THE POSTEMOTIONAL BULLY
THE PROBLEM

It is commonly assumed, and seldom questioned, that civilization or modernity – the two terms are often used interchangeably – is the opposite of barbarism. In everyday usage, this means that as humanity becomes more modern, it should be less barbaric. After surveying the economic and political carnage and brutality of the 20th century, George Orwell questioned this assumption: “What is the special quality in modern life that makes a major human motive out of the impulse to bully others? If we could answer that question – seldom asked, never followed up – there might occasionally be a bit of good news on the front page of your morning paper.”¹

Orwell was not a trained sociologist, but he raises the issue of bullying to a sociological level. It is a major insight to regard social institutions as well as individuals as capable of bullying. He made his observations in the first half of the 20th century, so let us update some of them. Humankind has invented comforts that were unimaginable a century ago. Yet, income and wealth inequality in the world is greater today (I am writing in 2014) than it was prior to and during the Great Depression. The secret police were frightening in Orwell’s time, but today, governments routinely spy on each other and on their own populations. The National Security Administration (NSA) in the United States collects and stores every bit of communication made by Americans. The masses have submitted to this new police state with irritated apathy. As for grabbing territories, markets, and raw materials, this has been the never-ending history of the world since the inception of modernity. Politicians, pundits, and opinion-makers claim routinely that such corporate and national bullying was a thing of the past even as such events routinely form the staple of everyday news in the present. Let us pursue Orwell’s insights sociologically.

¹ http://www.telelib.com/authors/O/OrwellGeorge/essay/tribune/AsIPlease19461129.html
DEFINING BULLYING

Before embarking upon this sociological analysis, it is worth noting that sociology is only a little over a century old. Prior to the 1880s and 1890s, it did not seem to occur to humankind or to intellectuals, in particular, that society is more than a collection of individual interests and that it could be studied scientifically. Sociology and the idea of modernity were born at about the same time in human history, which was characterized by the Industrial Revolution, urbanization, the rapid collapse of ancient regimes, and other dramatic changes. Most of the early sociologists were not certified sociologists with doctorates in this field, because sociology was too radical and too new at the time. The intellectuals who have been relabeled sociologists were philosophers, lawyers, journalists, or other professionals, and sometimes even amateurs. Born in Wisconsin, Thorstein Veblen was a Norwegian-American economist – abandoned by economists and later adopted by sociologists – who did not learn English until he started elementary school. Hailed by C. Wright Mills and others as America’s greatest social critic, Veblen remains strangely obscure and is rarely mentioned in sociology textbooks. The gist of Veblen’s sociology is that “modernity is only a latter-day barbarism.” This assertion contradicts common conceptions of progress, though it is somewhat in line with Orwell’s assessment. To the extent that Veblen is known, it is primarily for his concept of conspicuous consumption. Veblen’s dark portrait of modern culture, his “sick soul” sensitivity to what he called “predatory culture” within modernity, and the suffering it causes have been largely ignored.

A barbarian, for Veblen, is one who uses force or fraud to achieve his or her ends. Veblen wrote: “As it finds expression in the life of the barbarian, prowess manifests itself in two main directions – force and fraud. In varying degrees, these two forms of expression are similarly present in modern warfare, in the pecuniary occupations, and in sports and games.” Let us take a careful note of both these two concepts – force and fraud – and reflect on the myriad ways they continue to play out in modern culture: war, business, sports, and games. It is more true today than it was when Veblen wrote in 1899 that modern types wage war (meaning the use of force) not just on nations but on just about anything they want to change: metaphorical wars have been declared

---


3 I am using this term in the nonpejorative sense as used by William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (London: Penguin Books, 1982).

on drugs, obesity, corporations, women, terror, poverty, Christmas, cancer, and other phenomena, including a war on chocolate. As for fraud, most of these aforementioned metaphorical wars, as well as real wars, have turned out to be based on false or questionable premises. For example, the Gulf War was justified initially on the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but nothing was found. President Obama initially denied that the NSA was spying on Americans. The list of lies and chicanery imposed by governments and corporations upon the masses seems endless and has given rise to conspiracy theories on a multitude of topics, including 9/11, UFOs, the assassination of President Kennedy, AIDS, the advent of genetically modified (GM) foods, among a multitude of other issues, topics, and events.

