1

2013 and Beyond

Barack Obama and the Perils of Second-term Presidents

Michael Nelson

President Barack Obama won a narrow victory over former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney in the 2012 election. Unlike that of every other two-term president since Woodrow Wilson in 1916, Obama’s reelection majority was smaller than the majority he won in his initial election four years earlier. Franklin D. Roosevelt went from 57 percent of the national popular vote and 472 electoral votes in 1932 to 61 percent and 523 electoral votes in 1936. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s share of the popular vote rose from 56 percent in 1952 to 57 percent in 1956, and the number of electoral votes he received grew from 442 to 457. Richard Nixon won a nail biter in 1968, with 43 percent of the popular vote and 301 electoral votes in a three-candidate race. In 1972 he received 61 percent support from the voters and 520 electoral votes. Ronald Reagan leapt from 51 percent of the popular vote and 489 electoral votes in 1980 to a 59 percent, 525 electoral vote majority in 1984. Both of Bill Clinton’s two elections involved a serious third-party challenger, but he rose from 43 percent of the popular vote in 1992 to 49 percent in 1996 and his electoral vote count increased from 370 to 379. Although George W. Bush was elected by a whisker in both 2000 and 2004, his popular vote share rose from 48 percent to 51 percent and his electoral vote count increased from 271 to 286. In contrast to his reelected predecessors, Obama’s victory in 2012 with 52 percent of the popular vote and 332 electoral votes lagged his triumph in 2008, when he defeated Sen. John McCain of Arizona with 53 percent and 365 electoral votes.

A narrow victory is a victory nonetheless and not to be gainsaid. Three of Obama’s six most recent predecessors in the presidency—Gerald R. Ford in 1976, Jimmy Carter in 1980, and George H. W. Bush in 1992—were defeated at the polls. But Obama, like Reagan in 1984, Clinton in 1996, and Bush in 2004, enjoyed an enormous electoral advantage that the three defeated presidents did not: a united party. Ford had to defeat a serious challenge from a major Republican rival, former governor Reagan of California. Carter had to fight for renomination against an equally impressive Democratic challenger, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts. George H. W. Bush’s opponent was much less formidable but no less distracting: political commentator and
former White House aide Patrick Buchanan. In every case these presidents prevailed but only after being attacked for months by their intraparty rivals—diverting time, talent, and money from preparing for the general election campaign in order to fend off the primary challenge, and making concessions on matters such as the party platform and speaking time at the national convention in an effort to reunite the party.

Presidents who have to battle for renomination forfeit much of the electoral advantage of being president because they receive the same kind of hammering that those seeking the other party’s nomination encounter. In 2012, for example, Romney was battered and bruised politically and his campaign treasury was almost empty by the time he finally wrapped up the Republican nomination in April. In a seemingly endless series of primary debates, Romney’s rivals for the Republican nomination relentlessly attacked him in an effort to bring down the frontrunner. In order to beat them back, he had to run much further to the right than he planned, branding himself as “severely conservative” and urging undocumented Latino immigrants to “self-deport” from the country. Meanwhile, his opponents’ charges followed a script that the Obama campaign soon borrowed. For example, former House speaker Newt Gingrich accused Romney of having “looted” companies during his career as a business consultant and branded him a “vulture capitalist.” Gov. Rick Perry of Texas said that Romney had gotten rich by “sticking it to someone else.”

In contrast, Obama coasted to renomination. To be sure, he had critics within the Democratic Party, most of them liberals who thought that his $787 billion economic stimulus plan in 2009 was too modest, blamed him for allowing his health care reform bill to rely on private insurance and pharmaceutical companies, disapproved of his vigorous prosecution of the war in Afghanistan that he inherited from George W. Bush, believed that he was too pliable on matters of taxing and spending in the face of congressional Republican resistance to Democratic policies, and blamed him for his party’s massive defeat in the 2010 midterm elections, in which the Republicans seized control of the House of Representatives, made substantial gains in the Senate, and took command of most of the nation’s state governments.

Clinton had been similarly unpopular among Democratic liberals in 1996 as a result of his own tack toward the political center after overseeing the loss of both congressional chambers to the GOP in 1994. Taking a page from Clinton’s preelection year playbook, Obama raised so much money from Democratic donors that he scared off any potential challengers to his renomination. By the time the first Republican and Democratic caucus votes were cast in Iowa on January 3, 2012, Obama had already spent tens of millions of dollars building the infrastructure for his general election campaign and still had more than $60 million on hand. Like George W. Bush, Obama’s bid for an uncontested renomination also benefited from the increasing polarization that separates Democratic and Republican voters and activists. Rank-and-file Republicans might
disapprove mightily of Obama’s performance as president, as Democrats had of Bush, but that made his own party’s constituencies even more inclined to support him. In the election day national exit poll, all but 6 percent of Republicans said they voted against Obama and all but 8 percent of Democrats said they voted for him.4

Narrow as it was, Obama’s victory was clear. The television networks were able to call the election for him by 11:10 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. His party gained eight seats in the House, narrowing the Republican majority in that chamber to 234 to 201. Democrats also added two seats in the Senate to expand their majority to fifty-five to forty-five. Remarkably, they achieved this gain even though they had to defend twenty-three seats and the Republicans only ten, an artifact of the Democrats’ triumph in the congressional elections six years earlier. These victories, including the president’s, came in the face of slow economic growth and an unemployment rate that only dipped below 8 percent a few weeks before the election. No president in the post-World War II era had been reelected with an unemployment rate that high.

Post-election commentators paid particular attention to the exit poll results, which showed that Obama did especially well among those sectors of the electorate that are growing most rapidly. White voters, whom Romney carried with 59 percent (a greater majority than either McCain attained in 2008 or Bush won in 2004), comprised all but 12 percent of the electorate as recently as 1980. By 2012, 28 percent of the voters were nonwhite—African Americans (13 percent), Latinos (10 percent and rising), Asian Americans (3 percent, also rising), and others (2 percent)—with demographers projecting that the nonwhite share of the electorate will continue to grow in coming years at a rate of about 2 percentage points per presidential election. (As for the long term, it bears mentioning that in 2011, for the first time, more nonwhite than white babies were born in the United States.) Obama won 93 percent of the black vote, 71 percent of the Latino vote, and 73 percent of the Asian American vote.

Similarly, although Romney did well among seniors, earning 56 percent support from those aged sixty-five and older, Obama prevailed among younger voters, who presumably will remain in the electorate for a much longer time, earning 60 percent support from eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds. Unmarried voters, another expanding demographic constituency, favored Obama by 63 percent to 37 percent. Voters who marked “none” when asked about their religious affiliation—yet another growing sector of the electorate—favored the president by 70 percent to 26 percent. Finally, Obama did well among the substantial and increasing number of people claiming postgraduate degrees—18 percent of all voters. He bested Romney by 55 percent to 42 percent in this largely professional sector of the adult population.

Democrats took heart from these numbers. Ten years before the election, John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira published The Emerging Democratic
Majority, which identified the very population trends that came to fruition in 2012 so advantageously for Obama and his party. Surely, Democratic readers of the book rejoiced, an even better educated, more multiracial electorate that will include even fewer married people and Christians will only make the Democrats still more successful at the polls in the years to come against the shrinking GOP coalition of white, married Christians. Others pointed out the contrast between the six presidential elections that occurred from 1968 to 1988 and the six elections that have occurred since then. Of the first six, the Republican nominees won five, four of them by landslides. Starting in 1992, however, the Democratic candidate for president has won more popular votes than his Republican rival in five of six elections, and no Republican has been elected with an electoral vote margin of more than one state.

Less remarked, however, was that in the quarter-century of Republican dominance of the presidency that preceded Clinton’s election in 1992, Democrats controlled the House without interruption and dominated the Senate for all but the first six years of the Reagan administration. Since then, the House has been Republican for sixteen of twenty-two years and the Senate has been Democratic for just twelve of those years, only about half the time. Similarly, state governments, most of which Democrats controlled before Clinton ushered in the era of Democratic dominance in presidential elections, have generally swung to the GOP. As a result of the 2012 elections, Republican governors outnumber Democrats by thirty to twenty and Republicans control twenty-eight state houses of representatives and twenty-eight state senates.

The question these results raise is: Did 2012 mark a new political era characterized by an emerging Democratic majority, or simply the continuation of the old era of divided government, in which voters seldom entrust either political party with control of the presidency and both houses of Congress? Divided government was long the exception in American politics: from 1900 to 1968, the presidency, House, and Senate were all in the same party’s hands 80 percent of the time. Since then, divided party control has become the normal governing situation in Washington. United party government has prevailed since 1969 only during the one-term Carter presidency, the first two years of Clinton’s presidency, the middle four years of George W. Bush’s presidency, and the first two years of the Obama presidency—that is, just 26 percent of the time.

Some wave a different caution flag at those who think the country is becoming relentlessly Democratic. Historically, every new lasting partisan majority has been launched by a president who not only won a second term but also was succeeded in the next election by a president of his own party. Thomas Jefferson was elected in 1800 and 1804, and so was fellow Democratic-Republican James Madison in 1808. Democratic president Andrew Jackson’s victories in 1828 and 1832 were followed by Democratic president Martin Van Buren’s election in 1836. Ushering in a new Republican
majority, Abraham Lincoln was elected in 1860 and 1864, as was fellow partisan Ulysses S. Grant in 1868. Republican William McKinley’s victories in 1896 and 1900 set the stage for the election of Theodore Roosevelt, also a Republican, in 1904. Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected four times—in 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944—and voters then chose Democrat Harry S. Truman in 1948. After Ronald Reagan, a Republican, won in 1980 and 1984, George H. W. Bush, also a Republican, was elected in 1988. In sum, the path to a new and lasting partisan majority leads through the founding president’s second term to his successor’s election.

Obama has secured that term and, if it is successful and the Democrats nominate a credible candidate in 2016, their chances of becoming the nation’s majority party for years to come will be enhanced. The problem is that a president’s second term almost invariably turns out to be less successful than the first term. Historians may argue about whether the second terms of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, Ulysses S. Grant, and Grover Cleveland fit this pattern. But in the era of the modern presidency, second terms have been disappointing experiences for all of the presidents who earned them. As noted previously, two modern presidents, Franklin Roosevelt and Reagan, were succeeded by the election of a member of their party. Only one reelected president, Richard Nixon, left office in disgrace. But every two-term president—Woodrow Wilson, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and even FDR and Reagan—found his second term to be less productive than his first term.

The Anomaly of Second-term Disappointment

Why do second terms tend to be disappointing? After all, one might reasonably expect the opposite to be true. The second-term president, who under the two-term limit imposed by the Twenty-second Amendment cannot run again, is free from the cares of reelection politics that many presidents regard as an impediment to doing the best job possible. At least that is what they say when they endorse the proposal for a single, six-year presidential term, as several recent former presidents have done, including Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, and Carter. Obama himself said in January 2010 that he would “rather be a really good one-term president than a mediocre two-term president.”

