Models of Democracy

As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent there is a difference, is no democracy.

—Abraham Lincoln

Democracy is a complicated concept. The dictionary definition—“government (or rule) by the people”—seems simple, but once we begin to think about the components of the definition, complexities arise. What does government or rule mean? Does government by the people mean that all the people are directly responsible for the day-to-day operation of government? Or is a scheme of representation acceptable? If so, what sort of scheme? How should it be organized? Elections? How often and for which offices? Does “government” have special meaning in a democracy? What is its proper scope? Who decides what is proper? The people, again? How is this decision made and expressed? And who are “the people,” anyway? Everyone who lives in the governed territory, or citizens only? What is a “citizen”? Can newly arriving people (immigrants) become citizens? Under what rules? Should “the people” include everyone or just those with a stake in the community—say, property holders? Should certain groups of people, such as criminals and traitors, be excluded from citizenship?

This is just the beginning of a list of questions we could make about the meaning of government by the people. Notice that in this short list of questions, such additional complex concepts as representation, citizenship, and elections are mentioned and suggest additional questions. The search for answers to all these questions is the concern of democratic theory, the branch of scholarship that specializes in elucidating, developing, and defining the meaning of democracy.
If we move beyond dictionary definitions and ask Americans what they think about democracy, we find additional layers of complexity. Americans associate diverse and often contradictory characteristics of their political system with democracy. Most Americans believe that democracy requires majority rule, but at the same time, they consider the protection of minority rights from the will of the majority to be a key component of democracy. In fact, most Americans place considerable emphasis on the importance of freedom from governmental interference in their lives as the crucial ingredient of democracy. The individualistic American values democracy because it helps her or him to lead a personal life freely, without government getting in the way. At the same time, patriotic Americans believe that democracy imposes obligations—the duty to vote, for example, or to support the government in times of crisis such as war. Many Americans associate democracy with particular constitutional features, such as the separation of powers and the Bill of Rights. These same Americans would be surprised to see democracy performing quite well in political systems possessing neither of those features; Great Britain is one example. For some, American economic arrangements, usually described as the free enterprise system (capitalism), are a part of democracy. Others, as we later see, believe that capitalism is a threat to political equality and, hence, to democracy. Given these differing views, one can understand why the essay contest on the topic “What Democracy Means to Me” remains a continuing tradition in American schools.

If we are to analyze various challenges to democracy intelligently, we need to clarify some of this confusion about what democracy means. We need some sophisticated standards to use in evaluating the degree and kind of threat each of the challenges we examine poses for democratic politics. For example, what democratic characteristics and values does increasing economic inequality or a growing military–industrial complex threaten?

This introduction presents an overview of some of the basic concepts of democracy as found in democratic theory. It offers a base to be used in evaluating the challenges to contemporary democracy. Democratic theory is presented here in terms of four distinct “models” of democracy. Each model provides a different understanding of democracy as it has been interpreted by different groups of political theorists. Four different models are needed because democratic theorists have not agreed on what procedures, practices, and values must be emphasized for “government by the people” to be realized. The discussion of the models also provides a brief summary of the major issues and questions raised in modern democratic theory over the past two hundred years. Although some of the ideas in the models were first presented long ago, I believe each of them offers a viable alternative conception of democracy that is relevant to the United States today. The reader, however, should be warned that the discussion of democratic theory presented here is not meant to be a comprehensive review of this voluminous topic. Many important issues are not raised, and some important theorists are
not discussed. Readers interested in a more thorough review of democratic theory should consult the works listed in the “Suggestions for Further Reading” at the end of this introduction.

The models discussed in this chapter are derived from writings on democracy since the eighteenth century. Only in the past two hundred years have humans had experience with democratic government in large nations. The theorists of what I call modern democracy agree that democratic politics is possible on such a scale, and they premise their discussions on that assumption. But before the emergence of modern democratic theory, certain historical experiences and political ideas prepared the way for these theorists. Those precursors to modern democratic theory are discussed in the next section.

Precursors to Modern Democratic Theory

Democracy is an ancient concept. The idea of people participating equally in self-rule antedates recorded human history and may be as old as human society itself. From recorded history, we know that the ancient Greeks had well-developed and successful democratic societies among their various forms of government. Several Greek city-states, most notably Athens, involved their citizens in governing. The Athenian Assembly (Ecclesia), composed of all male citizens, met more than forty times each year to debate and decide all public issues. Officials responsible for implementing Assembly decisions were either elected or chosen by lot; their terms of office usually lasted one year or less. From historical accounts and the analyses of classic Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, we know that Greek democracy involved many of the key concepts and practices associated with modern democracy. Political equality, citizen participation—and in Athens, usually lively participation—the rule of law, and free and open discussion and debate were all part of Greek democratic practice. Nevertheless, the Greek form of democracy had characteristics that limited it as a model for modern democracy.

The first and most obvious limitation was scale. The Greeks assumed the city-state to be the appropriate size for the polity. Their democracy was carried out within this small territory among several thousand citizens, a condition permitting face-to-face interaction in a single public assembly. Political interaction beyond the scale of the city-state involved either diplomacy or conquest—hardly a democratic procedure. During the fourth and fifth centuries BCE, when Athenian democracy was at its height, Athens ruled its conquered territories in a decidedly undemocratic manner. The idea that democracy could encompass more than a few thousand citizens in a single city-state would have been absurd to Greek democrats.

