Symbolic Interactionism
Symbolic interactionism (Sandstrom and Kleinman 2005) offers a wide range of interesting and important ideas, and a number of major thinkers have been associated with the approach, including George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley, W. I. Thomas, Herbert Blumer, and Erving Goffman.

The Major Historical Roots

We begin our discussion of symbolic interactionism with Mead (Shalin 2011). The two most significant intellectual roots of Mead’s work in particular, and of symbolic interactionism in general, are the philosophy of pragmatism (D. Elliot 2007) and psychological behaviorism (Joas 1985; Rock 1979).

Pragmatism

Pragmatism is a wide-ranging philosophical position1 from which we can identify several aspects that influenced Mead’s developing sociological orientation (Charon 2000; Joas 1993). First, to pragmatists true reality does not exist “out there” in the real world; it “is actively created as we act in and toward the world” (Hewitt and Shulman 2011:6; see also Shalin 1986). Second, people remember and base their knowledge of the world on what has proved useful to them. They are likely to alter what no longer “works.” Third, people define the social and physical “objects” that they encounter in the world according to their use for them. Finally, if we want to understand actors, we must base that understanding on what people actually do in the world. Three points are critical for symbolic interactionism: (1) a focus on the interaction between the actor and the world, (2) a view of both the actor and the world as dynamic processes and not static structures, and (3) the great importance attributed to the actor’s ability to interpret the social world.

The last point is most pronounced in the work of the philosophical pragmatist John Dewey (Jacobs 2007; Sjoberg et al. 1997). Dewey did not conceive of the mind as a thing or a structure but rather as a thinking process that involves a series of stages. These stages include defining objects in the social world, outlining possible modes of conduct,
imagining the consequences of alternative courses of action, eliminating unlikely possibilities, and finally selecting the optimal mode of action (Sheldon Stryker 1980). This focus on the thinking process was enormously influential in the development of symbolic interactionism.

In fact, David Lewis and Richard Smith argue that Dewey (along with William James; see Musolf 1994) was more influential in the development of symbolic interactionism than was Mead. They go so far as to say that “Mead’s work was peripheral to the mainstream of early Chicago sociology” (Lewis and Smith 1980:xix). In making this argument, they distinguish between two branches of pragmatism—“philosophical realism” (associated with Mead) and “nominalist pragmatism” (associated with Dewey and James). In their view, symbolic interactionism was influenced more by the nominalist approach and was even inconsistent with philosophical realism. The nominalist position is that although macro-level phenomena exist, they do not have “independent and determining effects upon the consciousness of and behavior of individuals” (24). More positively, this view “conceives of the individuals themselves as existentially free agents who accept, reject, modify, or otherwise ‘define’ the community’s norms, roles, beliefs, and so forth, according to their own personal interests and plans of the moment” (24). In contrast, to social realists the emphasis is on society and how it constitutes and controls individual mental processes. Rather than being free agents, actors and their cognitions and behaviors are controlled by the larger community.2

Given this distinction, Mead fits better into the realist camp and therefore did not mesh well with the nominalist direction taken by symbolic interactionism. The key figure in the latter development is Herbert Blumer, who, while claiming to operate with a Meadian approach, was in fact better thought of as a nominalist. Theoretically, Lewis and Smith catch the essence of their differences:

Blumer . . . moved completely toward psychical interactionism. . . . Unlike the Meadian social behaviorist, the psychical interactionist holds that the meanings of symbols are not universal and objective; rather meanings are individual and subjective in that they are “attached” to the symbols by the receiver according to however he or she chooses to “interpret” them. (1980:172)

Behaviorism

Buttressing the Lewis and Smith interpretation of Mead is the fact that Mead was influenced by psychological behaviorism (J. C. Baldwin 1986, 1988a, 1988b; Mandes 2007), a perspective that also led him in a realist and an empirical direction. In fact, Mead called his basic concern social behaviorism to differentiate it from the radical behaviorism of John B. Watson (who was one of Mead’s students).

Radical behaviorists of Watson’s persuasion (K. Buckley 1989) were concerned with the observable behaviors of individuals. Their focus was on the stimuli that elicited the responses, or behaviors, in question. They either denied or were disinclined to attribute much importance to the covert mental process that occurred between the time a stimulus was applied and the time a response was emitted. Mead recognized the importance of observable behavior, but he also felt that there were covert aspects of behavior that the radical behaviorists had ignored. But because he accepted the empiricism that was basic to behaviorism, Mead did not simply want to philosophize about these covert phenomena. Rather, he sought to extend the empirical science of
behaviorism to them—that is, to what goes on between stimulus and response. Bernard Meltzer summarized Mead’s position:

For Mead, the unit of study is “the act,” which comprises both overt and covert aspects of human action. Within the act, all the separated categories of the traditional, orthodox psychologies find a place. Attention, perception, imagination, reasoning, emotion, and so forth, are seen as parts of the act . . . the act, then, encompasses the total process involved in human activity. (1964/1978:23)

Mead and the radical behaviorists also differed in their views on the relationship between human and animal behavior. Whereas radical behaviorists tended to see no difference between humans and animals, Mead argued that there was a significant, qualitative difference. The key to this difference was seen as the human possession of mental capacities that allowed people to use language between stimulus and response in order to decide how to respond.

Mead simultaneously demonstrated his debt to Watsonian behaviorism and dissociated himself from it. Mead made this clear when he said, on the one hand, that “we shall approach this latter field [social psychology] from a behavioristic point of view.” On the other hand, Mead criticized Watson’s position when he said, “The behaviorism which we shall make use of is more adequate than that of which Watson makes use” (1934/1962:2; italics added).

Charles Morris, in his introduction to Mind, Self and Society, enumerated three basic differences between Mead and Watson. First, Mead considered Watson’s exclusive focus on behavior simplistic. In effect, he accused Watson of wrenching behavior out of its broader social context. Mead wanted to deal with behavior as a small part of the broader social world.

Second, Mead accused Watson of an unwillingness to extend behaviorism into mental processes. Watson had no sense of the actor’s consciousness and mental processes, as Mead made vividly clear: “John B. Watson’s attitude was that of the Queen in Alice in Wonderland—‘Off with their heads!’—there were no such things. There was no . . . consciousness” (1934/1962:2–3). Mead contrasted his perspective with Watson’s: “It is behavioristic, but unlike Watsonian behaviorism it recognizes the parts of the act which do not come to external observation” (8). More concretely, Mead saw his mission as extending the principles of Watsonian behaviorism to include mental processes.

Finally, because Watson rejected the mind, Mead saw him as having a passive image of the actor as puppet. Mead, on the other hand, subscribed to a much more dynamic and creative image of the actor, and it was this that made him attractive to later symbolic interactionists.

Pragmatism and behaviorism, especially in the theories of Dewey and Mead, were transmitted to many graduate students at the University of Chicago, primarily in the 1920s. These students, among them Herbert Blumer, established symbolic interactionism. Of course, other important theorists influenced these students, the most important of whom was Georg Simmel. Simmel’s interest in forms of action and interaction was both compatible with and an extension of Meadian theory.

**Between Reductionism and Sociologism**

Blumer coined the term *symbolic interactionism* in 1937 and wrote several essays that were instrumental in its development (Morrione 2007). Whereas Mead sought to differentiate
the nascent symbolic interactionism from behaviorism, Blumer saw symbolic interactionism as being embattled on two fronts. First was the reductionist behaviorism that had worried Mead. To this was added the serious threat from larger-scale sociologistic theories, especially structural functionalism. To Blumer, behaviorism and structural functionalism both tended to focus on factors (for example, external stimuli and norms) that cause human behavior. As far as Blumer was concerned, both theories ignored the crucial process by which actors endow the forces acting on them and their own behaviors with meaning (Morrione 1988).

To Blumer, behaviorists, with their emphasis on the impact of external stimuli on individual behavior, were clearly psychological reductionists. In addition to behaviorism, several other types of psychological reductionism troubled Blumer. For example, he criticized those who seek to explain human action by relying on conventional notions of the concept of “attitude” (Blumer 1955/1969:94). In his view, most of those who use the concept think of an attitude as an “already organized tendency” within the actor; they tend to think of actions as being impelled by attitudes. In Blumer’s view, this is very mechanistic thinking; what is important is not the attitude as an internalized tendency, “but the defining process through which the actor comes to forge his act” (97). Blumer also singled out for criticism those who focus on conscious and unconscious motives. He was particularly irked by their view that actors are impelled by independent, mentalistic impulses over which they are supposed to have no control. Freudian theory, which sees actors as impelled by forces such as the id or libido, is an example of the kind of psychological theory to which Blumer was opposed. In short, Blumer was opposed to any psychological theory that ignores the process by which actors construct meaning—the fact that actors have selves and relate to themselves.

Blumer also was opposed to sociologistic theories (especially structural functionalism) that view individual behavior as being determined by large-scale external forces. In this category Blumer included theories that focus on such social-structural and social-cultural factors as “social system, social structure, culture, status position, social role, custom, institution, collective representation, social situation, social norm, and values” (Blumer 1962/1969:83). Both sociologistic theories and psychological theories ignore the importance of meaning and the social construction of reality:

In both such typical psychological and sociological explanations the meanings of things for the human beings who are acting are either bypassed or swallowed up in the factors used to account for their behavior. If one declares that the given kinds of behavior are the result of the particular factors regarded as producing them, there is no need to concern oneself with the meaning of the things towards which human beings act. (Blumer 1969b:3)

The Ideas of George Herbert Mead

Mead is the most important thinker in the history of symbolic interactionism (Chriiss 2005b; Joas 2001), and his book Mind, Self and Society is the most important single work in that tradition.

The Priority of the Social

In his review of Mind, Self and Society, Ellsworth Faris argued that “not mind and then society; but society first and then minds arising within that society . . . would probably
have been [Mead’s] preference” (cited in D. Miller 1982a:2). Faris’s inversion of the title of this book reflects the widely acknowledged fact, recognized by Mead himself, that society, or more broadly the social, is accorded priority in Mead’s analysis.

In Mead’s view, traditional social psychology began with the psychology of the individual in an effort to explain social experience; in contrast, Mead always gives priority to the social world in understanding social experience. Mead explains his focus in this way:

“We are not, in social psychology, building up the behavior of the social group in terms of the behavior of separate individuals composing it; rather, we are starting out with a given social whole of complex group activity, into which we analyze (as elements) the behavior of each of the separate individuals composing it. . . . We attempt, that is, to explain the conduct of the social group, rather than to account for the organized conduct of the social group in terms of the conduct of the separate individuals belonging to it. For social psychology, the whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts. (1934/1962:7; italics added)

To Mead, the social whole precedes the individual mind both logically and temporally. A thinking, self-conscious individual is, as we will see later, logically impossible in Mead’s theory without a prior social group. The social group comes first, and it leads to the development of self-conscious mental states.

The Act

Mead considers the act to be the most “primitive unit” in his theory (1982:27). In analyzing the act, Mead comes closest to the behaviorist’s approach and focuses on stimulus and response. However, even here the stimulus does not elicit an automatic, unthinking response from the human actor. As Mead says, “We conceive of the stimulus as an occasion or opportunity for the act, not as a compulsion or a mandate” (28). Mead (1938/1972) identified four basic and interrelated stages in the act (Schmitt and Schmitt 1996). Both lower animals and humans act, and Mead is interested in the similarities, and especially the differences, between the two.

The first stage is that of the impulse, which involves an “immediate sensuous stimulation” and the actor’s reaction to the stimulation, the need to do something about it. Hunger is a good example of an impulse. The actor (both nonhuman and human) may respond immediately and unthinkingly to the impulse, but more likely the human actor will think about the appropriate response (for example, eat now or later). The second stage of the act is perception, in which the actor searches for and reacts to stimuli that relate to the impulse, in this case hunger as well as the various means available to satisfy it. People have the capacity to sense or perceive stimuli through hearing, smell, taste, and so on. Perception involves incoming stimuli, as well as the mental images they create. People do not simply respond immediately to external stimuli but rather think about and assess them through mental imagery. Mead refuses to separate people from the objects that they perceive. It is the act of perceiving an object that makes it an object to a person; perception and object cannot be separated from (are dialectically related to) one another.

The third stage is manipulation. Once the impulse has manifested itself and the object has been perceived, the next step is manipulating the object or, more generally, taking action with regard to it. In addition to their mental advantages, people have another
A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Most of the important theorists discussed throughout this book achieved their greatest recognition in their lifetimes for their published work. George Herbert Mead, however, was at least as important, at least during his lifetime, for his teaching as for his writing (Huebner 2014). His words had a powerful impact on many people who were to become important sociologists in the 20th century. As one of his students said, “Conversation was his best medium; writing was a poor second” (T. V. Smith 1931:369).

Let us have another of his students, himself a well-known sociologist—Leonard Cottrell—describe what Mead was like as a teacher:

For me, the course with Professor Mead was a unique and unforgettable experience... Professor Mead was a large, amiable-looking man who wore a magnificent mustache and a Vandyke beard. He characteristically had a benign, rather shy smile matched with a twinkle in his eyes as if he were enjoying a secret joke he was playing on the audience...

