Iraqi Army soldiers rally in June 2014 as they prepare to fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which had captured major cities in the country’s northern region. Iraq’s military, however, virtually collapsed as ISIS broadened its reign of terror across the region. This conflict quickly became a major concern of U.S. foreign policy.
Not long ago, the United States stood tall as the predominant world power. Its victories in the world wars, and then in the Cold War, left the nation widely respected and secure. This status has changed, however, in the face of multiple upheavals that today threaten global stability. The decisions made by the architects of U.S. foreign policy will have long-lasting consequences for all states and societies. In the words of Chuck Hagel (quoted in Graham 2014), the U.S. secretary of defense between 2013 and 2014, “I think we are living through one of those historic, defining times. . . . We are seeing a new world order—post–World War II, post-Soviet implosion—being built.” Five factors drive these seismic shifts in the global security environment:

- **Escalating terrorism.** The number of reported attacks soared from 1,500 in 2004 to 13,500 in 2014 (Global Terrorism Database 2015). The majority of these terrorist attacks occurred in the Middle East, where the 2011 Arab Spring sparked civil wars and other forms of political violence. Most worrying, a new and powerful terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), laid claim to vast territories of Iraq and Syria in order to create a regional order based strictly on Islamic law. The group used public beheadings “to instill in us a state of terror” (Stern and Berger 2015, 3). Nigeria’s Boko Haram, using similar tactics, forbade all Muslims to engage either politically or socially with Western society (see Chothia 2015).

- **Revival of great-power competition.** The superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was a hallmark of the Cold War, which lasted from World War II until the Soviet collapse in 1991. In 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin revived these tensions by seizing the Crimean Peninsula in neighboring Ukraine. China’s government, meanwhile, made a similar power play when its leader, Xi Jinping, annexed off-shore islands in the East and South China Seas that were considered the sovereign territories of Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, and other coastal states. Rather than launching full-scale wars, both potential U.S. rivals engaged in “ambiguous warfare” based on coercion and intimidation (O’Rourke 2015).
• **Threats to American hegemony.** The United States is often known as a *hegemon*, or a nation-state that exerts a sphere of influence over other states and societies.¹ This stature, however, has succumbed to widespread perceptions of national decline. According to the U.S. Intelligence Council, China is likely to surpass the United States in key categories of national strength by 2040 (see Figure 1.1). Chinese officials have created an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank designed to rival the U.S.-based World Bank.² Other rising powers have taken advantage of massive U.S. foreign debts, political gridlock, and national war fatigue following its protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

• **Advances in military technology.** The growing density of Internet networks allowed hackers to penetrate private files, including U.S. government offices. According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2014), more than 60,000 cyberattacks took place in 2014.³ Of these attacks, which failed in most cases, more than 8,000 targeted the Defense, State, and Homeland Security departments. This new face of war was matched by Washington’s growing reliance on unmanned aerial drones. Originally used for surveillance, the drones became a primary instrument for bombardments of enemy bases and suspected hideouts. Several other governments, including China and Russia, moved quickly to develop their own drone arsenals.

• **Strains in the “global commons.”** Demographic and ecological trends pose long-term threats to global security. Total world population, which topped 7.3 billion in 2015, is projected to reach 11 billion by 2100 (Gao 2015). “Competition for

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1. Hegemony is different from colonization, which denies its subjects statehood. The sovereign governments of Latin America, for example, have been U.S. spheres of influence since the Monroe Doctrine pledged to defend the entire region against external threats early in the 1800s.

2. An informal alliance of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) took its own steps in marginalizing U.S. world power by creating a New Development Bank that would be funded primarily by China.

3. Aside from the cyberattacks on U.S. government sites, nearly 160,000 attacks targeted commercial enterprises and state, local, and tribal governments.
scarce resources, such as food, water, or energy, will likely increase tensions within and between states and could lead to more localized or regional conflicts” (U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2014, 5). Recent years have witnessed an unprecedented exodus of 60 million refugees who have been forced from their homes in the midst of civil unrest and political repression (Sengupta 2015). Growing dangers of global warming and climate change further threaten the global commons.

Washington’s struggles in the new millennium began on September 11, 2001, when al Qaeda terrorists attacked the United States in New York City and Washington, D.C. President George W. Bush responded forcefully by launching the war against Afghanistan, home base of the attackers. The U.S. overthrow of the Afghan government left the United States responsible for the nation. For American forces, this meant

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**Figure 1.1 The World in 2030: The Global Power Index Forecast**

![Graph showing the global power index forecast](chart.png)


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4. Al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial jets and flew three of them into highly visible, well-known symbols of American power—the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon near Washington, D.C. The fourth jet, apparently headed for the U.S. Capitol, crashed in rural Pennsylvania after several passengers struggled with the hijackers for control of the cockpit.
Part I: The Setting of U.S. Foreign Policy

a long-term effort to destroy terrorist cells and, even more difficult, to create a stable and democratic government in a remote and tribal nation that had never had such a political system. In 2003, Bush took his “war on terror” to Iraq, whose leader, Saddam Hussein, was suspected of harboring weapons of mass destruction and collaborating with al Qaeda. The president’s decision to strike first, a central element of what became known as the Bush Doctrine, lacked support from the UN Security Council and forced Washington to proceed with few allies. When both causes of the war proved unfounded, Bush changed the military mission to “nation building” along the lines of the Afghan effort. The combined costs of the two wars exceeded $1.6 trillion by 2014 (Belasco 2014).

Once President Barack Obama took office in January 2009, he devoted much of his energy to reviving the U.S. economy, which virtually collapsed the year before as the result of reckless lending practices by major banks and mortgage brokers. The most serious economic downfall since the Great Depression sent stock markets tumbling around the world. Both Bush and Obama responded by spending massively on bail-outs for paralyzed financial firms and on public projects to jump-start the economy. These actions, including the temporary government takeover of General Motors and Chrysler, prevented an even greater calamity but boosted U.S. budget deficits from $459 billion in fiscal year 2008 to more than $1.5 trillion in 2009. The national debt ballooned from $5.8 to $7.6 trillion in 2009 (Congressional Budget Office 2009a).

