the politics of
migration &
immigration
in Europe
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SAGE
Introduction

This book analyses and compares responses by European countries to international migration in its various forms and examines collective responses at European Union (EU) level. We assess why, how and with what effects European countries have developed policies that seek to regulate entry to their territory (immigration policies); what it means when they then seek to ‘integrate’ these migrant newcomers (immigrant policies); and the causes and effects of common EU migration and asylum policies.

Debates in Europe about migration have been profoundly influenced by the refugee crisis. In 2015, 1,003,124 people were reported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to have arrived in the EU via Mediterranean maritime routes with 3,771 people reported dead or missing (IOM, 2016). Following their arrival in Europe – with the IOM reporting that 845,852 people arrived in Greece in 2015 – hundreds of thousands of men, women and children then began journeys across Europe via countries such as Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Hungary and Austria, with Germany often the preferred final destination. By the end of 2015, there were estimates of up to 1 million people in Germany seeking refuge. This disorderly, dangerous and mass movement of people with its associated horrifying death toll opened the eyes of many people to the tragic effects of conflict and economic inequalities that underpin
much international migration. Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea were all key origin countries.

For other people, the refugee crisis demonstrated a need for much greater effort to secure the borders of EU states in the face of what were seen as unmanageable flows and threats to security. Whether or not a stronger and more collective EU migration and asylum policy can be developed also formed part of this debate. In September 2015, EU member states agreed to a scheme to relocate up to 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece, Hungary and Italy, but there were tensions within the EU. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania opposed the scheme but were outvoted, and it also raised major implementation challenges (CEC, 2015). The EU’s Schengen system of passport free travel – with compensating security measures – came under close scrutiny, which intensified after the terror attacks in Paris on November 2015 in which 130 people were murdered. Prior to the Paris attacks, border control efforts had already been reinforced. In summer 2015 Hungary constructed a fence at its borders with Serbia and Croatia to stop onward movement of migrants who had entered the EU in Greece. In December 2012, the Greek government completed a 12.5 km-long fence at their land border with Turkey. The Spanish had already intensely fortified their borders with Morocco in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Andersson, 2014). The port of Calais had for more than 10 years become a high security zone with extensive fencing to stop migrants making irregular crossings from France to the UK. It wasn’t just new fences that were popping up all over Europe. Germany, Sweden and France all reinstated temporary border checks during 2015 in an attempt to control refugee and migrant flows.

While the refugee crisis has been at the top of the European agenda since 2014, this book makes the point that we need to see it as a manifestation of a much broader and complex debate about how international migration in its various forms (to work, to join family, to seek refuge and to study being four key motives) affects European politics and societies and how these countries and societies themselves affect and shape migration. While the focus was on refugee flows, channels for labour and family migration remained the main routes for entry to Europe while hundreds of thousands of international (non-EU) students arrive each year to study at colleges and universities in Europe. Mobility within the EU by EU citizens with free movement rights has also increased, particularly from new member states such as Poland, Hungary and Romania, but also from economic crisis-hit Greece, Italy and Spain. More than ever before, migration and mobility became central to the debate about Europe’s future.

The wider point, as this book shows, is that European countries have long histories of immigration and emigration, which means that the day-to-day business of living together in European countries has been shaped by migration and has become part of everyday life, potentially holding both positive and negative connotations for societies and political systems. To take one example, the causes
and effects of immigration-related diversity have long been debated across European societies that are undoubtedly more socially, ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse. Immigration clearly plays a part in this diversity. For many people these changes are viewed as positive and as providing economic, social and cultural enrichment. For others they are viewed more negatively as a cost and burden. Immigration-related diversity means that European societies have become more multicultural, but there is a difference between a society being multicultural and a government pursuing multicultural policies. In 2011 the leaders of Germany, the UK and France all claimed that so-called ‘multicultural’ policies had failed because of their over-emphasis on difference and diversity and too little emphasis on commonalities. Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK all saw increased support for anti-immigration and anti-EU political parties that oppose immigration and multiculturalism.

How then to make sense of these dynamics? How can we understand contemporary developments while still being sensitive to historical factors and influences?

Since the 1990s, there has been a huge increase in resources devoted to categorising, regulating and trying to ‘manage’ migration and migrants, including at EU level. There has, for example, been an increase in migration that falls into categories defined by state policies as ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’, i.e. migration that is not authorised by migration laws and policies in destination countries (Jordan and Düvell, 2002). One unintended effect of this has been to direct migrants towards more dangerous routes of entry and to provide a powerful stimulus to the people-smuggling industry, as well as to government departments, international organisations, civil society groups, businesses, media organisations and researchers that all become involved in various ways in what Andersson calls ‘Illegality Inc’ (Andersson, 2014).

Geo-politically, the impact of international migration has widened since the 1990s from a group of ‘older’ immigration countries in North West Europe to include newer immigration countries, newer EU member states and non-EU member states in Southern and Central Europe, such as Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and Turkey. International migration now forms an important part of the relations between European countries and surrounding states and regions, including in Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and countries in the Horn of Africa such as Somalia and Eritrea.