As he lectured—always without notes—Professor Mead would manipulate the piece of chalk and watch it intently... When he made a particularly subtle point in his lecture he would glance up and throw a shy, almost apologetic smile over our heads—never looking directly at anyone. His lecture flowed and we soon learned that questions or comments from the class were not welcome. Indeed, when someone was bold enough to raise a question there was a murmur of disapproval from the students. They objected to any interruption of the golden flow...

His expectations of students were modest. He never gave exams. The main task for each of us students was to write as learned a paper as one could. These Professor Mead read with great care, and what he thought of your paper was your grade in the course. One might suppose that students would read materials for the paper rather than attend his lectures but that was not the case. Students always came. They couldn’t get enough of Mead. (Cottrell 1980:49–50)

Mead had enormous difficulty writing, and this troubled him a great deal. “I am vastly depressed by my inability to write what I want to” (cited in G. Cook 1993:xiii). However, over the years many of Mead’s ideas came to be published, especially in Mind, Self and Society (a book based on students’ notes from a course taught by Mead). This book and others of Mead’s works had a powerful influence on the development of contemporary sociology, especially symbolic interactionism.

Born in South Hadley, Massachusetts, on February 27, 1863, Mead was trained mainly in philosophy and its application to social psychology. He received a bachelor’s degree from Oberlin College (where his father was a professor) in 1883, and after a few years as a secondary school teacher, surveyor for railroad companies, and private tutor, Mead began graduate...
advantage over lower animals. People have hands (with opposable thumbs) that allow them to manipulate objects far more subtly than can lower animals. The manipulation phase constitutes, for Mead, an important temporary pause in the process so that a response is not manifested immediately. A hungry human being sees a mushroom, but before eating it, he or she is likely to pick it up first, examine it, and perhaps check in a guidebook to see whether that particular variety is edible. The pause afforded by handling the object allows humans to contemplate various responses. On the basis of these deliberations, the actor may decide to eat the mushroom (or not), and this constitutes the last phase of the act, *consummation*, or more generally the taking of action that satisfies the original impulse. Both humans and lower animals may consume the mushroom, but the human is less likely to eat a bad mushroom because of his or her ability to manipulate the mushroom and to think (and read) about the implications of eating it.

For ease of discussion, the four stages of the act have been separated from one another in sequential order, but Mead sees a dialectical relationship among the four stages. John C. Baldwin expresses this idea in the following way: “Although the four parts of the
act sometimes appear to be linked in linear order, they actually interpenetrate to form one organic process: Facets of each part are present at all times from the beginning of the act to the end, such that each part affects the other” (1986:55–56). Thus, the later stages of the act may lead to the emergence of earlier stages. For example, manipulating food may lead the individual to the impulse of hunger and the perception that the individual is hungry and that food is available to satisfy the need.

**Gestures**

The act involves only one person, but the social act involves two or more persons. The *gesture* is, in Mead’s view, the basic mechanism in the social act and in the social process more generally. He defines gestures as “movements of the first organism which act as specific stimuli calling forth the (socially) appropriate responses of the second organism” (Mead 1934/1962:14; see also Mead 1959:187). Both lower animals and humans are capable of gestures in the sense that the action of one individual mindlessly and automatically elicits a reaction by another individual. The following is Mead’s famous example of a dog fight in terms of gestures:

> The act of each dog becomes the stimulus to the other dog for his response. . . . The very fact that the dog is ready to attack another becomes a stimulus to the other dog to change his own position or his own attitude. He has no sooner done this than the change of attitude in the second dog in turn causes the first dog to change his attitude. (1934/1962:42–43)

Mead calls what is taking place in this situation a “conversation of gestures.” One dog’s gesture automatically elicits a gesture from the second; there are no thought processes taking place on the part of the dogs.

Humans sometimes engage in mindless conversations of gestures. Mead gives as examples many of the actions and reactions that take place in boxing and fencing matches when one combatant adjusts “instinctively” to the actions of the second. Mead calls such unconscious actions “nonsignificant” gestures; what distinguishes humans is their ability to employ “significant” gestures, or those that require thought on the part of the actor before a reaction.

The vocal gesture is particularly important in the development of significant gestures. However, not all vocal gestures are significant. The bark of one dog to another is not significant; even some human vocal gestures (for example, a mindless grunt) may not be significant. However, it is the development of vocal gestures, especially in the form of language, that is the most important factor in making possible the distinctive development of human life: “The specialization of the human animal within this field of the gesture has been responsible, ultimately, for the origin and growth of present human society and knowledge, with all the control over nature and over the human environment which science makes possible” (Mead 1934/1962:14).

This development is related to a distinctive characteristic of the vocal gesture. When we make a physical gesture, such as a facial grimace, we cannot see what we are doing (unless we happen to be looking in the mirror). In contrast, when we utter a vocal gesture, we hear ourselves just as others do. One result is that the vocal gesture can affect the speaker in much the same way that it affects the listeners. Another is that we are far better able to stop ourselves in vocal gestures than we are able to stop ourselves in
physical gestures. In other words, we have far better control over vocal gestures than physical ones. This ability to control oneself and one’s reactions is critical, as we will see, to the other distinctive capabilities of humans. More generally, “it has been the vocal gesture that has preeminentiy provided the medium of social organization in human society” (Mead 1959:188).

**Significant Symbols**

A significant symbol is a kind of gesture, one which only humans can make. Gestures become *significant symbols* when they arouse in the individual who is making them the same kind of response (it need not be identical) they are supposed to elicit from those to whom the gestures are addressed. Only when we have significant symbols can we truly have communication; *communication* in the full sense of the term is not possible among ants, bees, and so on. Physical gestures can be significant symbols, but as we have seen, they are not ideally suited to be significant symbols because people cannot easily see or hear their own physical gestures. Thus, it is vocal utterances that are most likely to become significant symbols, although not all vocalizations are such symbols. The set of vocal gestures most likely to become significant symbols is *language*:

> [Language is] a symbol which answers to a meaning in that experience of the first individual and which also calls out the meaning in the second individual. Where the gesture reaches that situation it has become what we call “language.” It is now a significant symbol and it signifies a certain meaning. (Mead 1934/1962:46)

In a conversation of gestures, only the gestures themselves are communicated. But with language, the gestures and their meanings are communicated.

One of the things that language, or significant symbols more generally, does is call out the same response in the individual who is speaking that it does in others. The word *dog* or *cat* elicits the same mental image in the person uttering the word that it does in those to whom it is addressed. Another effect of language is that it stimulates the person speaking as it does others. The person yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theater is at least as motivated to leave the theater as are those to whom the shout is addressed. Thus, significant symbols allow people to be the stimulators of their own actions.

Adopting his pragmatist orientation, Mead also looks at the “functions” of gestures in general and of significant symbols in particular. The function of the gesture “is to make adjustment possible among the individuals implicated in any given social act with reference to the object or objects with which that act is concerned” (Mead 1934/1962:46). Thus, an involuntary facial grimace may be made in order to prevent a child from going too close to the edge of a precipice and thereby prevent him or her from being in a potentially dangerous situation. While the nonsignificant gesture works, the significant symbol affords far greater facilities for such adjustment and readjustment than does the nonsignificant gesture, because it calls out in the individual making it the same attitude toward it . . . and enables him to adjust his subsequent behavior to theirs in the light of that attitude. (46)

For example, in communicating our displeasure to others, an angry verbal rebuke works far better than does contorted body language. This is because the person who is
using significant symbols (speech) can imagine the various ways that the child would respond to the rebuke. The speaker is prepared, then, to defend or explain the basis for the rebuke with the expectation that the child can learn the reason behind the words. This rich form of interaction cannot proceed if the person is merely responding to the child through unconscious body language.

Another very important function of significant symbols is that they contribute to the emergence of the mind and mental processes. It is only through significant symbols, especially language, that human thinking is possible (lower animals cannot think, in Mead’s terms). Mead defines thinking as “simply an internalized or implicit conversation of the individual with himself by means of such gestures” (1934/1962:47). Even more strongly, Mead argues, “Thinking is the same as talking to other people” (1982:155). In other words, thinking involves talking to oneself. Thus, we can see clearly here how Mead defines thinking in behaviorist terms. Conversations involve behavior (talking), and that behavior also occurs within the individual; when it does, thinking is taking place. This is not a mentalistic definition of thinking; it is decidedly behavioristic.

Significant symbols also make possible symbolic interaction. That is, people can interact with one another not just through gestures but also through significant symbols. This ability, of course, makes a world of difference and makes possible much more complex interaction patterns and forms of social organization than would be possible through gestures alone.

The significant symbol obviously plays a central role in Mead’s thinking. In fact, David Miller (1982a:10–11) accords the significant symbol the central role in Mead’s theory.

**Mind**

The mind, which is defined by Mead as a process and not a thing, as an inner conversation with one’s self, is not found within the individual; it is not intracranial but is a social phenomenon (Franks 2007). It arises and develops within the social process and is an integral part of that process. The social process precedes the mind; it is not, as many believe, a product of the mind. Thus, the mind, too, is defined functionally rather than substantively. Given these similarities to ideas such as consciousness, is there anything distinctive about the mind? We already have seen that humans have the peculiar capacity to call out in themselves the response they are seeking to elicit from others. A distinctive characteristic of the mind is the ability of the individual
to call out in himself not simply a single response of the other but the response, so to speak, of the community as a whole. That is what gives to an individual what we term “mind.” To do anything now means a certain organized response; and if one has in himself that response, he has what we term “mind.” (Mead 1934/1962:267)

Thus, the mind can be distinguished from other like-sounding concepts in Mead’s work by its ability to respond to the overall community and put forth an organized response.

Mead also looks at the mind in another, pragmatic way. That is, the mind involves thought processes oriented toward problem solving. The real world is rife with problems, and it is the function of the mind to try to solve those problems and permit people to operate more effectively in the world.
Self

Much of Mead’s thinking in general, and especially on the mind, involves his ideas on the critically important concept of the self (Schwalbe 2005). For Mead, the self is defined as a process. This means that the child is not born with a self, but that it emerges over time. People acquire selves when they are able to take themselves as objects. That is, they are able to act on and respond to themselves as they would to any other object in their environment. The self, then, has the ability to both act as a subject (a source of action) and to take itself as an object.

As is true of all of Mead’s major concepts, what should be clear is that selves do not precede society. Rather, they are a product of social processes, in particular the process of communication among human beings. In contrast to many psychological theories that treat the self as an entity that exists inside of the person, Mead embeds the self in social experience and social processes. In this way, Mead seeks to give a behavioristic sense of the self:

But it is where one does respond to that which he addresses to another and where that response of his own becomes a part of his conduct, where he not only hears himself but responds to himself, talks and replies to himself as truly as the other person replies to him, that we have behavior in which the individuals become objects to themselves. (1934/1962:139; italics added)

The self, then, is simply another aspect of the overall social process of which the individual is a part. This said, once a self has developed, it is possible for it to continue to exist without social contact. Thus, Robinson Crusoe developed a self while he was in civilization, and he continued to have it when he was living alone on what he thought for a while was a deserted island. In other words, he continued to have the ability to take himself as an object.

The general mechanism for the development of the self is reflexivity, or the ability to put ourselves unconsciously into others’ places and to act as they act. As a result, people are able to examine themselves as others would examine them. As Mead says:

It is by means of reflexiveness—the turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself—that the whole social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it; it is by such means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of the other toward himself, that the individual is able consciously to adjust himself to that process, and to modify the resultant process in any given social act in terms of his adjustment to it. (1934/1962:134)

The self also allows people to take part in their conversations with others. That is, one is aware of what one is saying and as a result is able to monitor what is being said and to determine what is going to be said next.

In order to have selves, individuals must be able to get “outside themselves” so that they can evaluate themselves, so that they can become objects to themselves. To do this, people basically put themselves in the same experiential field as they put everyone else. Indeed, one of the most counterintuitive, and sociologically important, assumptions of Mead’s theory of self is that people cannot experience themselves directly. They can do so only indirectly by putting themselves in the position of others and viewing
themselves from that standpoint. The standpoint from which one views one’s self can be that of a particular individual or that of the social group as a whole. As Mead puts it, most generally, “It is only by taking the roles of others that we have been able to come back to ourselves” (1959:184–185). The implication is that even in their most private moments people bear the mark of their relationships with others. Selves are deeply social in their makeup and character.

**Child Development** Mead is very interested in the genesis of the self. He sees the conversation of gestures as the background for the self, but it does not involve a self because in such a conversation the people are not taking themselves as objects. Mead traces the genesis of the self through two stages4 in childhood development.

*Play Stage* The first stage is the play stage; it is during this stage that children learn to take the attitude of particular others to themselves (Vail 2007b). Although lower animals also play, only human beings “play at being someone else” (Aboulafia 1986:9). Mead gives the example of a child playing “at being a mother, at being a teacher, at being a policeman.” In playing these roles, the child prompts itself with the same stimuli that would prompt action in these other people (1934/1962:150). As a result of such play, the child learns to become both subject and object and begins to become able to build a self. However, it is a limited self because the child can take only the roles of distinct and separate others. Children may play at being “mommy” and “daddy” and in the process develop the ability to evaluate themselves as their parents, and other specific individuals, do. However, they lack a more general and organized sense of themselves.