Well aware that U.S. citizens were exhausted with seemingly permanent war, Obama made good on his pledges to end the war in Iraq by 2011 and to withdraw most U.S. troops from Afghanistan by 2014. The president adopted a strategy of “rebalancing” U.S. foreign policy in several respects: diplomatic over military initiatives, a geographical “pivot” to East Asia, and domestic over global priorities. As Obama (2009a) told cadets at the West Point military academy, “the nation that I am most interested in building is our own.” His strategy amounted to an Obama Doctrine based on the selective use of America’s world power (Sanger 2012, xv): “In an age of reckonings, when so many bills have come due, Obama has made the case for an America that can no longer do it all. It must pick its fights.”

Americans today find themselves front and center on a volatile, rapidly changing world stage. The decisions made by their leaders, for better and for worse, have direct consequences for other countries and the world order. A clear grasp of U.S. foreign policy, therefore, is more vital than ever. This book seeks to strengthen our understanding by exploring the process by which U.S. leaders, faced with unending pressures at home and overseas, devise and implement foreign policies. As we will find, the United States maintains an unprecedented degree of world power while confronting many obstacles—many of which are “made in the USA”—that make the coherent use of this power exceedingly difficult. Coming to grips with this paradox of U.S. world power is the primary task of this book.
U.S. Decline vs. Continued Primacy

Recent developments have produced widespread perceptions that the United States is a declining world power. Such fears are not unique to the current period, according to analyst Josef Joffe. During the Cold War, Americans were alarmed by a “missile gap” between the United States and the Soviet Union. The 1980s featured numerous predictions of impending U.S. demise that soon proved unfounded when the Soviet Union, Washington’s rival in the Cold War, collapsed in 1991. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States raised new doubts about the government’s ability to protect its citizens.

To the current generation of declinists, President Obama’s reluctance to deploy U.S. armed forces in regional hot spots is often attributed to national decline. Popular analysts such as Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum believe the nation’s polarized politics have become so entrenched that solving domestic problems—and conducting foreign policy with a united front—have become impossible. Other declinists emphasize the sorry state of the U.S. government’s finances, which left the United States with a national debt of $13 trillion in 2015—almost three-quarters of the U.S. gross national product. Journalist James Risen believes that war profiteering in the “war on terror” has cost billions of wasted dollars. Elbridge Colby and Paul Lettow predicted that this mounting debt “will limit U.S. competitiveness and freedom of action with a severity not remotely appreciated in today’s foreign policy debates.”

In contrast, U.S. foreign policy optimists believe the United States will maintain its predominance for many more years. They believe that emerging powers will continue to bandwagon with Washington rather than form rival alliances. As for the widely feared rise of China, Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell argue that “the main tasks of Chinese foreign policy are defensive and have not changed much since the Cold War era.” To John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, U.S. officials have exaggerated terrorist threats since the 9/11 attacks on New York City and Washington. Finally, Joseph S. Nye Jr. presented evidence that the United States still leads the world in education, technological innovation, entrepreneurship, cultural influence, and other forms of “soft power.” In his view, “we are not entering a post-American world.”

SNAPSHOT: AMERICA’S WORLD POWER

We begin this inquiry by reviewing some basic indicators of world power. Taken together, these indicators reveal a unipolar balance of power in which one country—at present, the United States—maintains a predominant share of the world’s economic, military, and other resources that a country needs to project power beyond its borders. This power balance differs from that of the eighteenth century, when several European states created a multipolar world order, and from that during most of the Cold War, which featured a bipolar power balance dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Since the end of the Cold War, most foreign policy debates have accepted the reality of U.S. primacy as a starting point and focused instead on the extent, consequences, and likely future of the unipolar world power. The concentration of America’s world power detailed in this section is notable given that the United States is home to less than 5 percent of the world’s population. Much of the nation’s advantage derives from the scale of its economy, which produced $17.4 trillion worth of goods and services in 2014, or 22 percent of the world’s total output (see Figure 1.2). The value of America’s gross domestic product (GDP) was nearly twice that of China—a wide gap even after Beijing had averaged growth rates of 10 percent over the previous two decades. The GDP of the United States in 2014 roughly equaled that of the European Union, whose economy has been battered by budget deficits, external debts, and the growing pains accompanying the creation of its monetary union. Russia, not so long ago the primary U.S. rival in a bipolar balance of power, recorded about one-tenth the U.S. level of economic production.

The United States holds the additional distinction of being the world’s foremost trading state, exporting more than all other nations since World War II while displaying a voracious appetite for overseas goods and services. In 2014, American firms exported a record $2.35 trillion in merchandise and services (U.S. Department of Commerce 2015). The volume of U.S. imports was even larger ($2.85 trillion in 2014), leaving the U.S. economy a trade deficit of $505 billion. The nation’s imports were even larger in absolute terms (more than $2.9 trillion in 2014) and as a share of world imports. The United States has also served as the world’s leading source and destination of foreign direct investment in recent years. In 2014, U.S. firms spent $358 billion on foreign operations, more than one-quarter of the global total. Foreign firms, meanwhile, invested more in the United States ($64 billion) than in all other countries by mid-2014 (OECD 2014).

The degree of U.S. predominance is even greater in the military realm. The United States, the only country that has divided the world into regional military commands, also maintains “command of the commons—command of the sea, space, and air” (Posen 2003, 7). This is a major factor in an age when holding physical territory, while vital, no longer ensures national security. In 2014, the U.S. government spent about $610 billion on its military, or about one-third of the global total (see Figure 1.3).
If formal military allies of the United States are taken into account as elements of U.S. world power, the nation’s military potency is even greater. The United States also provides the largest volume of weaponry to other countries. In 2014, American arms merchants exported $10 billion in weaponry, or 34 percent of all weapons sales worldwide (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2015). At the same time, the United States provided more than 100 foreign governments with military training and education, further solidifying its projection of world power (U.S. Department of State 2015c). All of these military programs fortify U.S. strength.