This book analyses the political causes and consequences of international migration to Europe. We also suggest an alternative way of thinking about these causes and consequences. Often the focus is on the ways in which international migration ‘challenges’ nation states. Thought about in analytical terms, this means seeing international migration as a challenge to the nation state and means understanding it as an independent variable that can then help explain various social and political changes in European countries.
As we argue in this book, it can be equally – if not more – useful to reverse the analytical focus and explore the ways in which European countries (as well as changed relations between European states), play a key role in producing and shaping understandings of international migration (Geddes, 2005b). In these terms, territorial borders as well as important forms of social organisation within states, such as their labour markets and welfare states, play a central role in the constitution of immigration as a social and political issue (Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Ireland, 2004; Carmel et al., 2011). Put another way, these boundaries shape how we ‘see’ and understand immigration (as a challenge, threat, opportunity, benefit, cost etc.). Immigration also interacts with ‘conceptual’ boundaries of membership, belonging and entitlement that mediate relations between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Anderson, 2013). Our approach means seeing international migration as a dependent variable that acquires meaning when it meets the borders (territorial, organisational and conceptual) of destination states. International migration is, by definition, made visible by the borders of states. If there were no such things as states then there would be no such thing as international migration (Zolberg, 1989). As such, international migration is defined by the categorisations and classifications that occur at Europe’s borders. These differences between categories have hugely important effects because being labelled a ‘high skilled migrant’ leads to an entirely different relationship to the host society compared to that experienced by an ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘refugee’.

Thought about in such terms, whether international migration is viewed as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing is heavily dependent on decisions made in destination countries and, as Zolberg (1989: 406) evocatively put it, the walls that these countries build and the small doors that they open in these walls. This metaphor becomes more powerful in light of the efforts by European countries such as Britain, France, Greece, Hungary and Spain to literally build walls and fences to prevent migrants entering their territory. By shifting the analytical focus in this way and concentrating on the shaping effects of borders, we account for the ways in which the actions, inactions, inclusions, omissions and world-views of institutions and organisations in destination countries shape perceptions of and responses to international migration and migrants (Geddes, 2005b).

This tallies with the need to view international migration as related to underlying structural factors that play a key role in its generation. Chief among these are effects of global economic inequalities in the form of relative income and wealth inequalities plus the role played by conflicts, demographic change and environmental factors that can also cause people to move to another country (Black et al., 2011).

In such terms, international migration can be understood as epiphenomenal, i.e. it occurs as a result of something else happening such as economic inequalities and conflict. It also means that immigration policies can be after-the-fact reactions to the underlying factors that drive international migration and limits
the extent to which immigration policies provide ‘solutions’ to the more fundamental aspects of the global politics such as inequality, conflict, demographic patterns or environmental and climate change.

An important implication of this is that it’s not so much the personality or character of the individual migrant – for example, an asylum seeker or a high skilled labour migrant – that matters in immigration policy, but rather the ways in which they are viewed by institutions and organisations in the countries to which they move. These can then shape wider social perceptions of the ‘value’ of migration and migrants irrespective of the actual qualities, skills and attributes that they possess.

It is also important to think about the issue of ‘who decides’. Decisions about law and policy are still quite strongly focused at the national level, although the EU does play an increased role (Geddes, 2008a; Acosta and Geddes, 2013). It is, however, crucial to note that EU member states decide on the numbers of migrants from non-EU member states (known as third country nationals (TCNs)) to be admitted. In contrast, citizens of the EU’s 28 member states can move freely within the EU. This highlights a point that is central to the analysis that follows. The EU promotes economic liberalisation and free movement but seeks to strictly regulate entry by non-EU citizens. In this way European integration changes the meaning of borders both ‘internally’ within the EU and ‘externally’ in terms of relations with countries that are not EU member states. This became manifest again in response to the refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016 when, as mentioned earlier, ad hoc border controls were reinstated between EU member states in order to control or prevent onwards movement by refugees. By 2016, questions were being raised about the sustainability of the EU’s Schengen system of passport free travel covering 26 European countries. Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that ‘Schengen is dead’ while Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte stated that border controls at the EU’s external frontiers were imperative if Schengen were to survive. Yet, for hundreds of thousands of EU citizens, passport free travel has become part of their daily lives with many commuting across borders for work. Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, usually renowned for his Euroscepticism, said that for Hungarians Schengen was freedom (The Guardian, 2016).