More important, presidents begin the second term with four years of on-the-job training. They are in the ascending phase of the “cycle of increasing effectiveness” that comes with experience in office. As Paul Light, the inventor of the concept, has written,

Presidents can be expected to learn over time. The presidential information base should expand; the president’s personal expertise should increase. As the president and the staff become more familiar with the working of the office, there will be a learning effect. They will identify
useful sources of information; they will produce effective strategies for domestic choice. Clearly, prolonged contact with specific policy issues will produce specialization and knowledge.  

Even more than in domestic policy, most second-term presidents become increasingly sure-footed in foreign policy. Few presidents enter office with much international experience. They have been either governors consumed with domestic policy or senators focused on it. (The notable exceptions—Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush—both served for eight years as vice president.) A first-term president’s learning curve is steep in the domestic responsibilities of the office but steeper in those involving the nation’s role in the world. The president enters the second term better prepared to discover where the opportunities for international progress may be found, as Ronald Reagan did when he negotiated a nuclear arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union, Bill Clinton did when he brokered a peace agreement in Northern Ireland, and George W. Bush did when he launched the “surge” in Iraq.  

Clinton, who was Obama’s most recent Democratic predecessor in the White House, grew in most aspects of the presidency, following the pattern of his long tenure as governor of Arkansas. His Arkansas-heavy White House staff, hastily thrown together late in the transition period that followed the 1992 election and correspondingly chaotic during his first two years in office, gradually became more sure-footed after he appointed Washington veteran Leon Panetta as chief of staff. The president himself gained confidence as commander in chief when he discovered that the American people respected him for having the courage to make the unpopular decisions that extended U.S. assistance to Bosnia, Haiti, and Mexico. He learned how to deal with a professional, independent-minded Congress after many years in which his only legislative experience was with Arkansas’s part-time amateur legislature. Clinton’s deportment mirrored his growth. Out went the much photographed jogging shorts, self-revelations about his preferences in underpants, and limp salutes. In, after hours spent studying videotapes of Reagan, came a straight, shoulders-back posture and, with some coaching, crisp salutes. 

Obama was equally unprepared by his pre-presidential experience of public service to hit the deck running. Unlike Clinton, he had been a legislator, but eight years in the Illinois state senate and four years as a U.S. senator scarcely prepared him for the issues or institutions with which a president must deal—especially because most of his time in the Senate was spent running for president. Like Clinton, Obama initially staffed his White House with friends and associates from home, some of whom had serious Washington experience and some of whom did not. It took time for Obama to realize how deeply partisan Congress was and, as a consequence, how immune Republican legislators would be to his efforts to forge bipartisan majorities. He also had much to learn about being an effective commander in chief. In the early months of his presidency, when beribboned generals told him they needed substantially more troops for the war in Afghanistan,
Obama readily acquiesced. In 2010, however, when faced with a similar request, he subjected the military to a painstaking review of what the mission would be, how the troops would be deployed, and how success would be attained by 2014 when, he insisted, they would be withdrawn. Finally, four years of executive experience—which is four more than Obama had at the beginning of his first term—better equipped him to manage the large and complex branch of government he heads.

Offsetting these advantages of the second term, however, are more numerous and significant disadvantages for the president. As David Crockett has written about the second-term president, “When his knowledge and experience are at their highest, his political capital only gets lower.” These disadvantages are described in the rest of the chapter roughly in the order that they develop during a president’s tenure in office.

Postponed Problems

After George W. Bush was reelected in 2004, his chief political adviser, Karl Rove, commissioned a study of second terms from the White House’s in-house think tank, the Office of Strategic Initiatives. According to Rove, the study “argued that second terms were often tarnished by scandal or unpopular wars, or were lackluster because a president pursued a timid agenda or had won reelection by an appeal based on personality rather than ideas.” In other words, although Rove did not say so, the study came too late to do President Bush much good. Some of the most important problems that Bush would encounter as a second-term president had already developed by the time the study identified them. In truth, many of the seeds of second-term disappointment for all reelected presidents are planted during the first term—for reasons whose planting makes perfect political sense at the time.

During the second term, problems that were postponed from the first term because they were so controversial or intractable as to jeopardize the president’s reelection come back to haunt the administration. During his first term, for example, Franklin Roosevelt downplayed his important constitutional differences with the Supreme Court for fear that he would lose support among voters who approved of his policies but would resent any attack on judicial independence. Reagan blithely allowed his first-term tax cuts and defense spending increases to drive the budget deficit skyward rather than engage in preelection belt tightening that might slow the politically popular economic recovery in 1984. George W. Bush, who talked about the need for Social Security reform when he sought the presidency in 2000, did nothing about it during his first four years in office. As Dan Balz has observed, “Domestically, Social Security rose to the top of his [second-term] agenda because it was too risky and too difficult to deal with in his first term.” In every case, the president’s strategy of postponement was politically successful. Roosevelt in 1936, Reagan in 1984, and Bush
in 2004 were all reelected. But after each election, the postponed problems loomed larger than ever over the second term.

Scandal occupies a special category of recurring second-term problems inherited from the first term. As John Fortier and Norman Ornstein have pointed out, scandals are a common feature of second terms, but typically “second-term scandals began in the first term and were suppressed successfully by the White House, enabling the president to win reelection and avoid embarrassment.” 16 Even if the president has done nothing scandalous, observes Reagan administration alumnus Frank Donatelli, “The federal government is this enormous apparatus, and it’s just a matter of time before someone somewhere winds up screwing up.” 17

Nixon engaged in a massive cover-up of the Watergate affair hoping to prevent it from sullying his reelection campaign in 1972. Pursuing an unpopular policy in Nicaragua that he cared about deeply, Reagan nonetheless chose not to fight with Congress over the 1984 Boland Amendment, which barred the government from giving military aid to the anticommunist contra rebels in that country. Instead, his administration provided covert aid to the contras funded by the secret sale of American weapons to the hostile government of Iran. The Iran-contra scandal, when it surfaced during Reagan’s second term, nearly brought down his presidency. In ways both similar and different, the adulterous first-term affair that Clinton had with Monica Lewinsky, a twenty-one-year-old White House intern, came back to haunt him when it became public during his second term. Like Reagan in 1984, Clinton was reelected in 1996; as was Nixon in 1972. But during the second term, Reagan was nearly undone by a congressional investigation of Iran-contra, the House impeached Clinton for conduct related to the Lewinsky scandal, and Nixon was forced to resign lest he face not only impeachment but also certain conviction and removal from office by the Senate.

Only the pattern of history, not any available evidence, alerts one to the possibility that Obama may have to deal with a second-term scandal rooted in conduct that lay outside public scrutiny during his first term. But on a congeries of policy problems involving taxes, spending, massive entitlement programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security, annual budget deficits of about $1 trillion per year, and the national debt (about $16 trillion and growing), first-term avoidance was the rule in Obama’s Washington. The fingerprints of senators and representatives, many of them Republicans, are all over the fiscal crime scene, not just the president’s. But the accumulated problems of many years of federal profligacy are bound to shadow Obama’s second term even if it is scandal-free.

**Empty Reelection Campaigns**

Short-term political strategy also helps to lay the groundwork for second-term difficulties when presidents wage their reelection campaigns. Understandably, such campaigns tend to be “above party” affairs. The president, after
all, is the nation’s chief of state as well as its more partisan chief of government. As chief of state, the president embodies in a symbolic way all that unites Americans as a people, much as the monarch does in Great Britain. When George W. Bush stood on the rubble of New York City’s World Trade Center gripping a bullhorn in one hand and a firefighter’s shoulder with the other, or Barack Obama announced from the White House that Navy SEALs had killed terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, Republicans and Democrats united in celebration of their president’s achievement.

Presidents seeking reelection naturally try to drape themselves in the broadly unifying garb of chief of state, which means avoiding controversial or even specific issues as much as possible and distancing themselves to some extent from their party’s candidates for Congress and other offices. They are best able to do so when they avoid a bruising intraparty battle for renomination, as Obama did in 2012. But the result, even when presidents win reelection landslides (as Obama did not), is that they are in no position to claim a mandate to accomplish anything in particular during the second term. Nor do the president’s fellow party members in Congress feel much personal obligation to help.

In addition to being weak on substance, presidential reelection campaigns tend to be long on announcements in the White House Rose Garden, elaborately staged appearances before mass audiences, and other media events. They typically are short on face-to-face campaigning among the voters and direct encounters with the press. Consequently, the president does not learn much from the campaign (as he did when first elected) about what the voters are thinking. This lack of immersion in the shifting currents of public opinion can lead to serious miscalculations after the election. Ironically, all three of the presidents who won the largest reelection majorities (thus demonstrating the unmatched sensitivity of their political antennae) blundered severely at the beginning of the second term: Roosevelt and his Court-packing scheme in 1937, Nixon and Watergate in 1973, and Reagan and Iran-contra in 1985.

Even George W. Bush, who was only narrowly reelected in 2004, claimed to have “earned capital in the campaign, political capital,” and added, “I intend to spend it.” He bragged, “I’ve got the will of the people at my back . . . , and that’s what I intend to tell the Congress.” Convinced that his bare majority of popular and electoral votes had conferred a mandate to pursue Social Security reform, an issue he barely mentioned during the election, Bush launched a futile and politically damaging campaign to enact new legislation as soon as he was inaugurated for a second term. Self-inflicted political wounds by Bush and his three landslide-winning predecessors ended any hopes for a successful second term.

A final characteristic of presidential campaigns for reelection also creates problems for the second term. Almost by definition, such campaigns affirm the status quo. But it is hard to translate an “aren’t things fine?” theme into gains for the president’s party in Congress. After all, if the
country is on the right track, why should the voters want to turn out any incumbents, whether they are the president’s fellow partisans or members of the opposition?

Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, Clinton, and Bush fell prey to most of these syndromes. In every case, the president asked the voters, in effect, to express their approval of the first term or at least to conclude that he was the lesser of two evils compared with his opponent. Little was said about what the second term would bring. Even less was done to help the party’s candidates for Congress. The predictable result: the president was reelected, but with a campaign whose significance was undermined by its lack of content and by disappointing results for the president’s party in the congressional elections. Indeed, Republicans Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan each came out of his reelection with the same wholly or partially Democratic Congress with which he had entered it. The electorate that gave Eisenhower 57 percent of its votes also reelected 95 percent of the incumbent House members and 86 percent of the incumbent senators who were running for an additional term. Nixon’s 61 percent victory was undermined by reelection rates of 94 percent in the Democratic House and 85 percent in the Democratic Senate. Similarly, in the same election in which Reagan earned 59 percent of the popular vote, 95 percent of House members and 90 percent of senators also were successful.

