Chapter 1

The Analysis of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective

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Recent and far-reaching changes in the world present a challenge to leaders who make foreign policy, as well as to those who study foreign policy. Consider the changes in global politics that have occurred in the past few decades. The world has transformed from one in which the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were the primary players in an international drama dominated by military tensions, to something very different. European countries have moved toward greater political and economic integration, and new powers have emerged in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. We have also seen new transnational challenges arise, such as climate change and terrorism.

New means of interdependence have also emerged—from the Internet to satellite communications technology to global financial networks. These changes reflect broad pressures for globalization and economic liberalization. As a result more economies are opening up and becoming connected across country borders. Pressures for democratization are also sweeping the world, as witnessed by the revolutions of the “Arab Spring” of 2011. New groups inside countries are demanding a voice in governance or are competing with governments for representation. Outside of countries, organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and Amnesty International argue that a state’s internal affairs and human rights records are legitimate concerns of the international community. These and other events in recent years have significantly transformed international relations and domestic politics.

Although some countries and leaders today are facing an identity crisis, actions of the sovereign state remain critical to shaping global politics. They can define the level of a country’s engagement with the world, economic liberalization and trade, as well as war or peace with other countries. Thus, this book adopts as its focus states’ foreign policies in the context of contemporary internal and external developments.

Studying Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective

It is precisely because states are experiencing challenges and transformations both internally and externally that the analysis of foreign policy is important. Foreign policy analysis as a distinct area of inquiry connects the study of international
relations (the way states relate to each other in international politics) with the study of domestic politics (the functioning of governments and the relationships among individuals, groups, and governments). Most theories of international relations are primarily concerned with state behavior, but some include discussions of foreign policy. Theories of domestic politics, found in the study of U.S. politics and in the study of comparative politics, share this attention to internal factors. These theories tend to explain the functioning of the state or political system and the domestic policies that are chosen and rarely comment on the effects of internal politics on a state’s foreign policies.

Thus, the study of foreign policy serves as a bridge by analyzing the impact of both external and internal politics on states’ relations with each other. Leaders cannot forge effective foreign policies without being aware of these connections; students cannot effectively evaluate foreign policy choices without recognizing these linkages.

### Defining Foreign Policy

The first step in a comparative investigation of foreign policy is to define what we mean by foreign policy. This also raises issues concerning how foreign policy is studied and how it may be changing. We begin with the first term: “foreign.” We typically make the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy. “Foreign” is meant to apply to policy toward the world outside states’ territorial borders, and “domestic” is meant to apply to policy made for the internal political system. Going to war with another country, signing an international trade agreement, or aiding a rebel insurgency in another country are examples of foreign policy. Taxes, education standards, and civil rights are examples of domestic policy.

In the recent past, this distinction between foreign and domestic policy was easier to make, but contemporary politics and globalization have blurred the line between what is **foreign** and what is **domestic**. For example, the revolutionary uprising in Libya that threatened the rule of authoritarian leader Moammar Gadhafi in early 2011 began as a domestic issue. Antigovernment protestors launched a rebellion in the eastern part of Libya, and Gadhafi’s forces responded with a military crackdown. However, as reports of vicious attacks against the rebels and civilians circulated throughout the media, social networks, and blogs, western governments re-framed the civil war as a humanitarian crisis demanding international response. The United Nations Security Council voted to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a few Arab states launched airstrikes to protect civilians. By mid-2011, countries like the United States and Germany were engaged in delivery of humanitarian supplies, while Italy and France deployed military advisors to assist the rebels in the civil war. What began as a domestic uprising quickly became a foreign policy issue for Libya and many other countries in the world.

Another example of this blurring between foreign and domestic issues can be found in comparative public policy, a subject area that may seem less dramatic
than war, but potentially can be equally, or more dangerous to public health. Government safety standards for food are typically aimed at the citizens of a country, but they also shape the amount and type of foods exporting countries produce. When the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an alert regarding Melamine—a chemical used in the manufacturing of food items like dairy products and even baby formula—Chinese exports to the United States were adversely affected. So, when countries make domestic policies that have the effect of changing the interactions between states, the line defining international and domestic policymaking is unclear. Today’s economic interdependence means more policies have consequences inside and outside state borders.

This does not mean that there is no longer a difference between foreign and domestic policy, and a distinction can be made based on the intended target of the policy. If the primary target lies outside the country’s borders, it is considered foreign policy, even if it has secondary consequences for politics inside the country. Similarly, if the primary target is inside the country, it is considered domestic policy, even if it affects others outside the country’s borders. If the intention of new economic policy is to alter the trade balance with another country by placing restrictions on imports, we consider that foreign policy. Many policies, of course, have multiple targets. Ensuring clean air for a country’s domestic population and limited imports from foreign automobile competitors might be equally important in the design of the environmental policy, for example. In such cases, a single policy can be both foreign and domestic. It should be clear from our discussion that the targets of foreign policy are not limited to other countries. Foreign policy may be targeted at specific individuals such as a particular leader, nonstate actors such as international organizations, human rights groups working across borders, multinational corporations, terrorist groups, other states, the international environment, or the global economy.

Another difficulty in distinguishing foreign from domestic policy concerns the status of territorial borders. Many states’ borders are in dispute. Part of a country, like the Catalan region of Spain, may be attempting to establish its independence but has only partial control in running its own affairs. Meanwhile, the rest of the country is engaged in suppression of its attempt at secession and independence. In this case, is Spain’s policy toward a group seeking self-determination foreign or domestic policy? In some ways, it depends on your point of view. If you are part of the group claiming independence, as are the citizens of the region of Catalan (some 15% of Spain’s population), you see the country acting across a border that you have defined and thus it is foreign policy. If you are the leader of the government of Spain, you deny this independence and see the situation as strictly an internal, domestic affair.

For such cases, we tend to rely on the judgment of the international community to distinguish foreign policy from domestic policy. If most other countries have recognized the breakaway region as independent, the relations between it and the country are perceived as foreign policy. Although in some cases it is clear what the judgment of the international community is, in others it is not. The issue
of how much a country actually controls its borders is of extreme importance in states that are so weak internally that rival factions control different parts of the territory. Such “failed” countries, or countries that are sovereign only in international legal terms, have become part of the twenty-first century international landscape and raise further questions regarding the distinction between foreign and domestic policy.¹

Now that we have defined foreign, let us further clarify the term “policy.” This is a broad term, representing a whole range of activities and/or subjects. It can include specific decisions to sign a treaty on climate change, for example, and general guidelines to support initiatives to address global warming. Policy can include observable behaviors by countries, such as the Australian commitment of troops to Afghanistan, or verbal pronouncements that do not necessarily lead to follow-up action, such as Turkey’s condemnation of Israeli foreign policy toward the Palestinians. As you can see, foreign policy is not limited to military or security policy. It also includes such areas as foreign economic policy, international environmental policy, and human rights policy.

Who makes policy? The answer to this question is also an important part of the definition of “foreign policy.” Policies are typically thought of as the product of governments, and thus governments are the “actors.” Other players whose actions are intended to influence targets outside a country’s borders may also be foreign policy actors. For example, businesses may market their products in other countries. Multinational corporations are businesses that are owned by interests in various countries or divide their production across country borders. International organizations, such as the United Nations, act across borders. By traveling to foreign countries, you may be supporting their economies and interacting with foreign nationals. Although these actions are certainly “foreign,” and are an increasingly significant part of international politics, we rarely consider them “policy.” Instead, the term “policy” is typically reserved for the actions of governments, government institutions, and government officials. Hereafter, when we refer to “countries” or “states” in a discussion of foreign policy, we are referring to the governments or their officials that are acting in their name.

Comparing Foreign Policies

This book focuses on analysis, or explanation of foreign policy. To begin such an inquiry, one must ask why a state makes certain decisions in foreign affairs and how the foreign policy may have developed from these decisions. We then use this information to look for understandable patterns—across time, space, and issues—in order to formulate or test explanations of foreign policy. In other words, we assume that at least some of the same reasons behind Catherine the Great’s Russian foreign policy in the eighteenth century might influence Dimitry Medvedev’s Russian foreign policy in the twenty-first century; some of the same motivations for India’s border conflict with China can perhaps be found in Argentina’s decision to start a war with Great Britain; and some of the same
factors affecting France’s nuclear policy are useful for understanding French foreign policy toward Senegal and Mauritania.

In the search for regular and identifiable patterns, the field of foreign policy analysis rejects the view that every event is completely unique. Finding patterns is important to reach the end goal of a general understanding and an increased capability for prediction. In other words, we seek to explain the factors that influence not just a specific policy, but state behavior generally because general knowledge can be used to anticipate future action. If we know the factors that shape decisions for war, we are better able to predict, control, and possibly even prevent future international conflicts.

This is not to say that we assume all states’ foreign policies can be explained in exactly the same way. In order to discover similarities and differences across foreign policies, we use the “comparative method.” The comparative method involves selecting what to examine (in this instance, states and their foreign policies) and determining patterns. It is “comparative” because it involves comparing two or more states or, in some cases, one state at different time periods to determine similarities and differences.

Selecting the countries to compare is a very important step in the comparative method. The countries selected are shown in Table 1–1, along with some demographic, political, and economic characteristics that give a bird’s-eye view of their similarities and differences. The table includes the United States for a convenient comparison, though the case is not included in this book.

The countries chosen for this volume are some of the central players on the global and regional stages today. In order to evaluate the different theories scholars have used to explain states’ foreign policies, we used two primary criteria to select countries to examine. First, we included countries that have some factors or characteristics in common with other countries in order to facilitate comparison. For example, we have several economically strong countries (Great Britain, China, and Germany), and several developing countries (Venezuela, Brazil, India, and Iran). We can also compare the foreign policies of states in the same region dealing with some of the same issues (such as the policies of Great Britain versus Germany toward the European Union).

Second, we selected countries that are diverse on some dimensions in order to generate contrasts and to see how different theoretical perspectives fare in different settings. For example, some theories emphasize democracy and nondemocracy as being important determinants of how a state conducts itself internationally. Thus, we have included several democracies (such as Britain, India, Israel, and South Africa) and some nondemocracies (such as China and Venezuela). We have also chosen states with large militaries (such as China and Russia) and states with smaller militaries (such as Venezuela and Nigeria). These choices allow for comment, albeit in a limited way, on observed differences in foreign policy between democracies and nondemocracies and between military giants and military dwarfs. Had only democracies been chosen, we would not be able to say much about how well theories of foreign policy explain the behavior of nondemocracies.
## Table 1–1 Characteristics of Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>GNI (US$, billions)</th>
<th>GNI per capita (US$)</th>
<th>Military spending (US$, millions)</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Human Development Index&lt;sup&gt;‎b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Government Type</th>
<th>Freedom status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2,218</td>
<td>41,370</td>
<td>57,424</td>
<td>201,000</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Free (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2,671</td>
<td>42,620</td>
<td>61,285</td>
<td>357,000</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>Semi-presidential</td>
<td>Free (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3,377</td>
<td>42,450</td>
<td>46,848</td>
<td>246,000</td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Free (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>9,340</td>
<td>52,586</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Not Free (5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,331</td>
<td>5,029</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>114,300</td>
<td>2,070,000</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Not Free (6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>5,228</td>
<td>38,080</td>
<td>51,420</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Free (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,155</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>34,816</td>
<td>1,190,000</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Free (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>4,530</td>
<td>7,044 [2008]</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>Theocratic</td>
<td>Not Free (6.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>8,720</td>
<td>15,634</td>
<td>501,000</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Partly Free (3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>Transitional</td>
<td>Partly Free (4.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>5,760</td>
<td>3,735</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Free (2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>8,070</td>
<td>28,096</td>
<td>265,000</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Free (2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>10,900</td>
<td>3,106</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Partly Free (4.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>14,011</td>
<td>43,360</td>
<td>687,105</td>
<td>1,380,000</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Free (1.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup>Human development index based on life expectancy at birth; adult literacy; gross primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment; and purchasing power parity in U.S. dollars.