Why do people move? Explaining mobility and immobility

International migration is linked to underlying features of global politics, particularly inequalities between richer and poorer countries as well as the effects of factors such as political repression and conflict. Focusing on these and their effects can help to avoid a destination country bias focused only on the ‘problems’ for European countries and allow appreciation of the factors that cause people to migrate to Europe.
The term international migration might seem relatively straightforward: movement by people across state borders that leads to permanent settlement. This movement is then viewed by receiving states as immigration. It is in these terms – as immigration and permanent settlement in a world of nation states – that the politicisation of immigration has occurred across Europe. But it is not as straightforward as this. There are, in fact, many types of movement by people that cross state frontiers and each are ‘capable of metamorphosing into something else through a set of processes which are increasingly institutionally driven. What we then choose to define as migration is an arbitrary decision, and may be time-specific’ (Dobson et al., 2001: 25). Migration can be short-term or long-term. Migrants could live in one country and work in another. There can also be movement back and forth between sending and receiving countries.

Defining immigration and immigrants are political matters. Some governments distinguish between people of national descent ‘returning’ to their ‘home’ country after several generations (such as ethnic German Aussiedler or Dutch ‘repatriates’) and those who are ‘immigrants’ of non-national descent with implications for the policy developed towards such people and their treatment. A more recent manifestation is the debate about intra-EU free movement. EU institutions tend not to use the term ‘migrant’ because such people are mobile EU citizens making use of the possibilities that free movement offers. In political debate, however, intra-EU ‘mobility’ swiftly turns into ‘migration’ when permanent settlement in another EU state occurs and can raise concerns about issues such as housing, health care and education.

People movement from one country to another is primarily driven by relative inequalities of income and wealth. These can be thought of as powerful economic drivers of migration, but this does not mean that international migration or EU free movement are subject to simple push–pull pressures as migrants move for economic reasons from poor countries to richer ones. In addition to relative inequalities of income and wealth, other factors include:

- the effects of political change, including conflict;
- the operation and effects of migrant networks connecting potential migrants to kith and kin that have already moved and that can be facilitated by new information and communication technologies;
- the effects of population structure on people’s ability to move with younger adults generally being more able to move than older people;
- the effects of environmental change on peoples’ livelihoods.

It is also important to note that all of these factors – economic, political, social, demographic and environmental – can be reasons why people don’t or are unable to move. If people lack resources (economic, physical, social) or are fearful of the effects of conflict then they may not be able to move or may even be trapped in areas that threaten their livelihoods and lives. Evidence suggests that
the effects of conflict can be to push people to simply the next safe place, which meant in the case of the Syrian conflict that, by summer 2015, upwards of 4.5 million Syrians had fled to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

For destination countries, it is important to specify what actually is meant by the term immigration and how this turns into policy categories such as labour migrant, asylum seeker, family migrant and international student. The underlying assumptions informing definitions can have very powerful effects. Take, for example, the categories ‘voluntary’ economic migrant and ‘forced’ refugee. These tend to be defined from the vantage point of receiving states and can also be redefined by these states. Forced migrants are those fleeing persecution who are offered protection on the basis of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the rights of stateless people to which all EU member states are signatories. Only a small proportion of international migrants fall within the remit of this convention. Are migrants voluntary or forced if they leave their countries because of unemployment or poverty? Voluntarism would tend to be the supposition in receiving countries, which then legitimates restriction on this migration because it is defined as motivated by economic reasons. Instead, it has been argued that the voluntary/involuntary distinction is better viewed as a continuum reflective of the varying degrees of choice or freedom available (Faist, 2000: 23).

If the term international migration is unclear, then there are likely to be some difficulties enacting policies to establish authoritative capacity in order to manage and regulate it. Governments often make claims to be able to plan, regulate and even to control international migration, but, by doing so, it is assumed that the phenomena associated with international migration are relatively knowable and to some extent predictable. Yet, more often than not, migration policy can seem like reactive muddling through in the face of unpredictable migration pressures. For example, no-one predicted the scale of the refugee crisis that hit Europe in the 2010s. Migration policy is also made within institutional settings that do not always facilitate the translation of policy objectives into policy outcomes (Sciortino, 2000). One reason for this is that between the formulation of policy objectives and their implementation, there is the political process of decision-making during which countervailing and sometimes contradictory dynamics can affect migration policy (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). During elections there might be ‘tough’ rhetoric about controlling immigration, but, in government, other pressures such as the interest of the business community can lead to more expansive labour migration policies (Freeman, 1995; Geddes, 2008b).

A brief history of European migration

The main focus of this book is on events after the end of the Cold War in 1989, although there is also reference to earlier patterns of migration and their legacies.
The end of the Cold War fundamentally reshaped the EU leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union, German reunification and a wave of new countries joining the EU (16 between 1989 and 2013 when Croatia joined).

This wave of ‘new’, post-1989 migration does require some historical contextualisation. International migration is at a lower level in this contemporary era of ‘globalisation’ than in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when millions of Europeans left for the US or moved from colonising to colonised parts of the world (Moch, 1992). In 2015, around 3.5 per cent (around 244 million people) of the world’s population were international migrants meaning they were born outside of the country in which they reside (UNFPA, 2015). Of these around 10 per cent have moved to Europe. Most originate from certain countries and even from particular towns and villages in those countries (OECD, 2014).