A second limitation of Greek democracy was its exclusivity. Although all male citizens participated in governing themselves in Athens, this group constituted a minority of the people who actually lived in Athens and were governed
by the laws of the Ecclesia. The most obvious exclusion was the female half of
the population (an exclusion that would prevail, until quite recently, in modern
democracies). Likewise, the enormous slave population, larger than the number of
free citizens (about three slaves for each two citizens), had no right to political par-
ticipation.\(^7\) According to some scholars, one of the ironies of Greek democracy was
that its existence depended to a great extent on the slave economy, which permit-
ted citizens the leisure to perform public duties.\(^8\) In addition to slaves and women,
a large population of free individuals—immigrants from other Greek cities and
other parts of the world—were denied citizenship rights, even though they had
lived in Athens for generations and its laws governed their lives. The Greek con-
ception of democracy did not include the modern notion that democracy should
provide opportunities for political participation to all (with only a few exceptions)
who live within a polity and are subject to its laws.

Despite its limitations, Greek democracy remained the Western world’s most
complete expression of the ideal of \textit{rule by the many} for two thousand years after
its demise. Among the numerous empires, monarchies, oligarchies, and tyrannies
that followed, the Greek experience remained an inspiration to those who sought
to provide power to ordinary citizens to govern themselves. Until the eighteenth
century, society’s few experiments with democratic government, like the Greek
experience, involved political regimes encompassing limited geographic areas and
small populations. During the Middle Ages and later in various locales, from
Italian city-states to Swiss cantons, democratic experiments achieved some success,
but scale and exclusivity continued to limit democracy. As in Greece, democracy
meant all citizens gathering together in one assembly to make laws; size remained
a practical limitation on the relevance of democracy to the governance of large
nation-states.

Not surprisingly, given this experience, political theorists assumed that
democracy was feasible only in small states where face-to-face interaction of the
entire citizenry could occur. For example, the great eighteenth-century French
political theorist Montesquieu argued that the ability of citizens to perceive the
public good easily, which he considered a requisite of democratic government, was
possible only in a small republic.\(^9\) Even the influential democratic theorist of the
same period, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, assumed a polity the size of his native Geneva
to be the appropriate context for the application of his theories.\(^10\) Only in a small
state, where people could meet together in the relative intimacy of a single assem-
bly and where similarity of culture and interests united them, could individuals
discuss and find the public good.

By the end of the eighteenth century, events began to overtake the small-state
view of democracy and to stimulate a more expansive and modern conception.
Inspired by the Enlightenment values of liberty and equality, political activists agi-
tated for more popular forms of government. These democratic aspirations pro-
voked two key events in the history of democracy—the American and French
Revolutions. Because these popular revolutions occurred in large nation-states, satisfying democratic aspirations required moving beyond the small-state limitation. Conceptions of democracy had to be developed to provide for popular government among millions living in large territories.

The idea of democratic representation offered the mechanism to solve the dilemma of organizing democratic government over a large territory. The American and French revolutionaries intended to make democracy work through popularly elected assemblies—state legislatures and Congress in the United States and the National Assembly in France. Representative assemblies made democracy feasible in large nation-states, even if the direct participation of the entire people in a single democratic assembly was impossible; representatives would speak on behalf of their constituents. In his famous essay No. 10 in *The Federalist*, James Madison went so far as to turn the conventional wisdom of the political theorists on its head. He argued that representative democracy in a large territory would lead to a more stable popular government than was possible in a small democracy. The introduction of the concept of democratic representation in practice and theory opened the way for the modern conception of democracy.

Along with the idea of representation, a set of political ideas found in the political philosophy called liberalism was influential in the emergence of modern conceptions of democracy. Liberal political philosophy was articulated first in the work of the sixteenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes and later in the work of the seventeenth-century English theorist John Locke. Although neither Hobbes nor Locke, as we soon see, would be considered a democrat, their ideas about the nature of political life were influential in modern conceptions of democracy.

Liberal theorists begin with two basic assumptions about human nature: (1) Humans are reasonable creatures who can use their reason to improve their social existence; and (2) humans are self-interested—that is, concerned with their individual well-being. Based on these two assumptions, theorists such as Locke and Hobbes argued that political society comes into being through a “social contract” among reasonable, self-interested individuals. These individuals understand the need for political order because they desire prosperity and security. For Hobbes, the social contract replaced a chaotic state of nature in which selfish individuals spend their lives engaged in a “war of all against all,” making human life “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Locke had a more benign view of the state of nature, arguing that most reasonable humans could understand the laws of nature and the need to restrain their selfishness for the good of the community. But because some individuals might sometimes be unreasonable and likely to violate the natural rights of others, prudent people should see the advantage of forming a political society with their fellow citizens to protect themselves. Furthermore, this social contract would place “natural” rights on a more secure and stable basis than they had in the state of nature. According to
Locke, government—not the goodwill of humans—would become the guardian of natural law. Despite their differing conceptions of the actual “state” of the state of nature, Hobbes and Locke agreed that reasonable individuals would prefer the security of a social contract.

The purpose of the social contract, and of the government that follows from it, was to maximize the opportunity for individual self-fulfillment. Liberalism was distinguished from medieval and ancient political theories because it identified the individual, his or her rights, and the need for self-fulfillment as the goals of the political order. Individual goals, rather than the glory of God or some universal notion of “the Good”—the sorts of goals assumed in earlier political theory—were the proper end of government. For liberals, government existed to allow individuals to pursue whatever individual “goods” they desired. Individualism meant that each person, informed by reason, was the best judge of what was to be valued in life. The function of government was limited to protecting each individual’s natural rights to “life, liberty, and property.”

Among these individual rights, liberals counted the right to property especially important. For Locke, the natural—that is, God-given—right to property was central to human existence. The main reason individuals would leave the state of nature and form a political commonwealth was the protection of that right: “The great and chief end of Men’s uniting into Commonwealth’s, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their Property.” Since protection of property and other rights is the reason people placed themselves under the authority of a government, it follows logically that government itself should not be allowed to interfere in the exercise of those rights. This liberal commitment to limited government means that individuals have broad leeway in acquiring and disposing of property, free of governmental control.