<sup>b</sup>Data for the United Kingdom are presented for Great Britain.
Analyzing Foreign Policies

The analysis of foreign policy begins with theories that identify different factors—various forces that influence a state’s foreign policy. Most analysts recognize that any explanation of foreign policy typically involves multiple factors. As you will see, there is no shortage of theories on what factors influence foreign policy. These multiple factors can be grouped into two broad categories of explanations: those dealing with factors outside the state, and those dealing with factors inside the state. The first category points to the international environment as the explanation for countries’ foreign policy. In other words, factors external to the state—how the international system is organized, the characteristics of contemporary international relations, and the actions of others—can lead the state to react in certain ways. The second category points to factors internal to the state. In other words, characteristics of the domestic political system—citizens and groups within that system, the government organizations, and the individual leaders—serve as the source of a state’s foreign policy. As previously noted, the study of foreign policy uniquely bridges the study of international relations and domestic politics by considering how both internal and external factors influence state behavior. We turn now to a discussion of these categories and the variety of theories associated with each.

External Factors

All states, regardless of their type of political system, their history, or their culture, reside within an international system that limits choices they can make. The worldwide distribution of economic wealth and military power and the actions of other powerful states, multinational corporations, and international and transnational organizations often mean that states cannot pursue their preferred option in foreign policy. Scholars of foreign policy have long recognized that to understand how states behave toward each other, it is important to understand the influence of these systemic factors and the external actors and conditions outside the control of policy makers. In fact, for a long time, many argued that states’ foreign policies were solely a product of the international system—merely a reaction to external conditions and other actors. This is the expectation derived from theories of international relations such as realism and variants of liberalism and constructivism. Thus, foreign policy analysts often use perspectives on the international system to infer the actions states are likely to take in their foreign policies.

Anarchy and Power in the International System: Realism

The lack of an overarching government in the international system is one of the most important external conditions that affects foreign policy. Realist theory proposes that anarchy is the characteristic of the international environment that makes international politics so dramatically different from domestic politics. In domestic political systems, political actors (such as groups and individuals) can
cooperate because there are rules governing behavior and a government to enforce those rules. In the international political system, however, conflict is more likely because the absence of an overall system of law and enforcement means that each political actor (almost 200 states in 2012) must look out for itself. In addition, realists argue that power is a relative concept. In a condition of anarchy, any gain in power by one state represents an inherent threat to its neighbors. Realists prescribe policies that maximize state interests in an effort to seek relative gains and preserve balances of power.

What is the effect of anarchy on foreign policy? Without the protection of an international legal system or global police force, states must look out for their own interests. The result is distrust, competition, and conflict among states. The driving force behind foreign policies then becomes the constant need to acquire and safeguard one’s security and power. For most realists, the key components of power are military in nature, because ultimately it is the goal of every state to survive and to protect its territorial integrity (if not its citizens as well). Factors that contribute to military strength include the size and sophistication of military forces, economic wealth to purchase military strength, and good leadership. Geopolitical factors, such as natural defenses and abundant resources, have also long figured into the calculation of military strength. If a state does not have much power, it must enter into an alliance with states that are more powerful and can protect it. Thus, alliances and powerful allies also become additional external conditions that can constrain states.

The realist perspective leads to several expectations about foreign policy based on the power capabilities of a state and the potential threats to it. The foreign policies of states that are quite powerful militarily, such as China and Russia, focus on preserving their power by maintaining a high profile in world affairs and balancing against other powerful states. Policies aimed at demonstrating military capabilities and securing spheres of influence are most important. If there is only one other major power in the international system, such as was true during the Cold War, competition for allies and possible conflict with the other power likely dominates the foreign policy agenda.

For states with some capabilities but who are not global powers, such as Brazil and Great Britain, foreign policy often depends on the distribution of power in the international system (another systemic characteristic that realism sees as important). In a bipolar system, a middle power faces strong pressures to become a compliant alliance partner of one of the major powers and ultimately give up autonomy in its foreign policy for the sake of security. During the Cold War, Germany and Japan were arguably so dependent on their alliance with the United States that their potential influence as middle powers in the international system was largely constrained. Middle powers may instead try to play one major power off against another (as India and France attempted to do at times during the Cold War), but this can be a risky business.

In a multipolar system, realists argue, middle powers often have the most autonomy and regional influence because there is greater choice in alliance partners
when the major powers are competing. Middle powers often worry, however, that
the great powers will cooperate and rule the international system like an “oligarch-
chy,” ignoring the interests of the middle and smaller states. In terms of military
capabilities, the current international system might be hegemonic, with the United
States as the lone superpower. This presents new opportunities for middle powers.
Although they are no match for the hegemonic state and must often follow its lead
in areas of interest to the hegemon, a middle power may assert its influence region-
ally. Indeed, we are currently witnessing a resurgence of regional powers around the
globe with states like Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa, playing new, more inde-
pendent roles in their regions. As hegemony in the international system declines,
contenders may adopt foreign policies that challenge the dominance of the hege-
mon. For example, some may interpret Chinese foreign policy today as focused on
rivaling the United States as a world leader.7

States with fewer military capabilities at the beginning of their existence (such
as South Korea, East Timor, or Belarus) are the most constrained. According to
realism, they have little opportunity to forge an independent foreign policy, for
they must satisfy their protector. For example in the 1950s, geographic vulnerabil-
ity and regional threats impacted South Korea’s relationship with the United
States and necessitated the buildup of South Korea’s defense forces. In the 2000s,
East Timor sought support from Australia and other western powers in the face
of threats from the government of Indonesia.

All states, according to the realist perspective, must be vigilant and react to
potential threats, regardless of their military capability and their place in the
international system. They constantly seek to attain a balance with the power of
others. For instance, Russia and China must be wary of attempts by the United
States to dominate the international system. France must be concerned about
Germany’s influence in the European monetary union. The Iranian government
may be pursuing nuclear weapons, in part, to increase its security against western
threats. India must carefully watch and react to Pakistan’s military capabilities,
including its nuclear capability. And finally, Ukraine might seek support from
western European countries in an effort to maintain a balance against its power-
ful neighbor, Russia.

Although realism captures an important aspect of states’ foreign policies—the
primacy of security interests and the drive for power among all states—it is often
criticized for its excessive focus on military conflict at the expense of economic
cooperation. Military capability supposedly gives a state influence in international
politics, for example the influence to deter others from attacking and the influ-
ence to protect its allies. But economic power, not just economic wealth to pur-
chase military capability, can also give a state influence in international politics.
Even if a state does not use its wealth to build a strong military, it may be able to
influence others through the use of economic sanctions or promises of an eco-
nomically rewarding relationship. In other words, it may be able to “buy” its
influence. Indeed, because of changes in the international system, economic
power may be more significant in contemporary international relations. Military
force, for example, is often ineffective at solving some problems (such as trade imbalances and global environmental threats) and may be more costly to a state than economic sanctions. Such problems are arguably more important in an era of increasing interdependence and globalization.8

Interdependence in the International System: Liberalism

Liberal theories of international relations focus on the distribution of economic wealth as a primary characteristic that affects states’ foreign policies. Liberalism sees the world as markedly different from what it was fifty years ago. With the increase in global trade and financial relationships and the technological advances that have facilitated this increase, states have become more interdependent.9 One variant, neoliberal institutionalism contends that states cooperate because of expected mutual benefits, and they are likely to form multilateral regimes to increase information certainty, lower transaction costs, and foster mutual gains.10 For example, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) represents the core of the nonproliferation regime, a set of nested agreements and institutions that collectively help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Neofunctionalism is another theory which argues that trade is the most important spark for regional integration. Governments agree to pool sovereignty to manage technical issues created by expanding economic transactions, but integration quickly acquires a life of its own due to the dynamics of functional spillover (i.e., integration in one sector increases pressure to integrate in other areas).11 As flows of intraregional trade and investment increase, players may advocate creation of supranational institutions that allow them to reduce the uncertainty and the transaction costs, and to reap the benefits of advantages in an integrated economic system.12

How is foreign policy affected by interdependence? According to liberalism, states find cooperation rather than conflict, more in line with their interests. Arms control agreements, trade agreements, and cultural exchanges are examples of cooperation that can benefit states. Cooperating with other states, and building international institutions to facilitate that cooperation, allows states to further their goals of economic wealth. Indeed, economic liberalism argues that all states will be better off if they cooperate in a worldwide division of labor, with each state specializing in what it is relatively better at producing.13 Japan, for example, decided long ago that it was not possible to try to produce all that it needed to consume. Its experience in World War II of trying to control its access to resources through conflict was not successful in the end. Instead, it came to see participation in regional and global trade networks as a more efficient way to generate wealth in the 1950s and beyond.

An increase in interdependence can have a downside. The more numerous the connections are between states, the greater the opportunities for conflicts of interests. For example, Japan and western European states are highly dependent on
Middle East oil, and their economic interests have often diverged with Middle Eastern states' political and military interests. When states fail to resolve these differences through cooperation and compromise, states may resort to force to ensure access to resources on which they are dependent. This logic partly explains events in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and suggests a different interpretation of tensions between India and Pakistan over water resources originating in Kashmir today. More generally, when states become intertwined in one area, they often become sensitive to state behavior in other areas.

Interdependence also means states can be fairly constrained in their foreign policy. Because the fortunes of one state are connected to the fortunes of others, when one state harms another, it does so at its own peril. Going to war in an effort to gain power may make sense militarily, but states in an interdependent world harm themselves by destroying potential trading partners and markets in which to sell their goods. After World War II, France and Germany deliberately chose the path of interdependence and constraint and transformed a centuries-old relationship of distrust and rivalry into one of economic cooperation. Thus, liberalism views economic interdependence as the key characteristic of the international environment that states must consider when they make foreign policy.