American primacy also derives from its soft power, the expression of its political values and cultural dynamism in ways that other societies and governments may find appealing (see Nye 2004). As noted in Chapter 2, the United States is often regarded as an “idea” rather than an ordinary nation-state, traditionally defined by physical boundaries, common ethnic or religious identities, and material interests. The soft power of the United States enhances U.S. security by highlighting shared rather than

![Figure 1.2 World Economic Output, Seven Largest Producers by GDP, 2014](image)
A recent study found that eight of the world’s top ten universities—ideal centers for the sharing of ideas, knowledge, and culture—are located in the United States (see Table 1.1). American fashions, popular music, movies, and television programs are so pervasive overseas that they provoke charges of “cultural imperialism.” These charges aside, U.S. inventors are widely credited for bringing the world personal computers, the Internet, Facebook, instant messaging, and Twitter. Maintaining this “predominance of power” (Leffler 1992) has been a central goal of U.S. foreign policy since World War II (see Hook and Spanier 2016). The Cold War strategy of communist containment advanced this overriding goal of sustained primacy (see Chapter 2). The same motivations prompted U.S. leaders to ensure that newly created multilateral bodies—such as the United Nations (UN) and World Bank—consolidated U.S. advantages after World War II while providing tangible benefits for less powerful countries (Ikenberry 2001; Skidmore 2005).
Chapter 1: The United States in a Turbulent World

Following the Cold War, the George H. W. Bush administration devised a strategy to convince “potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role” (Tyler 1992). To Bill Clinton, who served as president from 1993 to 2001, the United States had to remain the “indispensable nation.” His successor, George W. Bush, vowed after the September 11 terrorist attacks that U.S. military forces “will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States” (White House 2002, 30). Most recently, while recognizing the domestic limitations of America’s world power, the Obama administration proclaimed that the nation “will continue to underwrite global security” (White House 2010, 1).

### CHALLENGES TO U.S. PRIMACY

Despite its strength, the United States confronts a variety of challenges to its global primacy. Its economic and military strength may be robust on an absolute level, but the nation’s power, relative to that of many other major powers, is eroding. As the National Intelligence Council (2012, x), an arm of the U.S. federal government, concluded,

> The U.S. most likely will remain “first among equals” among the other great powers in 2030 because of its preeminence across a range of power dimensions and legacies of its leadership role. More important than just its economic weight, the United States’ dominant role in international politics has derived from its

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Part I: The Setting of U.S. Foreign Policy

predominance across the board in both hard and soft power. Nevertheless, with the rapid rise of other countries, the ‘unipolar moment’ is over and Pax Americana—the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945—is fast winding down.

The challenges facing U.S. world power can be grouped into four categories. The first relates to the experience of past great powers and the difficulties they faced in preserving their advantages. The second group of challenges stems from the U.S. government’s own historical experience and past foreign policy actions, many of which violated its proclaimed moral principles and created widespread animosity toward Washington. The third set of challenges to U.S. primacy arises from the nation’s close association with economic globalization, which “aggravates anti-Americanism and appears to further isolate the United States in the world” (Kohut and Stokes 2006, 143). Finally, the United States faces unfamiliar challenges from international terrorism, a threat the United States largely avoided until September 11, 2001.

Cycles in the Balance of Power

Some political analysts see a U.S.-dominated world order as advantageous not only for the United States but also for the international system as a whole. A benign hegemon maintains stability in the international system, discouraging conflicts among regional powers and covering most of the costs of military security and global economic development. Under these circumstances, less powerful states have incentives to align with the dominant power rather than challenge it by forming rival blocs. This favorable view, however, is hardly universal. Others fear the concentration of power in one country and believe that “unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others” (Waltz 1997, 915). Historian Timothy Garton Ash (2002) found that “the problem with American power is not that it is American. The problem is simply the power. It would be dangerous even for an archangel to wield so much power.”

A related argument identifies historical cycles in the global balance of power. Historian Paul Kennedy traced The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987) to a pattern of imperial overstretch by which the Roman, Dutch, Ottoman, Spanish, British, and Russian empires bit off more than they could chew and then succumbed to uprisings in their far-flung provinces and to political infighting at home. World history has revealed the “increasing costs of dominance” that accompany global primacy (Gilpin 1981). According to long cycle theory (Modelski 1987), the dominant power’s strength in relation to others inevitably peaks and then erodes as smaller powers benefit from the leader’s technological advances, economic aid, and military protection. This cycle of hegemonic boom and bust prompts major wars and restructurings of the global power balance.

Equally ominous lessons can be drawn from the tendency of major powers to develop inflated perceptions of their capabilities and minimize the costs and risks of
militarism. “Napoleon and Hitler marched to Moscow, only to be engulfed in the Russian winter,” Jack Snyder (2003, 30) recalled. “Imperial Japan, facing a quagmire in China and a U.S. oil embargo, tried to break what it saw as impending encirclement by seizing the Indonesian oil fields and preemptively attacking Pearl Harbor. All sought security through expansion, and all ended in imperial collapse.” Sustained American primacy, in this view, is likely to give way to a new balance of world power (Walton 2007). To journalist Fareed Zakaria (2008), this marks the third fundamental shift in world power in five centuries. The first, around 1500, featured the rise of Europe. The second shift, in the early 1900s, produced the era of U.S. primacy. Today’s power shift, he concluded, could be labeled “the rise of the rest.”

The Shadow of the Past

The foreign policy record of the United States is known intimately to foreign governments, many of which have been engaged, as either allies or adversaries, in the expansion of U.S. power (see Chapter 2). This record, which features burgeoning territorial growth and trade alongside the extension of domestic political rights and a vibrant, multinational civil society, is admired widely overseas. At the same time, many past actions of U.S. foreign policy makers provoked anger and resentment that linger today and inspire anti-American social movements, hostile regimes, and potential threats to the nation’s citizens or government (Sweig 2006).