Veblen never wrote about single barbarians in a psychological manner, as if they were exceptions to the rule of civilized, comfortable, and peaceful life. Rather, he conceived of the barbarian as a social type who is enshrined and maintained by “predatory culture,” as opposed to what he called “peacable culture.” For Veblen, the predatory barbarian and the peacable type co-exist on a continuum in all cultures in all periods of history, but in modern times, the predatory type holds the upper hand. Veblen’s understanding of the paradoxically modern barbarian informs all of his writings and the topics he investigated: sports, religion, warfare, business, higher education, leisure, pets, the profession of law, etc. For Veblen, as modernity progresses, all social institutions are becoming increasingly predatory and favor the barbaric social type.

It is intriguing that the dictionary definition of the bully is largely similar to Veblen’s definition of the barbarian – minus the context of Veblen’s social theory or any formal, social theory. Thus, dictionaries define the bully as “a person who uses strength or power to harm or intimidate those who are weaker.” There is no mention of fraud, and the “weaker” are not necessarily the same as Veblen’s “peacable” types. The important point is that there is some connection between Veblen’s understanding of the barbarian – as one who uses force to achieve his or her goals – and contemporary conceptualizations of the bully – as one who uses power to harm others. In recent years, collective self-consciousness of bullying as a social problem has increased dramatically.

My intent here is not to revive Veblen, though I will use his characterization of the problem – the paradox of modern barbarism – as a starting point. Veblen startles us because he conjoins the modernist and the barbarian into the seeming oxymoron of the latter-day barbarian. Similarly, the contemporary bully is an oxymoron in the sense that he or she is more educated, self-aware, and aware of the feelings of others than people were in Veblen’s generation. The contemporary person has been indoctrinated to believe that education is the key not only to a successful career and comfortable life, but also to the eradication
of social ills such as bullying, racism, and sexism. It is startling, in the context of Veblen, to realize that the most educated and cultured generation in human history seems to be more afflicted by these issues than previous generations. There is no intention here to review the hundreds of studies on bullies and bullying that have been published, because they use so many divergent, yet mostly atheoretical, explanations and pose an impassable wilderness (or what C. Wright Mills called “abstracted empiricism”) of statistics and numbers, albeit without reaching any sort of satisfying conclusion.

Let us start with Veblen’s definition of the barbarian as one who uses force or fraud to achieve his or her ends against the peacable types. In everyday language, Veblen’s barbarian is the bully. The bully, as a social type, is instantly recognizable in playgrounds, classrooms, the military, boardrooms, and all social institutions at every stage of life. In recent decades, the United States and other modern nations have enacted laws and social media campaigns to punish the individual bully and his or her handiwork. Advertisements implore us to “stop bullying” and to report bullies. While language does allow us to speak of corporate, political, or national bullies, this sociological dimension of bullying is less prominent in public discourse when compared with the psychological dimension of the individual bully.

However, bullying is not a crime, while hazing is a crime in the United States. Hazing is defined in dictionaries as “the imposition of strenuous, often humiliating tasks, as part of a program of rigorous physical training and initiation,” and it involves “rituals” as opposed to individual acts of bullying. Curiously, in efforts to curtail bullying, modern nations have gone after hazing (bullying and hazing overlap primarily with regard to the use of force). But hazing is distinguished from corporal punishment and “customary” rituals which are not abusive or humiliating. The allusion to “physical training” is particularly troublesome. Physical training pertains to common practices in the military, sports teams, dance classes, fitness clubs, marching bands, school athletics, and a host of other social programs. How shall one distinguish excessive from “normal” strenuous and humiliating tasks in such activities? The potential language games in distinguishing bullying from hazing, and both from customary initiation rites, are seemingly infinite. From the perspective of social theory, it is interesting that the legal definition of hazing invokes the concept of initiation rites that are studied mainly by anthropologists.