Some states are more dependent than others. Richer states, such as China and Saudi Arabia, are very much affected by the actions of other states, but they can afford to sacrifice part of their economic wealth in order to pursue other goals. Their wealth and the centrality of their state in the world economy give them a choice in trading partners, and they do not have to rely on others for economic assistance. Poor states that are less engaged in the global economy, such as Bulgaria or Chad, enjoy no such luxury and are highly constrained in their foreign policy. Their very economic existence depends on their relationships with other states, as well as with nonstate actors such as multinational corporations and international financial organizations. Thus, they are often forced to comply with the foreign policy wishes of their benefactors. Furthermore, some suggest that the leaders of poor states often act in collusion with the rich states that exploit the poor states' cheap labor and abundant raw materials.14

As noted above, because there is no overarching authority to ensure cooperation, states may support international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization as forums for coordinating states' interests. What may be sacrificed in the short term, from that support, liberals believe is offset by the long-term benefits of stability, efficiency, and greater wealth.15 However, with international cooperation in the form of international organizations and with the rise of multinational corporations as the engines of globalization, states have no choice but to deal with these nonstate actors and sometimes compete with them for influence in international politics. At times, states even compete with nonstate actors for control over their own domestic politics.

Current globalization and liberalization pressures complicate the effects of interdependence in the early twenty-first century. Globalization connects more economies in worldwide financial and trading markets, but it has not done so...
evenly. Indeed, the gap between rich and poor states is widening, according to some measures. Poor states have little ability to resist pressures to open up their markets, even when they disagree with the liberal philosophy and risk political retribution when the gap between rich and poor becomes greater within their economies. Some states, such as China, have changed their past positions and embraced some elements of the liberal economic philosophy.

One response to current globalization is regional economic integration. Both rich and poor states are engaging in agreements and dialogues to establish greater interdependence at the regional level. The European Union (EU) is the most successful example of regional integration, particularly with the establishment in 1999 of a common currency, the Euro. There have been other recent attempts at regional integration in response, in part, to globalization. This is particularly true for states in Latin America and southern Africa that are trying to replicate the benefits of regional cooperation seen in the EU. If these attempts are successful, states in southern Africa and Latin America may find they are constrained by the new international organizations that they build—much as British, French, and German states are sometimes constrained by the political and economic structures of the EU. Thus, regional integration provides another layer of external factors that may affect states’ foreign policies.

International Norms and Legitimacy: Constructivism

A constructivist perspective sees the international system as composed of the social interactions of states and shared understandings in a global society. The international system includes more than objective forces of power, interests, and organization. For constructivism, anarchy and interests are not objectively determined. Instead, they are constituted by the actions of agents, such as states, and the meanings or ideas that agents attach to them. Given the breadth of this approach in the first decade after the Cold War, constructivism quickly emerged as a leading contender to rationalism in international relations theory.16

Constructivists view norms of appropriate behavior as socially constructed international structures that constrain states’ foreign policies.17 Norms represent shared expectations about appropriate behavior that derive from a combination of beliefs, standards of behavior, international conventions, and decision-making procedures. For example, a norm evolved in the past two centuries to reframe the international slave trade as repugnant and immoral, and some scholars suggest that there is a new norm prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons today. Norms are characterized as both regulative and constitutive in that they shape national interests and identity.18 States often avoid violating norms, but when they do, other actors may sanction them or shame them.19 For some of the same reasons, states tend to avoid foreign policies that are not seen as legitimate by the international community. International laws may codify what counts as legitimate. Although states do not always comply with international laws, the system does carry some kind of moral, normative authority that states support.20
In sum, external factors focus on aspects of the international system that push or pull states toward certain foreign policy choices. Realism proposes that states motivated by self-interests seek military power and create alliances while weak states submit to more powerful actors. Liberalism suggests that an interdependent international system results in more cooperation, more support for organizations that help coordinate activities, and the submission of economically weak states to the forces of the international marketplace. Constructivist perspectives point to socially-created meanings that develop into international norms that serve to guide actors’ behaviors. Proponents of each of these perspectives agree that foreign policies are a result of states’ rank, status, and links to other actors in the international system.

Internal Factors

Theories that focus on internal sources of foreign policy offer a rather different perspective and set of expectations. In contrast to the externally based theories, those who point to sources internal to the state expect differences across states’ foreign policies, despite similar international circumstances. For these analysts, the great diversity of political systems, cultures, and leaders are the factors that point states in different directions, even though they are facing the same external forces. Furthermore, externally based theories often assume the policies states make are in response to their interests and the demands of the international system. Their response is “rational,” or the most optimal decision given those interests and demands. Domestically oriented explanations, in contrast, argue that states sometimes make decisions that do not necessarily benefit them in international politics. These theories explain such “deviations from rationality” by pointing to the need of leaders to satisfy both domestic political goals and foreign policy interests or by examining the imperfect nature of the decision-making process. Finally, those who focus on external sources of foreign policy tend to examine states as if they were “unitary actors” whose politicians and citizens put aside any differences they may have and act with one voice for the sake of national security. Conversely, those who point to domestic sources of foreign policy highlight the many different voices and conflicts over foreign policy. These many voices reside at several levels of actors and institutions within countries—the public, societal groups, government organizations, and leaders.

The Public: Opinion, Identity and Culture

For purposes of this study, public opinion is defined as the attitudes citizens have about particular foreign policy issues. The public may agree on an issue or may be deeply divided. For example, the public may be for or against their state intervening militarily in another country or signing a particular trade agreement. Scholars continue to debate the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, even in highly democratized states in which policy supposedly reflects “the will of the people.”
Based on numerous findings in research, the conventional wisdom is that the public simply does not influence foreign policy. The average person tends to know little and care little about his or her country’s foreign affairs. Even if the public were knowledgeable about foreign policy issues, it is not clear that leaders would follow public opinion. They may instead try to lead the public to opinions that are in line with their preferences or ignore their opinion altogether.21 Many times, evidence suggests that leaders who do ignore the public are not held accountable at the polls because elections typically revolve around domestic rather than foreign policy concerns. The media also play a role in the relationship between the public and the state, as they, too, may influence public opinion on foreign policy.22

However, the question of public opinion and foreign policy may be more complicated than this conventional wisdom implies.23 Some evidence suggests that there is more congruence than skeptics assume between changes in public opinion and changes in foreign policy.24 In many specific cases of foreign policy decisions, we know leaders were quite sensitive to public reactions. Furthermore, although the public may not formulate specific stable opinions about foreign policy, it often expresses rather enduring “core values” or opinion “moods.”25 These refer to underlying beliefs—such as isolationism, anticommunism, nonappeasement, neutrality, and anti-imperialism—the public holds and uses to judge foreign policy. In Germany and Japan, the public has come to value multilateralism and antimilitarism. In post–Cold War Russia and in contemporary India, core values support the maintenance of a “great power” identity. Indeed, a country’s identity—how it sees itself in relations to others—and its conception of its role in the world can be powerful ideas that are shared by members of the public and that set boundaries within which leaders must remain or risk public opposition.26 As with public opinion on a specific policy, identity and role may be constructed by elites and used to support particular foreign policy positions.27

Thus far, most research on public opinion as a source of foreign policy has focused on democracies in which there are institutionalized channels for the public to hold leaders accountable for their decisions. The public is often assumed not to have any influence on the foreign policies of more authoritarian political systems. The views of society, however, may be just as important in these types of systems, although in an indirect fashion.28 As in democracies, core values held by the public may work to set boundaries. Indeed, authoritarian systems may be built on the foundation of such foreign policy orientations, such as self-determination and defense in North Korea, and anti-imperialism in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Iran. Thus, despite the fact that nondemocracies may not be “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” the people may still constrain the government in its foreign policy decisions.

Core values and national identities are connected to a society’s political culture—the values, norms, and traditions that are widely shared by its people and are relatively enduring over time. These enduring cultural features may also set parameters for foreign policy.29 A country’s culture may value individualism, collectivism, pragmatism, or moralism, and these culturally based values may affect
foreign policy. Cultures that place a premium on morality over practicality may be more likely to pass moral judgment over the internal affairs and foreign policy behaviors of others. Culture also affects the way foreign policy is determined. Cultures where consensual decision making is the norm, for example, may take longer to make policy, because the process of consultation with many people may be just as important as the final decision. Despite the general recognition that cultural particularities do affect foreign policy, it is often difficult to assess the impact of culture.

Societal Groups: Links and Opposition

Leaders may be more likely to pay attention to, and react to, the opinions of specific, organized societal groups than to the society at large, as they play the role of linking society to the state or of opposing and competing with the state. Interest groups articulate a particular societal sector’s position and mobilize that sector to pressure and persuade the government. Interest groups come in a variety of forms. They may be based on a single issue, on ethnic identification, on religious affiliation, or on economics. For example, nongovernmental organizations focused on human rights are becoming increasingly visible in countries as different as the United States and Egypt.

Economic interest groups can be an especially important societal source of foreign policy because they help to generate wealth, and economic welfare has become one of the primary functions of the modern state. Economic groups often have an interest in foreign relations as they seek to promote their foreign business adventures abroad or to protect markets from competitors at home. Business groups in Japan have often been considered partners with the bureaucracy on foreign, economic, policy making, and a wide range of business, labor, financial, and trade groups quite actively attempt to influence foreign policy in Ireland.

An interest group’s influence on foreign policy often depends on the particular issue, how organized the group is, and the relationship between the interest group and the government. Interest groups face an uphill struggle in attempting to influence a government that disagrees with their position. The government typically has greater resources to bring to bear on the issue and more control of the information that flows to the public. Depending on the political system, the government also has more diffuse political support from the public. Globalization and liberalization trends have certainly increased the number of economic groups that have an interest in their state’s foreign policies, as can be seen in contemporary Nigeria. Such trends have also arguably strengthened the capability of these groups to influence foreign policy.

Political parties, although often part of the government, also play the role of linking societal opinion to political leadership. In many ways, political parties function much like interest groups. In some countries, such as Iran, only one party exists or dominates the political system and that party’s ideology can be important in setting the boundaries for debate over foreign policy decisions and in providing...
rhetoric for leader’s speeches. In such cases, parties become less important than factions, which often develop within political parties. Factions are also important in political systems in which one party holds a majority in parliament and rules alone. In these countries too, factions may disagree over the direction of the country’s foreign policy, as have the pro- versus anti-European integration factions in the British Conservative Party.\(^{34}\) Party factions may seek to outmaneuver each other or they may be forced to compromise for the sake of party unity. Even if there is a consensus within the party, foreign policy might get captured by the intraparty fighting as factions compete with one another for party leadership. These internal dynamics of political parties can be seen in countries as different as China, Turkey, and Canada.

Factions are also important in more fragmented multiparty political systems, but in such countries the competition between parties becomes significant as well. In vying for the public’s support, parties may attempt to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other, thus polarizing the debate over foreign policy, or they may rush to the center of the political spectrum to capture the moderates, who often decide elections.\(^{35}\) In some multiparty systems, such as India and Germany, the political scene is so fragmented that parties must enter into coalitions and share power to make policy. In such cases, each foreign policy decision can be a struggle between coalition partners, who must get along to keep the coalition together.\(^{36}\)

A country’s military is, of course, part of the government, but in many countries military leadership competes with civilian leadership for control over policy. At times, the military can be a powerful source of opposition to a government’s foreign policy goals, especially if those goals concern national security issues or imply a cut in the military’s resources. At other times, military groups might push leaders in expansionist directions to further self-interested goals of organizational growth and prestige.\(^ {37}\) Since a military that is not subordinate to civilian leaders controls the primary means of coercion, policy makers may be very sensitive to this opposition. If they are not, they risk a military coup.