When looking at post-war migration to Western Europe we can see that it was powerfully structured by links between sending and receiving countries and by the development of the European economy that generated demand for migrant workers. Migration to countries such as France, the Netherlands and the UK was shaped by colonialism and into West Germany (as it then was) by guestworker recruitment agreements. Those migrants that settled then increased their level of engagement with the institutions of the host societies, particularly the labour market, welfare state and political system. Migration since the end of the Cold War in 1989 has not been so powerfully structured by post-colonial ties or guestworker recruitment.

**Trends in post-war migration**

Immigration into Western Europe during the 1950s and 1960s was central to economic reconstruction. There was, however, a lurking assumption that labour migration was temporary and migrants would return to their countries of origin when economic conditions changed. This assumption was misplaced: the guests stayed (Rogers, 1985). Labour migration peaked in the 1960s and ended with the recruitment-stop following economic slowdown and the oil price rises of 1973–4 before increasing again in the 2000s. By the late 1970s it was clear that supposed temporary migration had turned for many into permanent settlement. The immigrant-origin communities changed in profile to include more women, younger and older people. This meant increased engagement with key social institutions, particularly welfare states.

The door was closed to large-scale labour migration in the early 1970s, but migration by family members continued and became the main form of immigration to Europe. While labour migrants in the 1950s and 1960s were typically represented as being male, there were also female labour migrants.
Analysing the Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe

(Phizacklea, 1983). Family reunion led to a further feminisation of international migration, as well as bringing more children and older people. The origins of migrants also differed. Some migrants arrived from former colonies, holding the passport and nationality of the country to which they moved, and thus with the same formal rights as other citizens (Britain, France and the Netherlands all stand out in this respect). Meanwhile, non-national migrants such as guestworkers in Germany were granted legal rights and welfare state membership in accordance with what Hammar (1990) calls ‘denizenship’. This status can be understood as legal and social rights linked to legal residence falling short of full citizenship. The transformation of the incomplete membership status of denizenship into full citizenship would then depend upon naturalisation laws.

The decision to restrict labour migration did not lead to the end of immigration. It did not even lead to the end of labour migration. Rather, the labour migration channel was narrowed to allow mainly high skilled immigrants to enter while there was still scope for family migration. Much of the political debate about immigration in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s centred on family migration and the implications of permanent settlement.

A ‘third wave’ of migration developed in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in 1989–90 with a particularly noticeable increase in asylum-seeking migration and migration defined by state policies as ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’. This has contributed both to a diversification in terms of the countries of origin of migrants and the numbers of European countries affected by international migration. This phase is closely associated with the development of common EU migration and asylum policies since the 1990s that were then tested by the refugee crisis and huge scale movement towards Europe that plunged the EU asylum, migration and border control system into crisis. Table 1.1 provides an overview of Mediterranean arrivals and fatalities in the EU during 2015 and shows that the vast majority occurred in Greece.

Analytical themes

This chapter now introduces three themes that help develop these points and that will then be the basis for the comparative analysis in the chapters that follow: immigration policies, immigrant policies and the impact of European integration. The European societies upon which this book focuses can be understood as both structures and actors. As structures we are interested in the characteristics of their institutions and organisations, or put another way, their practices. As actors we pay attention to the understandings and ideas that animate these practices. The ways in which these organisations view the world plays an important part in the production of migrant categories and thus
Table 1.1 Mediterranean migration flows to Europe: Arrivals and fatalities in 2015

|                | Fatalities by month in 2015 (compared to 2014) |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               | Me | Me |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----|----|
|                | 12       | 82      | 24       | 346       | 10         | 61         | 50         | 1244        | 329       | 95         | 318       | 10         | 864        | 230        | 616         | 686         | 813         | 268        | 126        | 432        | 22         | 106       | 95         | 205       | 3279       | 3771       |
| Total arrivals in Greece and Italy 2015 |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |
| Italy          | 153,052  |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |
| Greece         | 845,852  |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |               |
| Top five origin countries in 2015 for Italy and Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Greece | To Italy | To Grammar |
shapes responses to international migration in its various forms. Organisational practices concern, for example:

- procedures governing legal residence and the rights associated with this status;
- citizenship, naturalisation and nationality laws;
- access to the labour market and welfare state (health care, education, housing, etc.);
- political rights;
- anti-discrimination and laws to tackle racism and xenophobia;
- policies that can seek to change, promote, preserve or protect aspects of immigrants’ social and cultural identities.

These are all informed by ideas about membership, entitlement and belonging. A central aspect of political activity is the attempt to control shared meaning and, as such, debates about immigration’s effects on European countries are good examples of conflict over the concepts used in framing political judgements on social problems and public policies (Edelman, 1988).