The only classical sociological theorist who addressed initiation rites was Emile Durkheim in his lesser-known work *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, which was first published in 1912. For Durkheim, initiation rites must necessarily involve cruelty and suffering, and suffering is the price one pays for the existence of society. Durkheim wrote: “Society requires us to make ourselves
into servants, forgetful of our own interests. It subjects us to all sorts of restraints, privations, and sacrifices without which social life would be impossible.”

He does not restrict hazing or initiation rites to physical training or activities. His understanding of cruelty and suffering includes the emotional and social “training” that is part of the initiation rites for becoming a doctor, scholar, or any other professional. For example, he wrote: “Thus the scholar who dies from excessive devotion is currently and not wholly unreasonably said to have killed himself by his labor. All such facts form a sort of embryonic suicide.”

Physical as well as emotional bullying and hazing can drive individuals to suicide. Yet societies in all periods of history, including today, demand sacrifice. What is the difference between normal initiation rites – which are inescapable – and hazing?

If Durkheim is correct, then the elimination or effective restraint of all hazing would destroy social existence itself (the initiation rite, for Durkheim, involves a “journey” from profane to society’s sacred representations, and the sacred–profane distinction is the basis of social life). It still seems to be the case in modern culture that society demands some sacrifice and suffering in becoming a member of any elite social group – even in such mundane achievements as losing weight or getting into better shape physically. “No pain, no gain” is a common expression that captures this aspect of social life. It is also true that modern society sends out mixed signals in this regard: joining elite groups or the mundane achievements of losing weight or achieving a more attractive appearance are touted as simple, easy, and effortless processes in many advertisements. But if earning a degree, becoming a Navy SEAL, or completing residency to become a medical doctor were truly simple and easy achievements, would society bestow respect upon them? To the popular mind, bullying overlaps with hazing, and modern culture is ambivalent about both phenomena. Bullying is depicted as bad, but the predatory barbarian is glorified in films (for example, Conan the Barbarian), video games such as Grand Theft Auto, music, novels, and advertisements. Hazing is a crime, but contemporary culture consistently portrays the respect gained by elite members of various groups for undergoing suffering through initiation rites as something that should be admired. At the same time, and in a contrary direction, contemporary culture tries to sell such elite achievements as easy and available to anyone.

The contemporary bully, as a social type, is expert at the other component of barbarism, which is fraud. Again, to quote Veblen, “Chicanery, falsehood,

---


THE POSTEMOTIONAL BULLY

brow-beating, hold a well-secured place in the method of procedure.”7 Veblen also claimed that with the development of modernity, “simple aggression and unrestrained violence in great measure gave place to shrewd practices and chicanery, as the best approved methods of accumulating wealth.”8 Every day, one will find news stories of bullying in sports, schools, business, and other social institutions – whether or not they are labeled by the news media as bullying, or by the law as hazing. This is the quandary in which we find ourselves in the modern world – punishing as well as admiring bullies via legal definitions of hazing that do not and cannot capture the full import of individually or collectively ritualized persecution, oppression, tyranny, torment, intimidation, and cruelty.

FORCE VERSUS OBLIGATION: REVISITING MARCEL MAUSS’S THE GIFT

The idea of using force, strength, and power to define bullying is not sufficient. There exist benign social forces; society is always stronger than the individual, and there is power in collective actions of all sorts that dwarf the power of any one individual. One must distinguish barbaric uses of force (bullying) from peacable social forces that give individuals as well as collectivities strength, hope, courage, and other beneficial results.