Government Organization: Democracies and Bureaucracies

How a government is organized may also affect foreign policy. Two characteristics are particularly important: democratization and bureaucratization. The foreign policy process is quite different for democracies—decision-making authority tends to be diffused across democratic institutions, and thus more actors are involved. In contrast, authoritarian leaders often make decisions by themselves. Democratic leaders are also directly accountable to political parties and the public and thus must build a consensus for foreign policy. Authoritarian leaders do not face these constraints and may enjoy considerable latitude in choosing their own policies.

Liberal theory argues that because of these differences in government organization, democracies will behave more peacefully than will authoritarian systems.\(^ {38}\) Even if a leader is inclined to war, they will have difficulty building political
support among a larger set of actors and mobilizing them for conflict. These leaders are accountable to a public that is often more concerned with economic than military issues. Furthermore, democratic institutions are built on and create a political culture that is likely to emphasize the value of peaceful resolution. In a democracy, citizens learn that conflicts of interest can be resolved nonviolently—for example, through elections, peaceful means of influence, or in the courts. They transfer that value to their relations with other states.

Despite these expectations, the proposition that democracies are generally more peaceful in their foreign policy is not supported by most evidence. Democracies and authoritarian governments, it seems, are both likely to be involved in and initiate conflict. For example, democratic constraints did not prevent British involvement in Iraq, French military interventions in Africa, India’s conflicts with China and Pakistan, and Israel’s participation in numerous Middle East conflicts. Democracies, however, rarely fight other democracies. Scholars continue to work on the answer to this puzzle, but many return to the ideas that democratic cultural values and institutional constraints make democratic foreign policy different, even if only when dealing with other democracies.

The differences between the making of foreign policy in democratic and authoritarian governments may be exaggerated. First, actual decision-making authority may not be as diffuse, or constrained, in democracies as sometimes supposed. As noted earlier, citizens in a democracy are often not well informed, and their influence over foreign policy is debatable. Furthermore, foreign policy decisions, unlike most domestic policy decisions, are often highly centralized at the top of the government’s hierarchy, as they typically are, for example, in France, Palau, and Poland.

Second, it is not always the case that authoritarian leaders act without constraint. These leaders often face considerable opposition from society, interest groups, party factions, and their own militaries and may consult frequently with these groups before making foreign policy decisions. Although citizens in authoritarian systems cannot vote their leaders out of office, they do have other means of holding leaders accountable, including forming or pledging allegiance to non-governmental groups who oppose the authoritarian leader, backing a coup and change of government, assassinating a leader, and starting a revolution. Indeed, simply being voted out of office may pale in comparison.

Authoritarian regimes that are fairly new, face tremendous internal opposition, or are otherwise weak in their control of the country need to pay special attention to public reaction to foreign policy. Countries such as India, Iraq, and Spain have serious economic, religious, and ethnic internal divisions that can detract from the legitimacy of the state. Leaders of such governments may use foreign policy to build national identity, demonstrate strong leadership, or divert attention away from internal problems. Finally in some authoritarian systems, no single leader controls foreign policy; decisions are made collectively, as in modern-day Iran. Since there are considerable differences in the organization of authoritarian governments and democratic governments, it may be better to
think of government organization in regard to how centralized the decision-making authority is, and how strong the government is, in relation to societal opposition.41

A second feature of government organization that affects foreign policy concerns the bureaucracy, which is charged with gathering information, developing proposals, offering advice, implementing policy, and, at times, making foreign policy decisions. Because of the complexities involved in dealing with the many issues of international politics, governments organize themselves bureaucratically, assigning responsibility for different areas or jurisdictions of policy to separate agencies or departments. Separate agencies, for example, are responsible for diplomatic relations, for trade ties, and for different parts of the military.

Although such bureaucratic organization is necessary to deal with a complex world, it can create problems for foreign policy.42 The different departments, for example, may come into conflict over what foreign policy should be adopted, partly because departments tend to develop their own sense of identity, or organizational mission. Bureaucratic conflict is a common problem, for example, in the process of making foreign policy in the United States and Japan. The conflict in viewpoints may create inconsistent foreign policy if departments are acting on their own rather than in coordination. It may also result in compromises that are not necessarily in the best interests of the state. Critics argue that the U.S. occupation of post-war Iraq was so chaotic, in part due to bureaucratic struggles for control over policies there.

These types of problems that stem from bureaucratic organization in a government are less likely under certain conditions. Although most states have some sort of bureaucracy, in some, a single leader or a single unifying force (such as one political party) can impose a decision on a reluctant or conflicted bureaucracy. On some issues, moreover, all agencies may share an overriding value that guides foreign policy, making inconsistencies and conflict less likely. Finally, in crisis situations, the top leadership often takes over, minimizing (but not always eliminating) the effects of bureaucratic politics.

Leaders: Personalities and Beliefs

At the top of government sits a leader, or leaders, who have the authority to make foreign policy. Characteristics of leaders are generally more important when they have significant latitude in shaping policy and the situation is ambiguous, uncertain, or complex. Under these conditions, which occur frequently in foreign policy making, a leader’s personality and beliefs may shape what the state does.43

Leaders’ decisions may be shaped by their own personal history. Their childhood or early political experiences, for example, may have taught them that certain values and ways of handling problems are important.44 The revolutionary tendencies of the Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung, for example, might be traced back to when he was a child. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was profoundly influenced by her upbringing in the former East Germany. Manmohan Singh is India’s
first Sikh prime minister, and holds a Ph.D. in political economy from Oxford University. His values and professional training have influenced his government’s emphasis on economic development and trade policy. Since every leader’s personal history is unique, one might expect each individual to draw on a particular set of beliefs, values, and experiences in coping with foreign policy issues.

Despite their individual differences, all humans prefer to be consistent in their beliefs, and studies show we often ignore or distort information that contradicts what we already believe. This is especially likely when we have strongly held stereotypes or “images” of other countries. Leaders who see another country as their enemy, for example, will often selectively attend to or perceive information about that country in a way that confirms their original belief. For this reason, images are extremely resistant to change, even if the “enemy” is making cooperative gestures. U.S. President George W. Bush’s image of Saddam Hussein, for example, was significant in his decisions about going to war with Iraq in 2003.

Leaders can also be categorized into types of personalities. Some leaders may be motivated by a need to dominate others and may thus be more conflictual in foreign policy; others may be more concerned with being accepted, and may therefore be more cooperative. Some leaders are more nationalistic, more distrustful, and believe that the world is a place of conflict that can only be solved through the use of force, whereas others see themselves and their state as part of the world community that can be trusted and believe that problems are best solved multilaterally.

Leaders’ decision-making style and how they manage information and the people around them can also be important. Some leaders, like Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, choose to be quite active in foreign policy making, whereas others, like Brazil’s Itamar Franco, tended to delegate the authority to make foreign policy decisions. Some leaders are “crusaders” who come to office with a foreign policy goal. They tend not to compromise on their vision and are less open to advice. Others are interested in keeping power or bridging conflicts. They tend to be sensitive to advice and are reluctant to make decisions without consultation and consensus. Historically, India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for example, tended to be an advocate for her own positions, whereas her father, Nehru, preferred to build a consensus among those around him.

Conclusion

As noted earlier, we have chosen a variety of countries in which to examine the links between international and domestic politics and the various propositions presented above. The following chapters afford a look at these various theories, which expect states’ foreign policies to differ according to their level of economic development, dependence, and military power. We gain insight by comparing Germany with Nigeria, Russia with Venezuela, and China with Turkey. We also assess other theories that point to countries that are very similar in their placement.
in the international security and economic system (such as Great Britain and France), but that choose different paths in their foreign policies, possibly because of internal factors. These countries also include a variety of different political systems, cultures, core values, historical experiences, societal opposition, degrees of centralization of political authority, and levels of bureaucratization, and they are led by leaders with their own beliefs and styles.

In addition, the countries represented in the chapters that follow provide an excellent opportunity to examine some of the recent changes in domestic and international politics and the effects these changes might have on foreign policy. Many of these states (such as Germany and Japan) were constrained by the Cold War international system. An examination of contemporary foreign policy allows us to assess how such states are coping with the post–Cold War world and its new security structures. Also of interest is how states, especially poorer states, are coping with globalization and pressures for liberalization, which may not be new but have intensified in the last decade. In internal matters, many of the states in this book have experienced changes in leadership over the past few years; several states have seen wholesale changes in their governing structures; others are facing significant pressures for reform. We examine how changes in domestic politics have influenced foreign policy in these states.

As you read the following chapters, we invite you to learn about the contemporary politics (both domestic and global) of central actors in the world today. We also encourage you to apply the theories discussed in this chapter to understand each country’s foreign policy and to think critically about these theories as you compare the countries’ experiences. As you go along, consider the questions presented below. In addition, try to assess which theories or group of factors are being emphasized as important for understanding the country’s foreign policy. Each chapter presents a brief historical review of the country’s foreign policy, an analysis of the most important external and internal factors in the country’s foreign policy, and a discussion of contemporary foreign policy issues. In the book’s final chapter, we return to a discussion of thinking comparatively and analytically about contemporary foreign policies.

Questions to Consider When Analyzing Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective

- Has the foreign policy behavior of many countries changed in the past two decades? What theories best explain different measures of change in countries’ foreign policies?
- Which theories of international constraints on state behavior are most important, and for which countries? Overall, how do these perspectives help to account for the foreign policy behavior of countries in comparative perspective?
- How are states coping with globalization and the pressures for liberalization in contemporary international relations? Are there fundamental differences in how states deal with these challenges?
• How do constructivists explain state foreign policy behaviors? How important is political identity in shaping decisions about foreign affairs?
• Which internal influences on state behavior are most important and for which countries? Overall, how do these perspectives help to account for the foreign policy behavior of various countries?
• Can external and internal factors be linked to better understand foreign policy in the twenty-first century? What type of conceptual framework would capture the interaction of these levels?
• What are the benefits of studying foreign policy in comparative perspective? What are the limitations?

Suggestions for Further Reading


Notes

2. The authors would like to thank Isabelle Howes for her valuable research and editorial assistance.


30. Valerie M. Hudson, ed., Culture and Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997).


Chapter 4

German Foreign Policy: Gulliver’s Travails in the 21st Century

Sebastian Harnisch

Germany, as a large country in the center of Europe with great power status in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has historically played an important role in international relations. After World War II, however, its division into East and West Germany and its dependence on the Western alliance significantly diminished its freedom and status as an actor in world politics. After the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy evolved in a gradual way, as leaders and other domestic political actors confronted many new challenges in global politics. In this chapter, Sebastian Harnisch characterizes the complex forces—from political culture to party politics to elite preferences—that have conditioned German responses to foreign policy challenges. These factors seem especially important as Germany confronts questions at the heart of the future of the European Union and western security.