Three episodes in early U.S. foreign policy—the importation of slaves before the Civil War, the wars against Native American tribes during the period of westward expansion, and frequent interventions in Latin America—revealed that for all its rhetoric about freedom and justice, the U.S. government often observed a Darwinian logic favoring survival of the fittest. Slavery has long been condemned as an ultimate denial of human rights, and the U.S. treatment of Native Americans fits the commonly
accepted definition of genocide.\(^5\) As for Latin America, U.S. forces seized northern Mexico in the late 1840s and then intervened more than sixty times in the Latin America–Caribbean region prior to World War II (Grimmett 2004).\(^6\) This pattern continued during the Cold War, when U.S. leaders turned to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow elected regimes in Guatemala (1954) and Chile (1973). Elsewhere, the United States supported dictators such as Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. American leaders aligned with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during its war against Iran in the 1980s even after Saddam used chemical weapons to massacre Iranian forces and ethnic minorities in his own country. These actions, including the catastrophic Vietnam War that spanned more than a decade, cast doubts on the virtues of U.S. foreign policy even as the nation fought successfully against fascism and communism in the twentieth century. During George W. Bush’s war on terror, the morality gap appeared in the prisoner abuses by U.S. guards at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison and in the February 2012 burning of Korans, the religious text of Islam, at an Afghan detention facility. Claims of U.S. double standards also extended to other areas, as critics questioned how the world’s foremost nuclear power could demand nonproliferation elsewhere and how a primary source of greenhouse gases could call for “sustainable development” in the world’s poorest regions.

The shadow of past actions not only damages U.S. credibility abroad but also has provoked direct challenges to its world power. Iran’s 1979 revolution, for example, was fueled by popular antagonism toward the United States, which had propped up its despotic shah for more than twenty-five years. In this context, the theocratic regime that still rules Iran can be seen as an antagonistic response to U.S. policies, or blowback (C. Johnson 2000). The same can be said for Nicaragua’s revolution in the same year, which toppled a former military general, Anastasio Somoza, who maintained his rule largely on the basis of his close ties to Washington. The terrorists who struck the United States in September 2001 explicitly cited U.S. support for the repressive monarchy in Saudi Arabia as a justification for their attacks. While such a rationale is hardly a defense for committing mass killings, one cannot deny that U.S. actions that violate a foreign country’s proclaimed moral and ethical principles commonly spark anti-American movements and acts of vengeance.

**Resistance to Globalization**

Yet another challenge to the United States stems from the process of globalization, or the linking of national and regional markets into a single world economy (see Stiglitz 2002).

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\(^5\) Genocide constitutes acts that are “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group,” according to Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, to which the United States is a signatory.

\(^6\) These military interventions, which protected U.S. economic interests in Central America and the Caribbean, led to long-term occupations in Panama (1903–1914), Nicaragua (1912–1933), Haiti (1915–1934), the Dominican Republic (1916–1924), and Cuba (1917–1922).
Advances in transportation and communications technology, intellectual developments, and public policy shifts in the eighteenth century first spurred this historic trend. The Internet revolution late in the twentieth century accelerated the pace of globalization. In today’s world economy, goods, services, and financial investments cross national borders at a record pace. This commerce is increasingly conducted by multinational corporations (MNCs) with headquarters, research centers, production facilities, stockholders, and customers in many countries.

Although Great Britain was at the forefront of the economic globalization through the nineteenth century, the primary catalyst since then has been the United States. Globalization conforms to a national consensus that private enterprise, unfettered by government interference, provides the surest path to prosperity as well as to individual liberty. According to this consensus, a prosperous world economy resembles that of the United States, with few internal barriers to the movement of goods, services, labor, and capital. Trade, not political or military competition, is the primary arena of foreign policy. Furthermore, “trading states” have strong interests in a stable international system and are reluctant to wage wars against each other. Globalization, according to this view, is a harbinger of world peace.

The quickening pace of economic globalization brought improved living standards to many nations, but others fell behind, unable to attract foreign investment or find new markets for their goods. The growing gap between the world’s rich and poor placed new strains on the international system. Critics believed that globalization produced a variety of other problems as well: the triumph of consumerism over cultural diversity, heightened pollution and deforestation, and the exploitation of sweatshop laborers by MNCs. Because many MNCs were based in the United States and its government had played such a vital role in the globalization boom, the United States bore the brunt of antiglobalization protests. The most dramatic example of this backlash occurred at the 1999 annual meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, Washington, when protesters blocked streets, smashed storefronts, and distracted the delegates from their focus of expanding free trade. Further complicating matters, the U.S. model of political economy has come under greater scrutiny as China and other rising powers have boosted economic growth while suppressing the political rights of their citizens. “In the final analysis the global population does not see itself as having benefited meaningfully from an era of American-led globalization,” Steven Weber and Bruce Jentleson (2010, 178) observed. “Those winners outside the West who have in some degree benefited largely attribute their good fortune not to liberal internationalism or American ideals, but rather to state-directed capitalism run by illiberal governments.”

**Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare**

The fourth challenge facing the United States comes from the ongoing threat of terrorism, a tactic of unconventional warfare that uses threats and acts of violence to
raise mass fear as a means of achieving political objectives. Among other motives for the September 11 attacks, the pervasive influence of the United States in the Middle East served as a primary grievance of al Qaeda. The region and its vast oil fields have long been considered a vital interest of the U.S. government, which has used whatever means necessary to gain and retain access to them. Because the Middle East lies in the heart of Islam, many Muslims view encroachments by the United States and its Western allies as desecrations of holy lands. These dissidents, who also dislike Western cultural norms and condemn U.S. interference in their internal affairs and support for Israel, generally lack political power or substantial economic resources. As a result, they frequently turn to terrorism to force political change.

Terrorism has a long history that precedes the rise of militant Islam (see Laqueur 1977, ch. 1). Terrorists do not seek to overpower the enemy in one swift blow—an approach that is not feasible because of their small numbers and lack of resources—but to gain attention and political concessions by instilling mass fear in their enemy. In this regard, terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare that “exploits vulnerabilities . . . by using weapons and tactics that are unplanned or unexpected” (de Wijk 2002, 79). Terrorists choose the time and place of their attacks, leaving an adversary perpetually on the defensive. They operate in secret, often beyond the reach of government forces or surveillance, and meld into civilian communities from which they may receive moral and material support. Terrorists’ use of unconventional tactics (for example, car bombings, kidnappings, and airplane hijackings) further confounds their enemies.7

The United States faces four problems in confronting terrorism, which was deemed the primary threat to its national security after the September 11 attacks. First, the United States is seen widely as the primary target of global terrorist groups.