Theme 1: Explaining immigration policies

Immigration policies concern themselves with conditions regulating territorial access by non-nationals and access to key social institutions such as the labour market and welfare state. A state’s power, authority and capacity to regulate access to its territory are important indicators of its sovereign authority.

EU member states have become increasingly open to free movement of goods, capital and services as part of the EU’s Single Market, but have been more resistant to free movement of people. Hollifield (2000a) calls this a ‘liberal paradox’ of open markets and relatively closed states. European states devote immense resources to the regulation of immigration and to efforts at control. As Brubaker (1994: 230) argues: ‘True, states are open at the margins to citizens of other states, but only at the margins. Seen from outside, the prosperous and peaceful states of the world remain powerfully exclusionary’.

This leaves us with a puzzle referred to earlier: since at least the 1970s, European countries have declared their intention to strictly regulate immigration but have continued to accept migrants. To address this puzzle, it has been argued that we need to analyse the form that immigration politics takes and the institutional venues where decisions are made. Gary Freeman (1995) has argued that immigration policies in liberal states such as European countries are inherently expansive in terms of numbers of migrants admitted and inclusive in terms of the rights that are extended. This seemingly counter-intuitive argument draws from studies of the politics of regulation, which identifies the role that small groups, with high stakes in a given policy area can play when trying to maximise the political benefits from a particular policy (Stigler, 1971). Freeman analyses the form of immigration politics that arises as a result of the distribution of costs.
and benefits. He argues that the concentrated beneficiaries (business and pro-
migrant groups) have a greater incentive to organise than the diffuse bearers of
costs (the general public). The result, Freeman argues, is ‘client politics’ and
expansive and inclusive immigration policies that reflect business and pro-
migrant NGO interests. Freeman focuses on the groups that have a stake in
policy and presents a counter-argument to ‘fortress Europe’ style accounts of
contemporary European migration politics. He offers a theoretically grounded
account of an empirically observable phenomenon; namely that rhetorical com-
mitments to control have been difficult to put into practice.

Similarly, Hollifield et al. (2014) identify a systematic gap in all the world’s
major destination countries between the rhetorical commitment to control and
the reality of continued immigration that has emerged because of the role of
courts as guarantors of the rights of both nationals and non-nationals in liberal
states. Since the 1970s, courts have offered protection to immigrant newcomers
with the effect that the liberalness of liberal states constrains the restrictive urges
Barry (1996: 538) wrote that the basic idea of liberalism is to create a set of rights
under which people are treated equally in certain respects, and in the past 200
years, western societies have been transformed in accordance with the precept
of equal treatment. The generality of liberal institutions, with courts as defend-
ers of rights, has been seen as leading to the development of ‘rights-based
politics’ linked to what Ruggie (1983) characterised as the ‘embedded liberalism’
of the post-Second World War international order. Hollifield (1992) writes that
this has helped to open ‘social and political spaces’ for migrants and their
descendants in European states, with, for instance, courts defending the right to
family life for national and non-national migrants in accord with national and
international laws.

This presents a quite rosy picture of expansive policies and immigrant inclu-
sion based on a universalistic ethic of inclusion that over-rides communitarian
or nationalistic ethics of closure. Yet, these values are used to justify the exclu-
sion of immigrants on the grounds that the moral relevance of community
membership supersedes the openness of liberal universalism (Boswell, 1999,
2000). This can justify exclusion on the basis of protecting welfare states. Mann
argues (1995, 1999) that there was a ‘dark side’ to the foundation of many
European states based on ethno-cultural nationalism and racism rather than
liberal universalism.

While not arguing that courts have always (and at all times) been progressive
bastions of migrants’ rights, recently judicial cool heads have tempered restrictive
policies that contravened legal or constitutional provisions. It has also been
argued that the changes in the EU system arising from the Treaty of Lisbon (2009)
have given a greater role to the CJEU and that this has led to decisions that affect
expulsion, family migration and integration (Acosta and Geddes, 2013).
These arguments about expansiveness and inclusivity have been challenged by those who argue that there is a rights versus numbers trade-off in admissions policies, which means that greater openness to the admission of migrants entails more restrictiveness in terms of the rights that are offered to them (Ruhs, 2013). The rights–numbers trade-off argument suggests that expansiveness and inclusivity do not go hand-in-hand. EU states, it could be argued, offer fairly extensive rights to those that are ‘in’, but they also make it increasingly difficult for people to get ‘in’.

While there is some variation between European countries in citizens’ attitudes to immigration, survey research in 2014 showed a general tendency to oppose current levels and also to see immigration as a burden rather than an opportunity, in terms of its impacts on labour markets and welfare states. As Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show this is particularly evident in Greece and Italy that both experienced relatively high immigration and suffered the consequences of austerity and economic crisis. As Figure 1.2 shows, there are interesting aspects to these attitudes that confound the notion of uniform hostility. For example, most British and German respondents thought that there should be fewer immigrants, but also recognised the contributions that immigrants made through their work and talents.