*Game Stage* It is the next stage, the game stage, that is required if a person is to develop a self in the full sense of the term (Vail 2007c). Whereas in the play stage the child takes the role of discrete others, in the game stage the child must take the role of everyone else involved in the game. Furthermore, these different roles must have a definite relationship to one another. In illustrating the game stage, Mead gives his famous example of a baseball (or, as he calls it, “ball nine”) game:

But in a game where a number of individuals are involved, then the child taking one role must be ready to take the role of everyone else. If he gets in a ball nine, he must have the responses of each position involved in his own position. He must know what everyone else is going to do in order to carry out his own play. He has to take all of these roles. They do not all have to be present in consciousness at the same time, but at some moments he has to have three or four individuals present in his own attitude, such as the one who is going to throw the ball, the one who is going to catch it, and so on. These responses must be, in some degree, present in his own make-up. In the game, then, there is a set of responses of such others so organized that the attitude of one calls out the appropriate attitudes of the other. (1934/1962:151)

In the play stage, children are not organized wholes because they play at a series of discrete roles. As a result, in Mead’s view they lack definite personalities. However, in the game stage,5 such organization begins and a definite personality starts to emerge. Children begin to become able to function in organized groups and, most importantly, to determine what they will do within a specific group.
**Generalized Other** The game stage yields one of Mead’s (1959:87) best-known concepts, the *generalized other* (Vail 2007d). The generalized other is the attitude of the entire community, or, in the example of the baseball game, the attitude of the entire team. The ability to take the role of the generalized other is essential to the self: “Only insofar as he takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs toward the organized, co-operative social activity or set of such activities in which that group is engaged, does he develop a complete self” (Mead 1934/1962:155). It is also crucial that people be able to evaluate themselves from the point of view of the generalized other and not merely from the viewpoint of discrete others. Taking the role of the generalized other, rather than that of discrete others, allows for the possibility of abstract thinking and objectivity (Mead 1959:190).

Here is the way Mead describes the full development of the self:

> So the self reaches its full development by organizing these individual attitudes of others into the organized social or group attitudes, and by thus becoming an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern of social or group behavior in which it and others are involved—a pattern which enters as a whole into the individual’s experience in terms of these organized group attitudes which, through the mechanism of the central nervous system, he takes toward himself, just as he takes the individual attitudes of others. (1934/1962:158)

In other words, to have a self, one must be a member of a community and be directed by the attitudes common to the community. While play requires only pieces of selves, the game requires a coherent self.

Not only is taking the role of the generalized other essential to the self, it also is crucial for the development of organized group activities. A group requires that individuals direct their activities in accord with the attitudes of the generalized other. The generalized other also represents Mead’s familiar propensity to give priority to the social because it is through the generalized other that the group influences the behavior of individuals.

Mead also looks at the self from a pragmatic point of view. At the individual level, the self allows the individual to be a more efficient member of the larger society. Because of the self, people are more likely to do what is expected of them in a given situation. Because people often try to live up to group expectations, they are more likely to avoid the inefficiencies that come from failing to do what the group expects. Furthermore, the self allows for greater coordination in society as a whole. Because individuals can be counted on to do what is expected of them, the group can operate more effectively.

The preceding, as well as the overall discussion of the self, might lead us to believe that Mead’s actors are little more than conformists and that there is little individuality since everyone is busy conforming to the expectations of the generalized other. But Mead is clear that each self is different from all the others. Selves share a common structure, but each self receives unique biographical articulation. In addition, it is clear that there is not simply one grand generalized other but that there are many generalized others in society because there are many groups in society. People therefore have multiple generalized others and, as a result, multiple selves. Each person’s unique set of selves makes him or her different from everyone else. Furthermore, people need not accept the community as it is; they can reform things and seek to make them better. We are able to change the community because of our capacity to think.
Mead identifies two aspects, or phases, of the self, which he labels the I and the Me (for a critique of this distinction, see Athens 1995). As Mead puts it, "The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases" (1934/1962:178). It is important to bear in mind that the I and the Me are processes within the larger process of the self; they are not "things."

**The I and Me** The I is the immediate response of an individual to others. It is the incalculable, unpredictable, and creative aspect of the self. People do not know in advance what the action of the I will be: "But what that response will be he does not know and nobody else knows. Perhaps he will make a brilliant play or an error. The response to that situation as it appears in his immediate experience is uncertain" (Mead 1934/1962:175). We are never totally aware of the I, and through it we surprise ourselves with our actions. We know the I only after the act has been carried out. Thus, we know the I only in our memories. Mead lays great stress on the I for four reasons. First, it is a key source of novelty in the social process. Second, Mead believes that it is in the I that our most important values are located. Third, the I constitutes something that we all seek—the realization of the self. It is the I that permits us to develop a "definite personality." Finally, Mead sees an evolutionary process in history in which people in primitive societies are dominated more by the Me while in modern societies there is a greater component of the I.

The I gives Mead's theoretical system some much-needed dynamism and creativity. Without it, Mead's actors would be totally dominated by external and internal controls. With it, Mead is able to deal with the changes brought about not only by the great figures in history (for example, Einstein) but also by individuals on a day-to-day basis. It is the I that makes these changes possible. Since every personality is a mix of I and Me, the great historical figures are seen as having a larger proportion of I than most others have. But in day-to-day situations, anyone's I may assert itself and lead to change in the social situation. Uniqueness is also brought into Mead's system through the biographical articulation of each individual's I and Me. That is, the specific exigencies of each person's life give him or her a unique mix of I and Me.

The I reacts against the Me, which is the "organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes" (Mead 1934/1962:175). In other words, the Me is the adoption of the generalized other. In contrast to the I, people are conscious of the Me; the Me involves conscious responsibility. As Mead says, "The 'me' is a conventional, habitual individual" (197). Conformists are dominated by the Me, although everyone—whatever his or her degree of conformity—has, and must have, a substantial Me. It is through the Me that society dominates the individual. Indeed, Mead defines the idea of social control as the dominance of the expression of the Me over the expression of the I. Later in *Mind, Self and Society*, Mead elaborates on his ideas on social control:

Social control, as operating in terms of self-criticism, exerts itself so intimately and extensively over individual behavior or conduct, serving to integrate the individual and his actions with reference to the organized social process of experience and behavior in which he is implicated. . . . Social control over individual behavior or conduct operates by virtue of the social origin and basis of such [self-] criticism. That is to say, self-criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled socially. Hence social control, so far from tending to crush out the human individual or to obliterate his self-conscious individuality, is, on the contrary, actually constitutive of and inextricably associated with that individuality. (1934/1962:255)
Mead also looks at the I and the Me in pragmatic terms. The Me allows the individual to live comfortably in the social world, while the I makes change in society possible. Society gets enough conformity to allow it to function, and it gets a steady infusion of new developments to prevent it from stagnating. The I and the Me are thus part of the whole social process and allow both individuals and society to function more effectively.

**Society**

Even though Mead has been associated with social psychology, from the very beginning of his career he was also concerned with the concept of society. The self, he insisted, could not be understood outside of its social context. In particular, he was interested in the relationship between society, self, and social change. This said, in spite of its centrality in his theoretical system, Mead has relatively little to say explicitly about society (Athens 2005). Even John Baldwin, who sees a much more societal (macro) component in Mead’s thinking, is forced to admit that “the macro components of Mead’s theoretical system are not as well developed as the micro” (1986:123). A full understanding of Mead’s theory of society requires, then, what Jean-François Côté (2015) calls a “critical reconstruction” of Mead’s theory of society. In other words, though Mead is never explicit in his macro analysis, and thereby lacks the clarity found in Comte, Spencer, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, a valuable and unique theory of society can be developed through a careful reading of his work.

At the most general level, Mead uses the term *society* to mean the ongoing social process that precedes both the mind and the self. He draws on both evolutionary and Hegelian perspectives to give us “a picture of a society as a living process of formation and transformation” (Côté, 2015:14). Though this definition bears some similarities to Spencer’s organismic conception of society and Durkheim’s definition of society as a social fact or a thing in itself (see Chapter 1), it should be clear that Mead offers a dialectical theory of self and society. Self consciousness and social consciousness, though distinct phenomenon, develop in relationship to one another.

On the one side of this dialectic, society guides the actions of individuals. Here, society represents the organized set of responses that are taken over by the individual in the form of the Me. In this sense, individuals carry society around with them, giving them the ability, through self-criticism, to control themselves. On the other side, society depends upon the self-reflective consciousness of its citizens. The consciousness of a society and the nature of its institutions, develops in relationship to the consciousness of the persons who compose that society:

Self-consciousness for Mead is not only, and not even primarily, an individual issue, but rather a societal one; it is only at a certain historical point in its self-development that a society requires the universality of self-conscious individuals for its development, that is to say, reaching every single individual. (Côté 2015:ix)

This is also where Mead’s interest in social reform meets his theory of self and society. According to Mead, the emergence of the political institution of “mass democracy” signals a new level of social evolution in which social change depends on the exercise of reflective individual self-consciousness at a collective level (Côté 2015).

Mead also uses the concept of *emergence* in his work. Emergence describes processes in which unique wholes develop out of the relationship between their parts. For example,
even though the phenomenon of society emerges out of the interaction between individuals, society is not merely the sum of those individual interactions. The whole is more than the sum of its parts. Mead says,

Emergence involves a reorganization, but the reorganization brings in something that was not there before. The first time oxygen and hydrogen come together, water appears. Now water is a combination of hydrogen and oxygen, but water was not there before in the separate elements. (1934/1962:198)

Typically, when Mead uses the concept of emergence it is to describe how consciousness emerges out of the social, but as we have seen from our discussion, Mead also allows for the social to emerge from the level of the interaction between individual consciousnesses.

At a more specific societal level, Mead does have a number of things to say about social institutions. For Mead, institutions (and the generalized other) are the “mediating points between self and society” (Côté 2015:22). Mead broadly defines an institution as the “common response in the community” or “the life habits of the community” (1934/1962:261, 264; see also Mead 1936:376). More specifically, he says that “the whole community acts toward the individual under certain circumstances in an identical way... there is an identical response on the part of the whole community under these conditions. We call that the formation of the institution” (1934/1962:167). We carry this organized set of attitudes around with us, and it serves to control our actions, largely through the Me.

Education is the process by which the common habits of the community (the institution) are “internalized” in the actor. This is an essential process because, in Mead’s view, people neither have selves nor are genuine members of the community until they can respond to themselves as the larger community does. To do so, people must have internalized the common attitudes of the community.

But again Mead is careful to point out that institutions need not destroy individuality or stifle creativity. Mead recognizes that there are “oppressive, stereotyped, and ultra-conservative social institutions—like the church—which by their more or less rigid and inflexible unprogressiveness crush or blot out individuality” (1934/1962:262). However, he is quick to add, “There is no necessary or inevitable reason why social institutions should be oppressive or rigidly conservative, or why they should not rather be, as many are, flexible and progressive, fostering individuality rather than discouraging it” (262). To Mead, institutions should define what people ought to do only in a very broad and general sense and should allow plenty of room for individuality and creativity. Mead here demonstrates a very modern conception of social institutions as both constraining individuals and enabling them to be creative individuals (see Giddens 1984). Mead was distinct from the other classical theorists in emphasizing the enabling character of society—arguably disregarding society’s constraining power (Athens 2002).

**Symbolic Interactionism: The Basic Principles**

The heart of this chapter is a discussion of the basic principles of symbolic interaction theory. Although we try to characterize the theory in general terms, this is not easy to do, for as Paul Rock says, it has a “deliberately constructed vagueness” and a “resistance
to systematisation” (1979:18–19). There are significant differences within symbolic interactionism, some of which are discussed as we proceed.

Some symbolic interactionists (Blumer 1969a; Manis and Meltzer 1978; A. Rose 1962; Snow 2001) have tried to enumerate the basic principles of the theory. These principles include the following:

1. Human beings, unlike lower animals, are endowed with the capacity for thought.
2. The capacity for thought is shaped by social interaction.
3. In social interaction, people learn the meanings and the symbols that allow them to exercise their distinctively human capacity for thought.
4. Meanings and symbols allow people to carry on distinctively human action and interaction.
5. People are able to modify or alter the meanings and symbols that they use in action and interaction on the basis of their interpretation of the situation.
6. People are able to make these modifications and alterations because, in part, of their ability to interact with themselves, which allows them to examine possible courses of action, assess their relative advantages and disadvantages, and then choose one.
7. The intertwined patterns of action and interaction make up groups and societies.