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7 Problems involving asymmetric warfare are not limited to fighting terrorism. The United States confronted the same tactics in the Vietnamese “guerrilla war” of the 1960s and 1970s. American leaders face similar challenges today in trying to ease civil and regional conflicts whose antagonists comprise ethnic or political groups rather than sovereign nation-states (see R. Smith 2005).
because of its visible role in the Middle East and its more general association with economic globalization. Second, U.S. military strategy has historically been based on fighting conventional wars, defeating foreign enemies on the battlefield through the use of overwhelming force, rather than confronting small groups of enemies who operate in secrecy. Third, the United States has traditionally viewed warfare as an exception to the general rule of peaceful coexistence among countries. Finally, the enemy is not typically a nation-state, such as Nazi Germany or even Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, but an invisible foe often impossible to engage through diplomacy.

THE PARADOX OF AMERICA’S WORLD POWER

These challenges to the United States raise profound questions about the nation’s capacity to sustain its dominant position in a unipolar world. As noted earlier, this objective has long been pursued by American leaders. Maintaining this unique position, however, will not be easy given many aspects of the U.S. foreign policy process. A central paradox of America’s world power is that, in seeking to sustain its global primacy, the United States is increasingly constrained by the very forces that propelled its rise to global predominance. These strengths—a culturally embedded sense of national exceptionalism, the diffusion of domestic foreign policy powers, an abiding faith in open markets, and the free rein granted to civil society in the policy process—also create vulnerabilities. Derived from an eighteenth-century model, the nation’s governing structures remain remarkably unchanged in the twenty-first century. Yet the world order that the United States played a lead role in creating has changed in profound ways, along with the country’s role in that order.

This book explores this paradox by examining its presence in the process of making U.S. foreign policy. Of particular interest are the institutions of power inside and outside the U.S. government that define the roles of public and private actors; create and reinforce common values; norms, and codes of conduct; and define what is possible among contending foreign policy choices. These institutions of power have become more complex as the scope of U.S. foreign policy broadens, as the lines between domestic and foreign policy concerns are increasingly blurred, as the number and magnitude of problems crossing national borders increase, and as more individuals and groups become stakeholders and participants in the foreign policy process. This paradox is visible in several recent examples:

- Domestic divisions over grand foreign policy strategy early in the 1990s prevented the United States from adopting a coherent world role, despite its resounding victory in the Cold War and unprecedented global power. Instead, the Clinton administration pursued four contradictory strategies, often all at once: retrenchment, primacy, liberal internationalism, and selective engagement (Posen and Ross 1996/1997). This ambivalence was shared by the general public.
When participants in a national survey were asked in 1999 to identify the biggest foreign policy problem facing the United States, they most often replied, “Don’t know” (Rielly 1999, 98).

- Several members of Congress sued President Bill Clinton in 1999, without success, to force a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Kosovo, then part of Yugoslavia. Legislators later charged that Clinton intervened in the renegade Yugoslav province to divert the public's attention from his impeachment by the House of Representatives for lying about an affair with a White House intern. Well aware of domestic opposition to the Kosovo intervention, Clinton limited U.S. military action to high-altitude bombing raids, many of which missed their targets and produced large-scale civilian casualties.

- President George W. Bush’s intelligence brief on August 6, 2001, featured the headline “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” and warned the White House of “suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” No one acted on the warning, however, because of the many conflicting reports by the more than a dozen U.S. intelligence agencies that “lacked the incentives to cooperate, collaborate, and share information” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, 12).

- The U.S. government, historically a champion for press freedoms, found itself powerless in November 2010 when the New York Times, and five foreign newspapers, began publishing the first of more than 250,000 secret U.S. diplomatic cables and military documents gathered by WikiLeaks, an online advocacy group committed to open government (see Chapter 8). Four years later, the Washington Post and two other papers published classified information regarding the National Security Agency’s “sweeps” of Americans’ private information, including their telephone calls, e-mails, bank records, and posts on Facebook. The Obama administration begged the papers not to reveal the program, to no avail.

- Entrepreneurs in the United States have led the way in the development of social media, Internet-based telecommunications that allow for instantaneous messaging around the world. This technology, however, has enabled adversaries of the United States to advance their political and military agendas. Actions by U.S. government officials as well as members of civil society have drawn the wrath of anti-American groups. In September 2012, for example, a low-budget U.S. film that ridiculed the Prophet Muhammad was circulated on YouTube—another American invention—sparking anti-American protests in many Islamic nations.

The costs of this paradox—in the loss of America’s world power and prestige—can be enormous. They are amplified by the openness, or transparency, of the U.S. political system and civil society, both of which are closely watched by friends and foes alike. In these and countless other cases, internal dynamics within the U.S. government and society have produced negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy. The failure of
the United States to steer a coherent course as the world’s preeminent nation-state, a failure that flows from the virtues as well as shortcomings of the American political system, reinforces the nation’s image as a potent but dysfunctional superpower.

**Cultural Roots of the Paradox**

The roots of this paradox can be found in the U.S. national style—that is, the cultural influences that historically have shaped the country’s approach to international relations (Dallek 1989). Although national style is an ambiguous concept and cultural influences are difficult to identify with precision, the conduct of every country’s foreign policy reflects its distinctive sense of place within the international system. This sense of place, in turn, is shaped by tangible factors such as geographic location, the availability of natural resources, and the size and characteristics of the population. Other factors, such as a country’s historical experience, also influence its national style.

When it became the first independent country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States was geographically far removed from the great powers of the time. This distance, combined with the ample territory and natural resources available within the thirteen original colonies, enabled the new nation to develop its political and economic systems with little outside assistance. The United States was distinctive in that its civil society, compared with those of most other countries, did not feature sharp divisions between a small but powerful aristocracy and a large but powerless feudal peasantry. As the French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville ([1835] 1988, 56) observed after his tour of the young United States, “One finds a vast multitude of people with roughly the same ideas about religion, history, science, political economy, legislation, and government.”

This consensus encouraged a sense of national exceptionalism, by which citizens felt the United States was destined not simply to survive as a nation-state but also to achieve the status of a superior world power. Long before the nation’s independence, the first European settlers to North America proclaimed the founding of a “city upon a hill” that would inspire societies far from its shores. Colonial leaders later believed that independence from Great Britain would create “a more perfect union” based on limited, representative government.