Germany, like Japan (Chapter 7), was a state that depended on the United States for its security during the Cold War and struggled with its new post–Cold War identity. But Germany was also deeply vested in European integration, and thus its foreign policy patterns can be compared and contrasted with those of Great Britain (Chapter 2), and France (Chapter 3). As one of the most established members of the European Union, German policies can also be compared with a country seeking EU membership, Turkey (Chapter 9). German foreign policy responses to regional and global security challenges, including the global war on terrorism and uprisings during the Arab Spring of 2011 such as the Libya War, also provide a fascinating contrast to that of France (Chapter 3), China (Chapter 6), and Japan (Chapter 7). As are the other democratic states in this book, Germany is an excellent country in which to examine public opinion, the political actors who seek to represent the public, and the effect these actors have on foreign policy. Germany has recently experienced a change of leadership and the effects of the new ruling coalition on contemporary German foreign policy can be compared with the consequences of the new leadership in Great Britain (Chapter 2), Japan (Chapter 7), and Turkey (Chapter 9).
Germany, the European Union’s largest economy and most populous state, is often depicted as a Gulliver in the foreign policy literature. After three expansionist wars in the 19th and 20th century (1870–1871; 1914–1918, 1939–1945), neighboring states harbored serious reservations about a unified Germany, resulting in different strategies to address the “German question.” In the late 19th century, the German Reich under the Chancellorship of Otto von Bismarck was enmeshed in an intricate net of alliances, the collapse of which triggered World War I. Then in the 1920s, the continental powers and the United States tried to both contain—through reparations and territorial revisions in the treaty of Versailles (1919)—and integrate Germany’s first democracy, the Weimar Republic, into the League of Nations. However, the Leagues incipient system of collective security did not stand up to the challenge of German and Italian fascism and Japanese militarism. In 1945, allied nations finally defeated the German Wehrmacht and occupied all of the territory of the so-called “Third Reich.”

After World War II, the German Gulliver finally was tied down successfully and the German question thus temporarily resolved when two states, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East, were bound in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), respectively. The dramatic demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent unification of Germany in 1990 once again raised serious concerns among neighboring states about “Gulliver’s travails.” At the time, many contemporaries cited the French novelist François Mauriac, who had proclaimed: “I love Germany so much, that I am glad there are two of them.”

Indeed, major approaches of foreign policy analysis came to very different and sometimes even mutually exclusive predictions for the reunified Gulliver. Realism, stressing anarchy in the external environment, suggested that gains in territory, population and economic power, as well as the withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army, would trigger a German quest for great power status through seeking autonomy outside established institutions (such as NATO) or seeking influence within those institutions that could be dominated by Germany (such as the European Union). In contrast, liberal institutionalists held that interdependence and
the institutional ties that had firmly anchored post-war Germany in the West would continue to hold for the sovereign and unified Germany, because of the huge benefits the country had reaped from its membership in Western institutions (NATO, EU, UN, GATT, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, etc.). Other scholars argued that societal and economic preferences may have shifted when 18 million East Germans joined the new unified polity. Liberal and constructivist scholars also posited that strong constitutional constraints and a powerful and consensual foreign policy culture would keep the foreign policy trajectory steady, because the West German political system was maintained almost unchanged and had absorbed the five new East German Länder (or States). Yet other identity studies surmised from analyzing discourses throughout the 1990s that German policy elites talked and acted more “self-confidently,” pursuing “national interests” openly and thereby shedding the country’s traditional image of a “model student” of European integration.

This chapter is based on these different approaches of foreign policy analysis and outlines a pluralist account of the German foreign policy trajectory. First, I briefly summarize the historical context in which Cold War bipolarity and U.S.-led Western institutions interacted with the internal predispositions of the young West German democracy. In the second part, I review how shifting distribution of power and interdependence as well as international norms and domestic beliefs and identities shaped Germany’s European and security policy. The final section addresses three cases: the decision against joining the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, Germany’s EU policy leading to the treaty of Lisbon, and its conduct during the current global economic and financial crisis.

Historical Context

Three distinct historical experiences predate Germany’s Cold War and post-Cold War conduct. First, in the late 19th century, the quest by the German Reich’s policy elite for great power status on par with colonial power increasingly isolated the country from powerful alliance partners in the European Concert of Powers. Internally, rapid industrialization led to growing social inequalities, fostering an aggressive nationalism. Second, the failure of the balance-of-power system, the subsequent horrors of trench warfare in World War I and the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty convinced the leading politicians of Germany’s first democracy, the so-called Weimar Republic, that they must cooperate with Western states, most notably the emerging great power, the United States, and seek a “peaceful revision” of Germany’s pariah status under the Versailles regimes.

However, the 1929 global economic crisis and the subsequent radicalization of the domestic scene swept away the fledgling democratic system and put the National Socialist Party of Germany (Nazi Party) in power. Adolf Hitler, the so-called “Führer” of the “Third Reich,” adopted a highly aggressive and expansionist strategy to forcefully revise the “Diktat of Versailles.” He also would conquer other countries for Lebensraum (“living space”) and commit genocide among...
European Jews and other groups in the Holocaust, causing tens of millions of casualties and enormous destruction up to 1945.\(^5\)

These incredible crimes forged a formidable allied war coalition—which later became the “United Nations”—against the axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan). The unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in May 1945 also triggered the division of the occupied areas (including the capital Berlin) among the four victorious powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France). In the ensuing Cold War, East-and West-German elites cooperated with the respective occupation powers, leading to the establishment of both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in 1949.

From the division of Germany to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, West Germany’s foreign policy was shaped by both external circumstances and past experiences.\(^6\) In material terms, the unconditional surrender in 1945 and military occupation by victorious allies led to Germany’s complete disarmament and substantial loss of territory (the so called Ostgebiete, former territories east of the river Oder and Neisse, and the Saarland to France).

The emergence of a powerful ideological adversary, the Soviet Union, encouraged the first Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to align the young Federal Republic with the United States and key Western European partners, most importantly France and Great Britain. Adenauer’s Western policy, or Westpolitik, sought to safeguard Germany’s territorial security. After World War II and the horrible crimes of the Holocaust it was also meant to ultimately reestablish German society as a legitimate part of Western civilization and thus to ensure a future sovereignty.

Soviet aggression in Europe (e.g. the blockade of land routes to Berlin in 1948/1949) and support for the North Korean military onslaught in Asia in 1950 led many analysts in the United States and Europe to conclude that NATO had to be transformed into a formidable military force to prevent an imminent attack by the Red Army.\(^7\) But some policy makers, especially in France, were either totally opposed to German rearmament or favored the deep integration of German Armed Forces in a supranational European Defense Community (EDC). Chancellor Adenauer, who favored rearmament as a tool of greater sovereignty, first pursued a dual-track diplomacy towards both NATO and EDC integration. But when France failed to ratify the treaty establishing the EDC in 1954, the Federal Republic was swiftly integrated into NATO, triggering the GDR’s integration into the WTO. Domestically, a majority of Germans and the oppositional Social Democratic Party (SPD) rejected the idea of German rearmament and accession to NATO, leading to the first major foreign policy debate, the so-called “Wehrdebatte.” The Adenauer government, led by the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was able to secure parliamentary action only after an electoral landslide victory in 1953 and significant compromises on the constitutional limits on the executive’s authority to establish and deploy armed forces.

When the Federal Republic joined NATO in May 1955, these domestic constraints were reinforced by alliance obligations. Consequently, the Adenauer
government readily accepted that almost all of its 340,000 combat forces were assigned to NATO and its territorial defense was determined by NATO’s defense strategy. It also pledged to forego the production of atomic, biological, chemical and other heavy weapons. To bolster NATO’s alliance pledge (which included a commitment by the United States to extend its nuclear umbrella over West German territory), Germany agreed on the forward deployment of various NATO armed forces, most significantly up to 100,000 U.S. combat forces in its territory during the Cold War. Thus, from a German perspective the quip attributed to Lord Ismay on NATO’s security functions being “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” seemed to neatly describe the alliance’s intent. Adenauer’s efforts to gain political integration in Europe focused on France. After three wars in 70 years, he believed that amicable and lasting relations with the former “arch enemy” were essential for Germany and the future of European integration. French President Charles de Gaulle not only promised a long-term relationship in the 1963 Elysée accords but he viewed the relationship as a springboard for an active, independent and global presence of (Continental) Europe as a “Third Force” (see Chapter 3). De Gaulle also accepted some territorial revisions—in 1957 citizens of the Saar region voted in favor of joining the FRG—and political and economic limits to France’s autonomy through bilateral and European integration.9

During the 1950s and 1960s, security and sovereignty in the West took clear priority over German unity. The GDR as such did not represent a direct challenge to the security or legitimacy of the West German democracy. However, immediately after the onset of the Cold War, several million GDR citizens fled from the East illegally, and in June 1953 Soviet troops led a crackdown on striking workers. The communist regime started building a system of border fences (1952) and a massive wall (1961) to prevent further emigration. Against this background, West German governments argued in the so-called Hallstein doctrine that the Federal Republic was the sole representative of all Germans, refusing to recognize the GDR and also withholding diplomatic recognition from any state that established formal relations with the GDR.

Under Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–1974), who led the first social-democratic government in a coalition of the SPD with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), this controversial policy was revised. Instead, Brandt initiated an “East Policy” (Ostpolitik) based on the belief that change between the blocs and the two Germanys could only result from a rapprochement strategy of more interaction, not less. Thus, while Chancellor Adenauer had already established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955 to ensure the repatriation of German prisoners of war, the Brandt government negotiated a whole system of treaties in 1972 through 1974—the so-called East Treaties—establishing a substantial, special, economic and political relationship with the GDR below the level of diplomatic recognition.

and his foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher employed these strategies—Western integration and cooperation with the East—in the “Two-Plus-Four Agreement” talks on unification. Again, the Gulliver willingly bound himself: while the four allied powers conferred their remaining rights over Berlin and Germany as a whole to the German government, the unified Gulliver settled all outstanding territorial issues (especially with Poland over the Oder-Neiße border). It once again renounced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and obligated itself to limit its armed forces to 370,000 personnel.10

Reconstruction and security required the jump-starting of the war-torn German economy (to help prevent political radicalization) and deep international integration (to avert protectionism and beggar-thy-neighbor policies). Under U.S. political leadership and with substantial financial support, West European economies recovered through transatlantic policy coordination and deeper European integration. The Marshall Plan (1947)—rejected by East European countries under Soviet pressure early on—not only provided much needed U.S. financial aid and market access, but also initiated cooperation between former enemies in Western Europe. Thus, Germany developed into a trading state in the 1950s, more than tripling its share of world exports from 3.5 percent to 11 percent (1950–1965).11

Domestically, the Federal Republic pursued a strategy often called “middle way” or “social market economy.” This strategy mixed instruments to promote economic growth and social protection through a high percentage of public spending, relative to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but a moderate amount of public employment (in comparison with Scandinavian welfare states). In addition, the economy is governed through a corporatist policy consensus in which government, trade unions, and business leaders negotiate to regulate the economy while also relying on “expert institutions,” such as an autonomous central bank.