![Graph showing percentage of the population saying their country should allow fewer/about the same/more immigrants](Image)

**Figure 1.1** Percentage of the population saying their country should allow fewer/about the same/more immigrants

*Source: Pew Research Centre, 2014*

*Note: Excludes data for those who answered ‘don’t know’*
Theme 2: Explaining immigrant policies

While a very broad and highly contested term, it is essential to think about the ways in which European countries have thought and re-thought the issue of immigrant integration because this goes to the heart of the debate about the relationship between migrant newcomers, their families and the places to which they move. Figure 1.3 reports attitudinal data that focused on perceptions of assimilation and detects the view held by many respondents that immigrants want to be distinct from the societies in which they live.

The framing of the questions in Figure 1.3 could be seen to reflect a turn towards assimilation and away from the idea that diversity could intrinsically be good thing.

Immigrant policies mark an attempt to re-organise and re-imagine the organisational and conceptual boundaries of a given community and create capacity to include or exclude newcomers. The organisations of European countries (their political systems, the distribution of power and authority within them, the organisation of their welfare states and labour markets, etc.) and the ideas that animate these practices (about the nation and about membership of the imagined national community) are of central importance. Here too we can see how the forms taken by national and local politics have shaped immigrant integration processes thus showing how the organisation of the political system, and

Figure 1.2 Percentage of the population saying immigrants are a burden or make country stronger

Source: Pew Research Centre, 2014
broader societal reflections on national identity and social cohesion, have shaped immigrant integration processes as much as the other way around.

This suggests strong associations between immigrant policies in European countries and the regulation of entry to the territory (sovereignty) and membership of the community (citizenship) in these nation states. This also means that the vocabulary of integration becomes heavily imprinted with historical, political and social processes associated with the nation state and national self-understanding (Brubaker, 1992).

The term ‘integration’ looms large in this debate, but it needs to be borne in mind that a social expectation of integration affects everyone and the costs of failure – social exclusion – are high for the individual and society. Integration in these terms can be linked to core nation state principles and associated with the ideas of T.H. Marshall (1964) who saw modern citizenship as a vehicle for the building of a national community based on the extension of legal, political and social rights (in that order). Marshall wrote before the arrival of large numbers of immigrants. Responses to immigration upset Marshall’s categorisation in the sense that non-citizen immigrants accessed legal and social rights but acquired political rights more slowly. Hammar (1990) then understood the status of non-national immigrants as ‘denizenship’ meaning legal and social rights falling short of full citizenship because of the absence of political rights. The various meanings of citizenship – as a status, as a relationship between the citizen and political authority and as a process of inclusion and exclusion – have

Figure 1.3 Attitudes to integration: immigrants in our society want to …

Source: Pew Research Centre, 2014
been central to the politics of immigration in Europe. Chapters 3 and 4 on France and Germany show how the debate about immigration was framed by debate about the meaning of nationhood and citizenship. We also see that there has been a tendency across Europe for citizenship to become ‘lighter’, meaning that fewer rights are associated with it while it has become easier to obtain (Joppke, 2010). At the same time, the language of inclusion, integration and citizenship is also associated with what is known as ‘civic integration’. As we show in Chapter 5 on the Netherlands, the idea of civic integration requires that citizens pass a test demonstrating knowledge of the language, history and culture of the country to which they have moved or, even, prior to moving, showing this knowledge. The Dutch call this pre-movement testing ‘civic integration from abroad’, which, despite the language of inclusion, is more accurately seen as a form of immigration control (Goodman, 2010, 2014).

Four points arise from this. First, we usually recognise integration in its absence as social exclusion or disintegration rather than being able to specify what is meant by an integrated society. It is likely that in any room full of co-nationals there would be disagreement about the requirements for the community membership that they hold in common. Second, the integration of immigrants can be linked to discussion of the supposed racial, ethnic, religious or cultural differences of immigrants as though these could be barriers to inclusion or, alternatively, could be vehicles for creation of a more progressive multicultural society. Clearly, the absence of knowledge about the society to which a person moves – such as the inability to speak the language – can work against inclusion; but to emphasise supposed racial, ethnic, religious and cultural differences can create social chasms between newcomers and their new country. Third, citizens tend to look to the state to guarantee integration. If the state won’t or can’t, then this can swiftly become a legitimacy problem for governments. While debates about the ‘integration’ (or lack thereof) of immigrants often focus on supposed racial, ethnic, religious or cultural traits of newcomers, these debates are also, if not more, about the capacity of European countries to secure social inclusion or social integration in the face of factors such as immigration, as well as welfare state and labour market changes that can affect the state’s capacity to perform this role. Fourth, the content, meaning and practice of citizenship itself as a manifestation of integration has been redefined and changed by immigration.

