There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong.

George W. Bush, in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington Hilton Hotel, February 26, 2003

I am a democrat only on principle, not by instinct—nobody is that. Doubtless some people say they are, but this world is grievously given to lying.

Mark Twain, Notebook, entry for February–March 1898

- Does democracy require a “democratic culture”? Are certain cultures incompatible with democracy? Does culture affect the emergence and survival of democracy?
- According to cultural modernization theory, economic development produces certain cultural changes, and it is these cultural changes that lead to democracy. A key cultural change is the emergence of a “civic culture.” For many, the existence of a civic culture is seen as a prerequisite for the successful emergence and survival of democracy. As we demonstrate, the empirical evidence in support of cultural modernization theory is somewhat mixed.
- We investigate recent claims that particular religions such as Islam are incompatible with democracy. As we indicate, all religions have some doctrinal elements that can be seen as compatible with democracy and others that can be seen as incompatible; Islam is no exception. Our empirical evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe that majority Muslim countries cannot sustain democracy once we take account of their wealth.
- We examine evidence from a series of experiments conducted around the world that throws light on why culture may be important for the emergence and survival of democracy.
In the previous chapter, we examined the vast literature linking economic factors to the emergence and survival of democracy. The literature addressing the relationship between culture and democracy is equally large and is the subject of this chapter. The notion that cultural differences drive significant elements of political and economic life is commonplace and has a long history. But does democracy really require a “democratic culture”? Are certain cultures incompatible with democracy? How does culture affect the emergence and survival of democracy? The claim that culture plays any role with respect to democracy obviously has important implications for those wishing to spread democracy to regions of the world such as the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

Cultural arguments regarding democracy typically fall into two categories: primordialist and constructivist (Laitin 1983, 1986; Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 1998). **Primordialist arguments** treat culture as something that is objective and inherited—something that has been fixed since “primordial” times. For example, Geertz (1973, 259–260) describes primordial cultural attachments, which for him include things like bloodlines, language, race, religion, and customs, as stemming “from the givens . . . of social existence. . . . For virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural—some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interaction.” According to primordialists, culture exists prior to, and remains unchanged by, political interaction. Put differently, it is culture that affects political behavior by providing ideological guidelines for collective action rather than political behavior that shapes culture. As a result, political institutions, such as democracy, may not be compatible with all cultures. In effect, primordialist arguments imply that democracy is not for everyone.

**Constructivist arguments** treat culture as something that is constructed or invented rather than inherited. Like primordialist arguments, constructivist arguments claim that culture has a causal effect and that a democratic culture is required for democracy to emerge and prosper. Constructivists recognize, however, that cultures are malleable and are not given once and for all—cultures can change in response to social, economic, and political actors. As a result, cultures do not necessarily represent impenetrable barriers to democratization. Although cultures may not act as impenetrable barriers to democratization as they do in primordialist arguments, constructivists recognize that the speed with which cultures can change is likely to vary from culture to culture. In this sense, some cultures will find it easier to adopt democracy than others.

**CLASSICAL CULTURAL ARGUMENTS: MILL AND MONTESQUIEU**

The notion that political institutions, such as democracy and dictatorship, are more suited to some cultures than others is not new (Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 1998). As long
ago as 472 B.C., Aeschylus contrasted the authoritarianism associated with the people of Asia with the democracy found in Athenian Greece in his play The Persians (Emmerson 1995, 96). The views of Aeschylus would later be echoed in what would become known as the Asian values debate in the 1990s. Although vague references to the compatibility of certain cultures with democracy have been around for some time, the first person to write in any great detail about the importance of culture to political institutions was Montesquieu in the eighteenth century. He claimed that monarchy was most suited to European states, that despotism was most suited to the Orient, and that democracy was most suited to the ancient world. He believed that the best government for a given country was that which “leads men by following their propensities and inclinations” (Montesquieu [1721] 1899, Persian Letter 81) and which “best agrees with the humor and disposition of the people in whose favor it is established” (Montesquieu [1752] 1914, 1:3). What did this entail exactly? He stated that political institutions “should be in relation to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds: they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs” (Montesquieu [1752] 1914, 1:3). He goes on to claim that it can be only by chance that the political institutions of one country can successfully be exported to another.

In his discussion “To What Extent Forms of Government Are a Matter of Choice,” John Stuart Mill also argued that different cultures were suited to different political institutions. He stated, “No one believes that every people is capable of working every sort of institutions” (Mill [1861] 2001, 7). To illustrate this, he claimed, “Nothing but foreign force would induce a tribe of North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilized government” (Mill [1861] 2001, 8). Mill believed that even those people who recognized the benefits of a civilized government might still have to live under authoritarianism if they did not have the required characteristics to support a better system of government. These necessary characteristics included “moral” or “mental habits,” such as the willingness to “co-operate actively with the law and the public authorities in the repression of evil-doers” (Mill [1861] 2001, 9). They also included a certain degree of development characterized, for example, by a press capable of propagating public opinion and a tax system “sufficient for keeping up the force necessary to compel obedience throughout a large territory” (Mill [1861] 2001, 11). Mill ([1861] 2001) was clearly a strong believer that legislators should take account of “pre-existing habits and feelings” when creating political institutions in a country (11).