Externally, Germany’s goals of security and economic development merged into a strategy of deeper European economic cooperation. In this approach, integration into the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, including member states Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), derives from a mutually reinforcing effect of seeking security and development: West Germany would shed its pre-World War II autarchy policy and integrate its export-oriented economy into European institutions, thereby alleviating concerns about its strong trade performance.12 Based on the supranational institutional structure of the ECSC—the fixing of steel and coal production quotas was delegated to a high authority—member states with converging economic interests also established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) in 1957. The member states then established (1993) and consolidated the European Union (EU) through further treaty revision processes (1997, 2001 and 2009) and expanded the EU’s issue areas of coordination such as agriculture, development, currency, and migration. In order to lock in cooperative gains and reassure its neighbors, consecutive German governments pooled and often delegated national regulatory competences in
European institutions, such as the European Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Parliament. Over the decades, this strategy gained greater legitimacy as Germany's economic interests and values became "vested" in the European constitutional order. In this way, Germany's economic recovery and revival followed from the concurrently emerging European economic order, accepted by an ever-growing number of EC/EU member states. This order also implies regional security, preventing others from balancing the emerging Gulliver militarily, protecting economic interests and adjudicating disputes through common European institutions.

External Factors

Any analysis of external factors influencing West German foreign policy trajectory must begin with a clear definition of what these factors are and how they relate to internal, cognitive and social factors. Does the Federal Republic's post-war conduct correlate with its relative power position (as measured by neorealist scholars), or does it fluctuate with the "perception" of that power position by German foreign policy elites? If international institutions shape choices by providing information and setting incentives for their members, how do we account for the influence of member states in establishing their "institutional design"? Also, when countries seek to generate a stable sense of self in the international social order, or what constructivists call "ontological security," how do we know when states decide that their traditional role, identity, or strategic culture is detrimental to achieving this in the current order and try to either change their role or pursue a "revolutionary foreign policy"?

Neorealism may lead us to infer that Germany's West Policy resulted from its weak power position as a penetrated state, both lacking full sovereignty and hosting several hundred thousand foreign troops by allied nations. We could account for this "bandwagoning" behavior (i.e., joining the most powerful pole rather than balancing against it) by employing the neoclassical realist "balance of threat" approach, and also draw the conclusion that acquiescence to allied expectations would falter once Germany's relative economic gains in the 1960s allowed for a more independent course. But then again, in those instances where West Germany pursued relative autonomous policies vis-à-vis Washington (e.g. Brandt's Ostpolitik and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's various arguments with the Carter administration over security and economic issues), these never turned into strategies of "autonomy seeking" outside the U.S.-led liberal institutional order.

In a first neoclassical realist cut, we may infer that Germany's opposition towards the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq (2003) emanated from the perception that the Bush administration had an imperial design in both the Middle East and among its alliance partners. In this reading, the Schröder government's public suspicion resulted in a "soft balancing" strategy to frustrate Washington's expansive designs through institutional deadlock in the UN Security Council and NATO council. And yet, even this interpretation does not fully explain the
Schröder government’s extensive support of the Iraq mission through over-flight rights, intelligence cooperation and target assistance as well as complementary defensive measures for U.S. bases and allied partners.¹⁷

In the German case, liberal and institutionalist accounts may well pose a plausible challenge to the prevailing realistic narrative of post-World War II foreign policies. First, West Germany’s culture of restraint, deeply engrained in both public opinion and the checks and balances of its political process, challenged structural and allied pressure to adopt a competitive containment strategy based on military power and posture. In the Wehrdebatte of the 1950s, the Notstandsdebatte of the 1960s and the debate over nuclear rearmament of the 1980s, large majorities or minorities revolted against the decisions of the Adenauer, Brandt and Schmidt governments to follow NATO’s collective or U.S. policy positions on conventional rearmament, the Vietnam war, or nuclear deterrence and posture. Second, the FRG’s strong support for European integration and supranational institutions is more plausibly explained by Germany’s economic interests and its willingness to manage and distribute the costs of complex interdependence. Unlike in France or Britain, a strong political and societal consensus to seek a European federalist state existed in West Germany well into the 1980s. Third, one could argue from a social constructivist perspective that Germany’s experience as a “semi-sovereign state,”¹⁸ in which corporatism, federalism and strong institutional veto players, such as the Federal Constitutional Court, tamed the executive’s power to act autonomously, and resulted in a European strategy that safeguarded this “semi-sovereign self” but allowed for a substantial delegation of sovereignty onto the European level.¹⁹

To assess the relative weight of external factors on German foreign policy, however, there are two requirements. First, one must acknowledge that these include material (territory, population, industrial base, etc.) and ideational (status, authority, trust, etc.) resources. Second, one must recognize the close connections between external and internal factors. Indeed, explorations of the growing salience of internal factors on German foreign policy have become a common trend in all theoretical explanations.

Internal Factors

The metaphor of Gulliver is typically invoked by scholars in reference to the constraints of Germany’s external environment. However, eminent scholars contend that external pressures alone are inadequate to explain the observed variance in Germany’s policy trajectory. Internal factors are often the bridge between external forces and foreign policy choices.

According to Germany’s constitution, the Grundgesetz, the power to conduct foreign and security policy is generally vested in the executive branch. Germany’s parliamentary system, based on an electoral system of modified proportional representation, regularly produces coalition governments in an increasingly factionalized party system. The chancellor has the power to select members of the Cabinet,
the central body in overall decision making, and to set the course in domestic and foreign policy. However, the composition and majority of coalition governments have often imposed strict limits on the chancellor’s (and senior party’s) ability to conduct foreign policy (see Chapter 1).

In addition, Germany’s postwar framers equipped the guilt-stricken polity with an unprecedented constitutional framework for checking executive power and enabling international (and European) cooperation. Normatively, the Grundgesetz commits all state authority to respect human rights, to seek the maintenance of international peace under all circumstances and to pursue a strategy of “cooperative internationalism.” Procedurally, the latter principle even allows for the possible transfer of sovereign power to international institutions (Article 24) like the EU, NATO, or the United Nations.

After formal unification in October 1990, the original fourth norm, seeking unification (Article 23), was revised. The new Article 23 of the Grundgesetz now calls for a “unified Europe” as a “national objective.” However, it also contained a clause in which Germany’s EU policy “is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law” (Article 23, paragraph 1), and heightened ratification requirements for EU treaty revisions both in the lower and upper house of the German Parliament.

In terms of politics, both the legislative (the Bundestag and Bundesrat) and judicial branch (the Federal Constitutional Court) have become more important players in the foreign policy process while the executive has sought and partially attained autonomy in policy making in international institutions. European policy making, it follows, has thus come under increased scrutiny by the German Länder and the Court, with the latter setting clear limits for both military interventions and further integration in various rulings on the ratification of EU treaties.

In Germany’s parliamentary democracy, governments are typically coalitions of two or more parties of varying strength, with Grand Coalitions (two major parties sharing 60 percent and more of the parliament seats) being an important exception to the rule. Over four decades (1970–2010), this setting meant that the junior coalition partners—from which the foreign minister and vice chancellor are usually drawn—had a strong influence on foreign and security policy decision making. Germany’s constitution, the electoral laws and regulations on party activities and finance are all regarded as moderating political conflict and institutionalizing democratic party governance and electoral competition.

Over the past 60 years, Germany’s political party system has evolved from a two-and-a-half party prior to unification to a five-party system after unification, with three parties dominating cabinet governments well into the 1990s. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with its regional Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union (CSU), led governments in the 1950s and 1960s under Chancellors Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Kiesinger. It had
a mostly conservative party platform, representing both catholic and protestant voters as well as small and medium business interests. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chancellors, Willy Brandt (1969–1974), Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982) and Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005) headed the second Volkspartei, or mass party, which traditionally represented a liberal social welfare state and labor interests. The Free Democratic Party (FDP, the Liberals), drawing on economic and republican liberalism, are supported by a smaller constituency of business and academics. Under the leadership of Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1974–1985) and Guido Westerwelle (2001-present), the FDP played a pivotal role in both CDU- and SPD-led governments by providing the foreign minister. In the current Merkel coalition government (2009–), Christian Democrats and Liberals built an uneasy alliance since 2011, which is plagued by a veto wielding opposition in the upper house, the Bundesrat.

Following the social protest movement of the 1960s and unification in the early 1990s, the party system changed in two profound ways. First, the Green Party (after unification called Bündnis ’90/the Greens) became a major contender for the junior partner position, drawing on environmental, pacifist and feminist concerns of the 1960s protest movement generation. Under the leadership of Joschka Fischer, an autodidact and vocal critic of the “establishment” in 1980s, the Greens joined the SPD in 1998 in a Red-Green coalition government, which saw both German support of the NATO-led, Kosovo campaign and Berlin's opposition against the U.S.-led Iraq intervention. Second, after unification the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, now called the Left), which succeeded the communist party of the GDR, and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) rallied discontented voters (mainly in the former East) with a populist left program based on a strong welfare state model and an isolationist foreign policy platform. As a consequence, both the Social Democrats and Greens have rejected a coalition with the Left party on the federal level.

These changes have further complicated coalition building and foreign policy making. The original, smaller party system established a stable bipartisan consensus on key questions, enduring three contentious policy debates: the rearmament debate of the 1950s, the emergency constitution debate of the 1960s and the nuclear re-armament debate of the 1980s. But the polarization of the party spectrum has caused a decline of nonparty politics and brought about a parliamentary opposition that is vocal on military intervention and European affairs.

As noted in Chapter 1, public opinion may considerably alter the course of a ship of state. With regard to Germany, scholars agree that elite and societal attitudes on foreign and security policy have also changed. But they differ substantially on how much variance there is and how this affects different policy areas. Evidence from public opinion polls suggests that German society still holds on to a “culture of restraint” (i.e., a policy preference for nonmilitary instruments, often economic sanctions) while adapting to the increasing number of Bundeswehr missions abroad, but recent data also shows that societal support for European integration has weakened considerably over the 1990s. German mass public opinion
was neither in favor of the creation of the Eurozone nor the opening of accession negotiations with regard to Turkey or with Germany’s Eastern European neighbors. Against the background of a traditional prointegrationist sentiment, the EU’s troubled recent history in dealing with the global financial crisis and the bailout of several of its member states have further eroded the trust Germans put into the EU.27

While researchers delve deeper into the question of how individual and elite perceptions matter, the theories they rely on are often spurious regarding the causal pathways by which a particular chancellor or foreign minister brought about a specific decision. Under the stringent structural conditions of the Cold War, it is clear that Chancellors Adenauer and Brandt had a significant influence on West and East Policy respectively. However, after unification it has become apparent that coalition governments and the domestication of executive autonomous decision authority have constrained major foreign policy changes.