Obviously, such a view of government and individual rights of property was very compatible with the emergence of capitalist economic relations. Capitalist entrepreneurs in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries sought to be free of the dictates of government. They found liberal political theory especially supportive of their efforts to accumulate wealth and make investments based on their individual estimates of profitability rather than on the dictates of government. Adam Smith, for example, argued in his Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, that economic prosperity, not chaos, would be the result if markets were allowed to function free of governmental interference—a view quite consistent with Locke’s notions of property rights and limited government.

Liberal political ideas clearly imply a capitalist or free-enterprise economic order. To what extent does liberalism also imply democratic politics? Liberalism emphasizes that individuals in a society are equally entitled to the protection of their rights and that all humans are equal in forming a social contract. Most Americans associate these liberal political values with democracy. The association is understandable because our American liberal democracy has been greatly
influenced by our liberal political culture. Nevertheless, liberal thought, although not incompatible with democratic politics, does not lead necessarily to popular control of government.

Neither Hobbes nor Locke favored democratic government. Hobbes, in fact, felt that a liberal society could be best protected if, as part of the original social contract, people turned over all power to a single absolute sovereign (the *Leviathan*), who would provide law and order, protecting citizens in return for their absolute obedience. He so distrusted selfish human nature that he could see no way to control it except with an authoritarian government. But keep in mind that Hobbes advocated authoritarian government for *liberal* ends—to protect individuals’ freedom to benefit from their labors. In this respect, Hobbes’s position is similar to the public statements of some modern military dictators—such as Chile’s former president Augusto Pinochet—who claim they must hold absolute power to protect law-abiding citizens and “free enterprise” from “communists and subversives.”

Locke favored some citizen participation in government, but he assumed that participation would be restricted to citizens who had a full stake in the commonwealth—namely, property holders. Although all citizens were obligated to obey government, having consented to the social contract that created it, Locke believed that only citizens with “estate” possessed the capacity for rationality that governing required. Liberals required of government only that it protect individual liberty and not meddle beyond that limited sphere. For this purpose, a nondemocratic government, as long as its powers were limited, might be more trustworthy than a democratic one.

So liberalism does not lead inevitably to democracy. Nevertheless, there are elements in the liberal vision that do suggest democratic politics. For example, both Hobbes and Locke believed that free individuals participated *equally* in the formation of the initial compact that establishes the state. Therefore, they saw no distinctions among people that could justify different political rights for different individuals. So even though differences between citizens may arise in the actual control of government, the foundation of the state rests on the initial consent of all citizens, irrespective of differences in wealth or social status. Furthermore, the initial social contract means that government itself has a democratic obligation to understand that its powers derive from the initial consent of citizens and to enforce laws and protect political rights equally. Failure to do so constitutes justification for revolution. These potentially democratic sentiments find sublime expression in the American Declaration of Independence, which both embodies liberal doctrine and calls for democratic revolution:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Certainly, these liberal ideas provided fruitful stimulus to inspire Americans to democratic revolution.

The significance of liberal ideas for modern conceptions of democracy is clearly evident in the first of the four models I describe in this chapter, the Protective Democracy model. As with all the models to follow, this set of ideas shows three things: (1) how one group of “democrats” values citizen participation; (2) what they think the purposes of government are, or should be; and (3) what political arrangements they find most consistent with their thoughts on the first two items. In the pages that follow, I describe each of the four models: Protective Democracy, Developmental Democracy, Pluralist Democracy, and Participatory Democracy. Toward the end of the chapter, a table summarizes and compares the four.

**Protective Democracy**

Protective Democracy is a model of democracy that advocates popular control of government as a means of protecting individual liberty. Its most explicit formulation is found in the work of two nineteenth-century British political philosophers, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, who favored democratic government as the best means for securing a liberal society. Bentham, founder of the philosophy of utilitarianism, believed that a capitalist, market society, as described by Smith and implicit in liberal theory, was most likely to achieve the utilitarian ideal of “the greatest good for the greatest number.” He and his disciple Mill believed that for a capitalist society to flourish, it needed government officials who would pass laws nurturing market relations and who would be restrained from using their powers to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of society.

Bentham and Mill believed that the democratic institutions of universal male suffrage, the secret ballot, a free press, and most of all, frequent elections offered the best chance of keeping government under control. For them, democracy was a method for protecting both citizens and capitalism’s market relationships: “A democracy, then, has for its characteristic object and effect, the securing of its members against oppression and depredation at the hands of those functionaries which it employs for its defense.”

If members of society were self-interested and competitive, as assumed, then voters would be vigilant against government officials bent on violating their liberties. Voters would be ready to punish (at the polls) government officials who
raised taxes too severely or whose policies reduced voters’ incomes. Bentham and Mill were willing to embrace universal suffrage, even though that meant including in the electorate the poor, people with no property, and the working class. They were confident that middle-class political leaders such as themselves could lead the lower class to support liberal, promarket governments. After all, in their utilitarian philosophy, the long-run best interest of even the poor lay in the successful operation of the market society. (This belief is still widely held in the United States, as in the “trickle down” economics of many conservative Republicans.)

Bentham’s and Mill’s confidence in the support of the poor and propertyless for liberal values contrasted sharply with earlier liberal anxiety about the participation of the poor. Just a few years earlier in 1787, the American founders also had expressed an essentially liberal view of the role of the government. In the Federalist No. 10, James Madison asserts that “the protection of [the diversity of the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate] is the first object of government.” To Madison, the chief danger to limited government (a liberal goal) was the emergence of factions that might gain control of governmental power and use it in their own interest and against that of the rest of society. Of particular concern was a potential faction comprising the majority of citizens without property, who might use government to inflate the currency, abolish debts, or appropriate property directly.