**Capacity for Thought**

The crucial assumption that human beings possess the ability to think differentiates symbolic interactionism from its behaviorist roots. This assumption also provides the basis for the entire theoretical orientation of symbolic interactionism. Bernard Meltzer, James Petras, and Larry Reynolds stated that the assumption of the human capacity for thought is one of the major contributions of early symbolic interactionists, such as James, Dewey, Thomas, Cooley, and of course, Mead:

> Individuals in human society were not seen as units that are motivated by external or internal forces beyond their control, or within the confines of a more or less fixed structure. Rather, they were viewed as reflective or interacting units which comprise the societal entity. (1975:42)

The ability to think enables people to act reflectively rather than just behave unreflectively. People must often construct and guide what they do, rather than just release it.

The ability to think is embedded in the mind, but the symbolic interactionists have a somewhat unusual conception of the mind as originating in the socialization of consciousness. They distinguish it from the physiological brain. People must have brains in order to develop minds, but a brain does not inevitably produce a mind, as is clear in the case of lower animals (Troyer 1946). Also, symbolic interactionists do not conceive of the mind as a thing, a physical structure, but rather as a continuing process. It is a process that is itself part of the larger process of stimulus and response. The mind is related to virtually every other aspect of symbolic interactionism, including socialization, meanings, symbols, the self, interaction, and even society.
People possess only a general capacity for thought. This capacity must be shaped and refined in the process of social interaction. Such a view leads the symbolic interactionist to focus on a specific form of social interaction—socialization. The human ability to think is developed early in childhood socialization and is refined during adult socialization. Symbolic interactionists have a view of the socialization process that is different from that of most other sociologists. To symbolic interactionists, conventional sociologists are likely to see socialization as simply a process by which people learn the things that they need to survive in society (for instance, culture, role expectations). To the symbolic interactionists, socialization is a more dynamic process that allows people to develop the ability to think, to develop in distinctively human ways. Furthermore, socialization is not simply a one-way process in which the actor receives information, but is a dynamic process in which the actor shapes and adapts the information to his or her own needs (Manis and Meltzer 1978:6).

Symbolic interactionists are, of course, interested not simply in socialization but in interaction in general, which is of “vital importance in its own right” (Blumer 1969b:8). Interaction is the process in which the ability to think is both developed and expressed. All types of interaction, not just interaction during socialization, refine our ability to think. Beyond that, thinking shapes the interaction process. In most interaction, actors must take account of others and decide if and how to fit their activities to others. However, not all interaction involves thinking. The differentiation made by Blumer (following Mead) between two basic forms of social interaction is relevant here. The first, nonsymbolic interaction—Mead’s conversation of gestures—does not involve thinking. The second, symbolic interaction, does require mental processes.

The importance of thinking to symbolic interactionists is reflected in their views on objects. Blumer differentiates among three types of objects: physical objects, such as a chair or a tree; social objects, such as a student or a mother; and abstract objects, such as an idea or a moral principle. Objects are seen simply as things “out there” in the real world; what is of greatest significance is the way they are defined by actors. The latter leads to the relativistic view that different objects have different meanings for different individuals: “A tree will be a different object to a botanist, a lumberman, a poet, and a home gardener” (Blumer 1969b:11).

Individuals learn the meanings of objects during the socialization process. Most of us learn a common set of meanings, but in many cases, as with the tree just mentioned, we have different definitions of the same objects. Although this definitional view can be taken to an extreme, symbolic interactionists need not deny the existence of objects in the real world. All they need do is point out the crucial nature of the definition of those objects as well as the possibility that actors may have different definitions of the same object. As Herbert Blumer said, “The nature of an object . . . consists of the meaning that it has for the person for whom it is an object” (1969b:11).

Learning Meanings and Symbols

Symbolic interactionists, following Mead, tend to accord causal significance to social interaction. Thus, meaning stems not from solitary mental processes but from interaction. This focus derives from Mead’s pragmatism: he focused on human action and interaction, not on isolated mental processes. Symbolic interactionists have in general continued in this direction. Among other things, the central concern is not how people mentally create meanings and symbols but how they learn them during interaction in general and socialization in particular.
People learn symbols as well as meanings in social interaction. Whereas people respond to signs unthinkingly, they respond to symbols in a thoughtful manner. Signs stand for themselves (for example, the gestures of angry dogs or water to a person dying of thirst). “Symbols are social objects used to represent (or ‘stand in for,’ ‘take the place of’) whatever people agree they shall represent” (Charon 1998:47). Not all social objects stand for other things, but those that do are symbols. Words, physical artifacts, and physical actions (for example, the word boat, a cross or a Star of David, and a clenched fist) all can be symbols. People often use symbols to communicate something about themselves: They drive Rolls-Royces, for instance, to communicate a certain style of life.

Symbolic interactionists conceive of language as a vast system of symbols. Words are symbols because they are used to stand for things. Words make all other symbols possible. Acts, objects, and other words exist and have meaning only because they have been and can be described through the use of words.

Symbols are crucial in allowing people to act in distinctively human ways. Because of the symbol, the human being “does not respond passively to a reality that imposes itself but actively creates and re-creates the world acted in” (Charon 1998:69). In addition to this general utility, symbols in general and language in particular have a number of specific functions for the actor.

First, symbols enable people to deal with the material and social world by allowing them to name, categorize, and remember the objects they encounter there. In this way, people are able to order a world that otherwise would be confusing. Language allows people to name, categorize, and especially remember much more efficiently than they could with other kinds of symbols, such as pictorial images.

Second, symbols improve people’s ability to perceive the environment. Instead of being flooded by a mass of indistinguishable stimuli, the actor can be alerted to some parts of the environment rather than others.

Third, symbols improve the ability to think. Although a set of pictorial symbols would allow a limited ability to think, language greatly expands this ability. Thinking, in these terms, can be conceived of as symbolic interaction with one’s self.

Fourth, symbols greatly increase the ability to solve various problems. Lower animals must use trial-and-error, but human beings can think through symbolically a variety of alternative actions before actually taking one. This ability reduces the chance of making costly mistakes.

Fifth, the use of symbols allows actors to transcend time, space, and even their own persons. Through the use of symbols, actors can imagine what it was like to live in the past or what it might be like to live in the future. In addition, actors can transcend their own persons symbolically and imagine what the world is like from another person’s point of view. This is the well-known symbolic-interactionist concept of taking the role of the other (D. Miller 1981).

Sixth, symbols allow us to imagine a metaphysical reality, such as heaven or hell. Seventh, and most generally, symbols allow people to avoid being enslaved by their environment. They can be active rather than passive—that is, self-directed in what they do.

**Action and Interaction**

Symbolic interactionists’ primary concern is with the impact of meanings and symbols on human action and interaction. Here, it is useful to employ Mead’s differentiation between covert and overt behavior. *Covert behavior* is the thinking process, involving symbols and meanings. *Overt behavior* is the actual behavior performed by
an actor. Some overt behavior does not involve covert behavior (habitual behavior or mindless responses to external stimuli). However, most human action involves both kinds. Covert behavior is of greatest concern to symbolic interactionists, whereas overt behavior is of greatest concern to exchange theorists or to traditional behaviorists in general.

Meanings and symbols give human social action (which involves a single actor) and social interaction (which involves two or more actors engaged in mutual social action) distinctive characteristics. Social action is that in which the individuals are acting with others in mind. In other words, in undertaking an action, people simultaneously try to gauge its impact on the other actors involved. Although they often engage in mindless, habitual behavior, people have the capacity to engage in social action.

In the process of social interaction, people symbolically communicate meanings to the others involved. The others interpret those symbols and orient their responding action on the basis of their interpretation. In other words, in social interaction, actors engage in a process of mutual influence. Christopher (2001) refers to this dynamic social interaction as a “dance” that partners engage in.

Making Choices

Partly because of the ability to handle meanings and symbols, people, unlike lower animals, can make choices in the actions in which they engage. People need not accept the meanings and symbols that are imposed on them from without. On the basis of their own interpretation of the situation, “humans are capable of forming new meanings and new lines of meaning” (Manis and Meltzer 1978:7). Thus, to the symbolic interactionist, actors have at least some autonomy. They are not simply constrained or determined; they are capable of making unique and independent choices. Furthermore, they are able to develop a life that has a unique style (Perinbanayagam 1985:53).

W. I. Thomas and Dorothy Thomas were instrumental in underscoring this creative capacity in their concept of definition of the situation: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (1928:572). The Thomases knew that most of our definitions of situations have been provided for us by society. In fact, they emphasized this point, identifying especially the family and the community as sources of our social definitions. However, the Thomases’ position is distinctive for its emphasis on the possibility of “spontaneous” individual definitions of situations, which allow people to alter and modify meanings and symbols.

Groups and Societies

Symbolic interactionists are generally highly critical of the tendency of other sociologists to focus on macro structures. As Paul Rock says, “Interactionism discards most macrosociological thought as an unsure and overambitious metaphysics . . . not accessible to intelligent examination” (1979:238). Dmitri Shalin points to “interactionist criticism aimed at the classical view of social order as external, atemporal, determinate at any given moment and resistant to change” (1986:14). Rock also says, “Whilst it [symbolic interactionism] does not wholly shun the idea of social structure, its stress upon activity and process relegates structural metaphors to a most minor place” (1979:50).

Blumer is in the forefront of those who are critical of sociological determinism in which the “social action of people is treated as an outward flow or expression of forces playing on them rather than as acts which are built up by people through their...
interpretation of the situations in which they are placed" (1962/1969:84). To Blumer, society is not made up of macro structures. The essence of society is to be found in actors and action: “Human society is to be seen as consisting of acting people, and the life of the society is to be seen as consisting of their actions” (85). Human society is action; group life is a “complex of ongoing activity.” However, society is not made up of an array of isolated acts. There is collective action as well, which involves “individuals fitting their lines of action to one another . . . participants making indications to one another, not merely each to himself” (Blumer 1969b:16). This gives rise to what Mead called the social act and Blumer calls joint action.

Blumer accepted the idea of emergence—that large-scale structures emerge from micro processes (Morrione 1988). According to Maines, “The key to understanding Blumer's treatment of large-scale organizations rests on his conception of joint action” (1988:46). A joint action is not simply the sum total of individual acts—it comes to have a character of its own. A joint action thus is not external to or coercive of actors and their actions; rather, it is created by actors and their actions.

From this discussion, one gets the sense that the joint act is almost totally flexible—that is, that society can become almost anything the actors want it to be. However, Blumer was not prepared to go as far as that. He argued that each instance of joint action must be formed anew, but he did recognize that joint action is likely to have a “well-established and repetitive form” (Blumer 1969b:17). Not only does most joint action recur in patterns, but Blumer also was willing to admit that such action is guided by systems of preestablished meanings, such as culture and social order.

It would appear that Blumer admitted that there are large-scale structures and that they are important. Here, Blumer followed Mead (1934/1962), who admitted that such structures are very important. However, such structures have an extremely limited role in symbolic interactionism. For one thing, Blumer most often argued that large-scale structures are little more than “frameworks” within which the really important aspects of social life—action and interaction—take place (1962/1969:87). Large-scale structures do set the conditions and limitations on human action, but they do not determine it. In his view, people do not act within the context of structures such as society; rather, they act in situations. Large-scale structures are important in that they shape the situations in which individuals act and supply to actors the fixed set of symbols that enable them to act.

Even when Blumer discussed such preestablished patterns, he hastened to make it clear that “areas of unprescribed conduct are just as natural, indigenous, and recurrent in human group life as those areas covered by preestablished and faithfully followed prescriptions of joint action” (1969b:18). Not only are there many unprescribed areas, but even in prescribed areas joint action has to be created and re-created consistently. Actors are guided by generally accepted meanings in this creation and re-creation, but they are not determined by them. They may accept them as is, but they also can make minor and even major alterations in them. In Blumer’s words, “It is the social process in group life that creates and upholds the rules, not the rules that create and uphold group life” (19).

Sheldon Stryker was not satisfied with Blumer’s treatment of the relationship between microprocess and macrostructures, and he enunciated a more ambitious integrative goal for symbolic interactionism:

A satisfactory theoretical framework must bridge social structure and person, must be able to move from the level of the person to that of large-scale social structure.
and back again. . . . There must exist a conceptual framework facilitating movement across the levels of organization and person. (1980:53)

Perinbanayagam articulated a similar goal for symbolic interactionism: “the existence of structure and meaning, self and others, the dialectic of being and emergence, leading to a dialectical interactionism” (1985:xv). Stryker embedded his orientation in Meadian symbolic interactionism but sought to extend it to the societal level, primarily through the use of role theory:

This version begins with Mead, but goes beyond Mead to introduce role theoretic concepts and principles, in order to adequately deal with the reciprocal impact of social person and social structure. The nexus in this reciprocal impact is interaction. It is in the context of the social process—the ongoing patterns of interaction joining individual actors—that social structure operates to constrain the conceptions of self, the definitions of the situation, and the behavioral opportunities and repertoires that bound and guide the interaction that takes place. (1980:52)

Stryker developed his orientation in terms of eight general principles:

1. Human action is dependent on a named and classified world in which the names and classifications have meaning for actors. People learn through interaction with others how to classify the world, as well as how they are expected to behave toward it.

