, and these are observable regardless of whether the search is successful. The effort to retrieve has been referred to as retrieval mode. On the other hand, there are the operations specifically associated with successful recovery of the event.

Several studies with PET and fMRI have shown that a region in the anterior prefrontal cortex of the right hemisphere is activated when an effort is made to retrieve an event (Buckner, 1996). This is not the only area activated, but it is the best understood to date. For example, as seen in Plate 9, strong PET activation can be observed in the right hemisphere in temporal regions in addition to the right insula and parahippocampal tissues when recollecting a highly emotional episode from more than a year in the past (Fink et al., 1996). As discussed earlier, structural differences in these regions appear to distinguish those with HSAM from those with typical autobiographical memory. In contrast to the right prefrontal and other regions activated in episodic retrieval, prefrontal regions in the left hemisphere are highly activated during the encoding of events into episodic memory. These activation
sites are summarized in Figure 5.3. Tulving, Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch, and Houle (1994) proposed the hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry (HERA) model to account for the neuroimaging findings. They drew upon past studies showing that the left prefrontal area mediates semantic encoding processes and suggested that these would be important for deeply encoding personal events into memory. By contrast, retrieval mode engages predominantly the right prefrontal region.

It is important to define operationally the concept underlying HERA as a difference between encoding activation versus retrieval activation in neuroimaging studies. Applying the method of subtraction, the appropriate control condition for retrieval is a task that requires encoding, as opposed to fixating on the center of the screen or resting, for example. The activation associated with encoding is subtracted from the activation obtained for retrieval. This difference score is claimed to be larger for the right prefrontal region in comparison with the left. The reverse procedure can be used to test the claim that the left hemisphere specializes in encoding information into long-term memory. The activation associated with retrieval is subtracted from that obtained with encoding. This difference score is predicted to be larger for the left prefrontal cortex, according the HERA model. In studies that have operationally defined the HERA concept in this manner, the results support its predictions for both verbal and nonverbal materials (Habib, Nyberg, & Tulving, 2003).

It has been difficult to say for certain whether the right prefrontal activation genuinely reflects a retrieval mode as opposed to successful recovery because of limitations in the scanning procedures (Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 2000). Researchers in the early days of neuroimaging had to compare scans from one group of trials in which retrieval was usually

Figure 5.3 Different regions of the left and right prefrontal cortex are involved in episodic encoding and retrieval.

successful to scans from another group of trials in which forgetting was likely; the data from such a comparison were noisy because they involved lumping together many different items. However, advances in fMRI procedures allowed comparisons of scans for the individual items on a recognition test. By comparing correct hits on old items (retrieval mode plus retrieval success) versus correct rejections of new items (retrieval mode only), the finer resolution of the individual item data allows the theoretical issue to be settled. The data from such studies show convincingly similar activation levels in the right anterior prefrontal cortex for both hits and correct rejections (Buckner, Koutstaal, et al., 1998). Thus, the activation observed there is unrelated to retrieval success.

Neuroimaging evidence has identified numerous regions of the brain that appear to be activated when events are successfully retrieved from long-term memory. Different locations are observed, depending on whether the events recollected are verbal or nonverbal in nature (Nyberg & Cabeza, 2000). The wide distribution across all lobes of the cortex in both hemispheres is to be expected, given that the representation of an event is distributed by its features, as discussed in Chapter 4. The hippocampus is also involved in retrieval of recently learned information. The medial temporal lobe initially stores an event prior to its consolidation in distributed areas throughout the neocortex (McClelland et al., 1995). Finally, certain areas of the prefrontal cortex in both the left and right hemispheres are more active when retrieval succeeds than when it fails (Buckner, 1996). Thus, a variety of prefrontal regions are involved both in the effort to search for an event representation and in its actual retrieval.

Behavioral studies also support the idea that intentional efforts to retrieve are different from the processes of successful retrieval. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, encoding processes do not function well at all when attention is not allocated to them. A comparison of the effects of divided attention on encoding and retrieval has revealed a sharp difference (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996). Dividing attention at encoding greatly reduces recall and recognition performance. The time needed to respond on a secondary task provided a measure of the effort devoted to encoding. The data showed that the effort given to encoding was under conscious control and was lessened in the divided-attention condition.