This concern with the dangers of popular participation—or the “excesses of democracy,” as the founders put it—was a major factor precipitating the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Many of the institutional arrangements established in the Constitution were intended to reduce the potential for a democratic majority to threaten individual liberty. Among the most important was the system of separation of powers, which divides lawmaking power among different institutions: the presidency, Congress, and the judiciary. In addition, Congress is divided into two branches, whose members are elected under different electoral schemes. This division of power ensured that even if a passionate majority were to succeed in capturing control of one institution of government, the other, separate institutions would manage to check the potentially tyrannical institution. Several articles of the Constitution—and especially the Bill of Rights—also contain specific limitations on governmental power as a means to protect individual liberty. All these provisions were intended to create a government that anyone bent on tyranny, whether a faction of the majority or a minority, could not easily use to that end.

Combining the institutional vision of the American founders with the democratic theory of Bentham and Mill suggests our first distinctive model of democracy. Protective Democracy values democratic institutions and procedures to the extent that they protect and nurture a liberal, capitalist, market society. According to this model, democracy exists so that free, competitive individuals can enjoy maximum freedom to pursue material gain (see Table I.1 on page 18). Some individuals may
choose other objectives for their lives, but the basic assumption is that most people are motivated primarily to seek wealth. These dedicated capitalists are likely to be interested in and participate in politics only to the extent necessary to protect their freedom in the marketplace.

Liberalism heavily influences the Protective Democracy model, in which the prime purpose of government is the protection of individual liberty and property. In fact, the limits that government imposes are needed precisely because threats to property are inherent in an acquisitive and competitive human nature. For its part, government should never threaten property rights and should always protect individual liberty. And since the natural human tendencies toward material greed and political tyranny live in government leaders as well, individual liberty can best be protected if there are also clear and strong limits on government. Political institutions such as the separation of powers, federalism, and bicameralism are intended to limit the power of the government so that it will not behave in a tyrannical manner.

Political participation within these institutions provides further protection because citizens will be vigilant in protecting their freedoms. Although Protective Democracy is very concerned with equality in political rights, such as voting, and with equal protection under the law, Protective democrats are less concerned about the existence or threat of material inequality in society; in fact they assume that such inequality will exist.

**Developmental Democracy**

As we have seen, the Protective model of democracy rests upon a negative view of human nature—democracy’s first aim is to prevent the inherent selfishness, acquisitiveness, and even evil of humankind from controlling the state to the detriment of individual liberty. In sharp contrast to this negative view, the Developmental model of democracy takes a much more positive view of people, especially people in a democratic society. Writing in the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill (James Mill’s son) declared that man is not simply a “consumer and appropriator” (as assumed in the Protective model) but also an “exerter, developer, and enjoyer of his capacities.” As a result, people in democratic societies can come to possess “civic virtue,” which permits them to look beyond their self-interest to the well-being of all of society. Through participation in governmental institutions and the affairs of their communities, people develop a broad appreciation of the public good and what it requires. They become public-spirited *citizens*. 

The concept of the good citizen is central to the model we call Developmental Democracy. This conception of democratic citizenship is widely embraced in American society, not only in civics textbooks but also by such “good government” groups as the League of Women Voters. “Good citizens” are knowledgeable about,
interested in, and active in government and civic affairs. They vote regularly, inform themselves on public issues, write to their elected representatives, and sometimes serve in public office. Democracy is desirable because it provides these opportunities.

Through their active involvement, good citizens contribute to the well-being of their communities, but they also receive something in return. Because democracy requires that citizens involve themselves in the community, it is a means for educating people, enhancing their capacity to improve themselves as well as their government. Democratic citizenship is an intellectual exercise, requiring ordinary people to make constant decisions about political issues and candidates. In making these judgments, citizens talk to one another, learn from one another, and develop their own intelligence. Their active involvement in democratic institutions develops their character in a more fully human direction. In being responsible for public affairs, people learn to be more responsible human beings. The virtue of democracy is that it develops these positive aspects of human character. In sum, the Developmental model sees democracy as having a moral value and purpose—it requires good citizens and thus develops good people. As in the Protective model, the Developmental model accepts the need for representative democracy, but only because of the impracticality of a more direct form of democracy. According to John Stuart Mill,

The only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate . . . any participation, even in the smallest public function is useful. . . . But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portion of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative.

Even though the Developmental model accepts the need for representation, as indicated in the last lines of the previous quotation, the emphasis rests on the people’s active control of their “deputies.” In such a relationship, citizens must be full and active participants in both electing their representatives and monitoring their activities. This view of representation is quite different from that of the proponents of the Protective Democracy model. The Protective democrats, like Madison, thought representation improved on direct democracy because elite, potentially more-civic-minded-than-ordinary citizens would control day-to-day policy making. The Developmental democrats, expecting and encouraging all citizens to be civic minded, accept representation only as a practical necessity.

For most of American history, this Developmental model of democracy dominated Americans’ interpretation of their political life. This view became ascendant during the Jacksonian era, when suffrage was extended to nearly all white males, and the spirit of the common man dominated the frontier. This democratic spirit led the French observer Alexis de Tocqueville to conclude in the
1830s that “the people reign over the American political world as God rules over the universe.” From Abraham Lincoln to Woodrow Wilson, American political leaders articulated this vision of Developmental Democracy, and their views were reiterated in schoolroom texts and in the writings of political philosophers.