A good starting point for resolving this ambiguity is Marcel Mauss’s The Gift. Mauss was Durkheim’s nephew and collaborator. Mauss’s book is considered a classic in anthropology and continues to be the subject of numerous publications and discussion. It has received far less attention in sociology and hardly any attention in other social sciences.9 Mauss’s argument in The Gift is succinct: all societies, in all periods of history, engage in gift-giving – which is very broadly defined – and which carries three obligations: the obligation to give, the obligation to receive, and the obligation to reciprocate. Mauss clarifies that the gift can never be repaid exactly, so that the reciprocation should not be and cannot be calculated. The gifts that are exchanged range from material objects to gestures, acts of kindness and acknowledgment, sacrifices, contracts, and any and all nonmaterial “things” that are given to other individuals, groups, and institutions. The gift may range from a look or smile to a watch or birthday present. The function of the gift is to create social bonds. One gives a gift to

---

7 Veblen, op. cit., p. 274.
8 Ibid., p. 236.
9 An excellent, recent review and analysis of Mauss’s theory of the gift is offered by Oili Pyyhtinen in The Gift and its Paradoxes: Beyond Mauss (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).
one’s beloved, who is obliged to accept and to reciprocate in the future. One is expected to write a thank-you note for a wedding present; one gives one’s word in a contract or treaty, and both sides are obligated to keep one’s word; all religions routinely oblige their members to make sacrifices of money, food, time, penances, and other “objects” and in return the God(s) of that religion are obligated to their worshipers; one gives the better part of one’s working life to an institution or corporation, and that entity is obliged to repay the worker with security and promises that should be kept, and so on.

What happens when any of these three obligations is violated? According to Mauss, “to refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality.”

It is still true that the miser makes enemies; the failure to invite someone to a party is to declare them an outsider; to reject a gift is to reject the person giving the gift. Mauss makes it very clear that “to make a gift of something to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself.” The gift, the giver, and the receiver are all unique; none of these components are interchangeable; the drama of the gift is simultaneously personal and social. These obligations are social in origin and nature and are not dependent upon the whims of particular individuals toward gift-giving. Because of its binding function, the gift is “one of the human foundations on which our societies are built.”

The most contentious aspect of Mauss’s theory of the gift is his assertion that the social phenomenon of the gift is ancient and primitive – the word “primitive” is abhorrent to contemporary anthropologists – and that we moderns are slowly but surely losing the spirit of the gift. In modern societies, money has largely replaced or at least weakened the spirit of the gift. In exchanging money for an object, favor, or other intangible good, the modern person is not making a present of some part of oneself. Money is fungible, and the goods and services it purchases are treated as fungible or interchangeable assets. (Yet the situation is not so simple: one may use money to purchase an object such as a watch, which is fungible, but when this same watch is offered as a gift, it becomes a unique and personal gift.) Sociologist Georg Simmel developed this theme further by comparing the use of money to prostitution: after the exchange, one quits the relationship and has no obligation to the prostitute.

---


11 Ibid., p. 12.

12 Ibid., p. 4.
or the recipient of money. Mauss lamented that the weakening of the spirit of the gift was weakening social bonds and the very existence of society. But many modern types are relieved that when they are paid for acts of generosity, kindness, compassion, or heroism on the job, they are free from emotional obligations to the recipients of the spirit of the gift. Emotional bonds are inefficient, time-consuming, and exhausting. I shall argue throughout this book that postemotional society is a fundamentally giftless society, and postemotional types increasingly prefer it that way.

As for the word primitive, it is worth keeping in mind that both Mauss and his uncle, Durkheim, did not use this word in a pejorative sense. Instead, in all their works, they sought out the “elementary forms” or earliest, historical origins of any phenomenon they studied – suicide, crime, sacrifice, language, education, and so on – and compared them with modern versions of that same phenomenon. It should be obvious that modernity has not obliterated the past, that our laws, customs, religions, art, and other cultural phenomena constantly draw upon, retouch, and modify past versions of them. Yet how the past has been transmitted in the age of the media and the screen image is not at all obvious and is one of the primary concerns in the present study.