By contrast, dividing attention at retrieval had little, if any, impact on success in recalling and recognizing events. But it caused a major increase in the effort devoted to retrieval—particularly in free recall, when the retrieval was most intentional and least automatic. Of great interest, the effort measure did not vary at all with the number of items successfully retrieved. Thus, the effort measure apparently reflected retrieval mode, which is under intentional control as one tries to recollect past events. Success in retrieval, on the other hand, appears automatic and undisturbed by divisions of attention. As Craik et al. (1996) pointed out, their data fit well with the neuroimaging results that discriminate the retrieval mode as a control process carried out in the right prefrontal cortex from the process that actually recovers items from memory.

Retrieval mode refers to the effort to retrieve an event from long-term memory as opposed to its actual retrieval. Activation in the right prefrontal cortex supports retrieval mode, whereas numerous regions are involved in successful retrieval.
Encoding Specificity

Tulving (1983) proposed that remembering depends on activating precisely the same cues at retrieval that were originally encoded with the event in question. Tulving’s principle of **encoding specificity** (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) asserts that “specific encoding operations performed on what is perceived determines what retrieval cues are effective in producing access to what is stored” (p. 369). The interaction between encoding and retrieval conditions is the key to high levels of recall and recognition.

For instance, Light and Carter-Sobell (1970) presented people with a cue and a target word to study, such as STRAWBERRY-JAM. Later, the participants tried to recognize whether the target word (JAM) had appeared during study. If on the test the cue word was switched (TRAFFIC-JAM), they had a harder time recognizing the target than if the retrieval cue matched the encoding cue. Furthermore, when encodings are highly distinctive and retrieval cues are available that match the encoding cues precisely, recall performance can be dazzlingly accurate. Mantyla (1986) obtained better than 90% accuracy in cued recall for a list of 600 words!

Recall of Unrecognizable Events. If one studies a list of words and later tries to remember them on a recognition test versus a recall test, performance is often better on the recognition test (Kintsch, 1970). A cued recall test generally yields better performance than a free-recall test in which no retrieval cues are provided. But cued recall still fails to come close to the accuracy typically observed on a recognition test. This makes sense if you think of the word on the recognition test as the perfect retrieval cue; it is an exact copy. Not only is the word familiar, but it allows one to retrieve the context in which the word was originally seen in the experiment (Mandler, 1980).

Suppose that you see someone at a party who looks familiar. Recognition requires not only a judgment about familiarity but also an identification of the context in which you have encountered the person before (“Oh, yes, she was at the grocery store”). This identification is much easier when looking at the person than when given a weakly related cue (“think of shopping”) or given no cues at all.

Tulving and Thomson (1973) arranged a situation in which the encoding specificity principle counterintuitively predicts accurate recall of an unrecognizable word. They presented a list of to-be-remembered target words (e.g., BLACK) along with encoding cues that were weak associates of the targets (e.g., TRAIN). After presentation of the list, the participants were given strong semantic associates of the target words (e.g., WHITE) and were asked to think of related words. Not surprisingly, target items (BLACK) were often generated.

Next, the participants were asked to examine all of the words they generated and to indicate which, if any, had originally been presented as targets. Finally, a cued recall test was given in which the encoding context (TRAIN) served as the retrieval cue.

Tulving and Thomson (1973) found that the participants successfully recognized the targets only a quarter of the time. But when given the proper cue (TRAIN), the participants recalled the targets a stunning two-thirds of the time. What is so striking about this is that the retrieval cue is only a weak associate of the target. Yet, because it had been encoded with the word initially, it was the ideal cue for recall. This phenomenon of recall of unrecognizable words strongly supports the principle of encoding specificity.
Tip of the Tongue States. Surely, you have seen a familiar face that you could not quite place, or perhaps you could not retrieve the person’s name. People often experience a feeling of knowing or familiarity in which some name, word, date, or other information cannot be retrieved despite a certainty that it is available in memory (see Learning Activity 5.2). When such feelings become particularly intense, psychologists refer to the experience as a tip of the tongue (TOT) state. Brown and McNeill (1966) studied such TOT states for words by giving people definitions of rare words and asking them to recall the words. Of interest, when people experienced a TOT state, they could correctly identify the number of syllables in the forgotten word more than 60% of the time. Further investigation (Brown, 1991) showed that “TOTs (a) are a nearly universal experience, (b) occur about once a week, (c) increase with age, (d) are frequently elicited by proper names, (e) often enable access to the target word’s first letter, (f) are often accompanied by words related to the target, and (g) are resolved during the experience about half of the time” (p. 204).