Toward the middle of the twentieth century, however, some intellectuals began to question the Developmental model’s accuracy as a description of actual political practice in the United States. This questioning led them to develop our next interpretation of democracy, Pluralist Democracy.

**Pluralist Democracy**

To a considerable extent, the Developmental model represents a democratic ideal—if political society were organized according to this model, popular control of government would be assured. But is it possible for such a political regime to exist? This key question troubled social scientists observing the emergent democratic regimes in such nations as the United States, Britain, and France at the turn of the twentieth century. The question was especially troubling because social scientists saw a political reality that differed greatly from the ideals represented in the Developmental model.

For example, instead of seeing average citizens actively engaged in political affairs, they observed that most ordinary people seemed to be apathetic and uninformed about politics. That left day-to-day governance in the hands of a political elite: party leaders, officeholders, “notables,” and journalists. Moreover, average citizens were far from equal in their ability to influence public officials; some seemed to have more interest in politics and greater resources for contact with political leaders. Democratic constitutions alone, they concluded, did not seem to create the sort of democratic politics described in the Developmental model.

Among political theorists, these observations about the gap between the democratic ideal and political reality led to two different responses. The first social scientists to describe the gap, in the early years of the twentieth century, saw it as evidence that democracy was impossible. These “elitist” theorists—Roberto Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto—argued that the experience with democratic institutions proved that democracy could never be achieved. As they saw it, the ideas of democracy and democratic constitutions only hid the reality of elite control of politics and government. For these theorists, the actual practice of democracy differed little from politics in authoritarian or oligarchical regimes because a small “political class” inevitably ruled all societies. A democratic constitution did not change this fundamental “iron law of oligarchy.”

By the middle of the twentieth century, another group of social and political scientists formulated an alternative response to the elitists’ conclusion about the impossibility of democracy. If the actual practice of politics in “democratic” regimes did not measure up to the democratic ideal, then instead of giving up on
democracy altogether, they suggested redefining democracy to fit actual political practice. Rather than let the standards of the Developmental model define democracy, the “revisionists” sought to redefine democracy by careful observation of politics as it was actually practiced in societies such as the United States.

In 1954, Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee made this argument in their book *Voting*, which was based on a sophisticated survey of a sample of citizens in Elmira, New York, at the time of the 1948 presidential election.²⁹ They found that the behavior of Elmira’s citizens differed significantly from the democratic ideal as presented in the Developmental model. Most citizens’ levels of knowledge about the election were quite low. More important, there was great variation in the level of political interest and participation—some people were highly interested and involved, others passive and apathetic, and still others showed moderate interest. Overall, there were not many “good citizens” among the population they studied.

But Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee did not conclude that these “facts” were a threat to democracy. Instead, they wrote that this mixture of involvement and apathy contributed positively to the stability of democratic politics:

How could mass democracy work if all the people were deeply involved in politics? Lack of interest by some people is not without its benefits, too. . . . Extreme interest goes with extreme partisanship and might culminate in rigid fanaticism that could destroy democratic processes if generalized throughout the community. Low affect toward the election . . . underlies the resolution of many political problems; votes can be resolved into a two party split instead of fragmented into many parties. . . . Low interest provides maneuvering room for political shifts necessary for a complex society. . . . Some people are and should be highly interested in politics, but not everyone is or needs to be.³⁰

Thus, for these authors, apathy among some citizens—even among a large portion of a society—could be considered a positive dimension of democracy. In fact, too many “good citizens,” as described in the Developmental model, would constitute a danger to orderly democratic politics.

If democracy is not to be defined by the activism of its citizens, how do democratic regimes differ from authoritarian ones? For the Pluralists, the answer to this question is *competitive elections*. This answer might seem paradoxical, given the previous quotation concerning the dangers of electoral participation, but to the Pluralists, elections provide an opportunity for even apathetic and passive citizens to choose their political leaders. This choice distinguishes democratic regimes from authoritarian ones. Since Pluralists assume that the political elite will make actual policy decisions, the role of democratic citizens lies primarily and almost exclusively in their capacity to choose among alternative political leaders. As Joseph
Schumpeter put it in a famous definition of democracy, “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”31 Elections are important not because they provide direct citizen involvement in governance, but because they allow citizens to choose whom their rulers will be. For the Pluralists, this mechanism ensures that political leaders will remain responsive to the general preferences of the people and at the same time have the flexibility to make intelligent policy decisions without intrusive public meddling.

For the periods between elections, Pluralists assign to interest groups the important role of providing democratic responsiveness.32 Most citizens, Pluralists observe, are not very aware of day-to-day governmental policy making, but leaders of interest groups represent average citizens in those policy debates. Because some interest group represents almost everyone’s interests, the activities of interest group leaders are an effective democratic channel for the expression of the public’s wants and needs. Moreover, interest group leaders possess the knowledge and institutional skills to influence policy making that ordinary people lack. They actively compete with leaders of other interest groups on a daily basis to convince elected officials to enact policies that they favor.

For their part, elected officials seek to please as many groups as possible as a means of maximizing electoral support. To achieve that goal, they must fashion compromises satisfactory to a wide variety of groups. Government policies represent democratic compromises reflecting the preferences of numerous interest groups and their members. Some Pluralists argue that even the concerns of those not represented by an interest group are taken into account in these compromises because politicians need to worry about the preferences of “potential” interest groups that might form if unaffiliated citizens become too dissatisfied with a policy compromise. For Pluralists, therefore, interest group activity and regular, competitive elections produce a democratic system that is responsive to the popular will, even though an elite is responsible for day-to-day governing and most citizens are relatively uninvolved in politics.