To the extent that perceptions or foreign policy identities and roles constructed by elites do matter, the evidence suggests that the old consensus on Germany as a civilian power may be gradually changing.28

Contemporary German Foreign and Security Policy

The success of reunification on October 3, 1990, has been a critical driver for policy continuity. By anchoring Gulliver domestically and internationally, and by ensuring peaceful and prosperous relations with all its neighbors, the traditional foreign policy trajectory became the role model. Historical success is not, however, the only factor shaping Germany’s postunification policies. French, British or Chinese foreign policies may be viewed as successful too, although they are far more robust in military terms or economic terms. Indeed, the very norms that informed Germany’s culture of military restraint—never to act alone and never to allow another genocide—were used to legitimate an increasing number of “humanitarian interventions” in the 1990s within the multilateral framework of NATO, the UN and the ESDP. Federalism, coalition politics and other institutional veto points may limit executive choices, but they may also instigate highly controversial policy choices, such as Germany’s opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Thus, there is no single, well-articulated theory of postunification German foreign policy. Nonetheless, we can deduct predictions from major theories of comparative foreign policy and subject them to critical examination when reviewing Germany’s policy track record. While each policy field may involve different actors and thus create unique policy patterns, we may be able to infer some broad trends. First, current realist accounts of the German Gulliver’s postunification policies assume that geopolitical changes re-created Germany as a natural hegemon in the middle of Europe which would pursue an influence-seeking strategy, maximizing its institutional power vis-à-vis other European great powers, such as France and the United Kingdom.29 While taking relative power constellations
into account, these studies integrate institutional and perceptual factors, thus opening up structural realism for the “neoclassical realism” of the 21st century. Second, in contrast, contemporary liberal analyses either stress the waning financial basis for a proactive, checkbook-centered integration strategy due to the costs of unification, or they focus on continuity and change in the representation of shifting societal interests. Third, the social constructivist view suggests that changes in Germany’s self-perception (i.e., national foreign policy identity, or role, as constituted by self- and other expectations), or strategic culture (attitudes towards the use of military force), are crucial for the understanding of Germany’s institutional and policy choices.

If realism is to be a plausible contender for explaining foreign policy changes after dramatic international power shifts, and if liberal and social constructivists are serious contenders to account for continuity and change in societal, institutional and individual choices then we should be able to examine these alternative theories and their policy implications. Two issue areas, the use of military force and Germany’s European diplomacy, seem particularly promising case studies because they feature variance in both external and internal factors.

From Kuwait to Kabul: Gulliver and Military Force

Prior to September 11, 2001, there had been a clear evolution apparent in Germany’s security policy, most importantly in the use of force. The incremental but decisive extension of Bundeswehr’s engagement (both geographically and functionally) led to the notion that German security policy finally had become “normal,” that is similar to that of traditional great powers. This process began in the wake of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, when Germany’s policy elite was still busily managing unification. At the time, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher wanted to avoid any active role in the conflict, because of serious domestic disagreements on the constitutionality of the use of German force abroad. Thus, Germany played its traditional role of a paymaster during the crisis, donating about $12 billion U.S. dollars to the cost of the war. It also deployed minesweepers to the Gulf under strong political pressure by the United States and UN-mandated coalition forces.

Against the background of strong societal opposition to any military involvement, Germany’s elite reacted to the first Gulf crisis by committing small (but still legally contentious) “out-of-area” deployments to Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia. The conservative CDU/CSU argued that these deployments were legitimate if based on Article 24 participation in collective defense. Its junior coalition partner, the liberal FDP, held that Article 87 (use of force only for self- or alliance defense) required a constitutional amendment. This political conflict, which also involved the oppositional SPD and Bündnis ’90/Greens charging hard against militarization, was resolved only after the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ruled in July 1994 that deploying the Bundeswehr abroad was constitutional under two conditions: it had to take place under a mandate of a system of collective
self-defense or collective security, and it had to be individually authorized by the lower house of parliament. In effect, the FCC did change the traditional interpretation of Germany’s constitution to allow for active participation in collective security operations and humanitarian interventions, thereby bringing postunification Germany more in line with the expectations of its major allies.

Germany’s subsequent contribution to the NATO-led, Kosovo intervention was heralded as another defining moment in its new security policy profile. The Kosovo crisis (1998–1999) was the first major foreign policy challenge for the Red-Green coalition under Chancellor Schröder (SPD) and Joschka Fischer (the Greens). In September 1998, the Bundestag voted in favor of a NATO activation order allowing for the use of force and German participation. In March 1999, when Germany simultaneously held the EU and Group of Eight presidencies, German Tornado bombers participated in NATO’s air strikes against Serbian targets both in Kosovo and Serbia itself. In contrast to the domestic debates during the Persian Gulf War and the Bosnian wars (1992–1995), the Kosovo war faced little public opposition.

Three indicators are typically mentioned when arguing that the Kosovo engagement pushed Germany’s normalization further. First, the deployment was explicitly a combat mission. Second, the troop deployment broke with the taboo that the Bundeswehr should never be deployed where the Wehrmacht had been in World War II. Third, the NATO-led campaign did not have an explicit UN Security Council mandate, and this put into question Germany’s strict adherence to the primacy of international law and the UN Security Council as its final arbiter.

Liberal and constructivist analyses note, however, that this change in the Bundeswehr’s engagement was couched in a moral argument, stressing the German obligation to end the killings in Kosovo. Schröder, Fischer and Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping all argued that the principle of Nie wieder Krieg (never again war) had to be superseded by a far higher principle, namely to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanian-Kosovars. Moreover, they point out that a key characteristic of the Red-Green coalition’s crisis management was its insistence on multilateral diplomacy. As the leader of the Group of Eight industrialized nations, Berlin sought to forge a broad international consensus and proposed a plan for a bombing halt in April. Germany reached out to Russia and China in the Security Council as well as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to pursue its objectives. German Foreign Minister Fischer, who tirelessly persuaded many former pacifists in his own party, also put forward the idea of a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe to promote cooperation among former conflict parties and with the EU.

After the September 11th attacks, Chancellor Schröder promised “unconditional solidarity” with the United States, announcing the willingness to participate in “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) to fight terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The Iraq crisis, however, revealed stark differences in U.S. and German views on the use of military force. The September 11th attacks changed the German government’s threat perception considerably, resulting in various
contentious domestic and international counter-terrorism laws and regulations. It did not, however, forge a transatlantic consensus on Iraq.

In his first major address in the Bundestag on September 19, 2001, Schröeder made clear that Germany would not join in what he termed “foreign adventures” and that any military action within the framework of NATO required prior consultation. This seemed to counter musings by several U.S. officials that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) should be expanded to Iraq. Subsequently, the chancellor’s early positioning received widespread support among both the policy elite and the German public. When the Red-Green coalition brought the necessary mandate for German military participation in OEF to a vote in the Bundestag (November 16, 2001), the coalition fell short by several votes. The chancellor had to invoke the vote of confidence procedure and to assure skeptics in the coalition, through clear legal limits on the geographic and functional scope of the mandate, that Germany would not join military action against Iraq. Only then did the coalition gain the necessary parliamentary permission to deploy Bundeswehr forces to Afghanistan, and only by a very narrow margin.

The German government’s position against foreign adventures persisted throughout the crisis. After President George W. Bush listed Iraq as a member of the “axis of evil” in his State of the Union Address in January 2002, and after he declared a doctrine of preemptive self-defense later that year, the public stance of German officials hardened considerably. German domestic politics also played an important, albeit secondary role in the unfolding drama. While Germany continued to cooperate quietly throughout the crisis by providing access to its airspace and sharing intelligence, the Schröder government turned its “quiet into a vocal opposition” in the 2002 national election campaign.

Chancellor Schröder and the SPD used their critical position vis-à-vis Washington to shore up support among German voters skeptical of the Bush administration, in general, and its escalation towards military conflict with Iraq, in particular. This explicit instrumentalization of societal attitudes began on August 1, 2002, when Schröder gave an interview in which he replied to a question on how the SPD may improve their election chances by referring to the key points of the election manifesto while adding ominously: “We have alarming news from the Middle East. There is talk of war.” He also insisted that while Germany would act in solidarity with its allies, “it would not participate in any adventures.”

After reelection in September 2002—winning a very close race by 6,000 votes—the Red-Green coalition insisted that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was not sufficient to legitimate military action. In January 2003, after Germany had joined the Security Council as a nonpermanent member, Chancellor Schröder even went so far as to hint that Germany might use an abstention to allow for a second Council resolution. Domestic considerations continued to prevail, even under tremendous U.S. and allied pressure. In February 2003, Berlin temporarily rejected NATO planning for defense against a possible attack by Iraq on Turkey (Germany’s NATO ally). This occurred because the deployment of
German Patriot missile batteries and personnel to Turkey would have required parliamentary approval, which did not seem likely. In sum, Germany’s vocal opposition to the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq is best explained by both external and domestic political considerations. Cooperating with the United States with logistical support, basing, over-flight rights, intelligence sharing, and increased military participation in Afghanistan reflected Germany’s willingness to keep its alliance commitments as long as they did not require parliamentary approval. German foreign policies that did not support the allied coalition in the global war on terror—such as the rigid stance on German nonparticipation in the invasion of Iraq as well as leaders’ vocal opposition in the summer and fall of 2002 can be attributed to the fragility of the parliamentary majority of the Red-Green coalition and electoral considerations to exploit the widespread antiwar attitudes of the German electorate.

Viewed through a lens of domestic rather than external factors, it becomes obvious that Germany’s opposition to commit combat troops to the UN Security Council mandated No-Fly-Zone operation over Libya in 2011 also goes back to a widespread societal skepticism, and subsequent concerns of the Merkel government in several state elections. At the same time, these concerns are amplified by Western government experiences during state-building missions in Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere. These lessons, as cited by the Merkel government, indicate serious risks associated with being drawn into an escalating conflict or civil war, even in the face of serious humanitarian concerns and the heavy expectations of alliance partners.

From Rome to Lisbon: Gulliver in Europe

Since participating in the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, Germany’s economic wellbeing and foreign economic policy have been linked to the political and economic integration of Europe. In the beginning, closer cooperation with its western neighbors reassured the region in three distinct ways. First, without a strong and internalized allegiance of its citizens to democratic values, the young democracy lacked a stabilizing democratic political culture. Second, it was uncertain whether the perpetrator could rebuild war-soured relations with its former enemies on which its postwar economic recovery depended. Third, the young German polity faced a new and formidable security threat from the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Adenauer’s European integration policy proved extraordinary successful in Europeanizing Gulliver’s threatening economic and military potential (i.e., coal, steel, trade, atomic energy) in Europe, while reaping the fruits of integration to satisfy the societal needs for economic accomplishment and political acceptance. Over the next decades, Germany’s political elites and society thus developed a robust attachment to European institutions, incorporating the strongest European identity among the larger member states. Also, German trade flows with EU partners—on which its formidable economic revival was built—are in excess of
60 percent of overall German trade. German external relations were mediated through European institutions. As a consequence, the institutional penetration of the German polity by European institutions grew steadily, especially after supranational governance had made quantum leaps in the 1980s and 1990s.41

When unification hit the German policy elite unexpectedly in the fall of 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl came back to these lessons of history. Externally, central decision makers faced critical (if not hostile) questions about the future intentions and policies of the soon-to-be new German Gulliver by neighboring countries—despite its strong prointegrationist policies in establishing a Common European Market, freedom of movement and a common currency in the 1980s. Domestically, it soon became obvious that unification posed tremendous economic risks because the five former East German Länder had barely any industry or infrastructure that could survive capitalist competition. In addition, the chancellor had ruffled feathers both abroad and at home when he proposed a ten-point plan for unification in November 1989 without consulting allied nations and his coalition partner, the FDP. Yet, with strong American backing and galvanizing French cooperation, the Kohl government launched a barrage of initiatives for deeper economic and monetary integration as well as further political integration. During the intergovernmental conference for the Maastricht treaty, the German delegation proved very successful in projecting its policy ideas of a strong independent Central Bank, which was committed to low inflation, into the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).