Learning Activity 5.2

A Demonstration of the Tip of the Tongue State

Try to name the capitals of the following states in the United States and countries in the European Union. Is there one (or more) for which you believe you know the answer but cannot retrieve it? Can you guess how many syllables are in the name? Can you guess the initial letter of the name?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOT states suggest that information may be available in memory but inaccessible. The forgetting seems to be clearly caused by a failure to find the right retrieval cue. Sometimes, we can successfully recall the forgotten information by stumbling on a thought or perception that triggers the memory. The principle of encoding specificity explains this as another example of cue-dependent forgetting. Numerous other experiments have documented the principle that the specific cues associated with an event during learning provide the key to later recall (e.g., Begg & White, 1985; Jacoby, 1974).

Environmental Context. The context in which learning is experienced ought to serve as a retrieval cue at the time of test, according to the encoding specificity principle. This has
been tested by varying the environmental and psychological contexts in a large number of experiments. Of interest to students, Smith, Glenberg, and Bjork (1978) had people learn a list of words in a particular room and then later try to recall them in the same room, or in one very different in appearance. The environmental context affected recall in the direction one would expect. The same room provided the right retrieval cues and supported superior performance. Although the effect was not large, it might pay off to study for an exam in the same room in which you will be tested.

A more compelling demonstration of the importance of reinstating the encoding context was provided by Godden and Baddeley (1975). Scuba divers learned a list of words underwater or on dry land. They were then tested in one of these two contexts, and the results showed a strong crossover interaction, as shown in Figure 5.4. Recall dropped substantially when learning occurred on dry land but then testing was underwater. However, when learning was underwater, performance improved by going underwater again at test relative to testing on land.

**Figure 5.4** Number of words recalled in a dry or wet environment after learning in a dry or wet environment.

Psychological Context. The emotional state of the individual also may serve as an effective retrieval cue. A mood congruence effect may be studied by instructing people to think about positive or negative life events in order to induce a happy mood or an unhappy mood. Bower (1981) found that the best learning occurs when the material being learned fits with the induced mood. Thus, depressing information is best learned when in a sad mood (Blaney, 1986).

State-dependent learning is sometimes observed when a person’s mood or state of consciousness (e.g., sober, intoxicated) is directly manipulated during learning and retrieval. Under such conditions, recall performance when one’s mood at retrieval matches the mood at the time of learning is not reliably better than when the moods do not match. Several drugs, on the other hand, have shown state dependency effects when dosages are sufficiently large to produce clear signs of intoxication, such as slurred speech (Eich, 1980, 1989; Overton, 1971). These include commonly used drugs such as alcohol, barbiturates, and marijuana. Information learned in a sober state is better retained when later recalled in a sober state, whereas information learned in an intoxicated state is better retained when tested while intoxicated. As one would expect from what we know about the importance of cognitive effort and elaboration during study, recall is by far the best during sober learning and sober testing.

However, there is a strong asymmetry in the relationship (Eich, 1989). Alcohol and prescription drugs (e.g., benzodiazepines such as Valium and Xanax) reduce the encoding and

**Figure 5.5** Asymmetry in drug-induced-state-dependent learning.
storage of details about the context of an event (Curran, 2000). As illustrated in Figure 5.5, if one is sober at study, then retrieving the information at the time of test is relatively easy both when one is sober and when one is intoxicated. At times, intoxication at retrieval can, in fact, increase the amount remembered (Curran, 2000). By sharp contrast, when the learner is initially intoxicated at study, there is a consistent decline in performance when the retrieval mode is shifted to sobriety.

It should also be noted that intoxication during encoding greatly impairs the degree of learning in the first place. An alert and sober state of mind is required for successful learning (Curran, 2000). It has been known for centuries that drugs can cause forgetting. Alcohol is by far the most widely used drug with this feature, but millions of people also take antidepressants and antianxiety drugs that can cause some memory problems. The elderly are particularly vulnerable because they may combine medications that have psychoactive properties. For example, 10% to 15% of the population over 65 years of age take sleeping pills that can produce brief memory loss. In extreme cases, older adults can experience confusion and memory loss that resemble dementia. It is important for physicians to distinguish between true organic dementia and dementia that is temporarily induced by prescription medications.