Finally, Pluralists emphasize that successful democratic politics rests on a base of social diversity. Society consists of many different and competing groups, interests, and associations, and government must be responsive to the legitimate aspirations of all these interests while it protects the right of various groups to exist. Pluralists believe that democracy can thrive only if the many and various associations that make up society express themselves politically.33 Consequently, the concentration of power in the state, in a social class, or in any single part of society is the complete opposite of democracy. As long as power is widely dispersed among many groups, all provide a check against the accumulation of hegemonic power by any one of them. The competition among aspiring government leaders, the fairness of elections, the free interplay of interest groups, and the formulation of democratic compromises can work only if no single group is able to monopolize
power and limit competition, undermine free elections, restrict interest groups, and bias policy compromises.

The Pluralist model emerged as social scientists observed apathetic, unin-terested, and uninformed citizens in democratic societies. Based on their obser-vations, they concluded that earlier democratic theorists, including those who created the Developmental model, had overestimated the capacity of most people to participate as active, democratic citizens. If most people were not interested in political affairs, it seemed logical to look to the active political elite as guardians of democratic values and participants in policy formation. Most ordinary citizens could be assigned the less demanding (although still important) role of voting in periodic elections to choose among alternative leaders. The basis of the Plural-ist conception was the intermittent and indirect—even remote—participation of most people in political affairs.

**Participatory Democracy**

But why are citizens apathetic? The Pluralists assume political apathy to be a natu-ral inclination—unless political affairs directly affect their immediate interests, most people prefer to focus on their private concerns. In the 1960s, however, political activists and political theorists began to question this Pluralist assumption. They formulated a conception of Participatory Democracy, which sees apathy as a result of lack of opportunities for significant participation rather than as a funda-mental disposition of humanity. If most people preferred to concern themselves with their private affairs rather than with public ones, it was because of the structure of social institutions, not human nature. For Participatory democrats, the solution to citizen apathy lay in restructuring political and social institutions so that citizens could learn, through participation, the value and joys of democratic citizenship.

The Participatory model, although it has antecedents in the earlier Develop-mental model, arose from the political turbulence of the 1960s. Its earliest formula-tions came from the manifestos of student political activists in such organizations as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In 1962, a small group of SDS members gathered in Port Huron, Michigan, to formulate a declaration of principles—the Port Huron Statement—which included a call for “a democracy of individual participation.” Political, social, and economic institutions were to be reformed to make them more conducive to participation. In the South, the black and white student activists of SNCC attempted to put participatory ideals into practice in their efforts to register black voters. The battles for civil rights and later against the Vietnam War provided arenas to test the capacity of mass participation to influence public policy.

While students practiced Participatory Democracy in the streets, a number of political scientists challenged the then-dominant Pluralist interpretation of American politics in scholarly journals. They questioned whether the elite-dominated politics
celebrated by the Pluralists merited the label *democratic*. They charged that the Pluralists were complacently praising the virtues of American politics while ignoring the structures that prevented the development of a more authentic democratic politics. Pluralists were criticized for claiming that interest groups offered wide representation to societal interests when many Americans did not belong to any voluntary associations and not all groups had equal access to policy makers. Most important, for discounting the ideals of democratic citizenship in the name of “realism,” Pluralists were accused of ignoring and undermining analysis of how more effective structures of democratic participation might be constructed.

The Participatory model, as presented by theorists such as Carol Pateman, differs from previous models in its emphasis on the importance of democratic participation in nongovernmental as well as governmental institutions. The Developmental model (like the Protective and Pluralist models) views the democratic problem as subjecting governmental institutions and decisions to popular control. Participatory democrats agree with the need to control the government democratically, but they also point out that in modern industrialized societies it is not only government that makes authoritative decisions that individuals must obey or that has the capacity to apply sanctions to those who do not obey. Individuals are subject to the rules and dictates of their employers, unions, schools, churches, and other institutions. In fact, the authoritative decisions of these institutions usually have a more direct impact on people’s lives than do government policies. The decisions an employer makes regarding salary, working conditions, or layoffs can have an immediate and, if adverse, devastating effect on an employee’s life. In comparison to these decisions, the national government’s choice to pursue a manned rather than an unmanned space program or a local government’s determination about which streets to pave is remote or unimportant to most people.

In most cases, nongovernmental decisions are made in hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations, in an authoritarian manner, and without any of the procedures and protections we associate with democracy. Participatory democrats think that the absence of democracy in these nongovernmental settings undermines both the capacity of citizens to function democratically and the overall quality of a society’s democracy. The model presents three related arguments to support this idea. First, the lack of participatory opportunities in the workplace, the school, and the union deprives citizens of the chance to influence those decisions that are most important to them. An opportunity to nurture those qualities of citizenship valued by the Developmental theorists is lost when people are unable to influence decisions that directly affect their lives. Democratic participation would be much more meaningful if people could see such participation affecting decisions with direct impact on their day-to-day lives.

Second, people are apt to acquire nonparticipatory habits when subjected to an authoritarian environment on a regular basis. After spending the day following orders without question at the factory, a worker cannot be expected to return home in the evening to act like the civics textbook’s inquiring, skeptical,
self-actualizing citizen. Students who are taught primarily to obey authority in school are not likely to grow into effective democratic citizens. Third, Participatory democrats argue that a society can hardly be called democratic when so many socially and politically relevant choices are in the hands of people who are not democratically accountable. For example, corporate officials sometimes make decisions—such as deciding to close a factory—that affect the well-being of a whole community. The inability of the community’s citizens to influence that decision is as indicative of a lack of democracy as their inability to influence the local property tax rate.