2. Among the most important things that people learn are the symbols used to designate social positions. A critical point here is that Stryker conceived of positions in structural terms: “the relatively stable, morphological components of social structure” (Stryker 1980:54). Stryker also accorded roles central importance, conceiving of them as the shared behavioral expectations attached to social positions.

3. Stryker also recognized the importance of larger social structures, although he was inclined, like other symbolic interactionists, to conceive of them in terms of organized patterns of behavior. In addition, his discussion treated social structure as simply the “framework” within which people act. Within these structures, people name one another—that is, recognize one another—as occupants of positions. In so doing, people evoke reciprocal expectations of what each is expected to do.

4. Furthermore, in acting in this context, people name not only each other but also themselves; that is, they apply positional designations to themselves. These self-designations become part of the self, internalized expectations with regard to their own behavior.

5. When interacting, people define the situation by applying names to it, to other participants, to themselves, and to particular features of the situation. These definitions are then used by the actors to organize their behavior.

6. Social behavior is not determined by social meanings, although it is constrained by them. Stryker is a strong believer in the idea of role making. People do not simply take roles; rather, they take an active, creative orientation to their roles.
7. Social structures also serve to limit the degree to which roles are “made” rather than just “taken” (D. Martin and Wilson 2005). Some structures permit more creativity than others do.

8. The possibilities of role making make various social changes possible. Changes can occur in social definitions—in names, symbols, and classifications—and in the possibilities for interaction. The cumulative effect of these changes can be alterations in the larger social structures.

Although Stryker offered a useful beginning toward a more adequate symbolic interactionism, his work has a number of limitations. The most notable is that he said little about larger social structures per se. Stryker saw the need to integrate these larger structures in his work, but he recognized that a “full-fledged development of how such incorporation could proceed is beyond the scope of the present work” (1980:69). Stryker saw only a limited future role for large-scale structural variables in symbolic interactionism. He hoped ultimately to incorporate structural factors such as class, status, and power as variables constraining interaction, but he was disinclined to see symbolic interactionism deal with the interrelationships among these structural variables. Presumably, this kind of issue is to be left to other theories that focus more on large-scale social phenomena.

**The Self and the Work of Erving Goffman**

The self is a concept of enormous importance to symbolic interactionists (Bruder 1998). In fact, Rock argues that the self “constitutes the very hub of the interactionists’ intellectual scheme. All other sociological processes and events revolve around that hub, taking from it their analytic meaning and organization” (1979:102). Though the work of Erving Goffman cannot be reduced to his theories of the self (Smith 2011), it is clear that one of his most important contributions to sociology is his theory of self. In what follows, we place Goffman’s theory of the self in the context of other symbolic interactionist theories of self as well as in Goffman’s more general theories.

**The Self**

In attempting to understand the concept of the self beyond its initial Meadian formulation, we must first understand the idea of the *looking-glass self* developed by Charles Horton Cooley (Franks and Gecas 1992). Cooley defined this concept as

> a somewhat definite imagination of how one’s self—that is, any idea he appropriates—appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined by the attitude toward this attributed to that other mind. . . . So in imagination we perceive in another’s mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it. (1902/1964:169)

The idea of a looking-glass self can be broken down into three components. First, we imagine how we appear to others. Second, we imagine what their judgment of that appearance must be. Third, we develop some self-feeling, such as pride or mortification, as a result of our imagining others’ judgments.
ERVING GOFFMAN
A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Erving Goffman died in 1982 at the peak of his fame. He had long been regarded as a “cult” figure in sociological theory. That status was achieved in spite of the fact that he had been a professor in the prestigious sociology department at the University of California, Berkeley, and later held an endowed chair at the Ivy League’s University of Pennsylvania [Manning 2005b; G. Smith 2007, 2011].

By the 1980s, he had emerged as a centrally important theorist. In fact, he had been elected president of the American Sociological Association in the year he died but was unable to give his presidential address because of advanced illness. Given Goffman’s maverick status, Randall Collins says of his address:

Everyone wondered what he would do for his Presidential address: a straight, traditional presentation seemed unthinkable for Goffman with his reputation as an iconoclast . . . we got a far more dramatic message: Presidential address cancelled, Goffman dying. It was an appropriately Goffmanian way to go out. [1986b:112]

Goffman was born in Alberta, Canada, on June 11, 1922 (S. Williams 1986). He earned his advanced degrees from the University of Chicago and is most often thought of as a member of the Chicago School and as a symbolic interactionist. However, when he was asked shortly before his death whether he was a symbolic interactionist, he replied that the label was too vague to allow him to put himself in that category (Manning 1992). In fact, it is hard to squeeze his work into any single category. In creating his theoretical perspective, Goffman drew on many sources and created a distinctive orientation.

Collins (1986b) links Goffman more to social anthropology than to symbolic interactionism. As an undergraduate at the University of Toronto, Goffman had studied with an anthropologist, and at Chicago “his main contacts were not with Symbolic Interactionists, but with W. Lloyd Warner [an anthropologist]” (Collins 1986b:109). In Collins’s view, an examination of the citations in Goffman’s early work indicates that he was influenced by social anthropologists and rarely cited symbolic interactionists, and when he did, it was to be critical of them. However, Goffman was influenced by the descriptive studies produced at Chicago and integrated their outlook with that of social anthropology to produce his distinctive perspective. Thus, whereas a symbolic interactionist would look at how people create or negotiate their self-images, Goffman was concerned with how “society . . . forces people to present a certain image of themselves . . . because it forces us to switch back and forth between many complicated roles, is also making us always somewhat untruthful, inconsistent, and dishonorable” (Collins 1986a:107).

Despite the distinctiveness of his perspective, Goffman had a powerful influence on symbolic interactionism. In addition, it could be argued that he had a hand in shaping another sociology of everyday life, ethnomethodology. In fact, Collins sees Goffman as a key figure in the formation not only of ethnomethodology, but of conversation analysis as well: “It was Goffman who pioneered the close empirical study of everyday life, although he had done it with his bare
Cooley’s concept of the looking-glass self and Mead’s concept of the self were important in the development of the modern symbolic-interactionist conception of the self. Blumer defined the self in extremely simple terms: “Nothing esoteric is meant by this expression [self]. It means merely that a human being can be an object of his own action . . . he acts toward himself and guides himself in his actions toward others on the basis of the kind of object he is to himself” (1969b:12). The self is a process, not a thing (Perinbanayagam 1985). As Blumer made clear, the self helps human beings to act rather than simply respond to external stimuli:

The process [interpretation] has two distinct steps. First, the actor indicates to himself the things toward which he is acting; he has to point out in himself the things that have meaning. . . . This interaction with himself is something other than an interplay of psychological elements; it is an instance of the person engaging in a process of communicating with himself. . . . Second, by virtue of this process of communicating with himself, interpretation becomes a matter of handling meanings. The actor selects, checks, suspends, regroups, and transforms the meanings in the light of the situation in which he is placed and the direction of his action. (1969b:5)

Although this description of interpretation underscores the part played by the self in the process of choosing how to act, Blumer has really not gone much beyond the early formulations of Cooley and Mead.

Goffman, however, significantly extends interactionist conceptions of the self in his book *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959; Dowd 1996; Schwalbe 1993; Traver 1992; Tseelon 1992). Goffman’s conception of the self is deeply indebted to Mead’s ideas, in particular his discussion of the tension between the “I” (the spontaneous self) and the “me” (social constraints within the self). This tension is mirrored in Goffman’s work on what he called the “crucial discrepancy between our all-too-human selves and our socialized selves” (1959:56). The tension results from the difference between what people expect us to do and what we may want to do spontaneously. We are confronted with the demand to do what is expected of us; moreover, we are not supposed to waver. As Goffman put it, “We must not be subject to ups and downs” (1959:56). In order to maintain a stable self-image, people perform for their social audiences. As a result of this interest in performance, Goffman focused on dramaturgy, or a view of social life as a series of dramatic performances akin to those performed on the stage.

*Dramaturgy* Goffman’s sense of the self was shaped by his dramaturgical approach (Alieva 2008). To Goffman (as to Mead and most other symbolic interactionists), the self is...
Goffman perceived the self not as a possession of the actor but rather as the product of the dramatic interaction between actor and audience. The self “is a dramatic effect arising . . . from a scene that is presented” (Goffman 1959:253). Because the self is a product of dramatic interaction, it is vulnerable to disruption during the performance (Misztal 2001). Goffman’s dramaturgy is concerned with the processes by which such disturbances are prevented or dealt with. Although the bulk of his discussion focuses on these dramaturgical contingencies, Goffman pointed out that most performances are successful. The result is that in ordinary circumstances a firm self is accorded to performers, and it “appears” to emanate from the performer.

Goffman assumed that when individuals interact, they want to present a certain sense of self that will be accepted by others. However, even as they present that self, actors are aware that members of the audience can disturb their performance. For that reason, actors are attuned to the need to control the audience, especially those elements of it that might be disruptive. The actors hope that the sense of self that they present to the audience will be strong enough for the audience to define the actors as the actors want them to. The actors also hope that this will cause the audience to act voluntarily as the actors want them to. Goffman characterized this central interest as “impression management.” It involves techniques actors use to maintain certain impressions in the face of problems they are likely to encounter and methods they use to cope with these problems.

Following this theatrical analogy, Goffman spoke of a front stage. The front is that part of the performance that generally functions in rather fixed and general ways to define the situation for those who observe the performance. Within the front stage, Goffman further differentiated between the setting and the personal front. The setting refers to the physical scene that ordinarily must be there if the actors are to perform. Without it, the actors usually cannot perform. For example, a surgeon generally requires an operating room, a taxi driver a cab, and an ice skater ice. The personal front consists of those items of expressive equipment that the audience identifies with the performers and expects them to carry with them into the setting. A surgeon, for instance, is expected to dress in a medical gown, have certain instruments, and so on.

Goffman then subdivided the personal front into appearance and manner. Appearance includes those items that tell us the performer’s social status (for instance, the surgeon’s medical gown). Manner tells the audience what sort of role the performer expects to play in the situation (for example, the use of physical mannerisms, demeanor). A brusque manner and a meek manner indicate quite different kinds of performances. In general, we expect appearance and manner to be consistent.

Although Goffman approached the front and other aspects of his system as a symbolic interactionist, he did discuss their structural character. For example, he argued that fronts tend to become institutionalized, and so “collective representations” arise about what is to go on in a certain front. Very often when actors take on established roles, they find particular fronts already established for such performances. The result, Goffman
argued, is that fronts tend to be selected, not created. This idea conveys a much more structural image than we would receive from most symbolic interactionists.

Despite such a structural view, Goffman’s most interesting insights lie in the domain of interaction. He argued that because people generally7 try to present an idealized picture of themselves in their front-stage performances, inevitably they feel that they must hide things in their performances. First, actors may want to conceal secret pleasures (for instance, drinking alcohol) engaged in prior to the performance or in past lives (for instance, as drug addicts) that are incompatible with their performance. Second, actors may want to conceal errors that have been made in the preparation of the performance, as well as steps that have been taken to correct these errors. For example, a taxi driver may seek to hide the fact that he started in the wrong direction. Third, actors may find it necessary to show only end products and to conceal the process involved in producing them. For example, professors may spend several hours preparing a lecture, but they may want to act as if they have always known the material. Fourth, it may be necessary for actors to conceal from the audience that “dirty work” was involved in the making of the end products. Dirty work may include tasks that “were physically unclean, semi-legal, cruel, and degrading in other ways” (Goffman 1959:44). Fifth, in giving a certain performance, actors may have to let other standards slide. Finally, actors probably find it necessary to hide any insults, humiliations, or deals made so that the performance could go on. Generally, actors have a vested interest in hiding all such facts from their audience.

Another aspect of dramaturgy in the front stage is that actors often try to convey the impression that they are closer to the audience than they actually are. For example, actors may try to foster the impression that the performance in which they are engaged at the moment is their only performance or at least their most important one. To do this, actors have to be sure that their audiences are segregated so that the falsity of the performance is not discovered. Even if it is discovered, Goffman argued, the audiences themselves may try to cope with the falsity so as not to shatter their idealized image of the actor. This reveals the interactional character of performances. A successful performance depends on the involvement of all the parties. Another example of this kind of impression management is an actor’s attempt to convey the idea that there is something unique about this performance as well as his or her relationship to the audience. The audience, too, wants to feel that it is the recipient of a unique performance.

Actors try to make sure that all the parts of any performance blend together. In some cases, a single discordant aspect can disrupt a performance. However, performances vary in the amount of consistency required. A slip by a priest on a sacred occasion would be terribly disruptive, but if a taxi driver made one wrong turn, it would not be likely to damage the overall performance greatly.

Another technique employed by performers is mystification. Actors often tend to mystify their performances by restricting the contact between themselves and the audience. By generating “social distance” between themselves and the audience, they try to create a sense of awe in the audience. This, in turn, keeps the audience from questioning the performance. Again, Goffman pointed out that the audience is involved in this process and often itself seeks to maintain the credibility of the performance by keeping its distance from the performer.