The important point, for the purposes of the present discussion, is this: the social obligations of the gift are not at all similar to the use of force and fraud – recall Veblen’s definitions – by a barbarian, whom we have renamed the bully. One would not commonly say that one is forced or bullied into giving gifts at weddings, graduations, birth of a child, religious ceremonies, or other occasions, which continue to rely upon the spirit of the gift in modern times. On the contrary, forcing one’s way into or being forced out of such events by failures to give, receive, or reciprocate gifts would often be labeled as bullying. The function of the gift is to build and maintain social bonds. It is most likely true that successful marriages, friendships, and working relationships are built upon continuous, daily exchanges of gifts such as politeness, encouragement, interest, and other emotional intangibles in addition to physical objects. Mauss emphasizes that the gift can never be repaid exactly and should not be calculated. He was not writing about exchange in the manner of George Homans’s exchange theory or rational choice theory. Again, it is the bully in a relationship – who claims that he or she is owed something, that he or she is putting more into a relationship than they are receiving, and that he or she is entitled – and other rationalizations that ruin the spirit of gift-giving and lead to broken friendships, relationships, and marriages. The use of force does...

not build social bonds – it destroys them. Mauss’s spirit of the gift is very similar to Veblen’s idea of peacable culture – and both ideas have been relatively neglected in the social sciences.

Another important point is that Mauss, like Veblen, treats social phenomena as “total social facts” that touch upon all social institutions simultaneously and draw upon the historical roots of such phenomena even if they operate in the present. Mauss and Veblen, like so many of the early sociologists, were constructing “grand theories,” as opposed to the piecemeal and disconnected social theories of the present. In Mauss’s words, “In these ‘total’ social phenomena, as we propose calling them, all kinds of institutions are given expression at one and the same time – religious, juridical, and moral, which relate to both politics and the family; likewise economic ones.”

Mauss makes an explicit connection between the gift and “the division of labor in society itself.” In *The Division of Labor in Society* published in 1893, Emile Durkheim made assertions similar to those of his nephew, Mauss, yet many scholars seem to be unaware that Mauss and Durkheim were related and were collaborators. Space does not permit anything like a satisfactory exposition of the connections between Mauss’s concept of the gift and Durkheim’s classic work on the division of labor, but they can be listed succinctly. The gift is an aspect of the division of labor because both phenomena require cooperation for society to function. This cooperation is not always voluntary or conscious, but is always a social obligation. Durkheim connects the division of labor to Darwin’s writings on cooperation in nature, Adam Smith’s theory of the “invisible hand,” Rousseau’s concept of the “social contract,” the organization of animal societies, the cooperation of different organ systems in the human body, and cellular life itself – among a host of other phenomena. The division of labor, like the gift, is a total social phenomenon. It is also the fundamental basis for life – organic and social – itself. In other words, the division of labor is a total phenomenon.

Like Mauss, Durkheim analyzes the division of labor from the earliest to the latest or modern forms of society. To complete his study, he proposes two abnormal forms of the division of labor: anomic and *forced*. For the division of labor to function “normally,” the various “organs” and “cells” – which correspond to social institutions and individuals in the society – must be in close contact.

---

14 For a fuller discussion, see Stjepan Mestrovic, “Durkheim’s concept of anomie considered as a total social fact,” *British Journal of Sociology* 38(4), December 1987, pp. 567–583.

15 Mauss, op. cit., p. 3.

16 Ibid.
with each other and able to adjust their needs and “gifts” to each other accordingly. His examples of forced division of labor are workers not being suited for their jobs and not being “justly” rewarded for their efforts. There can be little doubt that similar examples of forced division of labor exist today. Given that Veblen defined the use of force as barbaric, one could conceive of Durkheim’s forced division of labor as institutionalized bullying.

THE FORCED GIFT – THE CONNECTION TO BULLYING

All societies, at any and every point in history, must socialize their members so that they want to do what they have to do. This social constraint can be forced – in which case one is dealing with some manifestation of bullying – or it can be an obligation based upon the attitude that one is repaying a gift from some segment of society, past or present. For example, Durkheim explicitly depicts language and knowledge as gifts from our ancestors. In *Moral Education*, Durkheim promotes a pedagogy which will instill in the child a desire to learn so as to repay the gift of civilization and is highly critical of corporal punishment in schools, which are examples of forcing students to learn. In fact, he argues that the more advanced a society becomes in historical development, the more it forces children to learn as opposed to instilling a benign sense of obligation. Veblen, too, regarded “idle curiosity” as the most elementary and preferred form of learning and argued that it is in the process of being crushed by the predatory system of education which emphasizes competition and status-seeking. Force and obligation stand as two poles on the continuum of barbarian bully versus peacable gift-oriented societies.