The resulting Maastricht Treaty, consisting of three distinct pillars, the European Monetary Union (EMU), a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and cooperation in Home and Justice Affairs (HJA), was signed in November 1991. The treaty garnered overwhelming support in the Bundestag, but during the ratification process both the German Länder and the FCC raised concerns about the growing impact of European legislation. Consequently, the Länder managed to extract an Amendment to the Basic Law Article 23, which provided them and the Bundestag with veto power (if they could muster a two-thirds majority). Furthermore, this so-called Europe Article contains several guiding principles for Germany’s future integration policy, the Struktursicherungsklauseln, which oblige the executive to respect the core principles of the Grundgesetz.

In a similar vein, the FCC in its controversial ruling on the Maastricht Treaty established a high degree of control for itself vis-à-vis the executive and EU institutions (including the ECJ), and it also created a set of normative criteria that any additional transfer of competences to the EU would have to meet. Public support for deeper integration also weakened considerably over the 1990s. The willingness of Germans to integrate dropped from 80 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to just 40 percent at the end of the decade. Similarly, German voter turnout in European elections dropped from almost 60 percent (1989) to 43 percent (2004).

In the end, Germany ratified the Maastricht Treaty, which subsequently established the Euro as the common European currency. It also pushed for the
enlargement of the EU through the European Free Trade Area states (Austria, Sweden, and Finland) in 1995, and central European states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus) in 2004. Through both the EU-Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000), Germany proposed a further deepening of the competences of the European Commission and Parliament while also insisting on unanimity in Home and Justice Affairs due to pressure from the German Länder. As a response to the Maastricht ruling of the FCC, the Kohl and Schröder governments also started to call for a European catalogue of fundamental rights to be integrated into all EU treaties.

In sum, the changes in the German polity resulted in a two-pronged development. Not only did new players start to “domesticate” the executive’s prointegrationist European policy, but Germany’s support for ever deeper integration became much more contingent, combining strong approval in common foreign, security and defense policy with a much more narrowly defined position in other policy areas (i.e., EU budget, agricultural subsidies, etc.).

Germany’s new contingent Europeanism is also visible in the differentiated push for a constitutionalization of the European Union during the Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD, 2005–2008) and the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition (since 2008). German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer launched the debate with his agenda-setting speech at Humboldt University in May 2000. The German Länder, by insisting on a post-Nice process to codify a catalogue of competences for the EU during ratification, also initiated the subsequent constitutional convention (2001–2003). During the convention, the Länder with their own representatives managed to insert the catalogue of competences with various other demands into the European Constitutional Treaty (CT). The resulting treaty was ratified in parliament in May 2005, but challenged in the FCC so that the German ratification process was not finished when it was stopped by the negative referenda in France and in the Netherlands. Then in 2007, Chancellor Merkel decided on a new treaty initiative during Germany’s EU presidency. The strategy foresaw to keep as much as possible from the CT while addressing the concerns of those publics which were to hold (presumably close) referenda on the resulting treaty. Effective multilateral diplomacy ensured that several German key preferences were met in the subsequent Lisbon treaty, including increased provisions for qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers.

Called on by skeptics of EU integration, the FCC ruled again. The court held that the Lisbon Treaty itself is constitutional. However, it also stipulated that the accompanying German statute on the rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union was not. It instructed the legislators to modify the statute in accordance with its own decision thereby leaving no doubt that the FCC ultimately sets the limits for legislative acts. Moreover, the ruling took another (radical) step to delimit the integrative competences of the legislative and executive branch. Under the guise of the new concept of Integrationsverantwortung (“responsibility for integration”), the court withdrew a large chunk of procedural
and normative competences from the legislative and executive branches which they cannot delegate to the Union under the given German Constitution. The Lisbon ruling was highly significant, and may serve to further dampen Germany’s integrationist ambitions.

Ever since the global financial and economic crisis hit the eurozone, domestic constraints on Germany’s traditional role as a prointegrationist and cash-dispensing leader have become even more apparent. This pattern was already visible when Germany (and France) violated the deficit limits of the EMU Stability and Growth Pact in 2003, even managing to prevent censure by the European Commission. Subsequently, economies in the eurozone stabilized due to low interest rates and a barrage of cheap credit: Germany became very competitive because of low wage increases and efficiency gains, but Southern European economies exploited cheap credit lines, creating sizeable housing and investment bubbles. When the global credit crunch hit in 2008, it left these economies (and Ireland) seriously exposed.42

The Merkel government first reacted very cautiously to the Euro crisis, advising Greece and other troubled economies to follow the German example by improving their competitive edge. But when Greece tinkered on the edge of default in March 2010, the chancellor, albeit reluctantly, accepted a multilateral loan facility which included the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Merkel government rejected an all-out bailout for Greece, because it suspected another intervention by the Federal Constitutional Court and a growing public skepticism, which was ratcheted up by the German media. Thus, to sustain public and parliamentary support, which had been weakened by several electoral losses and the abstention of both the SPD and Green Party in the vote on the eurozone stabilization package bill, Berlin insisted on stringent conditions attached to the loan facility. The chancellor asked for and received IMF involvement, the troubled economies must have exhausted their capacity to borrow on the financial markets and harsher conditions for eurozone members with budgetary indiscipline were accepted.43

In sum, Germany’s European policy has become weaker. In a European Union of twenty-seven member states, Gulliver’s capacity alone (or in tandem with France) to procure the necessary majorities and resources to solve some of the most pressing problems has been waning. Berlin’s integration policy has become “leaner” in the sense that its prointegrationist stance has become much more qualified since reunification. Moreover, Gulliver has become “meaner” in the sense that domestic, financial, political and ideational concerns, often take precedence over commonly held European interests.

Conclusion

German foreign policy has evolved dramatically over time. The largest change occurred after World War II, when the pursuit of the expansionist and racist Nazi grand strategy was dropped, and the legitimacy and security of the young
democracy itself became a priority. A second major change took place after unification, resulting in a shift from military restraint to humanitarian interventions and from prointegrationist to contingent European policies. This contingent Europeanism is now visible in the guarded German response to the global financial and Euro crisis, with a yet unknown outcome.

When examining postwar and contemporary German foreign policy, contrasting the different approaches reveals that the mix between external and internal factors also shifted over time. While policy choices seemed severely constrained in the early years of the Cold War, key decisions such as the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (1991) or the noncoalition strategy during the Iraq crisis, display a greater willingness to stick to controversial positions despite strong pressure by Germany’s traditional allies and partners.

Several patterns lend themselves to further analysis. First, while the strong domestic consensus on the use of force may change—even in the guilt-stricken case of Germany—it does so only gradually and path-dependently. To change attitudes, policy makers and citizens alike need critical situations in which their traditional beliefs are challenged and where key norms contradict each other. When government forces or militias targeted large ethnic groups in Africa and the Balkans, committing genocide and ethnic cleansing, a strict pacifism became untenable for many in the SPD and Green Party. And yet, Germany foreign military interventions still must be legitimated on humanitarian grounds or based on vital security interests to garner the necessary parliamentary and societal approval.44

Second, the German polity and foreign policy process are not independent from its international and domestic environment. In turn, changes in the party system (i.e., the emergence of the Green and Left party) not only change the coalition arithmetic in parliament, they also influence policy choices through the disproportional effects of junior partners on coalition governments in the German system. Changes in the external institutional setting, including the delegation of sovereignty to supranational EU institutions enhance the relative autonomy of the German executive vis-à-vis other branches of government. European obligations also may directly challenge Germany’s constitutional order, such as when transfer payments during the Euro crisis undermine Germany’s ability to comply with its own debt limits in its constitution.

Third, legitimate German foreign policy may not always be effective multilateral foreign policy. As the vocal opposition to the Iraq intervention and the waning support for the Afghanistan operation displays, democratic German governments do not always offer “unlimited solidarity.” Rather, to maintain support in a polity which still differs from major allies and partners on issues like the use of military force, data and privacy protection, or environmental security, German leaders have broken with, circumvented or reinterpreted their respective institutional obligations. In many cases, particularly the EU, these conflicts go back to the enduring economic and budgetary implications of incorporating the former East German states.
These theoretical implications also provide a sketchy roadmap for the future. Most pointedly, they suggest that both domestic and international constraints on the German Gulliver after World War II complicate its foreign policy development. As the fragmentation and polarization of its party system further progresses, these crosscutting pressures are unlikely to vanish anytime soon. To minimize these pressures, German society has to either adapt to foreign expectations, or to shape those expectations so that they fit more comfortably with German interests and preferences.

Suggestions for Further Reading


Notes


5. The Lebensraum concept of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) involved the claim of foreign territory postulated to be essential for the survival and well-being of the Aryan race.


7. The Alliance, as it is often simply referred to, was established as a political commitment to contain the spread of Soviet communism in Europe.
8. Through these treaties, the FRG and its Western partners ended the occupation statute, administered the FRG’s membership in NATO and West European Union (WEU) and the FRG established a political understanding with France on the Saar territory.


10. There is voluminous literature on the diplomatic process surrounding German unification. The best account to date is Philipp Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

11. The term “trading state” was coined by Richard Rosecrance, describing economies which pursue a peaceful trading thereby transforming their positions in the international political sphere, . . . [while (S. H.)] “other states also benefit from the enhanced trade and growth that economic cooperation makes possible.” See Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1986).

12. Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy Since 1945 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).


14. The social constructivist concept of “ontological security” stresses that uncertainty motivates decision makers and societies to establish (detectable) structures of meaning across time and space, which provide cognitive and emotional stability and that these actors seek to update and protect those critical structures salient to ontological security, see Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–70.


16. “A world with six billion people will not be led into a peaceful future by the mightiest power alone . . . I do not support anti-Americanism at all, but even all the differences in size and weight, alliances between free democracies should not be reduced to following. Alliance partners are not satellites.” German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (in 2002) as cited in Judith Kelley, “Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq Was Not Just About Iraq,” International Politics 42, no. 2 (2005): 153–73.


18. The term was coined by Peter Katzenstein, originally describing Germany’s domestic policy structure from a comparative perspective. However, its meaning was broadened subsequently to encompass its foreign policy process, see Peter Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987); Peter Katzenstein, “Conclusion: Semisovereignty in United Germany,” in Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited, eds. Simon Green and


20. These key provisions are stated in the preamble of the basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany, the Grundgesetz in Article 1 and 9, paragraph 2 as well as Articles 23 through 26.

21. Based on Article 24, the Federal Constitutional Court held in a July 1994 ruling that German integration in systems of collective defense and systems of collective security meant that foreign deployments of Germany’s Armed Forces was constitutional.


24. For example, the electoral law of 1957 institutionalized the so-called 5 percent-hurdle, requiring parties to receive at least 5 percent of the popular vote or three direct constituency seats.

25. Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) after joining the WASG—the Electoral Alternative for Labor and Social Justice in West Germany—the two have now merged into the Party called The Left or Die Linke.


30. See Steven Lobell et al., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009).


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44. As the resignation of Federal President Horst Köhler indicates, Germany’s discourse on the use of force is still narrowly confined. In an interview in May 2010 he seemed to suggest that the Bundeswehr could also be deployed for economic purposes, and after some public furor he subsequently resigned.