Application. The encoding specificity principle has important implications for medical, police, and legal professionals who rely on the recollections of an individual to determine the facts of a case. For example, doctors often try to obtain an accurate clinical picture by interviewing a patient about, say, eating habits. An accurate picture is needed to diagnose eating disorders, such as anorexia and obesity, and to understand the causes of diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, allergies, and other conditions. Unfortunately, our current eating habits distort recollections of past habits. If our current habits differ in important respects, then the information about the past is inaccurate (Croyle, Loftus, Klinger, & Smith, 1992).

To improve the accuracy of information obtained by medical, police, and legal professionals, Fisher and Geiselman (1992) developed the Cognitive Interview. The method is illustrated in Learning Activity 5.3. It entails asking respondents (a) to mentally picture the personal and environmental context of the event to be remembered; (b) to report all recalled information, including partial information; (c) to recall the specific events in not just one order but several; and (d) to recall the specific events from several different perspectives. Notice that the first aspect of the procedure tries to reinstate the encoding context at the time of recall, in keeping with the encoding specificity principle. Partial information might serve as a retrieval cue for additional recovery of information, much as happens in the TOT phenomenon. Trying different orders and perspectives helps to avoid the use of a single schema for guiding the reconstruction of events. The Cognitive Interview improves the quality of information obtained in police questionings of eyewitnesses (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1986) and in patients’ recollections of food consumption (Croyle et al., 1992).
CHAPTER 5  Remembering Events

Emotion and Retrieval

Understanding how emotion affects the retrieval of past autobiographical events could have important consequences for the treatment of psychological disorders such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (Buchanan, 2007). After all, the pathological effects of past negative emotional experiences occur when these memories are retrieved in the present. Perhaps therapeutic interventions could target disruption of the retrieval process, if the basic mechanisms were well enough understood. In reviewing the literature, Buchanan (2007) affirmed the importance of the encoding specificity principle. A retrieval cue—such as an auditory fragment of a conversation or a visual image of a scene—for a past emotional experience will serve to reactivate the brain regions that played a part in the encoding and storage of the event itself. For an emotion-laden event, this implies that the amygdala and medial regions of the prefrontal cortex involved in emotional processing may be triggered at the time of retrieval. Activity in these brain structures results in a temporary emotional experience that itself serves as an additional retrieval cue. Thus, an emotion associated with the encoding of an event provides a powerful cue for also retrieving the event.

Recall from the last chapter that retrograde amnesia can be used to track the consolidation process over a period of years. Patients with injuries to the hippocampus and other regions of the medial temporal lobe suffer from anterograde amnesia, as seen in their deficits in new learning. A temporal gradient of retrograde amnesia may also be found: Fairly recent events prior to the injury are unable to be recalled, whereas events from the distant past are fully consolidated and unaffected by the injury. Retrieval of events from the remote past, then, can be used to study the effects of emotion on retrieval, in particular, given that their encoding and consolidation had already been completed long ago. Buchanan, Tranel, and Adolphs (2005) compared emotional autobiographical memories for patients with medial temporal lobe damage either limited to the hippocampus or including the amygdala as well as the hippocampus. Both groups of patients, at a younger age, were able to encode the events into their memory and consolidate them over a period of years. When asked to describe the five most emotional memories they had ever experienced, the recollections were just as common and just as vivid for those with damage limited to the hippocampus as for those with more extensive damage. This result is consistent with the conclusion that consolidation had been completed and the memory was no
longer dependent on the hippocampus. With respect to the retrieval process, however, those with damage to both the hippocampus and the amygdala remembered fewer unpleasant experiences. Moreover, their recollections of these negative emotional events were less intense and less vivid compared with patients suffering injuries only to the hippocampus. Thus, it is clear that the amygdala is critically involved in the retrieval of unpleasant events from the remote past. This role of the amygdala in retrieval is independent of its role in encoding and consolidating the memory in the first place.