Americans’ sense of moral righteousness, reducing world politics to a contest between good and evil, has persisted as a defining trait of U.S. foreign policy. In the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan condemned the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” Bill Clinton adapted this view to the post–Cold War world by identifying “rogue states” as the principal threat to the United States. After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, George W. Bush described the struggle in starkly biblical terms: “Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.” A few months later, Bush declared
the nation’s enemies to be part of an “axis of evil” that must be destroyed for the United States to be truly secure (see Phillips 2006).

Such views have profound, but contradictory, implications for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy (see H. W. Brands 1998; Monten 2005). One school of thought, fearing that an activist foreign policy would only dirty the hands of U.S. leaders in “power politics,” believes the United States should lead primarily by example. A second school of thought contends that U.S. leaders should engage in a global crusade against injustice, aggression, and war itself. Lacking consensus between “exemplarists” and “vindicators” in times of peace, the United States has pursued both strategies, detaching itself from the outside world during certain periods and immersing itself in foreign affairs during others. Most often, U.S. foreign policy exhibits the two tendencies at once, confounding observers at home and abroad (see Hook and Spanier 2016).

The public’s ambivalent approach toward foreign affairs is most acute when the United States is at peace. Americans tend to focus on more immediate domestic concerns during these times, and elected officials respond in kind. Only when foreign problems reach crisis proportions do they spark the public’s interest. As a result, the public hastily demands action by the government, which responds impulsively, with little deep background or understanding of the underlying problems that provoked the crisis. George Kennan (1951, 59), the architect of U.S. Cold War strategy, found this aspect of democratic foreign policy making particularly troublesome:

I sometimes wonder whether in this respect a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin. He lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath—in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed. But, once he grasps this, he lays about with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.

**Institutional Branches**

Every nation’s political culture has a direct impact on the structures of governance that regulate public affairs, define the relationships between the rulers and the ruled, and carry out public policies. The prevalent ideas about the proper role of the government at home and abroad express themselves in the creation of legislatures, courts, and government agencies. These institutional branches of a nation’s political culture determine what is possible in the policy-making process, constraining the options of policy makers. In addition, political institutions commonly multiply and produce new agencies and governing structures that further shape the policy process.

The links among prevalent cultural norms, political institutions, and government behavior can be clearly seen in the United States, which was born during the
Enlightenment era. Under the prevailing theory of that time, governments often do not simply regulate society but also deny or suppress basic freedoms and, in the economic sphere, threaten private property and the profitability of firms through excessive taxes and regulations. Thus, governments must be actively restrained to protect individual liberties.

The architects of the U.S. government restrained its power in several ways. First, they established political liberties in the Bill of Rights that limited the sphere of governmental authority. Second, they dispersed power among the federal, state, and local governments. Finally, they provided for the sharing of federal powers among Congress, the president, and the judiciary. This institutional blueprint, devised more than two centuries ago, endures today. “The central feature of American politics is the fragmentation and dispersion of power and authority,” Stephen Krasner (1978, 61–62) observed. “It is not clear in the United States where sovereignty rests, if indeed it rests anywhere at all.”

Yet for all its virtues in restraining centralized power, this fragmentation creates problems in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, which requires a unified statement of national purpose, clear chains of command, consistency, and timely presidential action. Democratic norms “undermine and weaken the power and authority of government and detract, at times seriously, from its ability to compete internationally” (Huntington 1982, 18). This problem was illustrated during Obama’s presidency, as he could not overcome bitter conflicts between the two political parties. Foreign powers can exploit such internal divisions and try to divide and conquer their more fragmented rivals. At home, a weak state is likely to be “captured” by interest groups that cater to their own needs rather than national interests. In this respect, de Tocqueville considered democracies “decidedly inferior” to other governments (see In Their Own Words box).

In dispersing foreign policy powers across the legislative and executive branches, the architects of the U.S. government extended an “invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy” (Corwin 1957, 171). The institutional reality of divided powers leads to chronic friction between Congress and the White House over the ends and means of foreign policy. Unless the nation faces an unambiguous foreign challenge, the federal government rarely speaks with one voice. As a result, much of U.S. foreign policy is made, in the words of Supreme Court justice Robert Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in a “zone of twilight in which [the president] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”

In wartime, however, presidents are generally granted far more power and freedom of action. As commander in chief, President George W. Bush seized on this heightened authority after the September 2001 terrorist attacks. His decision to declare an open-ended war on terror and to redefine the laws of war in this conflict stemmed directly from this constitutional power. The terrorist attacks in September silenced any differences between the White House and Congress, which gave Bush
full discretion in pursuing and punishing the attackers (see Margulies 2006 and J. Mayer 2008). Thus, the pendulum swung radically in the U.S. political system from legislative-executive gridlock to a virtual blank check for the president to prosecute the war on terror.

Still, Bush’s efforts raised concerns heard earlier during the Vietnam War, when historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1973) argued that an imperial presidency had taken hold in the United States (see Rudalevige 2005). John Yoo, a legal adviser to the president, instructed Bush that Congress cannot “place any limits on the president’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response” (quoted in Shane 2005). This view was rejected strongly by constitutional scholar Louis Fisher (2007, 59), who observed that “the rule of law, the Constitution, and the ‘sharing of power’ cannot coexist with one-branch government.”

An imperial presidency in the United States is of particular concern because of the lack of foreign policy experience most recent presidents have brought to the White House. Only three presidents since World War II—Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and George H.W. Bush—had substantial backgrounds in foreign policy. Post–Cold War presidents Clinton and George W. Bush had served only as governors, and Obama’s previous experience in national politics was limited to an unfinished term in the U.S. Senate. Also revealing was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s lack of formal experience in foreign policy. Such a lack of on-the-job training may seem paradoxical in view of the White House’s immense world power. Yet it is entirely consistent with the nation’s ambivalent view of the “outside world”—a cultural perspective that looks at foreign peoples, places, and events with a mixture of intrigue and indifference, fascination and suspicion.