Just as for immigration policy, the ways in which migrants are understood and represented is highly significant. In Britain and the Netherlands immigrants and their children have been referred to as ‘ethnic minorities’, in Germany immigrants have been defined mostly based on their national origin (such as ‘Turks’) and in France, officially at least, there is a preference not to speak of immigrant minorities at all as it would conflict with the idea of the ‘one and indivisible’ French Republic. Distinctions between ‘migrants’ or ‘minorities’ and ‘us’ or ‘natives’ is also becoming increasingly complex as the descendants of
migrants blend into society over several generations meaning that terms such as ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ can become unclear in what have been labelled as ‘superdiverse’ cities such as London and Amsterdam (Vertovec, 2007).

Theme 3: Explaining the effects of EU integration

No account of European immigration politics could be complete without factoring in the EU’s role, but, at the same time, strong foundations need to be put in place before the EU’s role can be assessed in order to balance either neglecting the impacts of the EU or overstating them. Put another way, the politics of migration and immigration in Europe is not a story of various national exceptionalisms or of countries just doing their own thing. There are close ties between European countries as a result of European integration. However, this does not mean that European countries are locked into a trajectory that will inevitably transport them to some kind of federal Europe.

The EU can lurk in the background of analyses of European immigration politics either as the repressive ‘fortress Europe’ or as a potentially progressive source of post-national rights. Both these perspectives pay too little attention to the form and content of EU migration policy. The basic analytical problem is that while it is clear that the EU’s importance has grown, it’s not always clear how and why this has been the case and what have been European integration’s effects on immigration and immigrant policies. The EU is not a nation state and there is no reason to assume that European integration can be likened to a nation-state building process.

EU migration policy has three main elements, which will be analysed more closely in Chapter 7:

- Free movement laws for (mainly) EU citizens within the single market.
- Migration and asylum provisions that have developed since the mid-1980s and are related to a number of factors such as the implications of single market integration for immigration and asylum coupled with the growing awareness of domestic legal and political constraints on immigration control.
- Immigrant policies that offer some legal, social and political rights to legally resident non-EU citizens, or TCNs.

The unevenness of European commonality across migration policy sectors (with some sectors such as asylum and irregular migration being more common than others such as admissions policy and integration), and the unevenness of effects (with some member states more affected than others) means that we need to assess both the reasons for the shift to the EU and the effects on member states and on surrounding states and regions. We should also avoid ascribing political and institutional changes to the impact of the EU without first being sure that it was actually the EU that drove these changes rather than domestic or other
international factors. The congruence of EU developments does not make the EU a cause of all change in the member states. It is easy to overstate the EU’s influence, but at the same time, the sources of legal, material and symbolic power associated with it need to be carefully analysed. European integration profoundly changes the strategic context for policy-shaping and making while having substantial effects on both member states and non-member states. The EU is a regional bloc comprising rather resilient nation states that have moved towards a highly developed form of market integration and common currency (for some, but not all member states) that extends rights to its citizens under the banner of EU citizenship while building barriers between themselves and surrounding states and regions. As the EU response to the refugee crisis shows there are still highly significant national sensitivities at play, which mean that movement to a common EU policy is far from assured.

Comparing European immigration countries

Focusing entirely on national differences between countries and on the particularities of debates within these countries could lead to the conclusion that national particularities are the key element of immigrant policies in Europe. This would diminish the opportunities for comparison. In fact, many studies of migration, and of migrant integration in particular, have tended to focus on the national specificities of migration and integration regimes. Yet, we are analysing responses in European countries to ostensibly similar phenomena associated with international migration while inclusion and exclusion are mediated in arenas (i.e. nationality laws, welfare states, labour markets) that display some broad similarities in both their structure and exposure to pressures. While there are clear national particularities, there are also crosscutting factors presenting similar dilemmas to European countries of immigration. One of the purposes of this book is to uncover how different European countries have responded to these dilemmas and to find explanations for these country responses by looking at a country’s historical and institutional settings as well as to more crosscutting factors such as levels of politicisation of immigration, the effects of Europeanisation and the influence of factors such as the organisation of welfare states.

Another challenge to a state-centred emphasis on national cases and national political processes has come from those who argue that rights and identities have become decoupled and that forms of ‘post-national membership’ change the position of migrants and their descendants in European countries. Soysal (1994) argues that a universalised discourse of entitlement derived from international human rights standards underpins claims for social and political inclusion made by migrants and their descendants. Thus the incomplete membership status of denizenship (rights short of full citizenship) is recast as a progressive
model for new forms of post-national belonging that no longer take the nation state as their frame of reference. For example, EU citizenship could be construed as a significant ‘post-national’ development that defies narrow state-centrism by offering scope for free movement and ‘rights beyond borders’ that could signify the decline of national citizenship (Jacobson, 1996).

A further challenge to the state-centric approach to integration stresses the local dimension of migration and integration. This is not necessarily incompatible with the key role of national governments, but, instead, emphasises the importance of local politics, particularly at city level, in many EU states. Rather than nationally distinct integration philosophies, integration policies can be shaped by local conditions with different local approaches in different towns and cities. This is reflected in a growing local political leadership visible in towns and cities across Europe. It is also reflected in the growing importance of networks of cities for the exchange of knowledge and ideas about immigrant integration, such as the ‘EUROCITIES’ and ‘Intercultural Cities’ networks.