I argue throughout this book that as Mauss’s giftedness in social relations recedes in social evolution, it is being replaced by the use of force or bullying in its broadest sense on the part of governments, corporations, groups, and individuals. The introduction and acceleration of media and social media in recent decades have given rise to what I call postemotional society. Here I intend to develop the concept of “postemotionalism,” which I introduced in *Postemotional Society*, and apply it to the issues of bullying and hazing (always using these terms in Veblen’s wide-ranging and paradoxical sense, and always reminding the reader that hazing is a legal concept). I use postemotionalism because the two main bodies of social theory – modernism and postmodernism – are inadequate to explain the bully as a social type in advanced societies.

The central theoretical problem comes down to this: how do modern societies cope with the historical past? There seems to be unanimous agreement that the archaic past was barbaric, savage, and cruel. Modernist theories posit some sort of magical, Western drive toward progress, which supposedly
obliterates (or will eventually) backwardness, tradition, “primitivism,” and barbarism. When challenged by eruptions of barbarism (which is renamed deviance), modernists resort to theories of social control, surveillance, and other forms of suppression or the use of force. Conversely, postmodern theories posit a loss of “aura” (from Walter Benjamin) that leads to the visions of Baudrillard and other postmodernists of rootless, circulating simulacra as a cause for viral, uncontrollable violence. The debate between these two broad theoretical perspectives has been going on for several decades, and there is no resolution in sight.

Postemotionalism is an alternative to modernist and postmodernist theories. I rely upon the classical theorists who argued that the past does not disappear entirely in modern societies. Some of Veblen’s chapter headings read, “Modern Survivals of Prowess” and “Conservation of Archaic Traits.” Similarly, Durkheim argued that traces of mechanical solidarity survive and carry over into modern organic solidarity. For Durkheim, modern punishment is essentially the same as the archaic vendetta – only it is muted and rationalized. Max Weber charts the progress of modernity from charismatic to rational legal authority – but what happens to charisma in screen image societies? In The Lonely Crowd, David Riesman posits the overlapping co-existence of tradition-, inner-, and other-directed (modern) societies. To this perspective (that the archaic past is conserved and preserved) I add the consequences of the explosive rise and importance of the media, social media, and Internet – something that Riesman vaguely foresaw, but that Veblen and Durkheim could not have imagined. I agree with Baudrillard that when one is “hooked into” the computer or i-phone, he or she is hooked into one’s own brain. The many consequences of this media explosion are that the mind is more able than ever before to access, rationalize, and otherwise manipulate archaic and barbaric “habits.” Both Veblen and Durkheim studied a social world in which the past was revivified mainly through face-to-face (primary group) contact in collective festivals, rituals, and other gatherings. But the media enables the revivification of such archaic habits and representations through anonymous (secondary group) contact via the media. More importantly, and as noted by Riesman, the media replaces traditional authority figures in childhood socialization (parents, teachers, extended family). The end result in such a postemotional society is that barbarism grows exponentially. For example, fights in schools have existed as long as schools have existed. But the newest trend is for fights to occur in school restrooms, which become veritable, virtual gladiator arenas because onlookers record the fights on their i-phones (and other devices) and then post them on YouTube. Teachers and parents are exasperated that their fight against the powers of the media and the peer group is a losing battle.
In order to illustrate this theory of the postemotional barbarian, I first review some of the most significant theories of modernity and postmodernity as they defined bullying broadly as the use of force instead the benign obligations of the gift. In chapters 5, 6, and 7, I present three court cases in which I was involved as an expert witness as examples of what I call postemotional bullying. My aims are not to test a hypothesis or offer a positivistic analysis, but to illustrate what is new, distinctive, and challenging to existing modernist and postmodernist theories when applying postemotional social theory to the phenomena of bullying and hazing in the broadest and total senses.