Institutional struggles within the U.S. government are not limited to legislative-executive relations. The executive branch itself is highly fragmented and prone to fierce internal competition over foreign policy. Officials in the Defense and State Departments routinely disagree over policy issues and compete for White House attention, budgetary resources, and authority. These officials must also share power with their counterparts on the National Security Council (NSC), the intelligence community, and other government agencies. Understandably, presidents often become frustrated by their inability to rein in the bureaucratic actors presumably under their control. President Harry Truman famously expressed this feeling in 1952 when he warned his successor, Dwight Eisenhower, not to expect the kind of discipline he enjoyed as commander of U.S. armed forces during World War II. “He’ll sit here and he’ll say ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating” (quoted in Neustadt 1960, 9).

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8 The NSC had such control over the White House’s decision to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba that top State Department officials “found out only as (the NSC) neared completion” (DeYoung 2015).
IN THEIR OWN WORDS

Alexis de Tocqueville

Alexis de Tocqueville, an aristocratic Frenchman, traveled through the United States in 1831–1832 to chronicle the social, political, public, religious, and intellectual life of the emerging democratic nation. His account of these travels, Democracy in America, long considered one of the most astute observations of American life ever written, is still widely read and studied by historians and political scientists alike.

I have no hesitation in saying that in the control of society’s foreign affairs democratic governments do appear decidedly inferior to others. . . . Foreign policy does not require the use of any of the good qualities peculiar to democracy but does demand the cultivation of almost all those which it lacks. . . .

Democracy favors the growth of the state’s internal resources; it extends comfort and develops public spirit, strengthens respect for law in the various classes of society, all of which things have no more than an indirect influence on the standing of one nation in respect to another. But a democracy finds it difficult to coordinate the details of a great undertaking and to fix on some plan and carry it through with determination in spite of obstacles. It has little capacity for combining measures in secret and waiting patiently for the result.


Pervasive Civil Society

In addition to these domestic political institutions, forces outside the government and, increasingly, beyond the United States altogether further complicate the American foreign policy process. These external forces, which include public opinion, the news media, interest groups, and intergovernmental organizations, collectively form a transnational civil society. Private groups, including business interests, religious institutions, and think tanks, exert pressure continually on the United States to accommodate their policy preferences. Because U.S. elected officials must also heed domestic public opinion for electoral reasons, they must be sensitive to public opinion overseas, particularly in democratic countries whose support for American foreign policy is needed. In addition, the financial ownership of major news outlets has become increasingly transnational, and the impact of their news coverage is felt immediately in the White House.

Presidents choose which private groups, as well as government agencies, they will invite into the foreign policy process. A primary source of input for all recent administrations has been the multinational corporations that share close connections with many top foreign policy officials. These firms actively seek benefits from the U.S.
government in the form of contracts, tax breaks, favorable regulations, and access to foreign markets. The greater influence wielded by multinational corporations than by nonprofit groups such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace demonstrates clearly that not all interest groups are created equal. “If there is government intervention in the corporate economy, so there is corporate intervention in the governmental process,” sociologist C. Wright Mills (1956, 8) observed. This pattern, to be expected in any society that emphasizes market-driven economic growth, raises questions about the “democratic” conduct of foreign policy.

Public opinion plays an important role in the policy process of any democratic nation. The first scientific polling, conducted shortly after World War II, found Americans to be largely ignorant of events taking place overseas (Bailey 1948; Almond 1950). Although more recent surveys suggest greater coherence in public preferences (see Jentleson 1992), surveys and nationwide tests of U.S. students reveal a lack of in-depth knowledge of world history, geography, and international problems. Several examples demonstrate this “knowledge gap”:

- In 2009, high school sophomores in the United States ranked below the average among 34 member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in a cross-national test of reading, mathematics, and science skills (OECD 2010, 8).
- In a 2011 survey of 1,000 U.S. adults, 73 percent could not state the reason that the United States fought the Cold War (Romano 2011).
- Nearly two-thirds of U.S. adults in 2014 were unable to identify the three branches of U.S. government. In the same survey, only 38 percent of respondents knew which political party had a majority in the U.S. Senate (Annenberg Public Policy Center 2014).
- Results of the 2014 “Nation’s Report Card” revealed that about one-quarter of eighth graders were either proficient or advanced in U.S. history, geography, and civics, all of which are vital to future understanding of domestic and world politics (see Table 1.2).

Trends in public knowledge and public opinion are closely related to coverage of international affairs by the news media. Such coverage decreased dramatically after the Cold War as news organizations closed overseas bureaus and reduced the proportion of international news to about 10 percent of total news coverage in the print and broadcast media (Graber and Dunaway 2015). National surveys consistently reveal that U.S. newspaper readers find foreign news of the least interest (see, for example, Rielly 2003). But this indifference changes when the United States
faces an international crisis. At that point, media outlets shift to saturation coverage, “parachuting” into war zones correspondents who have little knowledge of the regions or conflicts they will be covering (see M. A. Baum 2002; A. S. Jones 2009). In keeping with this pattern, extensive coverage of the 2011 U.S. military intervention in Libya, which led to the overthrow of its repressive leader, Muammar Qaddafi, was followed by virtually no attention being paid to Libya’s descent into civil war.

CONCLUSION

A central question examined in this book is how well the United States can provide the international leadership it espouses in the face of the domestic and global constraints that are essential features of its political and social system. Of particular concern is whether a political culture that is largely indifferent to foreign affairs is compatible with a dominant world role. The institutions of power raise further concerns about the U.S. government’s ability to overcome domestic divisions as well as pressures from transnational civil society, particularly economic pressures. How the government manages the paradox of its world power will determine how long U.S. primacy endures in the turbulent new millennium.

This paradox, which can be seen throughout the nation’s history, has direct consequences for the course of U.S. foreign policy, which has vacillated for more than two centuries between policies of engagement with and detachment from the “outside world.” Most recently, this pendulum has swung from the administration of Bill Clinton (engagement) to that of George W. Bush (detachment from global governance) and then back to Obama’s venture in global engagement. These divergent courses, reflecting an endemic ambivalence in America’s political culture, make the United States a curious and unpredictable world power (Hook and Spanier 2016).
While this may be frustrating for leaders overseas, they have little choice but to manage the ongoing identity crisis in U.S. foreign policy.