**STUDY STRATEGIES**

College students are expected to learn the often novel concepts and factual information of the disciplines that they study. Such semantic knowledge is typically presented in lectures and in textbook assignments. All of the principles outlined in the present chapter could be applied to study strategies. For example, elaborative rehearsal, including the use of mnemonic techniques such as the method of loci, can be used in learning course-related material. Paying attention to the distinctive features of a concept, including ways to use visual imagery, aids learning, but so does using organizational strategies, such as showing how various concepts fit into a hierarchical tree diagram. As noted before, the encoding specificity principle can be applied by studying for an exam in the same room in which the test will be administered. Besides the principles already covered in the chapter, the study strategies outlined below have been supported by empirical evidence and warrant use by college students.

Students typically have a fixed amount of time that can be devoted to a single course. How, then, should that fixed amount of time be distributed over multiple study sessions? Put differently, how long should one stick with the same course material before shifting to a different course or quitting for the time being? The evidence shows that study time should continue only as long as is needed for the material to be mastered, but that then one should quit or shift to different material (Rohrer and Pashler, 2007). Overlearning is helpful only for retention over a matter of days (up to a week or so), but for longer retention intervals, it is an inefficient use of time.

The spacing effect refers to the superior performance obtained when study time is spaced or distributed over time rather than massed or crammed. In general, a given amount of study time is most effective when it is divided into units and distributed over days or weeks of study. Saving it all up for a long cram session the night before the exam is not a good strategy. Determining the ideal amount of spacing between study sessions is complicated by Rohrer and Pashler’s (2007) findings that for very long retention intervals (6 months), the optimal spacing is also lengthy (1 month between study sessions), but for shorter retention intervals (10 days), the optimal spacing is correspondingly shorter (1 day between study sessions).

Should one devote all available time to reading and attempting to learn the material? Or would it be better to spend at least some time attempting to retrieve what one has already studied? The answer is surprising. It turns out that the retrieval process itself contributes directly to overall learning. It is not just studying but also testing that matters for learning.
To illustrate this point, consider a study in which college students read text passages on general scientific topics during a learning session (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). In one condition, the students studied the passage again (study-study), whereas in another condition, the students took a free-recall test in which they wrote down as much as they could remember from the passage. No feedback on the text was provided. A final free-recall test was then given either 5 minutes, 2 days, or 1 week after the initial learning session. The results showed a small benefit of studying twice (6% difference) on the final test when it was given almost immediately. However, the study-test (ST) condition did better than the study-study (SS) condition after a 2-day or 1-week delay (14% better in both cases). Taking a test—that is, practicing retrieval of the facts learned during study—was more beneficial than additional study for retention over long time periods. In a further study, Roediger and Karpicke discovered that the more retrieval practice students receive, the better their long-term retention a week after study. An SSSS condition, where students studied text passages during four separate periods, had poorer recall on the final test than an SSST condition, where students studied three times and took one test. The best recall of all was shown by an STTT condition. Remarkably, studying the material once and then repeatedly testing oneself produces the best long-term recall.

Karpicke, Butler, and Roediger (2009) surveyed a large sample of college students to discover their typical study habits. Suppose you have an upcoming test for a class. After reading through your notes or your textbook one time, what would your next study strategy entail? Most students (57%) indicated they would reread their notes or textbook. Only about one in five students (18%) said they would attempt to recall information from their notes or their textbook. These choices reflect that students think about learning in terms of encoding new information into long-term memory. Retrieval is thought of as a means of measuring what has been learned rather than as a process that enhances learning. Tellingly, when students were asked to judge how well they had learned the material in the Roediger and Karpicke (2006) experiment, they predicted the highest amount of recall in the SSSS condition and the least amount in the STTT condition. In fact, the results showed the exact opposite pattern.

Note taking is a widely used strategy when learning from lectures or reading assignments. Although reviewing notes is a useful method of studying, it does not capitalize on the fact that retrieval practice through self-test is highly effective. The Read, Recite, and Review or 3R strategy explicitly introduces retrieval of information learned first by reading a text and then reciting out loud all that can be remembered. Then, as a means of self-assessment and as an opportunity for further study, the student reviews the reading passage again. McDaniel, Howard, and Einstein (2009) found that the 3R strategy improved free recall of the facts given in a text passage compared with either rereading the passage or taking notes on it. The advantage of 3R was obtained on both an immediate test and on one administered a week after studying the material. Thus, before rereading an assignment, students should attempt to recite it first.