For Participatory democrats, the way to hold those who make decisions accountable is to expand participatory opportunities in society. Democracy is a concept that is not only relevant to government; it should be implemented in all instances where authoritative decisions affecting people’s lives are made. Workers should be able to participate democratically in the running of their factories, students and faculty their schools and universities, and welfare recipients the welfare department. Through meaningful participation in these environments, people will acquire the capacity to be more effective participants in influencing government. For Participatory democrats, creating effective democracy in our industrialized and bureaucratized society requires a radical restructuring of institutions to increase people’s control over the decisions that affect their lives.

On a snowy day in March, the citizens of Elmore, Vermont, practice Participatory Democracy at their town meeting.

Photo from AP Photo/Toby Talbot.
The Models Compared

Table I.1 compares and summarizes the characteristics of the four models of democracy described in this chapter. In the table, the purpose (goal, end) that the model assigns to democracy uniquely defines that model. The Protective model values democracy because democratic institutions are thought to provide the best protection for individual liberties, particularly economic ones such as the right to individual control of property. Developmental Democracy considers democratic politics the best method of developing the personal qualities associated with its idea of the “good citizen.” Pluralists value the social diversity and system stability that democratic institutions encourage. And for the Participatory democrats, democracy is worthwhile because it permits people to participate in decisions that affect their lives. Each model’s unique character seems to derive from the central purpose or goal it expects democracy to accomplish.

Other dimensions of the table direct our attention to values and characteristics the models share. For example, the Developmental and Participatory models obviously have a lot in common. Each assumes a positive view of human nature—people are thought to be capable of rising above their narrow self-interest. Through participation in democratic procedures and institutions, citizens acquire the quality of civic virtue, which enables them to evaluate public issues in terms of the public interest. Consequently, we should expect and encourage people to be active participants in political affairs to enrich both society and the individual. Both of these models also agree on the need for political and social equality in democratic societies. When citizens come together to discuss the needs of the community, no artificial distinctions of political or social status should override the commonality of citizenship.

Table I.1 Models of Democracy Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Protective Democracy</th>
<th>Developmental Democracy</th>
<th>Pluralist Democracy</th>
<th>Participatory Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal or purpose</td>
<td>Protect liberty (market relations and private property)</td>
<td>Nurture citizenship</td>
<td>Protect and promote diversity</td>
<td>Foster participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of citizens</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional mechanisms</td>
<td>Separation of powers and representation</td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Interest groups and elections</td>
<td>Neighborhood assemblies and workers’ councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political and social</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Economic, political, and social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human nature</td>
<td>Selfish and acquisitive</td>
<td>Capable of civic virtue</td>
<td>Selfish and acquisitive</td>
<td>Capable of civic virtue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The differences between the Developmental and Participatory models center on their different evaluations of the impact of economic relationships on democratic politics. Developmental democrats do not view economic inequalities or class differences as significant barriers to equal citizenship. They emphasize the potential that all citizens enjoy, no matter what their economic resources, to participate fully in governmental institutions. In contrast to this governmental focus, Participatory democrats focus on the importance of social relationships, particularly economic ones that lie outside government. For them, full and active participation in government alone cannot fulfill the requirements of democracy, which also entails popular control of authoritative decisions in corporations, factories, unions, and schools. Moreover, social and economic inequality may impede the functioning of even political democracy. This broader view makes greater economic equality both a prerequisite for more meaningful participation and a likely consequence of popular power over economic decision-making.

Like the Developmental and Participatory models, the Protective and Pluralist models share a common view of human nature. Both adopt the pessimistic position that humans are primarily selfish and acquisitive creatures, concerned primarily with increasing and maintaining their private wealth. From this assumption follows these models' shared expectation that most people will have only limited interest in public affairs. Moreover, especially for the Pluralists, the average person's limited interest and participation in politics are quite acceptable, for they contribute to the stability of the system and the liberty of all. If people are naturally rapacious and interested in their own welfare, their active involvement in government will only produce factional conflict and, if one faction wins, potential violations of liberty. Because both models assume that political leaders (elites) make most of the decisions, even in a democracy, many political scientists would label these elitist models of democracy.

The Pluralist and Protective democrats also agree that equality in a democracy need only apply to political rights and opportunities. They expect social and economic inequalities to affect the degree of actual participation, but these conditions reflect a natural reality that does not disturb them. Political leaders, whether elected representatives or interest group leaders, will probably possess higher social standing and greater affluence, but that elite status will not interfere with their ability to speak and act for their constituents and followers, according to these two models. Universal suffrage and competitive elections are enough in themselves to ensure equal representation for all economic interests. Furthermore, the “one person, one vote” idea ensures that the voting power of the many will counterbalance the potential political advantages of the affluent few.

The discussion so far may have left some readers a bit confused. The preface promised that this chapter would offer a definition of democracy as a standard against which to judge alternative challenges to the well-being of democracy. However, instead of a single definition, I have presented four very different models, each claiming to provide a description of democratic politics. It appears that
one of the challenges democracy faces is that no one can agree on what it means! What conclusions about the concept of democracy can be drawn from these various models? Can we identify some essential characteristics of democracy that will facilitate our identifying its challenges?

First, the models suggest that a part of the meaning of democracy is a continuing discussion of the meaning of democracy. The reader should note that these models have evolved historically in response to practical efforts to establish and maintain democratic regimes during the past two hundred years. Democratic politics has been a new experience for humankind; it is understandable that conceptions of it remain in formation. There is obviously no single, authoritative blue-print for how democracy can be achieved. Instead, democratic politics involves a constant discussion among citizens about how best to organize their political life.