Clinton’s reelection campaign in 1996 fit the historical pattern. He seldom called on the voters to elect a Democratic Congress—to do so would have jeopardized his efforts to rise above the partisan fray. Instead of pushing a change-oriented agenda, Clinton pointed with pride to the status quo, taking credit for the success of his first-term economic policies. Discussions of the future were shrouded in the gauzy rhetoric of “building a bridge to the twenty-first century.” Not surprisingly, as in previous elections that returned a president to power, incumbents did well across the board in 1996: 95 percent of senators and 95 percent of representatives who sought reelection were successful. Democratic leaders in Congress, who had long resented Clinton’s “triangulation” strategy for winning a second term (it placed the president as far above and apart from congressional Democrats on the left as from congressional Republicans on the right), understandably felt that they owed little to him. Clinton ended his first term with a Republican Congress and began his second term the same way.

Bush’s 2004 reelection campaign offers a mixed case. As noted earlier, his candidacy was no less content-lite about his plans for the second term than those of his predecessors. But Bush was determined not to win a “lonely victory.” “I don’t want what Nixon had,” he told his political strategists. “I don’t want what Reagan had.” What Bush wanted—and worked hard to get—was coattails in the congressional elections. He was partially successful. To be sure, incumbents were massively reelected at a rate of 99 percent in the House and 96 percent in the Senate. But a string of Republican victories in open-seat Senate elections increased the GOP’s majority in that chamber from fifty-one seats to fifty-five. Laying it on the line for his
party, however, did little for Bush’s programmatic agenda. Neither Republican activists nor Republican candidates for Congress had been asked during the election to support Social Security reform, and many abandoned the cause as soon as they saw how unpopular it was.

Obama could not plausibly campaign in 2012 on the one-word slogan “Hope,” as he had in 2008. Instead, he rebranded his appeal with the equally substance-free “Forward.” Unexpectedly, the president was able to perform the chief of state role to a tee just days before the election, when Hurricane Sandy did massive damage to densely populated areas of New Jersey and New York. Obama toured the Jersey shore with Republican governor Chris Christie, previously a fierce partisan critic, who now praised the president for their “great working relationship” and said that Obama had “sprung into action immediately” when the hurricane hit. In the national exit poll, 15 percent of voters said that Obama’s response to the hurricane was the most important factor in their decision about how to vote, and 73 percent of them voted for the president.

At times during the general election campaign, Obama’s aides told reporters that he had a second-term policy agenda that included tackling issues such as climate change and immigration reform. In an unguarded moment, the president was overheard confiding to Russian leader Dmitri Medvedev that “after the election I’ll have more flexibility” in scaling down the nation’s politically resilient missile defense program. But the president’s only substantive public discussion of his second term was almost willfully obscure: it came in an off-the-record interview with the Des Moines Register two weeks before the election. The one issue the president talked about emphatically throughout the campaign was his longstanding desire to increase income taxes on high earners—a carryover from 2008 that he still hoped to achieve. He reaped the harvest of this rare act of specificity immediately after the election, when Republican leaders in Congress grudgingly conceded that they had lost the argument and increased taxes on households earning $450,000 or more per year. Unlike Bush—but like Bush’s reelection-seeking predecessors—Obama provided little help to his party’s congressional candidates. His coattails were short. Only 16 of 215 Republican House members who were on the November ballot were defeated by Democratic opponents, and only one Republican senator.

No Honeymoon

A third reason that presidents experience disappointment during their second terms is that they are not granted the honeymoon that most first-term presidents enjoy. Newly elected presidents usually receive the early approval of millions of voters who opposed them in the election, as Obama did in early 2009 when his 53 percent majority in the 2008 election became a 65 percent approval rating in post-inauguration polls. Yet some crucial ingredients that make up the first-term honeymoon are not present the second time around, notably the general willingness of the public and the Washington
community to give the new president a chance and the widespread (and, of course, impossible) hopes of all sectors of the nation that he will govern in their many and often contradictory interests.

The importance of the honeymoon period extends beyond good will and starry-eyed sentimentality. The honeymoon glow, its temporary nature noted ruefully by Lyndon B. Johnson in his remark that “you’ve got just one year when they treat you right,” helps to explain, for example, why presidents make more new legislative requests to Congress in the first year of their administrations than in any other year, most of them during the first five months.\(^\text{27}\) It also accounts for why so many of the landmark legislative achievements for which presidents such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Ronald Reagan are remembered took place during the first year of their first term.\(^\text{28}\)

Partisan polarization, both among members of Congress and, increasingly, among voters, has diminished the president’s ability to attract support across party lines even in the afterglow of a victorious election. Still, Obama’s second-term surge of increased public support was remarkably small. According to data compiled by Micah Cohen, right after the 1996 election Clinton received a 3 percentage point increase in the Gallup Poll’s measure of net job approval—that is, the percent of voters who say they approve of the president’s performance in office minus the percent who disapprove—the same boost Reagan received after being reelected in 1984. George W. Bush’s net approval rating rose 8 points from the poll taken just before the 2004 election to the poll taken just after. Obama’s net approval rating increased as well in 2012, but only by 2 points. The percent of voters who approved his performance actually remained flat at 52 percent, and his 2 point improvement came entirely from preelection disapprovers who now expressed no opinion.\(^\text{29}\)

**Midterm Election**

Almost halfway into the second term comes the midterm congressional election and the fabled “six-year itch,” the fourth common ingredient of second-term frustration. Midterm elections of any kind seldom provide good news for presidents—the only midterm in history in which the president’s party gained ground in both the House and the Senate was in 1934, during Franklin Roosevelt’s first term. But a president’s first midterm election, which occurs two years into the first term, generally is less punishing than the one that takes place during the second term, at the six-year mark. Roosevelt’s Democrats lost seventy-one House members and six senators in 1938, midway through his second term. Congressional Republicans lost forty-eight seats in the House and thirteen in the Senate in 1958, the sixth year of Eisenhower’s tenure as president. Republicans lost forty-eight House members and five senators in 1974, six years after Nixon was first elected. Reagan’s Republicans lost five seats in the House and eight in the
Senate (along with control of the upper chamber) in 1986, halfway through his second term.

Clinton broke the pattern in 1998, when Democrats ran even in the Senate elections and actually gained five seats in the House. Although this was a remarkable achievement, Colleen Shogan has pointed out that the circumstances that occasioned the result are unlikely to be repeated: a Republican Party set on pursuing an impeachment that the public did not want, and a Democratic Party artificially united behind its president in reaction against a nearly unprecedented partisan overreach by the opposition. Not surprisingly, politics as usual prevailed again in 2006, during the next two-term president’s second midterm election. George W. Bush’s Republican Party not only lost thirty House seats and six Senate seats, but also surrendered its majority in both chambers to the Democrats.

These losses take their toll on the president’s relationship with Congress as the second term wears on. As Michael Grossman, Martha Kumar, and Francis Rourke have shown, the final two years of second-term administrations “have been accompanied by declines in presidential support in Congress on issues where the president took a clear stand.” This is especially true when the opposition party controls one or both houses of Congress, which has been the case for nearly every second-term president since the Civil War. Looking ahead to 2014, the small number of competitive districts currently held by Republicans means that Democrats are highly unlikely to win control of the House, (Obama carried only fifteen districts won by House Republicans in 2012.) No midterm election in history has produced even a ten-seat gain for the president’s party, much less the seventeen-seat gain that the Democrats would need to secure a majority in that chamber.

In the Senate elections, moreover, the Democrats will have to defend twenty-one seats to the Republicans’ fourteen. That is not an insurmountable problem; the Democrats thrived in the face of longer odds in 2012. But some of the Democratic senators whose seats will be on the ballot serve in states that have grown dramatically more Republican since they were last elected in 2008, including Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, and Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, whose seat became open when he announced in January 2013 that he would not seek reelection. Others represent states that Romney carried in 2012, including Kay Hagan of North Carolina, Mark Begich of Alaska, Tim Johnson of South Dakota, and Max Baucus of Montana. In contrast, the only seat the Republicans will be defending in a state carried by Obama is in Maine, where Susan Collins is a strong incumbent and which probably will go Democratic only if she does not run for reelection. Further, Democratic candidates for all offices in 2014 will have to confront the dangers posed by the considerably smaller electorate that participates in midterm elections, especially the reduced presence of the young voters and racial and ethnic minorities who
turned out in such large numbers for Obama and, as long as they were in the voting booth anyway, cast ballots for other Democrats in 2012.

**Lame-duck President**

During Obama’s final campaign appearances in 2012, he noted wistfully to crowds that this was the last political campaign he ever would wage. Political observers marked the underlying significance of this statement: at the moment of his reelection, Obama, like all second-term presidents since Eisenhower, became a lame duck, unable to run for another term as president.

One reason for the weakened political condition of the second-term president is the two-term limit imposed by the Twenty-second Amendment, which was passed by Congress in 1947 and ratified by the states in 1951. (The amendment exempted President Harry S. Truman, who was serving at the time, but he chose not to run in 1952.) To be sure, a two-term tradition had existed ever since Thomas Jefferson, willfully misinterpreting George Washington’s mainly personal decision not to serve a third term as president, proclaimed in 1807 that no one should violate Washington’s “sound precedent.”

In the years that followed, only Franklin Roosevelt lasted more than two terms, winning a third election in 1940 and a fourth in 1944. But several other presidents, including Ulysses S. Grant and Woodrow Wilson, kept open the possibility of running again, which meant that second-term presidents could not be counted out as lame ducks until late in their tenure. By codifying the two-term tradition, the Twenty-second Amendment removed all doubt that, in beginning the second term, the president also was beginning his last term.

The disempowering effects of lame-duck status are at first subtle, manifested, for example, in the slow disappearance of the president from the evening news and the front pages as the media spotlight gradually shifts to the contest to select a successor. Dana Perino, who was George W. Bush’s second-term press secretary, noted toward the end of the 2008 campaign that “if we are on the front page of the paper, [it must be because] we have done something terribly wrong or have a huge problem.” In 2012, no sooner were the returns in than cable news channels and political websites and blogs were alive with speculation about 2016. Would Republican vice presidential nominee Paul Ryan of Wisconsin seek his party’s presidential nomination? What about Florida senator Marco Rubio or former Florida governor Jeb Bush? Would Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or Vice President Joseph Biden try to become the Democratic nominee—or both of them, or neither?