The mutual love-hate relationship between the United States and the world beyond its borders may be inevitable given the nation’s unprecedented primacy. There is little doubt, however, that the country’s successes and failures also stem from the peculiarities of U.S. government and social structures and the growing pressures imposed by transnational civil society. Historical patterns suggest that the U.S. political system is self-correcting. Previous bursts of “creedal passion” have been followed by restraint and moderation (Huntington 1981). In this context, it remains to be seen how effectively the U.S. government will adapt to vital changes in the strategic environment and global balance of power. That said, many respected observers still make the case for continued U.S. primacy. “The United States’ globe-girdling grand strategy is the devil we know,” wrote Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth (2012/2013, 10). “A world with a disengaged United States is the devil we don’t know. . . . Retrenchment would in essence entail a massive experiment: How would the world work without an engaged liberal leading power?”

These enduring questions and debates make the study of U.S. foreign policy a challenging yet rewarding enterprise at this critical period in the history of the nation and the world. The chapters ahead examine more closely the impact of domestic and transnational forces on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. The book’s second and third sections analyze these state and non-state actors, respectively, and the final section illustrates their role in the primary domains of foreign policy: security and defense; economic affairs; and global problems such as population growth, climate change, and weapons proliferation. First, however, Chapter 2 reviews the origins and evolution of U.S. foreign policy, and Chapter 3 introduces the contending theories and concepts of foreign policy decision making.
KEY TERMS

asymmetric warfare, p. 16
bandwagon, p. 7
bipolar, p. 8
blowback, p. 14
Bush Doctrine, p. 6
globalization, p. 14
hegemon, p. 4
imperial overstretch, p. 12
imperial presidency, p. 22

long cycle theory, p. 12
multipolar, p. 8
national style, p. 19
Obama Doctrine, p. 6
primacy, p. 8
soft power, p. 9
terrorism, p. 15
unipolar, p. 8
war on terror, p. 14

INTERNET REFERENCES

The American Foreign Policy Council (http://www.afpcc.org) is a nonprofit organization whose research is devoted to democratization and bilateral and regional relationships between the United States and other countries. The organization’s programs in Russia, China, and Asia address trade, defense, and other policy issues.

The Brookings Institution (http://www.brookings.edu) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank in Washington, D.C. Its scholars, fellows, and academics produce policy reports, briefs, and books related to U.S. foreign policy. Areas of interest are trade, defense, diplomacy, international institutions, and bilateral relations with foreign countries.

The Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs (http://www.cceia.org) focuses on human rights, conflict, environmental issues, economic disparities, and political reconciliation around the world. Scholars produce research briefs and books on current topics that analyze the ethics of international relations with a specific focus on the U.S. role in these policy issues. Carnegie Council publications include the journal Ethics and International Affairs, much of which is available online via the “publications” link on the council’s home page.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (http://www.carnegieendowment.org) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that concentrates on global change by examining international organizations, bilateral relations, and political-economic forces in the world. Special attention is devoted to the U.S.-Russia relationship as well as geopolitics involving the United States and other countries. The organization publishes Foreign Policy, one of the leading magazines on world politics and foreign policy with an emphasis on the United States (www.foreignpolicy.com).

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (http://www.csis.org) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that addresses international defense and security issues with an emphasis on policy analysis, policy recommendations, and geographic analysis. The center publishes the Washington Quarterly, which analyzes global changes and foreign policies, looking especially at
the U.S. role in the world, defense procurement, terrorism and counterterrorism, and regional issues (www.twq.com).

The Council on Foreign Relations (www.cfr.org) studies international affairs, foreign policy, and the role of the United States in the world. The council examines an array of issues as they pertain to the United States, such as trade, defense, security, globalization, terrorism, specific regions, energy resources and the environment, and political systems. The council also publishes Foreign Affairs, a leading journal that features scholarly analysis of these issues (www.foreignaffairs.org).

The Foreign Policy Association (www.fpa.org) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating legislators and the American public on U.S. foreign policy issues. Its mission includes all aspects of U.S. foreign policy, especially current events and global issues. The association produces reports, videos, and books on regional and specific policy issues.

Foreign Policy in Focus (www.fpif.org) is a think tank that produces policy reports on the United States and its role in the world. Specific policy briefs and reports include, but are not limited to, the topics of human rights, regional relationships, bilateral relationships, defense funding and procurement, terrorism, trade, energy, and environmental issues.

Part of Johns Hopkins University, the Foreign Policy Institute (http://www.fpi.sais-jhu.edu) provides training and research on the global role of the United States. The institute brings together all disciplines interested in U.S. foreign policy. It also publishes The SAIS Review of International Affairs, which analyzes current international policies (www.saisreview.org).

The Foreign Policy Research Institute (www.fpri.org) studies U.S. national interests, the war on terror, security relationships, and long-term policy planning. Its research is based on a multidisciplinary approach that includes scholars and advisers from economics, politics, law, the media, and history. Orbis, a quarterly journal published by the institute, consists of reports from conferences and scholars on U.S. and world national interests (www.fpri.org/orbis/).

The Hoover Institution (www.hoover.org) is devoted to policy analysis and both domestic and international affairs research within the ideological framework of an emphasis on a free society. The Hoover Institution researches trade, markets, postcommunist transition, international law, and democratic growth. Fellows at the Hoover Institution produce policy briefs, the Hoover Digest (www.hoover.org/publications/digest/), and books through the Hoover Press.

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (www.ifpa.org) provides briefings for foreign policy students who are interested in the costs, benefits, and planning of U.S. foreign policy. The institute covers a variety of issues but focuses on globalization, missile defense, international institutions, and grand strategies.

The RAND Corporation (www.rand.org) is a private research group that concentrates on international affairs, homeland security, terrorism, and U.S. national security issues. It also produces reports on individual countries that have close ties to the United States and the RAND Review, a magazine about current security and defense issues (www.rand.org/publications/randreview.html).

The U.S. Department of State (www.state.gov) manages many aspects of U.S. diplomacy and the U.S. foreign policy process, including foreign aid, peace building, democratization, and disease and poverty prevention. The website provides speeches, policy descriptions, and issue explanations for those studying American foreign policy.