Despite the differences among the models, we can identify certain common elements that seem to have emerged during humankind’s two-century discussion about democracy. First, all models assume that democracy means popular rule—that is, government based on popular sovereignty (as opposed, say, to the divine right of kings) and subject to popular control. The models differ on how popular control is to be expressed, but all merit the label “democratic” because they assume the need for control by the people. Second, all models assume political equality. None questions the fact that democracy requires all citizens to possess equal political rights, even though the models differ on the capacity of individuals to take equal advantage of those rights. What differentiates these models from authoritarian theories of government is the absence of any argument in favor of an aristocracy or of assigning a privileged political role to any preordained class or group in society. Third, all assume the need for political liberty. Democratic discussion and popular control of governmental actions can occur only if all people feel free to express themselves and to try to influence government. In sum, these three values—popular rule, equality, and liberty—constitute the core of democracy’s definition. All those who honestly call themselves democrats embrace these concepts.

The differences among these models do not mean that the models are mutually exclusive. Embracing one does not necessarily require a total rejection of the others. Instead of containing a wholly distinctive definition of democracy, each emphasizes different values consistent with the other models and an implicit global definition of democracy. The Protective model, for example, stresses the importance of individual liberty and the need to protect liberty from governmental infringement. Participatory democrats would object to the Protective democrats’ preoccupation with property rights but would agree with the need to preserve the generic liberties required for free and open political participation. Pluralists emphasize the necessity of social diversity for effective democracy; the other models do not question this need. The Developmental model calls attention to the value of good democratic citizenship, while the Participatory model emphasizes the value of searching for new ways for democratic citizens to make social
decisions that control their lives. I do not mean to suggest that the disagreements among adherents of the various models are merely cosmetic—only that certain common values underlie them all.

Finally, these four models do not exhaust all the theoretical possibilities for conceptualizing democracy. Those who think and write about democracy have developed a wide variety of ways of thinking about the concept, and the practice of democracy has varied in a multitude of ways across time and throughout the world. A careful examination of these variants can lead one to many different democracy models. British political scientist David Held, for example, identifies nine distinct models of democracy in his comprehensive review of the concept. Nor do these four models, as presented here, focus on all the key issues of concern to democratic theorists. For example, in recent years many theorists have written about the importance of deliberation as a key aspect of the democratic ideal (an issue that will be touched on in subsequent chapters). These theorists argue that one advantage democracy offers over other forms of government is the opportunity for reasoned deliberation, in public, over the best policies that ought to be pursued. In a democracy, when a public problem or issue arises people can think through together what should be done to address it and are thereby more likely to find successful solutions. One can find advocates of deliberative democracy among theorists who otherwise see democracy through the lens of different ones of the four models presented in this chapter. For example, some who support the Protective model consider the separation of powers and checks and balances, which that model emphasizes, conducive to public deliberation. Other proponents of deliberative democracy emphasize the merits of widespread popular participation in public deliberation, and they can be classed as Participatory democrats.

What the four democratic models presented here suggest and what this chapter shows is that democracy remains, even after much practical experience with democratic institutions throughout the world, an ideal to be continually sought after, rather than a settled system to be complacently admired. People in many countries, including the United States, strive to achieve democratic ideals. They aim to subject public decisions to popular control, to protect individual civil rights and liberties, to expand political equality, to encourage participation in decisions that affect people's lives, to foster social diversity, and to promote good citizenship. Nevertheless, nowhere—not even in the United States—have these ideals been achieved. Partly, the reason is that our definitions of these ideals, like our definition of democracy, continually change. For example, in 1840 universal white male suffrage seemed to satisfy the aspirations of most American democrats; in the United States of the twenty-first century, the exclusion of women and non-whites from voting is rightly considered a gross violation of democratic principles.

We can see, therefore, that the achievement of the democratic ideal is so difficult because the ideal itself is so demanding. The limitations of human nature and social organization are always barriers in the way of successful democracy.
Sometimes doing things undemocratically is just simpler than wrestling with
democratic procedures. Impatience with the demands of democracy often tempts
some people in democracies to bypass democratic procedures. Another way
in which democracy is demanding is in the time and energy that democratic
citizenship requires—time many people would prefer to devote to their private
affairs. Also, despite the almost universal lip service given to democratic ideals in
the modern world, not everyone believes in democracy. Active opposition from
individuals and groups opposed to democratic aspirations is surely a significant
barrier to the achievement of democratic ideals. Whether it is a government such
as those in Saudi Arabia, China, or North Korea, a segment of society such as
the southern whites who opposed the civil rights movement of the 1960s, or the
economic interests of corporate officials who resist public efforts at regulation,
the opponents of democracy remain powerful in every country and in every seg-
ment of society. With such opposition, the world will never be absolutely “safe
for democracy.”

This recognition of the fragility of democratic political institutions brings us
to the main point of this book. Observers of democratic politics are continually
identifying threats to the future and well-being of democracy. When studying
these challenges, several questions need to be asked:

- First, what is the implicit or explicit model of democracy that each par-
ticular challenge seems to confront? Does the seriousness of the particular
challenge diminish or increase depending on the model? Does the chal-
lenge threaten underlying values differently in the various models?
- Second, to what extent does the threat discussed undermine the demo-
cratic values of all the models, of democracy itself? Is the challenge to
democratic values so serious that Protective, Pluralist, Developmental, and
Participatory democrats should be equally concerned?
- Finally, what does analysis of the various threats to democracy tell us about
the models themselves? Which model of democracy seems to offer the best
chance of overcoming the challenges American democracy faces in the
modern world? In other words, how should our politics be structured if
we are to thrive as a democratic society?

**Suggestions for Further Reading**

prominent American democratic theorist sums up his ideas on why democracy is the
preferred system.

meditation on the concept of democracy.