To the extent that the spotlight continues to shine on the president, its glare becomes harsher. Typically, the proportion of presidential news stories that are favorable declines and the proportion of unfavorable stories increases from the first to the last years of an administration. Perhaps in response, the popularity of most second-term presidents undergoes a steeper
descent than during the first term. A certain lassitude may ensue: Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley find that “a significant drop in energy in second terms occurs,” with the president less likely to take to the hustings or even the airwaves to defend the party or administration.\textsuperscript{37}

As the end of the second term approaches, the lame-duck effects become more tangible and visible. Members of the president’s team, both within the White House and in the departments and agencies of the bureaucracy, begin their exodus to greener pastures in the private sector, fully aware both that their employment with the president is drawing to an inevitable close and that their value in the job market will decline dramatically as soon as the president leaves office. Finding competent and loyal replacements to join the administration, at this late hour and for such a short time, is correspondingly difficult. Richard Schott and Dagmar Hamilton observe that “candidates are less willing to make financial and other sacrifices for an appointment of merely a year or two, and much of the excitement and challenge of being part of a new administration have dissipated.” As for members of the career civil service, their sense of commitment to the policies and programs of the administration dwindles steadily as the arrival of a new chief executive draws near.\textsuperscript{38}

During the final year of the second term, the Senate takes an especially jaundiced view of the president’s judicial nominations. Historically, the rejection rate for final-year nominations to the Supreme Court has been 48 percent, compared with 14 percent for nominations made earlier in the term. When the opposition party controls the Senate, the final-year rejection rate rises to 75 percent.\textsuperscript{39} Opposition-party senators are even more likely to resist an outgoing president’s nominations to the nation’s thirteen courts of appeals, sometimes by bottling up the nominees in committee and at other times by threatening a filibuster. No modern Supreme Court nomination has been filibustered, but it is not hard to imagine that happening if Obama were to nominate a liberal to replace a retiring conservative.

Obama faces a federal court system closely divided between Republican and Democratic appointees. The Supreme Court has five generally conservative justices, all appointed by Republicans presidents, and four generally liberal justices, all appointed by Democrats.\textsuperscript{40} The thirteen appeals courts are just as closely divided between judges appointed by Democrats (49 percent) and Republicans (51 percent). Obama was considerably slower than Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to fill vacancies on these courts and on the federal district courts during his first term. He also chose judges who were about four years older, on average, than Bush’s, meaning that their presence on the bench probably will not last as long.\textsuperscript{41}

Obama’s ability to fill any seats on the Supreme Court that become vacant in the next few years will depend greatly on when the vacancies occur. During the president’s second term conservative justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy will both turn eighty. If their health permits, they may
decide to remain on the Court in the hope that a Republican president will be elected in 2016 and become the one to replace them. Meanwhile, liberal justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg will turn eighty-three and fellow liberal Stephen Breyer will turn seventy-eight during Obama’s second term. (The next oldest justice, Clarence Thomas, was born ten years after Breyer and at sixty-eight will still be relatively young by Supreme Court standards.) Even if the two older liberals remain healthy, they may decide to time their retirement to assure that Obama will nominate their successor. But if that is their goal they had better do so sooner rather than later. The closer to the 2016 election a vacancy occurs, the more likely it is that Republicans in the Senate will find a way to prevent any Obama nominee from being confirmed. George W. Bush was in this way fortunate that the two vacancies that occurred on the Supreme Court during his second term both appeared in its first year.

To be sure, lame-duck presidents are not without resources. Hoping “to establish a final diplomatic victory as their legacy,” they are “much more likely to schedule foreign trips in the final year of their administrations.” In addition, the constitutional powers of the presidency remain intact throughout the term, as Clinton’s predecessor, George H. W. Bush, showed after losing the election of 1992. During his final two months as president, Bush dispatched 25,000 American troops to Somalia, signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), bombed Iraq, reached an arms control agreement with Russia, and pardoned six high-ranking former Reagan administration officials of any crimes they may have committed in connection with the Iran-contra affair. Clinton also spent much of his final days in office issuing pardons, some of them highly controversial. Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, knowing he would never face the voters again, rejected their verdict in the Democrat-dominated 2006 midterm election that the war in Iraq had been a failure. Instead of withdrawing American troops, Bush deployed an additional 20,000—the surge—under his authority as commander in chief. It turned out to be the most successful decision he made in a generally unsuccessful war.

**Conclusion**

Pattern is not predestination, at least not in politics. To observe that modern presidents have been less successful in their second terms than in their first terms, even when that observation is adduced by explanations that are deeply grounded in the workings of the political system, is not to say that no second term ever will surpass a first term, or even that Obama’s second term will not turn out more successfully than his first term. Historical “what ifs” are of limited value, but who is to say, for example, that John F. Kennedy, a narrowly elected president in 1960 who used his first term mainly to set
the agenda for a massive, mandate-giving reelection in 1964, would not have reaped the harvest of his earlier efforts in the form of historic legislative achievements in a second term? Obama was denied an overwhelming reelection in 2012, but four years as president have made him more sure-footed in his conduct of the office, including experience at dealing with a Republican-controlled House of Representatives. He also began his second term with a historical sensitivity to the new challenges he faced. “I don’t presume that because I won an election that suddenly everybody agrees with me on everything,” he said in a post-election news conference. “I’m more than familiar with all the literature about presidential overreach in second terms. We are very cautious about that.”

Still, the historical pattern and the explanations that underlie it do not augur well for Obama’s second term: the postponement of thorny problems until after the election, the lack of substance in his 2012 reelection campaign, the absence of a postelection honeymoon period, the midterm election in 2014, the coming exodus of talented and experienced presidential lieutenants and the difficulty of replacing them, and the growing problems attendant with advanced lame-duck status during the waning years of the term.

Underlying most of these problems is the Twenty-second Amendment. No constitutional amendment has undone the Framers’ intentions more completely than the two-term limit. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 designed all of their provisions for the term and election of the executive around the central goal of allowing the president to be always eligible for reelection. They believed strongly that presidential reeligibility was good for the president, who would have every incentive to do the best possible job, and good for the country, which would have the option of keeping a president it liked in office. Nor has any amendment been rushed to enactment by Congress in such haste and with such disregard for the original constitutional design. Briefly restored to power in the 1946 congressional election after a long absence, Republicans passed the amendment in posthumous resentment of Franklin Roosevelt’s four victories. An argument could have been made, after careful consideration of the debates at the Constitutional Convention, that the Framers had been wrong not to impose a presidential term limit in the first place or that the times had changed since 1787 in ways that made such a limit necessary. But the enactors of the Twenty-second Amendment were uninterested in serious constitutional argument and unwilling to take the time to construct one.

Most Americans support the two-term limit on presidents. If anything, they want to extend the constitutional term-limit principle to members of Congress. One can only hope that at some point, putting fervor aside, they will pause to consider what they have done to the second-term presidents whom they have elected.
Notes

1. Wilson won a three-way contest in 1912 with 42 percent of the popular vote and 435 electoral votes. In 1916, facing only one rival, his share of the popular vote rose to 49 percent but he received only 277 electoral votes.

2. Presidents who were elected to at least two terms are the focus of this chapter. This criterion deemphasizes the experiences of successor presidents, even those who were later elected to one full term, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry S. Truman, and Lyndon B. Johnson.


4. The exit poll data cited in this chapter may be found at www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/race/president#exit-polls.


14. In their study of the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan presidencies, Brace and Hinckley found that “the ratio of negative to positive events was much larger during the second terms,” mostly because of “things set in motion [by these presidents] during their first terms.” Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley, Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidency (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 40, 41.


19. One could add Johnson and his massive escalation of the Vietnam War after winning a landslide election in 1964 to this list.
21. Quoted in ibid., 2.
33. The Democrats gained nine seats in 1934, a second-year-term midterm and five seats in 1998, a sixth-year midterm.


42. Brace and Hinckley, *Follow the Leader*, 61, 196–197.


3

The Election

How the Campaign Mattered

Marc J. Hetherington

The media need new stories every day. As a result, they often overstate the effects that political campaigns have on election outcomes. Because each new advertisement or appearance is news that they must cover, the people who give us political information frame their stories to suggest all the twists and turns of the race are critical. In their post-election retrospectives, pundits often argue that this advertisement or that gaffe proved decisive in determining the election’s outcome. Such daily episodes are rarely important, as much as pundits would like us to believe otherwise. That, however, is not to say the campaigns do not matter. They do. But how do they matter?

The election of 2012 provides an excellent illustration that it is the long-run strategies of the campaigns, rather than their day-to-day tactics, that have a profound influence on who wins and who loses and by how much. To understand why, we must consider the range of things campaigns do. Their decisions rarely change the dynamics of the race with a stunning advertisement or appeal. Rather political observers can better see a campaign’s effects by examining who came out to vote, who stayed home, and what issue stands the candidates decided to take. With these criteria in mind, much evidence suggests that Mitt Romney’s campaign contributed to his loss, while Barack Obama’s snatched victory from what, perhaps, should have been the jaws of defeat.

The seeds of Romney’s setback in 2012 were sown in 2008. That is when the formerly moderate Massachusetts governor began to lurch to the political right. Only a few years before his first run for the presidency in 2008 Romney publicly championed gay rights, abortion rights, and universal access to health care for all citizens. These were popular positions in Massachusetts, one of the nation’s most liberal states. However, he and his advisers decided that those positions would be liabilities with the much more conservative Republican presidential primary electorate. Moreover, they viewed other relative moderates who were also vying for the nomination, namely John McCain and Rudy Giuliani, as his toughest foes in 2008. Rather than tangle with them for the few moderate voters in Republican primaries, Romney staked out staunchly conservative positions on the entire range of issues in an effort to appeal to the conservative base of the
Republican Party. Although the gambit did not work in 2008, he managed to stagger through a very weak field in 2012 to secure the nomination.

Changing issue positions in this way may sound cynical at first, but strategic positioning to help win votes is nothing new. To some extent, all candidates attempt to balance their more ideological primary election constituency’s wishes with those of the more moderate mass of Americans who vote for president in November. But Governor Romney’s problem was more acute than for most candidates for two reasons. First, the positions of key groups within his party base, particularly religious conservatives, were particularly extreme, putting him in direct conflict with critical emerging forces within the electorate. Most notably, the Republican base has little sympathy for immigrants, legal or otherwise. To satisfy this group in the primaries, Romney took a very conservative position on immigration throughout the primaries, going as far at one point to suggest that the millions in the country illegally ought to deport themselves. For obvious reasons, his positions alienated Latino voters, the nation’s fastest growing ethnic minority. Similarly, religious conservatives’ disdain for gay rights caused Romney to believe that he needed to change his positions on gay marriage and gay adoption to satisfy them. This, in turn, alienated socially liberal younger voters who, in 2012, increased their turnout share to its highest point in recent general elections.

Romney’s second problem with his primary election constituency probably explains why he did so much to try to accommodate it on the issues. Specifically, a large swath of the Republican base was uncomfortable with the fact that Mitt Romney is a Mormon. Although Mitt’s father, George, encountered little resistance to his religious denomination when he ran for president in 1968, the emergence of white evangelical Protestants as a force in American party politics has changed the political dynamics fundamentally. America is a more tolerant country racially and religiously than it was decades ago, but many evangelical religious groups classify Mormonism as a cult rather than a Christian religion. In fact, election analyst Harry Enten found during the Republican primary campaign that the percentage vote for candidates other than Romney in a county very strongly correlated with the percentage of evangelical Christians living in the county.¹ Knowing that they did not consider him “one of them,” Romney apparently felt a particularly acute need to satisfy this constituency where he could. As illustrated subsequently, Romney’s decision to position himself far to the right contributed to his defeat, as people who consider themselves moderates abandoned his candidacy in droves.