This leads us to Goffman’s interest in teams. To Goffman, as a symbolic interactionist, a focus on individual actors obscured important facts about interaction. Goffman’s basic unit of analysis was thus not the individual but the team. A team is any set of
individuals who cooperate in staging a single routine. Thus, the preceding discussion of
the relationship between the performer and audience is really about teams. Each mem-
ber is reliant on the others because all can disrupt the performance and all are aware that
they are putting on an act. Goffman concluded that a team is a kind of “secret society.”

Goffman also discussed a back stage where facts suppressed in the front or various
kinds of informal actions may appear. A back stage is usually adjacent to the front stage,
but it is also cut off from it. Performers can reliably expect no members of their front
audience to appear in the back. Furthermore, they engage in various types of impres-
sion management to make sure of this. A performance is likely to become difficult when
actors are unable to prevent the audience from entering the back stage. There is also a
third, residual domain, the outside, which is neither front nor back.

No area is always one of these three domains. Also, a given area can occupy all three
domains at different times. A professor’s office is front stage when a student visits, back
stage when the student leaves, and outside when the professor is at a university basket-
ball game.

**Impression Management** In general, impression management (P. Manning 2005c) is ori-
ented to guarding against a series of unexpected actions, such as unintended gestures,
inopportune intrusions, and faux pas, as well as intended actions, such as making a
scene. Goffman was interested in the various methods of dealing with such problems.
First, there is a set of methods involving actions aimed at producing dramaturgical loy-
alty by, for example, fostering high in-group loyalty, preventing team members from
identifying with the audience, and changing audiences periodically so that they do not
become too knowledgeable about the performers. Second, Goffman suggested various
forms of dramaturgical discipline, such as having the presence of mind to avoid slips,
maintaining self-control, and managing the facial expressions and verbal tone of one’s
performance. Third, he identified various types of dramaturgical circumspection, such as
determining in advance how a performance should go, planning for emergencies, select-
ing loyal teammates, selecting good audiences, being involved in small teams where dis-
sension is less likely, making only brief appearances, preventing audience access to pri-
vate information, and settling on a complete agenda to prevent unforeseen occurrences.

The audience also has a stake in successful impression management by the actor or
team of actors. The audience often acts to save the show through such devices as giving
great interest and attention to it, avoiding emotional outbursts, not noticing slips, and
giving special consideration to a neophyte performer.

Manning points not only to the centrality of the self but also to Goffman’s cynical
view of people in this work:

The overall tenor of *The Presentation of Self* is to a world in which people, whether
individually or in groups, pursue their own ends in cynical disregard for others . . .
The view here is of the individual as a set of performance masks hiding a manipu-
lative and cynical self. (P. Manning 1992:44)

Manning puts forth a “two selves thesis” to describe this aspect of Goffman’s think-
ing; that is, people have both a performance self and a hidden, cynical self.

**Role Distance** Goffman (1961) was interested in the degree to which an individual
embraces a given role. In his view, because of the large number of roles, few people
get completely involved in any given role. Role distance deals with the degree to which individuals separate themselves from the roles they are in (Butera 2008). For example, if older children ride on a merry-go-round, they are likely to be aware that they are really too old to enjoy such an experience. One way of coping with this feeling is to demonstrate distance from the role by doing it in a careless, lackadaisical way by performing seemingly dangerous acts while on the merry-go-round. In performing such acts, the older children are really explaining to the audience that they are not as immersed in the activity as small children might be or that if they are, it is because of the special things they are doing.

One of Goffman’s key insights is that role distance is a function of one’s social status. High-status people often manifest role distance for reasons other than those of people in low-status positions. For example, a high-status surgeon may manifest role distance in the operating room to relieve the tension of the operating team. People in low-status positions usually manifest more defensiveness in exhibiting role distance. For instance, people who clean toilets may do so in a lackadaisical and uninterested manner. They may be trying to tell their audience that they are too good for such work.

Stigma Goffman (1963) was interested in the gap between what a person ought to be—virtual social identity—and what a person actually is—actual social identity. Anyone who has a gap between these two identities is stigmatized. Stigma focuses on the dramaturgical interaction between stigmatized people and so-called “normals.” The nature of that interaction depends on which of the two types of stigma an individual has. In the case of discredited stigma, the actor assumes that the differences are known by the audience members or are evident to them (for example, a paraplegic or someone who has lost a limb). A discreditable stigma is one in which the differences are neither known by audience members nor perceptible by them (for example, a person who has had a colostomy or a homosexual passing as straight). For someone with a discredited stigma, the basic dramaturgical problem is managing the tension produced by the fact that people know of the problem. For someone with a discreditable stigma, the dramaturgical problem is managing information so that the problem remains unknown to the audience. (For a discussion of how the homeless deal with stigma, see Anderson, Snow, and Cress 1994.)

Most of the text of Goffman’s Stigma is devoted to people with obvious, often grotesque stigmas (for instance, the loss of a nose). However, as the book unfolds, the reader realizes that Goffman is really saying that we are all stigmatized at some time or other or in one setting or another. His examples include the Jew “passing” in a predominantly Christian community, the fat person in a group of people of average weight, and the individual who has lied about his past and must be constantly sure that the audience does not learn of this deception.

Frame Analysis In Frame Analysis (1974), Goffman moved away from his classic symbolic-interactionist roots and toward the study of the small-scale structures of social life (for a study employing the idea of frames, see McLean 1998). Although he still felt that people define situations in the sense meant by W. I. Thomas, he now thought that such definitions were less important: “Defining situations as real certainly has consequences, but these may contribute very marginally to the events in progress” (Goffman 1974:1). Furthermore, even when people define situations, they do not ordinarily create those definitions. Action is defined more by mechanical adherence to rules than through an active, creative, and negotiated process. Goffman enunciated his goal: “to try to isolate
some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events and to analyze the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject” (10).

Goffman looked beyond and behind everyday situations in a search for the structures that invisibly govern them.

These are “‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large [Chambliss, 2005]. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. (Snow 1986:464)

Frames are principles of organization that define our experiences. They are assumptions about what we are seeing in the social world. Without frames, our world would be little more than a number of chaotic individual and unrelated events and facts. Gonos provided other structural characteristics of frames:

From Goffman’s analyses of particular framed activities, we can derive certain principal characteristics of frames. A frame is not conceived as a loose, somewhat accidental amalgamation of elements put together over a short time-span. Rather, it is constituted of a set number of essential components, having a definite arrangement and stable relations. These components are not gathered from here and there, as are the elements of a situation, but are always found together as a system. The standard components cohere and are complete. . . . Other less essential elements are present in any empirical instance and lend some of their character to the whole. . . . In all this, frames are very close in conception to “structures.” (1977:860)

To Gonos, frames are largely rules or laws that fix interaction. The rules are usually unconscious and ordinarily nonnegotiable. Among the rules identified by Gonos are those that define “how signs are to be ‘interpreted,’ how outward indications are to be related to ‘selves,’ and what ‘experience’ will accompany activity” (1980:160). Gonos concludes, “Goffman’s problematic thus promotes the study not of observable interaction of ‘everyday life’ as such, but its eternal structure and ideology; not of situations, but of their frames” (160).

One can grant frames the status of preexisting structures, especially in the larger culture, but it is also the case that interpretive, constructionist (P. Berger and Luckmann 1967; Swatos 2007) work is required by actors in relationship to frames. Actors must decide which frame among others is the one to be used in a given situation. Frames themselves may be transformed by actors as the need arises. Frames also may change over time rather than remaining static. This is especially the case when successful social movements arise that contest extant frames or succeed in replacing them with different ones.

According to Snow (2007), frames perform three functions in interpretive work. First, they focus attention on our surroundings by highlighting what is relevant or irrelevant, what is “in-frame” and what is “out-of-frame.” Second, they act as articulation mechanisms by linking the various highlighted elements so that a “story” is told about them,
so that one set of meanings rather than another is conveyed. Third, they serve a *transformative function* through the reconstitution of the way some things are seen in relation to other things or to the actor. Snow (2007:1778–1786) concludes that “it is arguable that they [frames] are fundamental to interpretation, so much so that few, if any, utterances could be meaningfully understood apart from the way they are framed.”

Philip Manning (1992:119) gives the following examples of how different frames applied to the same set of events serve to give those same events very different meaning. For example, what are we to make of the sight of a woman putting two watches in her pocket and leaving a shop without paying? Seen through the frame of a store detective, this appears to be a clear case of shoplifting. However, the legal frame leads her lawyer to see this as the act of an absentminded woman who was out shopping for gifts for her daughters.

Another change that Manning argues is clear in *Frame Analysis* and that was foreshadowed in other works by Goffman is a shift away from the cynical view of life that lay at the heart of *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. In fact, on the first page of *Frame Analysis*, Goffman says, “All the world is not a stage—certainly the theater isn’t entirely” (1974:1). Goffman clearly came to recognize the limitations of the theater as a metaphor for everyday life. While still useful in some ways, this metaphor conceals some aspects of life just as it illuminates others. One of the things that is concealed is the importance of ritual in everyday life. Here is the way Manning describes one of the roles played by ritual in everyday life:

For Goffman, ritual is essential because it maintains our confidence in basic social relationships. It provides others with opportunities to affirm the legitimacy of our position in the social structure while obliging us to do the same. Ritual is a placement mechanism in which, for the most part, social inferiors affirm the higher positions of their superiors. The degree of ritual in a society reflects the legitimacy of its social structure because the ritual respect paid to individuals is also a sign of respect for the roles they occupy. (1992:133)

More generally, we can say that rituals are one of the key mechanisms by which everyday life, and the social world in general, are made orderly and given solidity.

Goffman’s interest in rituals brought him close to the later work of Emile Durkheim, especially *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912/1965). More generally, in accord with Durkheim’s sense of social facts, Goffman came to focus on rules and see them as external constraints on social behavior. However, rules are generally only partial, indeterminate guides to conduct. Furthermore, even though people are constrained, such constraint does not rule out the possibility of individual variation, even imaginative use by individuals of those rules. As Philip Manning puts it,

For the most part, Goffman assumed that rules are primarily constraints. . . . However, at other times Goffman emphasized the limitations of the Durkheimian idea that rules are constraints governing behavior, and argued instead that we frequently ignore or abuse rules intended to limit our actions. (1992:158)

In fact, in line with modern thinking, to Goffman rules could be both constraints and resources to be used by people in social interaction.
The Sociology of Emotions

Since the 1970s, the sociology of emotions has become a major area of inquiry within sociology and sociological theory (Kemper 1990; Turner and Stets 2005). This field includes contributions from sociologists of culture, evolutionary sociologists, structural theorists, and microsociological theorists in traditions as diverse as exchange theory, conversation analysis, and symbolic interactionism. Indeed, Turner and Stets (2005) claim that the study of emotions is at the forefront of contemporary microsociology.

What Is Emotion?

Arlie Hochschild (1983/2003), one of the founding figures in the sociology of emotion, argues that in the last century there have been two major models of emotion. The organismic model is exemplified in the work of Charles Darwin, William James, and Sigmund Freud. This model treats emotion as largely biological and argues that some emotions are universally shared. For example, in their review of the emotions literature, Turner and Stets (2005) identify fear, anger, happiness, and sadness as universal primary emotions. In the organismic model, emotion is guided by instinct, and its basic character remains unshaped by social factors. Happiness, for example, is independent of the culture or social context in which it is expressed. This is related to another assumption—namely, that emotion is passive. It cannot be managed or worked on by the people who experience emotions.

The interactional model is exemplified in the work of John Dewey, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, and Erving Goffman. Though, as Hochschild points out, interactionists agree that some component of emotion is biological, they argue that “social factors enter not simply before and after but interactively during the experience of emotion” (1983/2003:221). This means that people do not passively respond to emotion but actively engage with emotion as it is expressed. This also allows for the idea that the experience and expression of emotion varies according to cultural rules and social context.

Clearly symbolic interactionist work on emotion shares features of Hochschild’s interactional model. Many of the early symbolic interactionists address emotions at least to some extent. Mead, for example, dedicates several passages of *Mind, Self and Society* to the relationship between emotion and symbols. He points out that most vocal gestures have an emotional character. However, unlike symbols, the emotional component of vocal gestures does not arouse the same response in us as it does in others. When people express anger at others, they do not feel other people’s experience of that anger. This said, Mead argues that there are some kinds of human expressions that are intended to arouse the same emotional experience in others. Poetry, for example, uses symbols in order to evoke the same emotional response in both poet and audience. Charles Cooley’s theory of the looking-glass self also includes an emotional component. Recall that Cooley’s theory of self-development unfolds in three phases (see previous discussion under Goffman). In the third phase, after a person recognizes that others view him or her in a certain way, the person develops a self-feeling, in particular a feeling of pride or shame. Goffman (1967) also touched on the problem of emotion when he argued that people engage in self-presentation, in part, to avoid the feelings of embarrassment that accompany failed performances.
In these earlier theories, though, emotion is treated as less important to social interaction than symbol and language exchange. In this sense, symbolic interactionism has exhibited a cognitive bias and overemphasized the role that symbol use and thought (the internalization of symbol use) play in shaping self and social reality. In what follows, we focus on two theorists who have been central in the development of the sociology of emotions: Thomas Scheff and Arlie Hochschild. Both theorists treat emotion as central to social interaction and, more generally, to social organization.