Throughout the present chapter, a variety of learning principles relevant to educational settings have been identified. The work reviewed in this final section on storing facts and concepts from reading assignments indicates three clear best practices for effective studying: (a) self-test often to practice retrieval; (b) space one’s study time rather than massing...
it; and (c) supplement note taking with the 3R strategy. Notice that the 3R strategy can be used for studying notes taken from a lecture as well as for reading assignments. Moreover, one can try to recite material read or heard earlier at any time during the day, not just during times set aside for studying. McDaniel et al. (2009) recommended that students practice retrieving course information while walking to class or exercising, for example. The key point is that self-testing is an integral part of the study process.

**SUMMARY**

1. Long-term memory is not a unitary store, according to the multiple-systems hypothesis regarding the structure of long-term memory. There is a fundamental division in long-term memory between declarative (knowledge of what) and nondeclarative (knowledge of how) systems. Declarative memory is further divided into episodic memory (events that are encoded in terms of specific times and places of occurrence) and semantic memory (general knowledge of facts and concepts). Nondeclarative memory includes skill learning, priming, conditioning, and habituation.

2. Mental time travel refers to the use of episodic memory to recollect past events and envision future events using reconstructive retrieval processes. It stresses the subjective experience of traveling backward or forward in time when engaged in episodic recollection and imagination. The default network of the brain is activated by traveling backward in mental time or traveling forward into the imaginary future. An everyday form of future thinking occurs in tasks requiring prospective memory. This refers to remembering to take some specific action at some point in the future. One must first form an intention to perform an action in a specified window of time. Two kinds of retrieval processes are involved in successfully remembering to do something later. The first is to engage in the attention-demanding retrieval mode of monitoring the environment for cues to act as planned. The second is to rely on spontaneous, relatively effortless retrieval triggered automatically by environmental cues, as when the thought to act just pops into mind.

3. Encoding and storage of episodic information in long-term memory varies with the kind of rehearsal given to information stored in short-term memory. Repeating a list of words illustrates maintenance rehearsal. Elaborative rehearsal is superior to maintenance rehearsal because it establishes links between the information held in short-term memory and the information already stored in long-term memory, for example, by forming visual images of the objects referred to by the words in a list. Mnemonic techniques, such as the method of loci, are kinds of elaborative rehearsal. The level of processing also affects learning success, with deep semantic processing supporting better memory than shallow sensory processing. Deeply encoded information is distinctive and easily retrieved in the future. Finally, the organization of newly learned information is necessary for successful recognition and recall.
4. Encoding processes are important, but they cannot be considered apart from retrieval processes. The encoding specificity principle asserts that events are recognized or recalled only when retrieval cues at the time of test match the encoding cues at the time of learning. The retrieval cues allow one to activate the to-be-remembered episode and its context. From this perspective, forgetting represents a failure to access an episode because the retrieval cues are inadequate.

5. Students are advised to (a) self-test often to practice retrieval; (b) space one’s study time rather than massing it; and (c) supplement note taking with the 3R strategy of reading, reciting, and reviewing. In addition to these study strategies, all of the principles of encoding and retrieval discussed in this chapter can be applied to learning course-related material. For example, the method of loci can be adopted to learn a list of facts in a history course or a biology course, just as it can be used to remember a grocery list.

**KEY TERMS**

declarative memory  
semantic memory  
episodic memory  
nondeclarative memory  
Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM)  
mental time travel  
prospective memory  
maintenance rehearsal  
elaborative rehearsal  
levels or depths of processing  
self-reference effect  
transfer-appropriate processing  
distinctiveness  
flashbulb memory  
relational processing  
subjective organization  
retrieval mode  
encoding specificity  
tip of the tongue (TOT) state  
mood congruence effect  
state-dependent learning

**QUESTIONS FOR THOUGHT**

- What kind of long-term memory did you use in coming to class for cognitive psychology? Provide specific examples of both declarative and nondeclarative memory use.
- Describe a flashbulb memory that you have had personally. In what specific ways does this memory illustrate the distinctiveness principle?
• Provide an example of when you experienced a tip of the tongue state. Did you at a later time successfully recall what had been inaccessible information? Discuss the theoretical concepts that are important to understanding your experience.
• Suppose you are answering a survey question that asks how often you engage in some specific behavior (e.g., how many minutes per day you spend watching television). Do you draw on semantic memory or episodic memory to answer this question?