Even as Romney may have cost himself the election in the prenomination process, Obama plotted a strategy that proved a winner. Without any primary challengers, Barack Obama’s campaign only needed to prepare for the general election. And prepare it did. The vaunted turnout machine that produced near record voter participation in 2008 got the job done again in 2012. Although absolute levels of turnout were down, Obama succeeded
in turning out people from the demographic groups that the campaign targeted. Generally, campaigns find it hard to get young people and racial and ethnic minorities to the polls on election day, but these groups made up a larger than usual slice of the electorate in 2012. Young people (those aged 18–29) increased their share of the electorate to 19 percent, its highest percentage since exit poll data have been gathered. In addition, nonwhites made up fully 28 percent of the total electorate, an increase of 2 percentage points over 2008. That the Obama campaign boosted minority turnout even with a sluggish economy that was particularly unforgiving to racial and ethnic minorities is a testament to its get-out-the-vote campaign’s success.

Also indicative of the Obama campaign’s relative strength, it achieved a near sweep of the battleground states, winning nine of the ten states that both campaigns targeted. Going into election day, Ohio was viewed as the lynchpin. Whoever won there would win in the election. Not only did Obama win Ohio by 1.9 percentage points, he also narrowly won toss-up states like Virginia and Florida that many thought Romney would carry and, in fact, needed in order for Ohio to be important. In the end, Obama retained all the states that he won in 2008 except Indiana, which had been a fluke victory the last time around, and North Carolina, which he won in 2008 by a mere 14,000 votes.

In retrospect, Republicans will likely view 2012 as an opportunity missed. In 2010, Republican House and Senate candidates took advantage of widespread voter discontent to make sweeping gains. With unemployment still hovering around 8 percent, the GOP had every reason to expect a victory. Mitt Romney failed to take advantage of the type of sluggish economy that usually leads to a change in president. This chapter explains why.

### The Basics

The 2012 election was reasonably close by historical standards. Barack Obama won 50.9 percent of the popular vote, while Mitt Romney garnered 47.4 percent. Only six elections since the dawning of the twentieth century have been closer as far as the popular vote is concerned. Obama’s electoral vote margin was somewhat more impressive. He totaled 332 electoral votes compared with Mitt Romney’s 206, or about 62 percent of the overall number. This makes it the eighth closest electoral vote election of the post–nineteenth century.

Figure 3.1 displays the 2012 electoral map. States Obama won are shaded. Romney states are white. Table 3.1 shows the percentages of the vote the major party candidates won in each state. Consistent with recent voting patterns, the regional differences cannot be ignored. Every northeastern state, from Maryland in the south to Maine in the north, voted for Obama. The entire Pacific Coast was also strong Democratic territory. Not only did the Democratic ticket win these states, they often won with large margins. For example, New York in the East and California in the
Table 3.1 State by State Results of the 2012 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
Table 3.1  Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Romney</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
West both went for Obama by more than 20 percentage points. Republican support unmistakably comes from the South, Great Plains, and the upper Rocky Mountain West. Romney’s margins in these states were often very large, too. Idaho and Oklahoma, for example, went for Romney by more than 30 percentage points.

The states that featured the closest margins tended to come from the border South (e.g., Virginia and North Carolina), the desert Southwest/lower Rocky Mountains (e.g., Colorado and Nevada), and the upper Midwest (e.g., Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota). Of course, the story of the election’s outcome was that Obama won almost all these competitive states, a point we will revisit. Although the margins were not large, that is immaterial. To win all but two states’ electoral votes, one need only win by a single vote.

The Electoral College encourages us to examine presidential elections using the state as the unit of analysis. Doing so causes us to lose sight of the fact that it is really population density that divides Republicans and Democrats these days. Republicans win states that are disproportionately rural, while Democrats prevail in disproportionately urban states. If one were to break down a state like Pennsylvania, for example, it would make the population density story clearer. Obama ran up a huge margin in the greater Philadelphia metropolitan area and healthy margins in and around Pittsburgh. The rest of the state is very rural, which was strong Romney country. Given the urban-rural divide there, it produced a relatively close outcome, with Obama winning by just over 5 points. The same is true of similar city-country mix states like Ohio.

Also consequential is the fact that Obama won his states by, on average, smaller margins than Romney won his. This fact had the potential to produce an electoral vote winner that was different from the popular vote winner. Specifically, Obama had fewer “wasted” votes—votes more than the minimum one vote margin needed to win a state’s electoral votes—in the states where he did well. Indeed, New York Times blogger Nate Silver estimated that, for Romney to win the electoral vote, he probably would have needed to win the popular vote by at least 2 percentage points. This could be an interesting feature of future elections that lean just slightly in a Republican direction.

Do Campaigns Even Matter?

Political campaigns matter. They are at least part of why this specific electoral map emerged. In their infinite “cleverness,” political scientists often argue that campaigns do not matter, suggesting that the outcomes of presidential elections are driven by “the fundamentals.” Most often, the fundamentals they have in mind are measures of the economy’s strength in the months leading up to the election. Political science has spawned a cottage industry of election forecasting models that often use economic data gathered...
well before the campaign starts in earnest to make projections about the outcome. These forecasting models usually pick the correct winner. The political scientists’ argument goes that, if we can pick the winner without knowing anything that happened between when these data were gathered and election day, that means the effect of the campaign is minimal. Instead it is merely sound and fury.

This view is wrong headed. The campaigns may not always (or even often) change the outcome of a race, but that is not the same as not mattering. Instead, it is probably most often the case that both sides in a campaign field evenly matched teams that, until recently, had exactly the same amount of money to spend on the race. As a result, the campaigns themselves have a tendency to cancel each other out. If one side gains an advantage for a time, the other has the skill to counter that advantage. The reasoning here is analogous to product advertising. Coke and Pepsi spend billions on marketing, with each spending roughly the same as the other. Despite a slew of memorable ads on both sides, Coke maintains a slight sales advantage. Presumably both employ the Don Drapers of the advertising world to make their case, making it difficult for one side to move ahead without the other making a major mistake (remember New Coke?). Is this, then, money wasted by Coke and Pepsi? Surely not. If one side spent more resources or if one side spent them much more effectively than the other, the outcome would be different. In that sense, marketing campaigns matter, even if all they do is reinforce people’s existing preferences.

The same is true of political campaigns, specifically. To illustrate the point, it might be useful to explore examples occurring when the fundamentals were not the whole story. In 1988, the fundamentals suggested a narrow victory for George H. W. Bush. Instead, he won comfortably with 53 percent of the vote and 426 electoral votes. Why? His campaign was better than Michael Dukakis’s campaign. Whereas the Dukakis campaign was slow and ineffective in responding to attacks, the Bush campaign produced a remarkable number of memorable advertisements, from Willie Horton to Boston Harbor to one that featured Dukakis himself, looking ridiculous, riding in a tank with a helmet that appeared four sizes too big. Not only were these short-term tactics important, but the Bush campaign was strategically successful in painting Dukakis as an out-of-touch liberal. In this case, the campaigns were not equally skillful, and the difference between the two manifested in an easier than expected Bush victory.

The effect of the campaign was similarly obvious in 2008. In this case, the campaigns were probably more similar in their skill level than they were in 1988, but Barack Obama outspent John McCain by better than a hundred million dollars. Such spending asymmetries had not been possible since the adoption of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974. In return for tens of millions of federal dollars, candidates agreed not to raise and spend cash in the general election beyond what the government gave them. In 2008, however, Obama became the first candidate to eschew federal campaign money
for the general election while McCain accepted it. This allowed Obama to raise and spend an unlimited amount of money while McCain’s spending was capped at $84.1 million.

As a result, Obama’s team had resources to commit to a sophisticated ground game designed to mobilize voters who are usually difficult to reach. Making voter mobilization a centerpiece of the campaign has been rare in recent decades. The reason is that, because racial and ethnic minorities and young people are not frequent political participants, campaigns worry that they will not respond to their appeals. Concerned about wasting finite resources on these groups, campaigns often ignore them. Taking advantage of their resource advantage, however, the Obama campaign got these hard-to-reach voters to the polls in record numbers, which padded what the fundamentals predicted would be a reasonably comfortable win. Just how important these efforts were in 2008 is obscured because of the several percentage points of voters that political scientists estimate Obama lost because of the color of his skin.8

These examples suggest that the campaign mattered in 2012 even though the preconvention polls taken several months before the election had Obama up narrowly and he won relatively narrowly. In making this case, it is first important to note that Obama won, in the end, by about 3.5 percentage points, which is a couple points more than the roughly 1 point lead he enjoyed according to poll averages generated on the eve of the Republican National Convention in late August. Although 2.5 percentage points might not seem like much, it amounts to about 3 million people moving toward Obama during the general election campaign, given that 129 million people voted. A number that large seems significant. Although the campaign may not have altered the predicted winner, it almost certainly changed the margin.

Even if one does not believe that a 2.5 percentage point shift is much of anything, it is still important to note that there was nothing inevitable about the race ending in roughly the same way as it started. Only the skillful work of the campaign teams and the candidates themselves brought the twists and turns of the race back to where it roughly began.

Let’s consider some of the reasons for the movements that we saw during the campaign season. In early September and again in mid-September we saw marked turns toward Obama. The first turn coincides with the end of the convention period, suggesting the Democratic convention was more successful than the Republican convention. Most credit Bill Clinton’s nomination speech, which has been described as the best convention speech of the modern era, for the Democratic bounce. Perhaps even more significant was the second turn toward Obama. It coincided with what came to be known as the “47 percent” gaffe. A recording of a private Romney fundraiser was released to the press that showed Romney giving a speech to big donors. In it, he said, “There are 47 percent of the people who will vote
for the president no matter what. All right, there are 47 percent who are with him, who are dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims, who believe that government has a responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are entitled to health care, to food, to housing to you name it... And so my job is not to worry about those people—I'll never convince them that they should take personal responsibility and care for their lives.”

The implication was that 47 percent of the electorate, including veterans, senior citizens, active duty service members, and the like, were moochers being supported by a harder working 53 percent.

The 47 percent controversy raged for weeks. Had the election been held during this period, the polls suggest Obama would have won an even more comfortable victory than he did nearly two months later. But the election was not held then, and Obama suffered from the next major campaign event. Specifically, he gave a lackluster performance in the first presidential debate, which was held in Denver on October 3. At times, the president seemed disinterested and sleepy. His delivery was halting and weak, contrasting sharply with Romney’s crisp performance. Indeed Romney’s performance was probably the best by a Republican presidential candidate since Ronald Reagan in 1980. Although sitting presidents dating back to Jimmy Carter have tended to perform poorly in their first presidential debate, which was held in Denver on October 3. At times, the president seemed disinterested and sleepy. His delivery was halting and weak, contrasting sharply with Romney’s crisp performance. Indeed Romney’s performance was probably the best by a Republican presidential candidate since Ronald Reagan in 1980. Although sitting presidents dating back to Jimmy Carter have tended to perform poorly in their first presidential debate, the public provides them little quarter. The electorate in 2012 was no different. Just two days after the first debate, Romney seized his first lead in the poll averages, a lead he would enjoy for nearly three weeks. In fact, some individual polls had him up by more than 5 points at times. Had the election been held after the first debate, then Romney would likely have been the popular vote winner.