Shame: The Social Emotion

Thomas Scheff (2003) combines the work of Charles Cooley, Erving Goffman, and psychoanalytic theorist Helen Lewis to create a particularly dynamic theory of emotion. Scheff argues that it is important to theorize the nature of specific emotions. Implied in this is that different emotions enter into social interaction in different ways. Scheff has focused on the emotions of pride and, in particular, shame because, he says, these are the most important emotions for understanding social interaction.

Indeed, in one essay, Scheff nominates shame as the “premier social emotion” (2003:39). This implies a distinction between emotions that are fully social and those that can be accounted for by individual and biological factors. Fear, for example, is not primarily social because it signals a threat to the body (256). It can thus be experienced irrespective of other people. Shame, on the other hand, always depends upon judgments passed by other persons and is therefore a social emotion. Scheff defines shame in the following way:

By shame I mean a large family of emotions that includes many cognates and variants, most notably embarrassment, humiliation, and related feelings such as shyness that involve reactions to rejection or feelings of failure or inadequacy. What unites all these cognates is that they involve the feeling of a threat to the social bond. (2000:96–97)

As the quotation indicates, shame is important because it mediates the social bond. In particular, Scheff describes three ways that shame does this. First, it functions as a “moral gyroscope,” forcing people not just to recognize but also to feel their social transgressions (2003:254). Second, it most often arises when a relationship is in trouble, thus signaling a need to restore the social bond. Third, it regulates the expression of all other emotions. We are unlikely to express love, fear, and anger if we anticipate that these emotions will lead to feelings of shame.

The strength of Scheff’s theory is its attention to the intricacy of microsocial emotional exchanges. Like Mead, he assumes that people are in a continuous state of self-assessment—shifting back and forth between the perspectives of the I and the Me. He develops this concept by drawing on the work of another American pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce. Scheff (1997) insists that when in interaction, on a moment-to-moment basis we shift between observing other people’s external behavior and imagining other people’s inner experiences, both symbolic and emotional. In this process, it is possible to approximate interpersonal understanding, which he also calls attunement. People become attuned to one another’s cognitive and emotional states. The achievement of attunement is one way in which the social bond is secured. The more people feel as if they understand one another, the tighter the social bond. The discussion of attunement
Scheff's microsociological theory of emotion connects the social bond to macrosociological problems. He argues that understanding the nature of the social bond allows us to understand how societies are held together. In other words, just as Emile Durkheim studied the glue that holds society together, we can also begin to understand the nature of the social bond.

Tied to the process of attunement are feelings of pride and shame. In social interaction, people not only seek intersubjective understanding, but also they do so through feelings of pride or shame. Interaction is not simply driven by the exchange of symbols, but there is also an underlying “exchange of feelings”—a back-and-forth movement between pride and shame, which guides the interactive process (Scheff 1997:100, 102). Drawing on Goffman (1967), Scheff calls this the deference-emotion system. Each exchange, each sentence, each intonation of the voice brings with it acts of deference. In some cases, deference is granted. The individual is treated with respect and experiences feelings of pride. In other cases, deference is withheld. The person is judged inadequate and experiences feelings of shame.

The Invisibility of Shame

Scheff argues that when it comes to the acknowledgement of shame, we are faced with a paradox. Feelings of shame and pride attend every moment of interaction. Yet, people are largely unaware of their shame feelings. Shame is present, directing interaction, but invisible. This is part of a larger argument in which Scheff (1997, 2006) claims that in the contemporary Western world most people are unaware of the central role that emotions play in their social-relational lives. This is due to a shift toward value systems that overemphasize the virtues of self-sustaining individualism. It is difficult for Western people to conceive of shame because it reveals the presence of feelings that come from other people. In a culture that prizes self-containment, the feeling of shame demonstrates our utter dependency and vulnerability before others.

Here, Scheff’s theory parallels Norbert Elias’s (1939/1994) analysis of the history of manners (see Chapter 9). Elias shows that in the transition from medieval to modern Western society, the tolerance for embarrassing and shameful acts has declined. Where, for example, picking one’s nose in public was inconsequential in the medieval age, it became an occasion for embarrassment and shame. At the same time, the awareness of these shame feelings has declined, so while one may be embarrassed about picking one’s nose in public, one will not be able and willing to openly discuss that embarrassment. Not only are shameful acts hidden, but the fact that they are hidden is denied. This double denial of emotion, shame about shame, ensures the invisibility of shame and allows the efficient and rational coordination of everyday social life.

The problem with the denial of shame is that it can lead to pathological shame and other destructive emotions. This is where Scheff (1997) incorporates psychoanalytic arguments. The essential idea is that when shame is denied, or in psychoanalytic terms repressed, it has a negative impact on self and others and ultimately threatens the social bond. For example, when shame is denied, people can become caught in what Helen Lewis (1971) calls a feeling trap. Shame finds no outward expression but rather cycles inward. When it is turned inward, people begin to feel shame about their shame. Returning to Goffman’s deference-emotion concept, Scheff says that people can also become caught in interpersonal feeling traps. This happens when one person starts to feel ashamed.
of another person’s shame. In turn, this increases the first person’s shame, further deepening the feeling trap. Because of the cultural taboo against shame, all of this remains unspoken, and individuals become incapable of moving beyond the shame that characterizes both the interpersonal relationship and the intrapersonal relation of self to self.

Furthermore, this shame can turn into outwardly expressed humiliation and anger. People who are ashamed of themselves do not admit the shame but rather strike out against others, another attack on the social bond. When the denial of shame becomes a central component of a society, as it has become in the West, the social order in general is threatened. Thus, Scheff’s theory of emotion is not only aimed at restoring psychological and interpersonal relationship but also at understanding the origins of macrosocial chaos and conflict (see, for example, his analysis of the emotional roots of Franco-German relations from 1871 to 1945; Scheff 1997).

**Emotion Management and Emotion Work**

We have already mentioned the ideas of Arlie Hochschild in the introduction to this discussion. She works in the interactionist tradition but takes one step beyond it to introduce the *emotion management* perspective. In this theory, Hochschild offers a microsociological theory of emotion, informed by the work of Goffman and the theater director Constantin Stanislavski. However, she also places these microsocial processes within the context of larger social structures. In particular, she brings a Marxian and feminist dimension to her analysis of emotion management.

Drawing on Goffman, Hochschild argues that emotions are not stored inside of people; rather, they are dependent upon emotion management, or as she also calls it *emotion work*. In its most basic form, emotion is biological. However, this is only the raw material on which human agents go to work. Hochschild likens emotion and feeling to other human senses:

> Emotion, I suggest, is a biologically given sense, and our most important one. Like other senses—hearing, touch, and smell—it is a means by which we know about our relation to the world, and is therefore crucial for the survival of human beings in group life. Emotion is unique among the senses, however, because it is related not only to an orientation toward action but also to an orientation toward cognition. (1983/2003:229)

Emotion is given by biology, but it is not determined by biology. Rather, it is modified through cognition (or thought). In symbolic interactionist theory, cognition is a product of culturally constructed significant symbols. Therefore, it is by manipulating symbols through various kinds of acting (a la Goffman) that people are able to modify emotions.

Hochschild extends Goffman’s ideas by distinguishing between *surface acting* and *deep acting*. To say that emotions are a product of acting implies that emotions are performed. However, they can be performed in two different ways. In surface acting, the person manipulates surface appearances such as facial expression and tone of voice in order to convey an emotional expression to others. The politician, for example, smiles and warmly shakes a supporter’s hands in order to communicate appreciation. Referring to the ideas of Stanislavski, Hochschild says that in this kind of performance “the body, not the soul, is the main tool of the trade” (1983/2003:37). Goffman is regarded as the
master theorist of surface acting; in fact, a criticism of his work is that he reduced all of human behavior to strategic and cynical forms of surface acting.

Hochschild, on the other hand, develops the notion of deep acting through reflection on Stanislavski’s technique of method acting. Stanislavski wanted his actors to not only communicate emotion through the surface of the body but through the “soul” as well. In deep acting, the performance of emotions comes from living through them. A deep actor does not simply perform the emotion but actually experiences the emotions as part of the performance. Emotions are conjured up and performed, but this is done with depth.

Hochschild argues that in everyday life people engage in a similar kind of deep acting. Since emotions are not instinctually produced, each time that a person enters into a new situation he or she must generate the emotion appropriate to the setting. According to Hochschild, the technique involves the following:

- A person recognizes that she or he is expected to feel a particular way in a situation.
- The person then creates the conditions under which that emotion could emerge.
- To create these conditions, the person conjures up an emotion memory.
- An emotion memory is an autobiographical episode that carries within it strong feelings.
- The person then acts “as if” the feeling contained in the memory was relevant to the present moment.
- This allows the person to deeply feel the emotion appropriate to the situation.

Hochschild gives numerous examples of how this works in everyday life. A person is not as strongly affected by a friend’s mental breakdown as would be expected, so he recalls a similar episode from his or her own past and uses that emotion memory to better sympathize with his friend. A young Catholic woman works hard to feel love for a man in order to justify having slept with him. In this procedure, there is an intense use of memory and imagination in order to bring the body into alignment with the expectations of the moment.

This said, emotion work does not only involve a person’s relationship with her or his own emotion memory. Hochschild identifies the numerous ways in which people use their immediate setting to conjure up deep feeling. For example, people may rely upon “stage props” to better help conjure up an emotion memory. Or they may rely upon friends and family—their performance team, to use Goffman’s term—to help them feel the right emotion. Alternately, people might leave a particularly evocative setting in order to suppress an unwanted emotion. Here, we see that emotion work is not only used to evoke particular emotions but also to suppress particular emotions. If, for example, an individual starts to feel inappropriate joy at a failure of a friend or classmate, she might imagine a similar failure from her own past. If this emotion work is successful, she will suppress the emotion of joy and evoke the more appropriate emotion of sympathy.

Two things should be clear from this summary. First, even though Hochschild argues that surface acting is an insufficient concept to understand the experience of emotion in everyday life, she still sees emotion as something that is created by the actor in interaction with self and others. Second, much of the deep acting in which we engage is automatic, quick, and private. Therefore, it is not immediately recognizable as something
created through emotion work. That is, even though Hochschild’s description of emotion work might seem quite complex, most of us have made this kind of emotion work a habitual part of our everyday interaction. Indeed, we generally only come to recognize the hard work of creating emotion when our feelings are at odds with the feeling rules that pervade a situation.

**Feeling Rules**

Emotion management varies historically, culturally, and cross-situationally. In other words, different situations are accompanied by what Hochschild calls feeling rules. Feeling rules are culturally determined standards for emotion management. For example, Lyn Lofland (1985) describes the way that expressions of grief at the death of a loved one have changed over historical time. Feeling rules lay out the extent, direction, and duration of feeling in a particular situation. Extent refers to how strongly a particular emotion should be felt. Should I be very happy at the birth of my friend’s child or a little bit happy? Direction refers to the kind of emotion appropriate to a situation. Can I feel sad at the birth of my friend’s child? Duration refers to the length of time that a particular feeling can be felt. Can I feel happy for my friend for days, weeks, months, a year?

More specifically, feeling rules enter the microsituation as a set of rules for interpersonal exchange. Hochschild likens emotional exchange to gift giving. The important point is that gift giving is governed by cultural rules. Like the well-given gift, the appropriate exchange of feeling ensures the viability of the social bond. In everyday life, then, we expect to receive certain feelings from others and to give back certain feelings to others: "Feeling rules set out what is owed in gestures of exchange between people" (1983/2003:76).10 These rules also bear upon the previous discussion of surface acting and deep acting. Hochschild says that people are quite good at recognizing the difference between surface and deep acting. In some situations, where the feeling rules allow, we can exchange feelings through surface acting. We fully expect that the politician’s expression of warmth for a supporter is, at least in part, a surface performance. We are usually content if they merely put in the effort to keep up this performance. In other cases, such as a love affair, emotional exchange will require deep acting. If a person feels that his lover is only going through the motions, rather than conjuring real feeling, this will generally be considered an inadequate exchange of feeling.

**Commercialization of Feeling**

A central theme in Hochschild’s work is the effect of capitalism on emotion management. Although in the past feeling rules were organically produced within the realm of everyday life, increasingly feeling rules are determined by the machinations of capitalism. She calls the process by which our private and unconscious emotion work is overtaken by corporations and organizations the transmutation of emotional systems. The private emotional system of previous eras is replaced by an increasingly public and corporate emotion system. A brief review of Hochschild’s research on this process also demonstrates various ways in which we can conceive the relationship between the microsocial management of emotion and macrosocial structures.

economic production in the 18th and 19th centuries, Karl Marx argued that economic value was produced through manual labor. In contrast, in contemporary America economic value is increasingly produced through service work. A large component of service work involves emotional labor. For example, in the airline industry, flight attendants are expected to keep up a smile and maintain a happy face despite long hours and often challenging customers. The emotional atmosphere that the flight attendant creates within the airplane cabin is one component of the product sold by the airline. Indeed, as Hochschild’s work reveals, industry managers provide flight attendants with specific instructions on the kinds of feelings they are to project to customers and the techniques they can use to generate these feelings. In the way manual labor exerts a toll on the body, service work exerts a toll on the emotional system. At one level, of course, this kind of emotional labor can be viewed as surface acting, and the individual can maintain some role-distance from the performance. However, Hochschild worries that the increasing preponderance of corporately managed emotion work may impact our capacity to feel and detect deeper forms of emotional expression in other areas of our lives.