While this book focuses on different European countries it does not take national approaches to migration and integration (or ‘national models’) as its point of departure. Rather, we study the institutional conditions that frame policy responses at the country level while also taking into account relevant developments at the sub-national and EU levels. Our objective is not to find what is specific to the countries discussed in this book, but rather to examine how and why they have responded to similar challenges under specific institutional conditions.

Some of these factors will be pursued throughout the book and reflected upon in the conclusions. Within the book’s focus on the politics of migration, this search for factors involves more than recounting different migration histories that may account for policy differences. One key factor is the role of the welfare state in European countries in shaping immigrant policies given the different organisational form that they take. Another factor is the degree of politicisation of immigration with one indicator being the growth or resurgence of populist and anti-immigrant parties throughout Europe.

The widening of migration

A drawback with analyses of European immigration politics can be a focus only on ‘older’ immigration countries in North Western Europe with less attention paid to the experiences of ‘newer’ immigration countries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. In fact, to label countries in Southern Europe as ‘new’ immigration countries is to misuse the word. For example, Greece, Italy and Spain have been experiencing immigration for more than 25 years while Turkey has a complex migration history that can also belie the word ‘new’. The geographical focus needs to be widened if genuine elements of novelty in European
immigration politics and policy are to be properly captured. This book thinks beyond the EU’s current members to also consider Turkey, which has, over the past decade, experienced growing levels of immigration. Turkey was also central to the European refugee crisis both as a major destination for around 2 million people displaced by the Syrian conflict but also because relations with Turkey were central to EU responses to attempt to deal with these complex issues. Debate about Turkish membership of the EU has been dominated by fear in some member states about large-scale emigration by Turks towards the EU, but Turkey has also experienced rapid economic growth and become an immigration country. Chapter 10 shows that, while Turkey is not an EU member state, its policy responses have been shaped by the EU while the refugee crisis also became part of the debate about EU–Turkey relations.

By focusing on the wider Europe and beyond the usual suspects in North West Europe, this book also highlights issues around policy implementation. Policy implementation is difficult because it depends upon decisions made by one group of people at a particular point in time and in a particular place being implemented by another group of people, at a different point in time and at a different place. We should, perhaps, be more surprised when policies are actually implemented. This dilemma is particularly important for the EU as it relies on member states to implement its legislation. We will see that the making of a formal policy commitment at national or EU level does not mean that this commitment will be fulfilled if legal, bureaucratic and administrative resources are lacking. In the case of restrictive immigration policies, we have already seen that in ‘older’ immigration countries there has been continued immigration despite restrictive policies. Constraints may arise because of implementation dilemmas such as the costs of control and the lack of well-developed bureaucratic or administrative resources. Control capacity can also be hindered if policy is not based on a valid theory of cause and effect. For example, if there is a continued demand for migrant labour in some economic sectors and well-entrenched economic informality that provides a context for the economic insertion of irregular migrants then the discussion of internal controls and the regulatory capacity of states is also important, as shown in the cases of Italy, Greece and Spain (Chapters 8 and 10).

Plan of the book

This book’s analysis of European migration politics is organised at two levels.

- A horizontal dimension compares responses in European countries. To what extent is European immigration politics characterised by distinct national responses to international migration? How have national responses changed over time and what factors have underpinned these changes? Where are the points of convergence and the points of divergence between European countries? If there is convergence, then what causes this?
Analysing the Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe

- A vertical dimension analyses the impact of European integration. We can assess both the institutionalisation of Europe (the development of common institutions and policies) and the Europeanisation of institutions (the impact on member states of EU integration, including at local or city level).

These two dimensions can then be connected to explore the extent to which it makes sense to talk of a politics of migration and immigration in Europe with linkages at both horizontal and vertical level.

The horizontal and vertical analytical dimensions are analysed in relation to the two themes discussed in this introductory chapter.

- Immigration policies to regulate and manage international migration.
- Immigrant policies that centre on the development of a social and political response to the presence of immigrant newcomers and their descendants.

We now take these ideas forward and apply them in Britain (Chapter 2), France (Chapter 3), Germany (Chapter 4), the Netherlands (Chapter 5) and Sweden (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 examines the development of EU responsibilities. This is followed by consideration of the politics of migration in Italy and Spain (Chapter 8) and in Central and Eastern Europe (Chapter 9). Chapter 10 extends the analysis into South East Europe by looking at Greece and Turkey.

The aim is then to highlight divergence and convergence, while seeking explanations for these when and where they arise. The book demonstrates both the conceptual (new types of migration and new types of response) and geopolitical (more countries) widening of the migration issue in contemporary European politics as well as their effects.