Although liberal Democrats appeared ready to hang themselves after the first debate, the race again moved back in their direction. As usual, the vice presidential debate made little difference in the polls, but Obama showed voters that he really did want to be reelected president by performing much better in the second debate than the first. He had more success parrying Romney’s attacks on taxes, health care, and the economy. And Romney performed much worse than he had. Two gaffes stood out, both occurring in areas where the former Massachusetts governor was vulnerable. The first had to do with gender pay equality, an issue on which Republicans find themselves on the wrong side of public opinion. Most Americans think government should enact pay equity statutes, which the Obama administration successfully championed with the passage of the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009. This law removes previous requirements that any lawsuits challenging pay determinations had to be filed within 180 days of the initial discriminatory pay decision. Under the new law, the 180-day window to file suit begins again with each paycheck that reflects the discriminatory wages, thereby facilitating easier legal challenges to pay discrimination. The GOP tends to see such efforts as unnecessary intrusions on business.
In the debate, Romney attempted to counter charges that he was unsympathetic to women in the workplace by noting how invested he was in ensuring women equal opportunities when he was governor, especially as he assembled his cabinet. In doing so, however, he chose his words inartfully. Specifically he said that he had asked for assistance from women’s groups in identifying qualified female candidates for cabinet posts, and the women’s groups delivered “whole binders full of women.” His unfortunate phrasing became a social media sensation, causing some people, especially women, to focus on an area that was not a strong point for the Republican ticket.

The second gaffe occurred in another area in which Governor Romney had less experience and hence less credibility than his opponent—foreign policy. In the second half of the town hall debate, a member of the audience asked about the situation in Libya whereby the U.S. ambassador and three other Americans had been killed near the consulate in Benghazi. The deaths suggested a serious security lapse. In addition, Republicans were arguing that the Obama administration’s evolving story about what had precipitated the attacks suggested a potential cover-up. The administration’s original interpretation suggested the attack was part of a spontaneous protest that erupted after an anti-Islamic film showed up on YouTube. Later the administration allowed that it was probably a more coordinated terrorist attack. In pressing this line of argument, Romney ignored the fact that the president had, in his original comments the day after the tragedy, left open the possibility that it was a terrorist attack. When the governor refused to believe the president, the debate moderator, Candy Crowley, corrected him. This turned what seemed to be a positive for Republicans—a colossal security failure that led to the death of an ambassador—into a negative.

The third debate, which was held on October 22, contained no similarly memorable miscues. But Obama provided a commanding performance, which, according to snap polls of debate watchers, was on par with Romney’s dominating performance in the first debate. Two days later, the president took a slight lead in the national poll averages, a lead he did not relinquish over the last two weeks of the campaign. Although his margin was small, it was persistent. In short, the polls on election eve suggested a narrow Obama victory, but narrow enough so that even slight changes in the expected composition of the electorate could support a belief that Romney would emerge victorious.

Although the race ended where it started, that didn’t mean the events of the campaign were meaningless. Had the election been held right after the 47 percent gaffe, Obama would have won easily. Had it been held after the first debate, Romney would have been elected. There was nothing inevitable about the return of the race to its late August starting line. The candidates and their campaigns needed to perform.
How the Campaigns Mattered in 2012

In assessing campaign effects, most pundits automatically frame the conversation in terms of one side changing voters’ minds, turning Romney voters into Obama voters or vice versa. If changing minds is the main criterion when measuring whether campaigns matter, then they matter little. This is especially true now that the parties have polarized along ideological lines. Over the last forty years, Americans (1) have grown more partisan, (2) care more about who wins elections, (3) vote a straight party ticket more often, and (4) perceive larger differences between the parties. As a result, most see the world as they want to see it and are not particularly open to persuasion.

Democrats and Republicans even tend to interpret objective facts differently. For example, less than a week before the election, the government released its October jobs report. Employers added 170,000 new jobs in October and the unemployment rate was 7.9 percent, a slight increase from September’s rate of 7.8 percent. Democrats hailed it as great news—all those new jobs and an unemployment rate below 8 percent meant the economy was on the mend. Republicans noted that most of the decrease in the unemployment rate in recent months could be explained by people abandoning job searches—the economy was still broken. Social scientists call this tendency to see the world as people want motivated reasoning, a tendency that has grown stronger as the political world has become more polarized.

Instead of persuasion, effective campaigns are more likely to measure success by their ability to change the shape of the electorate in ways advantageous to their side. Mobilizing voters who might otherwise have decided not to vote is central to this strategy. Recent research in political science, in particular, and behavioral social science more generally has uncovered a range of techniques to encourage people to participate, even as researchers remain largely in the dark about how to change minds. Political campaigns have started to use these tools. For example, we know that Americans respond to social pressure. When you tell people that voting records are public and that friends and neighbors can view them, people are more likely to vote. People are also more likely to vote if they see on Facebook that members of their friend community have voted and believe that their friends can see that they have not. These field experiments also provide campaigns ideas about the best ways to encourage participation. They find that people do not participate more in response to taped phone messages, and also that the effect of direct mail solicitations on voting is relatively weak. But people do respond strongly to canvassers visiting homes. Hence, if you live in a battleground state, chances are you have had at least one person from at least one of the campaigns pay you a visit.

Old style political parties in the “boss era” relied on such tactics for decades, but they fell into disuse as television advertising rose in importance.
Campaign operatives from the 1970s to the 1990s believed they could reach more people more effectively through electronic media. Lately, though, politics has witnessed a resurgence of door-to-door canvassing, sometimes with decisive effects. In 2004, for example, George W. Bush’s campaign succeeded in increasing the number of regular churchgoers in the electorate, a group that is overwhelmingly supportive of Republicans. Mobilizing people who belong to organizations like churches can be particularly effective because those in the organization can work to mobilize others in that social network. Moreover, many think the mobilization that occurred around churches in Ohio was decisive in explaining Bush’s narrow Electoral College victory. A swing of just 60,000 votes in Ohio would have thrown the election to John Kerry.

In 2012, voter mobilization was central to understanding the efficacy of the campaigns as well. Understanding the importance of mobilization also helps explain the foundation for one of the big controversies that raged through the campaign—whether the news media’s pre-election polls were accurate. Throughout the campaign, Republicans argued that the polls were skewed in favor of the Democrats. In fact, a website maintained by a conservative activist that was devoted to “unskewing” the media polls received significant attention. The crux of the controversy boiled down to two related questions. What percentage of Republicans and Democrats would make up the electorate on election day? And, what percentage of voters would be white? These two questions are related because of the immense racial polarization in voting that has emerged over the last generation. Since racial and ethnic minorities of almost all types identify and vote disproportionately Democratic, properly estimating how much of the electorate they will make up has a profound effect on the poll forecasts.

According to exit poll data, which appear in Table 3.2, whites supported Mitt Romney over Barack Obama by a 59 to 39 percent margin. Had the demographics of the country remained the same as they were in 1984, Romney, like Ronald Reagan, would have won handily. Back then, 86 percent of the electorate was white. The racial makeup of the electorate has changed significantly since then, however. Although minorities made up only 13 percent of voters in 1992, that percentage had doubled to 26 percent by 2008. In contrast to whites, minority groups all provided overwhelming support to Obama. African American support was nearly unanimous, 93 to 6 percent. Latinos and Asian Americans were among the few groups whose support for Obama increased between 2008 and 2012. For Latinos the increase was from 67 to 71 percent, and for Asian Americans, it was from 62 to 73 percent. These gains are particularly impressive because Obama’s overall margin decreased by 4 percentage points. Because Latinos are the fastest growing minority group in the United States, this gap became a particular concern to GOP political operatives after the election. Taken together, minority voters supported Obama over Romney by more than a 2-1 vote.
In advance of the election, the question pollsters had to answer was just how large a percentage would nonwhites make up. As always, it would have to be an educated guess. Would the percentage continue to increase after 2008? Or was 2008 an anomaly, driven by the first major party presidential nominee of color? Republican pollsters tended to think the electorate would look more like it did in 2004. That year 24 percent of the electorate was nonwhite. Democratic pollsters thought the percentage would continue to grow, reflecting overall increases in the minority population in the United States, particularly Latinos and Asian Americans. Media polls tended to take the middle position—that the racial composition would be about the same as it was in 2008. The Democratic pollsters turned out to be right. The exit polls suggest that 28 percent of the electorate was nonwhite. That is why the Democratic polls tended to be closer to the mark than the Republican polls. Obama’s pollster missed the popular vote total by about 0.1 percentage points. The Romney campaign polls apparently showed Romney winning.

The minority vote is more than a story about poll accuracy. It is also a marker of the success of the Obama campaign’s mobilization efforts. Realizing that they would change few minds in the weeks leading up to the election, the campaign worked hard to get out as many of their potential voters as possible. The literature on political participation tells us that minorities are less likely to vote than whites. This gap can be explained by differences in socioeconomic status; minorities tend to be less well educated and less well off financially. The need for campaigns to mobilize such irregular voters is very important because, absent get-out-the-vote efforts, they are likely to stay home.20

Groups and Voting Behavior

The racial polarization in voting was not the only storyline in the 2012 election. Many different groups contributed to the result. Table 3.3 presents a systematic breakdown of groups and their voting behavior as reported in the 2012 exit polls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obama</th>
<th>Romney</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White (72% of electorate)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American (13%)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic-Latino (10%)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American (3%)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (2%)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first thing to note is that party identifiers were more loyal to their party’s standard bearer than any time in the history of polling. Twenty or thirty years ago, it was not uncommon for 90 percent of partisans in the winning candidate’s party to support him or her but for only about 80 percent of the partisans in the losing candidate’s party to vote for him or her. In 2012, 92 percent of Democrats voted for Obama and 93 percent of Republicans voted for Romney. This continues a trend toward more party-orienting voting that political scientist Larry Bartels first identified in the 1990s. Increased party voting is a function of the clearer choices that Republicans and Democrats now provide voters. Back in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the parties were ideological hodgepods. Although the Democrats were the more liberal party, they had plenty of conservative leaders, especially from the South. Similarly, the Republican Party featured a more liberal wing, mostly from the Northeast, to go along with its

Table 3.3 Coalitional Support of the Presidential Candidates, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obama</th>
<th>Romney</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats (38%)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents (29%)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans (32%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals (25%)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderates (41%)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives (35%)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (47%)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (53%)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant (29%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Evangelical</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic (25%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Catholic</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish (2%)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion (12%)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $50,000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000-$100,000</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than $100,000</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

conservative base. That heterogeneity has all but disappeared among office holders today, with Republicans homogenously conservative and Democrats homogenously liberal.