Hochschild (1997, 2003) has further developed these ideas in her research on the relationship between work and home in American families. In her study of a company that she calls Amerco, Hochschild noticed a perplexing shift in the relationship between home and work. Traditionally, people viewed the family home as a warm and welcoming place of respite and recuperation, but increasingly, the home is viewed as a place of tension. Instead, the workplace has come to be viewed as a place of respite: “Family life had become like ‘work’ and work had become more like ‘home’” (2003:198). She argues that the reason for this shift has been a transformation in the emotional culture of corporate America. In explaining this concept, Hochschild draws on Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory (see Chapter 9). Individual emotions are not unilaterally determined by an overarching corporate structure, rather institutions work with individuals to create an environment that is conducive to the promotion of feelings of comfort and happiness. More specifically, “an emotional culture is a set of rituals, beliefs about feelings, and rules governing feeling that induce emotional focus and even a sense of the ‘sacred’” (203). Like the flight attendants who are expected to create an atmosphere of safety and comfort in the airline cabin, many contemporary American corporations have been able to generate an emotional culture that is viewed as welcoming and sacred, an alternative to the increasingly troubled and desacralized space of the family home.

Hochschild offers one further conceptual innovation in her examination of care work. Here, she connects the emotional systems described in her earlier theoretical work with recent research on global social systems. She defines care in this way:

By the term care, I refer to an emotional bond, usually mutual, between the caregiver and cared-for, a bond in which the caregiver feels responsible for others’ well-being and does mental, emotional, and physical work in the course of fulfilling that responsibility. (2003:214)

Care work involves tasks that, in America, have been performed historically by women: maintaining the family home, caring for children, nursing the elderly. However, as more middle-class American families become dual-income families, care work has
been outsourced: nannies, nurses, and homecare workers are hired to care for children and the elderly. Unable to secure a living wage in their home countries, many of these care workers are imported through global networks. In particular, many care workers are women from Third World countries. They leave their own families and children behind in order to care for the children of middle-class American families. Hearkening back to her early Marxist theories of emotional labor, with this example in hand, Hochschild argues that feelings have become “distributable resources” (2003:191). Though in previous eras capitalism extracted gold and other forms of capital wealth from the Third World, in the contemporary moment capitalism extracts love and care from the Third World.

Though Hochschild does not explicitly offer a theory that connects the global system to the microsocial practice of emotion management, it is clear that these emerging social structures reach deeply into the emotional lives and emotion work of people around the world.

**Criticisms**

Having analyzed the ideas of symbolic interactionism—particularly those of Mead, Blumer, Goffman—and the sociologists of emotion, we will now enumerate some of the major criticisms of this perspective.

The first criticism is that the mainstream of symbolic interactionism has too readily given up on conventional scientific techniques. Eugene Weinstein and Judith Tanur expressed this point well: “Just because the contents of consciousness are qualitative, does not mean that their exterior expression cannot be coded, classified, even counted” (1976:105). Science and subjectivism are not mutually exclusive. Though we have not examined it here, it is important to note that, beginning with the work of Manford Kuhn (1964), symbolic interactionists from what is called the Iowa School have attempted to develop what they consider a more scientific version of interactionism (Miller 2011).

Second, Manford Kuhn (1964), William Kolb (1944), Bernard Meltzer, James Petras, and Larry Reynolds (1975), and many others have criticized the vagueness of essential Meadian concepts such as mind, self, I, and Me. Most generally, Kuhn (1964) spoke of the ambiguities and contradictions in Mead’s theory. Beyond Meadian theory, they have criticized many of the basic symbolic-interactionist concepts for being confused and imprecise and therefore incapable of providing a firm basis for theory and research. Because these concepts are imprecise, it is difficult, if not impossible, to operationalize them; the result is that testable propositions cannot be generated (Sheldon Stryker 1980).

The third major criticism of symbolic interactionism has been of its tendency to downplay or ignore large-scale social structures. This criticism has been expressed in various ways. For example, Weinstein and Tanur argued that symbolic interactionism ignores the connectedness of outcomes to each other:

> It is the aggregated outcomes that form the linkages among episodes of interaction that are the concern of sociology qua sociology. . . . The concept of social structure is necessary to deal with the incredible density and complexity of relations through which episodes of interaction are interconnected. (1976:106)
Sheldon Stryker argued that the micro focus of symbolic interactionism serves “to minimize or deny the facts of social structure and the impact of the macro-organizational features of society on behavior” (1980:146).

Somewhat less predictable is the fourth criticism, that symbolic interactionism is not sufficiently microscopic, that it ignores the importance of factors such as the unconscious and emotions (Meltzer et al. 1975; Sheldon Stryker 1980). Similarly, symbolic interactionism has been criticized for ignoring psychological factors such as needs, motives, intentions, and aspirations. In their effort to deny that there are immutable forces impelling the actor to act, symbolic interactionists have focused instead on meanings, symbols, action, and interaction. They ignore psychological factors that might impel the actor, an action that parallels their neglect of the larger societal constraints on the actor. In both cases, symbolic interactionists are accused of making a “fetish” out of everyday life (Meltzer et al. 1975:85). This focus on everyday life, in turn, leads to a marked overemphasis on the immediate situation and an “obsessive concern with the transient, episodic, and fleeting” (85).

The Future of Symbolic Interactionism

Gary Fine (1993) offered an interesting portrait of symbolic interactionism in the 1990s. His fundamental point is that symbolic interactionism has changed dramatically in recent years. First, it has undergone considerable fragmentation since its heyday at the University of Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s. A great diversity of work is now included under the broad heading of symbolic interactionism. Second, symbolic interactionism has undergone expansion and has extended far beyond its traditional concern with micro relations (S. Harris 2001). Third, symbolic interactionism has incorporated ideas from many other theoretical perspectives (Feather 2000). This is illustrated in our discussion of the sociology of emotions. Scheff, for example, draws on the work of Cooley, Mead, and Goffman but has also made use of psychoanalytic ideas. So, too, Hochschild, while starting with Goffman, uses the writing of Stanislavski, as well as Marx’s macrosociological theories. In addition, the ideas of symbolic interactionists have, in turn, been adopted by sociologists who are focally committed to other theoretical perspectives. Finally, symbolic interactionists are deeply involved in some of the major issues confronting sociological theory in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This includes concerns with micro–macro and agency–structure integration, studies of the relationship between selfhood and the Internet (see special issue of Symbolic Interaction, 2010), and a recent concern with the contributions that symbolic interactionism can make to the field of globalization studies (Knorr-Cetina 2009a).

Thus, lines dividing symbolic interactionism and other sociological theories have blurred considerably (Maines 2001). While symbolic interactionism will survive, it is increasingly unclear what it means to be a symbolic interactionist (and every other type of sociological theorist, for that matter). Fine puts it this way:

Predicting the future is dangerous, but it is evident that the label symbolic interaction will abide. . . . Yet, we will find more intermarriage, more interchange, and more interaction. Symbolic interaction will serve as a label of convenience for the future, but will it serve as a label of thought? (G. Fine 1993:81–82)
Summary

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the roots of symbolic interactionism in philosophical pragmatism (the work of John Dewey) and psychological behaviorism (the work of John B. Watson). Out of the confluence of pragmatism, behaviorism, and other influences, such as Simmelian sociology, symbolic interactionism developed at the University of Chicago in the 1920s.

The symbolic interactionism that developed stood in contrast to the psychological reductionism of behaviorism and the structural determinism of more macro-oriented sociological theories such as structural functionalism. Its distinctive orientation was toward the mental capacities of actors and their relationship to action and interaction. All this was conceived in terms of process; there was a disinclination to see the actor impelled by either internal psychological states or large-scale structural forces.

The single most important theory in symbolic interactionism is that of George Herbert Mead. Substantively, Mead's theory accorded primacy and priority to the social world. That is, it is out of the social world that consciousness, the mind, the self, and so on emerge. The most basic unit in his social theory is the act, which includes four dialectically related stages—impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation. A social act involves two or more persons, and the basic mechanism of the social act is the gesture. While lower animals and humans are capable of having a conversation of gestures, only humans can communicate the conscious meaning of their gestures. Humans are peculiarly able to create vocal gestures, and this leads to the distinctive human ability to develop and use significant symbols. Significant symbols lead to the development of language and the distinctive capacity of humans to communicate, in the full sense of the term, with one another. Significant symbols also make possible thinking, as well as symbolic interaction.

Mead looks at an array of mental processes as part of the larger social process, including reflective intelligence, consciousness, mental images, meaning, and, most generally, the mind. Humans have the distinctive capacity to carry on an inner conversation with themselves. All the mental processes are, in Mead's view, lodged not in the brain but rather in the social process.

The self is the ability to take oneself as an object. Again, the self arises within the social process. The general mechanism of the self is the ability of people to put themselves in the place of others—to act as others act and to see themselves as others see them. Mead traces the genesis of the self through the play and game stages of childhood. Especially important in the latter stage is the emergence of the generalized other. The ability to view oneself from the point of view of the community is essential to the emergence of the self as well as of organized group activities. The self also has two phases—the "I," which is the unpredictable and creative aspect of the self, and the "me," which is the organized set of attitudes of others assumed by the actor. Social control is manifest through the Me, while the I is the source of innovation in society.

Mead has relatively little to say about society, which he views most generally as the ongoing social processes that precede mind and self. Mead largely lacks a macro sense of society. Institutions are defined as little more than collective habits.

Symbolic interactionism may be summarized by the following basic principles:

1. Human beings, unlike lower animals, are endowed with a capacity for thought.
2. The capacity for thought is shaped by social interaction.
3. In social interaction, people learn the meanings and symbols that allow them to exercise their distinctively human capacity for thought.
4. Meanings and symbols allow people to carry on distinctively human action and interaction.

5. People are able to modify or alter the meanings and symbols they use in action and interaction on the basis of their interpretation of the situation.

6. People are able to make these modifications and alterations because, in part, of their ability to interact with themselves, which allows them to examine possible courses of action, assess their relative advantages and disadvantages, and then choose one.

7. The intertwined patterns of action and interaction make up groups and societies.

In the context of these general principles, we seek to clarify the nature of the work of several important thinkers in the symbolic-interactionist tradition, including Charles Horton Cooley, Herbert Blumer, and, most important, Erving Goffman. We present in detail Goffman's dramaturgical analysis of the self and his related works on role distance, stigma, and frame analysis. However, we also note that Goffman's work on frames has exaggerated a tendency in his earlier work and moved further in the direction of a structuralist analysis. We also introduce one of the most important areas of recent symbolic interactionist theory: the sociology of emotions. We present theories developed by two of the founding figures in emotions research. Thomas Schell argues that shame is the most important social emotion, and drawing on both symbolic interactionism and psychoanalysis, he develops a theory of self and social order that places shame at its center. Arlie Hochschild combines her interest in emotion with theories developed by the theater director Constantin Stanislavski and Karl Marx. This leads to the concepts of deep acting, emotion work, and emotion labor.

We conclude with some of the major criticisms of symbolic interactionism, as well as one image of symbolic interactionism's future.

Notes

1. See Joas (1996) for an effort to develop a theory of creative action based, at least in part, on pragmatism.

2. For a criticism of the distinctions made here, see D. Miller (1982b, 1985).

3. For a critique of Mead's thinking on the differences between humans and lower animals, see Alger and Alger (1997).

4. A first, preparatory stage involving mimicry is implied (Vail 2007a) in Mead's work.

5. Although Mead uses the term *games*, it is clear, as Aboulafia (1986:198) points out, that he means any system of organized responses (for example, the family).

6. Although they recognize that Blumer takes this view, Wood and Wardell (1983) argue that Mead did *not* have an "astructural bias." See also Joas (1981).


8. A performer and the audience are one kind of team, but Goffman also talked of a group of performers as one team and the audience as another. Interestingly, Goffman argued that a
team also can be a single individual. His logic, following classic symbolic interactionism, was that an individual can be his or her own audience—can *imagine* an audience to be present.

9. Scheff is not alone in this claim. As noted, both Cooley and Goffman treat shame as a central social emotion. The psychologist Sylvan Tomkins, one of the inspirations for an emerging area of social theory called “affect theory” (Sedgwick and Frank 1995; see Chapter 14), also identifies shame as one of the most important emotions.

10. Candace Clark (1987) further develops this idea with her concepts of sympathy biography and sympathy credit.