Not only do voters have a clear ideological choice, partisans have developed a real dislike of the other party over time. Consider how partisans say they feel about the other side. Since the 1970s, the American National Election Study (ANES) has been asking voters to rate people and groups on what it calls a feeling thermometer. If someone loves a group, they can rate it as high as 100 degrees. If they really despise a group, they can rate it as low as 0 degrees. And, if their feelings are neutral, they are instructed to rate the group at 50 degrees. They can choose any temperature between 0 and 100 degrees.

As Figure 3.2 shows, Republicans did not exactly love Democrats and vice versa back when Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan served as president, but they did not hate the other side either. The average scores they tended to provide were in the high 40s—chilly but not cold. Partisans have grown far more negative about the party they do not belong to. In 2010, for example, Democrats rated the Republican Party at about 17 degrees, while Republicans rated the Democratic Party around 18 degrees. To put those scores in perspective, only groups like “student radicals” and “black militants” have ever received scores similarly low since the ANES started to ask these types of questions forty years ago. Polarization has not caused partisans to like their own party more, but has caused them to like the other party much less. It seems reasonable to conclude such negative affect is critical to understanding the big increase in party-based voting in 2012. The other party is simply not a viable option in the eyes of most partisans any longer.

**Figure 3.2**  Partisan Feelings About the Other Party

![Graph showing partisan feelings about the other party](https://example.com/graph.png)

*Source: Compiled by the author.*
Not surprisingly, ideology affected vote choice as well. More than 80 percent of self-identified conservatives favored Romney while more than 85 percent of self-identified liberals favored Obama. Perhaps more significant, the percentage of self-identified liberals has been creeping upward over time. Although conservatives still outnumber liberals by a 35 to 25 percent margin, not long ago the difference was much larger. In 1988, when a Democratic presidential candidate was castigated for being “a card carrying member of the American Civil Liberties Union,” only 17 percent of Americans said they were liberals. Indeed from the mid-1960s until recently, the word liberal was often used as an insult. That appears to be changing.

Even more significant in the exit poll data on ideology is Obama’s success with self-identified moderates. This group, which made up fully 41 percent of the electorate, preferred Obama to Romney, 56 percent 41 percent, a very large 15 percentage point gap. When pundits talk about swing voters, they often mistakenly pitch their analysis in terms of political independents, those who say they do not identify with a political party. Research suggests, however, that most people who say they do not identify with a party actually do. Instead the percentage of pure independents voting in a presidential election is probably under 10 percent, much less than the 40 percent who identify themselves as moderates.

The fact that people who like to think of themselves as moderate provided Obama with such an advantage is surely indicative of the strongly conservative positions Romney felt compelled to saddle himself with in the Republican primaries. Although the exit polls asked few questions about specific policies, most that they did ask suggest the electorate as a whole was not on the far right. For example, when asked about their opinions on abortion, 59 percent said they believed it ought to be legal in all or most cases. Only 36 percent said it ought to be illegal in most or all cases. Similarly, exit polls asked respondents whether most illegal immigrants who are working in the United States should be “offered a chance to apply for legal status” or be “deported to the country they came from.” When given this choice, 65 percent of voters favored a path to legal status while only 28 percent favored deportation. On most issues, Americans prefer something in the broad middle ground. All this suggests that Romney’s efforts to woo the Republican primary constituency may have fatally wounded his candidacy in the general election.

Another group that received significant attention from pundits both before and after the election was women. Women comprised 53 percent of the electorate, significantly more than men did. Moreover, the presence of more women was bad news for Mitt Romney. Women favored Obama over Romney by 11 percentage points (55 to 44 percent), while men favored Romney over Obama by 7 percentage points (52 to 45 percent). Although pundits often ascribe this gender gap in voting to social issues like abortion rights and contraception, such issues have little to do with why men and women vote differently. In fact, men and women have basically the same opinions on them.
Instead, the gender gap is driven by women and men’s differing opinions on the role of government and their differing preferences about foreign policy. Specifically, women favor more government services and spending on social safety net programs than men do. Women also tend to favor a less hawkish foreign policy than men. It is also worth noting that the constant focus on women in understanding gender and voting is probably misguided. In fact, women have cast the majority of their ballots for Democrats in every election since 1988. It is men who tend to shift back and forth from election to election. Although men have voted more Republican than women for decades, they have cast a majority of their ballots for Democratic candidates several times during that period, including 2008.

It is also a mistake to consider the genders as particularly descriptive. Let’s face it; we all know people of the same gender who are very different from one another. Categorizing any 50 percent of the public into a single group is bound to be a pretty course treatment. Different types of women and men vote differently. For example, Romney actually won 53 percent of married women’s votes, compared with 46 percent for Obama. Similarly, unmarried men favored Obama over Romney by 16 percentage points (56 to 40 percent). The largest voting gap between the candidates involved unmarried women, which is the fastest growing of the four groups. Unmarried women favored Obama by 67 to 31 percent, a remarkable 36 percentage point difference.

Religion has received significant attention from political observers in recent decades and it continues to have a significant effect on voting behavior. As usual, Protestants favored the Republican candidate, this time by a 15-point margin (57 to 42 percent). But Protestantism is a problematically lumpy category, insofar as it includes a wide array of different types of people—mainliners, evangelicals, whites, blacks. Breaking the data down further reveals clearer divisions. White evangelicals favored Romney over Obama by a whopping 51 points.

Interesting differences emerged among other religious groups as well. Catholics overall split their vote evenly between the candidates, but, as with Protestants, there is more to it than meets the eye. White and Latino Catholics behaved quite differently. Anglos actually favored Romney by 19 points (59 to 40 percent), while Latinos favored Obama by even more. In decades past, even white Catholics were a strongly Democratic constituency. This was because many were working class and hence beneficiaries of government programs. In addition, the Catholic Church’s emphasis on social justice meshed well with the Democrats’ use of government to lessen economic inequalities. As the group became more affluent and as the Church embraced conservative positions against abortion and gay rights, white Catholics have become a solidly Republican constituency. The evolution of white Catholics from ardent Democrats to Republicans provides conservatives hope in attracting Latino Catholics in the future. As the thinking goes, although Latinos are, on average, not well-off financially now, they
will be in the future, allowing them to make political decisions on moral rather than material grounds. This thinking hinges on the belief that Latinos eventually will identify more strongly with their religious group than their ethnic group.

Finally, income returned to its customary role in structuring vote choice, unlike in 2008, when its effect was not particularly strong. In 2012, those making under $50,000 a year voted for Obama by a 60 to 38 percent margin, almost identical to the numbers in 2008. But those making more than $50,000 moved toward the GOP. Although Obama managed to tie John McCain among those making between $50,000 and $100,000 and those making more than $100,000 in 2008, Romney enjoyed an advantage among those with higher income in 2012. Those making between $50,000 and $100,000 favored Romney by 52 to 46 percent, while those making over $100,000 favored Romney by a 54 to 44 percent margin.

The Economy: An 800 Pound Gorilla?

The issue environment seemed advantageous to any Republican candidate in 2012. Although some issues wax and wane in importance from election to election, the state of the economy is almost always influential. Voters can act, in V. O. Key’s famous words, as gods of vengeance or reward.\textsuperscript{26} When the economy is bad, voters can send the incumbent president home. When the economy is good, voters can keep the president around. Usually the effect of the economy is asymmetric. Because people expect the government to succeed, they often give the president less credit for a good economy than they give blame for a bad one. The economic voting literature would seem to have portended a bad end for Barack Obama.

In 2012, the economy was anything but strong. Indeed the economy had been in the doldrums for Obama’s entire presidency. Toward the end of George W. Bush’s second term, a near collapse of the world financial sector brought the U.S. economy to the brink of collapse. Even though policymakers avoided the worst possible outcome, the aftermath became known as the “Great Recession,” the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Flagging economies usually take time to recover, but the situation was particularly difficult to manage in the late Bush and early Obama years. Many of the usual levers used to stimulate the economy were not available. For example, policymakers often use interest rate cuts to stimulate growth. But interest rates were already at their minimum when the crisis hit. Making matters worse, although banks lending money at low interest rates can provide stimulus, the crux of the economic problems lay in the world credit markets, which led financial institutions to hoard money rather than lend it. Further exacerbating problems, disasters at home like the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and unrest abroad like the euro-zone crisis persistently pushed down any green shoots in the economy.
As a result, the depressed economy that Obama inherited never began to roar. Unemployment, which peaked just below 10 percent in 2009, remained relatively high. At election time, it stood at 7.9 percent, higher than it had been for any successful incumbent presidential candidate. Economic growth was similarly sluggish. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a paltry 1.97 percent in the year leading up to the election. Household incomes remained relatively flat and the housing market remained deeply depressed. As far as the economy was concerned, Obama had little good news to report except that inflation remained low and growth, while slow, was at least positive. His main argument was that he had kept the economy from getting much worse, always a politically tough sell.

Mitt Romney appeared on paper to be the ideal candidate to take advantage of the country’s economic distress. He grew up around successful businesses; his father, George, was president of American Motors during its boom years. And Mitt Romney built his own professional reputation as a businessman, leading a very successful venture capital firm called Bain Capital. These skills also allowed him to solve problems in more public arenas. When the management of the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City fell severely short of expectations, Romney was called in to save the Games. He was successful. Conventional wisdom held that he was better suited than most any other Republican to argue credibly that he could fix the economy.

But the effect of a bad economy did not play out as expected. On the one hand, it is clear that people realized the economy was not particularly strong. When asked about the condition of the nation's economy in the exit poll, 77 percent described it as being either “not so good” or “poor.” Such perceptions would seem to predict an electorate ready to be the gods of vengeance. A deeper look at the data, however, suggests something more complicated. When asked whether President Obama or President Bush was more responsible for the negative economic circumstances, 53 percent said Bush while only 38 percent said Obama. If people do not believe the incumbent is responsible for the state of the economy, then in their minds it would not make sense for them to punish him at the ballot box.

In addition, voters were close to evenly split on which candidate would be better at handling the economy: 49 percent said Romney, and 48 percent said Obama. Romney’s impressive business credentials clearly did not translate into much of a political advantage. Although people did acknowledge that conditions were poor, they did not necessarily think the challenger was better equipped than the incumbent to solve the problem. Given how poor the economy was for all four years of the Obama presidency, this is a remarkable finding.

That the electorate would split evenly on the economy between Romney and Obama is perhaps the biggest surprise from the exit poll data. Obama’s economic stewardship during his four years as president had not produced great results as measured by most any economic indicator. Furthermore the Republican candidate’s leading credential was his experience
and success with economic matters. Something must have been operating below the surface to produce such an even split in opinion on management of the economy.

Part of the problem for Mitt Romney appears to have been his background. He was the scion of a wealthy family, perceived by many to have been born with a silver spoon in his mouth. Although Americans have elected presidents who were very wealthy, these presidents, more often than not, were liberals whose policies often demanded more, not less, of the well-off. Examples include John F. Kennedy and Franklin D. Roosevelt. That Romney argued in favor of lower tax rates for high income earners surely did not help his cause. In addition, his successes in the business world were not of the storied brick and mortar type. He came from a world of lever-aged buyouts and high-stakes venture capital, not building factories that employed people for life.

Both of these factors probably contributed to the perception that Romney’s policies would not benefit ordinary people. As evidence, the exit polls asked voters what type of people the candidates’ policies would generally favor: the rich, the middle class, or the poor. For Obama, only 10 percent said the rich, while the most common response was the middle class (44 percent). Although 34 percent of the electorate thought Romney’s policies were designed to help the middle class, too, 53 percent thought they would help the rich the most. Romney’s problems with “ordinary” Americans showed up in people’s assessments of the two candidates’ personal qualities. The exit polls asked respondents which of four qualities mattered most to them in guiding their vote choice: “shares my values,” “is a strong leader,” “cares about people like me,” and “has a vision for the future.” About a fifth of Americans said “cares about people like me,” which made it only the third most popular response option. But Obama trounced Romney by 81 to 18 percent among people who chose that option. Finally, the exit polls asked which of the two candidates was “more in touch with people like you.” Obama enjoyed a 10-point advantage on this question as well. As compelling as Romney’s background may have been and regardless of how weak Obama’s record on the economy was, Romney’s inability to cause voters to believe that his policies would help people like them rather than people like himself robbed him of whatever advantage he might otherwise have enjoyed on the economy.

The Battleground

Obama’s campaign successes manifested in a near sweep of what are called the battleground states. These are states that both sides agree could go either way and are thus critical to winning the election. In 2012, ten states received almost all the candidates’ attention: Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Iowa, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Colorado. Taken together these states have only 130 electoral votes, or less than a
fourth of all 538. Indeed the number of electoral votes that are truly up for grabs in presidential elections has decreased markedly over the last fifty years. At least as interesting as the ten battleground states are the states that do not appear on the list. Electoral College gold mines like California (55 votes), New York (29 votes), and Texas (38 votes), which combined have 122 electoral votes, merit no attention at all from the campaigns, except when the candidates parachute in to raise money from wealthy donors in private events. Because one party’s candidate is assured of winning each of them, neither campaign has an incentive to spend scarce resources appealing to their voters. It does not matter if, say, the Republicans lose California by 20 points or 10 points; the Democrats still win all 55 electoral votes. Moreover, these three states are not alone. In 2012, thirty-four states were decided by 10 percentage points or more and, of those, eighteen were decided by 20 points or more. Only five states were decided by 5 percentage points or less. An electoral map like this produces a range of perversities. For example, the states that contain the five most populous metropolitan areas in the country (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Houston) received no public attention from either campaign. In short, even though presidential elections are nationally competitive, with the last several elections producing some of the closest Electoral College votes in history, they are not at all competitive at the state level, with more blowout states containing far more electoral votes than any time before.

Examining the battleground states offers some clues about how well the Obama and Romney campaigns did their jobs. It is in these ten states that the campaigns spent upwards of 95 percent of their resources. As a first cut, consider the candidates’ win-loss record. Obama took nine of the ten states. Only North Carolina broke for Romney on Election Day. Consider that these ten states were viewed as toss-ups at the beginning of the campaign, with about a fifty-fifty chance of going either way. That Obama won 90 percent of them is a remarkable achievement.

Another way of assessing the campaigns is to examine how the actual election result differed from the polls taken just before the election. Because polling in the battleground states was ubiquitous during the lead-up to the election, it is possible to calculate averages based on many polls. Such averages are more reliable than the result of any single poll. If a candidate did better than the polls predicted, it could indicate that the candidate’s organization did a superior job turning out supporters. The data presented in Table 3.4 suggest that, by this metric, Obama consistently outperformed his preélection poll average. Only in Ohio did Romney’s actual share of the vote exceed his average predicted share of the vote in the polls. In the other nine battleground states, Obama’s vote share exceeded his average poll share, sometimes by quite a bit. In New Hampshire, Iowa, Nevada, and Colorado, Obama’s vote share exceeded his preélection poll average by more than 3 percentage points. In four of the other battleground states, he ran more than 2 points better than expected. One might argue that the differences here
could be driven by pollsters’ inability to gauge minority turnout. Although this explanation might be true in racially and ethnically diverse states like Florida and Nevada, it does not hold for states like New Hampshire and Iowa, which are not at all diverse.

Instead these differences between Obama’s support in the polls and in the actual vote might be better read as mobilization effects. When pollsters calculate their results, they usually focus on “likely voters.” Different polling organizations have different ways of deciding who a likely voter is, but, regardless of how they do it, it requires a certain amount of guesswork. Pollsters can’t read people’s minds. And, if pollsters just ask people whether they plan to vote, almost all say they will because it is the socially desirable thing to say. Whatever likely voter screens were employed by pollsters, they had the effect of skewing results toward Romney. Throughout the campaign, samples of registered voters (that is, both likely and unlikely voters combined) were consistently more pro-Obama than samples of likely voters. Obama’s campaign apparently turned registered voters whom pollsters judged unlikely to vote into actual voters on Election Day. That is a tangible metric on which campaigns can be judged. The Obama campaign did a demonstrably superior job encouraging potential supporters, who were not particularly enthusiastic, into actual participants when it mattered.

Conclusion

Much of this chapter has painted a discouraging picture for conservatives and Republicans. They lost an election that was winnable. Just two years before, the GOP enjoyed sweeping victories in the 2010
midterm elections. But the Obama campaign’s successful mobilization of key groups changed the playing field enough so that the electorate in 2012 did not look like the one in 2010. It was much younger and more diverse, like the one that elected Obama in 2008. The numbers that have come out of the 2012 election have caused Democrats to become giddy with excitement about the future. The country is getting more racially and ethnically diverse, and these minority voters are voting overwhelmingly Democratic. Women also make up a larger share of the electorate, especially those who are not married—another overwhelmingly Democratic constituency. And young people are starting to develop a habit of voting Democratic, too. Although the support of eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds for Obama dropped from two-thirds to three-fifths between 2008 and 2012, they still provided a sizable edge for Democrats. Moreover, strong support among the elderly for Republicans will not last forever. The Grim Reaper eventually gets us all.

It is probably best not to turn demographic trends into inevitable future outcomes, however. Although demography definitely favors the Democrats, these demographics might not play out the same way in subsequent elections. First, a coalition that relies so heavily on difficult-to-mobilize groups like young people and minority groups is bound to suffer from a fair amount of surge and decline. High stimulus presidential elections may bring out irregular voters, provided mobilization efforts continue to be successful. But Democrats will be much more vulnerable in midterm elections when interest is lower and mobilization efforts less complete. The GOP sweep in 2010 is evidence of the limits of purely demographic arguments. Democrats may find similar problems in 2014, particularly if the economy does not improve demonstrably by then.

It is also possible that Republicans will change tactics by attempting to win minority voters as the country grows more diverse. Democrats probably will not continue to win more than three-fourths of the minority vote if Republicans begin pursuing policies that are attractive to nonwhites. In the aftermath of the election, for example, some prominent Republicans, such as senator Lindsay Graham of South Carolina and conservative radio and television host Sean Hannity argued that the party needed to moderate its stance on immigration. In 2004, when George W. Bush championed a comprehensive immigration reform plan, about 40 percent of Latinos supported him. Taking what many see as extreme and hostile stances on such issues is not only alienating the GOP from Latinos but is making Asian Americans feel like Republicans regard them as foreigners in their homeland, too. Of course, a more moderate position on immigration may distress some of the party’s base, but it is unlikely they will vote Democratic as a result. Moreover, Republicans might be well served by losing some votes in the staunchly conservative South and Great Plains by pursuing policies that help them win votes in increasingly diverse swing states such as Colorado, Virginia, and Nevada.
Making such changes on issues to attract new coalition partners usually does not come easily. The reason party leaders are the leaders of their parties often has to do with their positions on issues that matter to the existing party coalition. Change often requires an electoral shellacking in which party leaders cannot possibly misinterpret the public’s message. Such a shellacking has not yet happened to the GOP. Although they have lost the last two presidential elections, they still control the House of Representatives and a majority of state governments. Indeed just two years before Obama’s reelection, Republicans made among the most sweeping gains the party has ever achieved in off-year elections, picking up sixty-three House seats in 2010. Moreover, conservatives in the party can still argue that they would have won the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections if the GOP had nominated “real conservatives.” Although they did not run as moderates, both McCain and Romney were drawn from the moderate part of the party.

Absent an old-fashioned beat down, old habits die hard. We saw evidence of this in 2012. Since Richard Nixon’s southern strategy, Republican candidates have used resentments toward African Americans to win whites’ votes. Although saying directly disparaging things about African Americans is no longer socially acceptable, Republicans have found that talking about “states rights,” “welfare,” “street crime,” and “food stamps” act as proxies. Following the usual playbook, Republican campaign operatives described Obama as being somehow less than American and his supporters as not coming from “the real America.” They expressed a desire “to take the country back.”

The use of such implicitly racial appeals almost became overtly explicit after Obama’s poor performance in the first presidential debate. John Sununu, the former Republican governor of New Hampshire and White House chief of staff under George H. W. Bush, invoked a common racial stereotype in calling Obama “lazy.” Around the same time, Newt Gingrich, the former Republican Speaker of the House and 2012 presidential candidate took his racialized criticism a step further. He said, “You have to wonder what he’s doing. I’m assuming that there’s some rhythm to Barack Obama that the rest of us don’t understand. Whether he needs large amounts of rest, whether he needs to go play basketball for a while or watch ESPN, I mean, I don’t quite know what his rhythm is, but this is a guy that is a brilliant performer as an orator, who may very well get reelected at the present date, and who, frankly, he happens to be a partial, part-time president.” The racial stereotypes in remarks like these are not hard to identify.

After their defeat in 2012, Republicans began some serious soul searching. Much of it was directed toward attracting votes from a more diverse group of Americans. Doing so would almost certainly serve the best interests of the party. Although they may lose a few votes in the South and Great Plains, they can afford such losses if it helps them arrest their slide among young people and people of color. To do so, however, will require
grappling with established ways of doing things within the party. Convincing existing Republican leaders to change course will be made harder by the fact that 2012 was a close election. Parties find it hard to change without collapsing first.

Notes

1. As evidence, see www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/02/06/a_demographic_divide_could_evangelicals_block_romney_113031.html.
4. Ibid.
7. Ray Fair, Michael Lewis-Beck, Tom Rice, and Alan Abramowitz are all notable contributors to this genre.
9. The transcript is from MotherJones, the original source for the secret video, www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/full-transcript-mitt-romney-secret-video#47percent.
10. The summary here is from a legislative summary by the bill’s Senate sponsor, www.mikulski.senate.gov/_pdfs/Press/LedbetterSummary.pdf.
25. For this evidence and other observations about the gender gap, see Christina Wolbrecht, “Parties and the Gender Gap,” http://mischiefsoffaction.blogspot.com/2012/10/parties-and-gender-gap.html.