It is important, however, not to interpret Mill’s statements as if they are arguments that certain cultures are incompatible with political institutions, such as democracy. In fact, Mill was highly critical of those who believe that culture prevents political actors from choosing the institutions they desire. Although he thought that “people are more easily induced to do, and do more easily, what they are already used to,” he also believed that “people . . . learn to do things new to them. Familiarity is a great help; but much dwelling on an idea will make it familiar, even when strange at first” (Mill [1861] 2001, 11). Ultimately, Mill did not see
particular cultural traits as necessary conditions for democracy. This is because he thought that culture is inherently malleable and that, as a result, people could learn to live with democracy. As you can see, Mill asserted a constructivist cultural argument regarding the prospects for democracy.

The cultural arguments put forth by both Montesquieu and Mill were later incorporated into strands of cultural modernization theory. As you'll remember from the previous chapter, modernization theory predicts that “immature” societies (those with large agricultural sectors and authoritarian institutions) will eventually become “mature” societies (those with large industrial and service sectors and democratic institutions) as they develop economically. Cultural modernization theory states that socioeconomic development transforms societies with primitive cultures into societies with civilized cultures—only when this happens are societies ready for democracy. In other words, cultural modernization theory argues that socioeconomic development does not directly cause democracy; instead, economic development produces certain cultural changes, and it is these cultural changes that produce democratic reform. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 15) put it, “socioeconomic development brings roughly predictable cultural changes . . . [and] these changes make democracy increasingly likely to emerge where it does not yet exist, and to become stronger and more direct where it already exists.”

The claims made by Montesquieu and Mill regarding culture and democracy illustrate several potential problems that characterize some cultural arguments to this day (Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 1998). How would you test the claims made by Mill and Montesquieu? What exactly would the hypotheses be? Try to state one of them in a way that can be tested. One obvious problem is that neither scholar specifically states exactly what it is about culture that matters for democracy. Both men provide a whole host of cultural things that might affect the emergence and survival of democracy—religion, customs, morals, manners, marital institutions, and so on. Indeed, most of these things are left quite vague. For example, what particular morals are incompatible with democracy? Which customs are problematic? Moreover, both scholars point to numerous noncultural things that also affect democracy such as the climate of a country, the quality of the soil, and the economy. The key point here is that cultural arguments must specify exactly what it is about culture that matters, otherwise it will never be possible to conclude that culture does not matter. Put simply, one of the problems with cultural arguments such as those made by Montesquieu and Mill is that they are so vague or nonspecific that they become nonfalsifiable (Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 1998). In effect, they become “nonscientific” in the terms we outlined in Chapter 2.

The second problem relates to the purported causal relationship between cultural, economic, and political factors. Does culture cause political institutions, such as democracy, to
emerge and survive? Does it also cause economic development? Or do political institutions and economic development cause culture? In other words, which way does the causal arrow go? If culture does cause democracy, is it a necessary or a sufficient condition? If culture is a cause, does it cause the emergence of democracy, or does it affect only the survival of democracy? In Figure 7.1, we illustrate some of the causal arguments that scholars have made concerning the interaction between culture, economic development, and democracy.

**Figure 7.1** Culture, Economic Development, and Democracy: Some Potential Causal Relationships

- a. Culture \(\rightarrow\) Democracy
  - Culture \(\rightarrow\) Economic development
- b. Culture \(\rightarrow\) Democracy
  - Economic development \(\rightarrow\) Culture
- c. Culture \(\rightarrow\) Economic development \(\rightarrow\) Democracy
- d. Economic development \(\rightarrow\) Culture \(\rightarrow\) Democracy
- e. Economic development \(\rightarrow\) Democracy
  - Culture
- f. Economic development \(\rightarrow\) Democracy \(\rightarrow\) Culture
- g. Economic development \(\leftrightarrow\) Democracy
  - Culture
Mill and Montesquieu clearly believed that economic development and culture both matter for democracy. From what they wrote, however, it is hard to discern what they thought the exact causal relationship was between these factors.

**DOES DEMOCRACY REQUIRE A CIVIC CULTURE?**

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba reopened the debate about culture and democracy in the 1960s with their book *The Civic Culture*. Although they recognized the importance of economic development for democracy, they believed that only a “civic culture” could provide the “psychological basis of democratization” and that without this, the prospects for democratic survival were slim (Almond and Verba [1963] 1989, 9). Almond and Verba claimed that there were three basic types of political culture in the world—parochial, subject, and participant/civic. According to them, the civic culture was the only culture compatible with democracy. In contrast, parochial cultures were compatible with the traditional political systems of African tribes, and subject cultures were compatible with centralized authoritarian institutions like those seen in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe (Almond and Verba [1963] 1989, 20, 33).

A political culture, for Almond and Verba, was something that captured how individuals think and feel about the political system. They believed that it was possible to study culture by conducting surveys and asking individuals about their feelings toward political institutions, actors, and processes. The idea was that the distribution of responses to these survey questions would identify a nation’s political culture. In this conceptualization, a political culture simply refers to a relatively coherent cluster of attitudes in society. According to Almond and Verba, a civic culture reflects a particular cluster of attitudes that includes (a) the belief on the part of individuals that they can influence political decisions, (b) positive feelings toward the political system, (c) high levels of interpersonal trust, and (d) preferences for gradual societal change. In contrast, parochial and subject political cultures reflect different clusters of attitudes on these same issues. Applying their methodology to the study of Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Almond and Verba found that the United States and the United Kingdom were not only the most stable democracies in their sample but also the countries that most closely resembled their ideal civic culture. As a result, they concluded that a civic culture was necessary for democratic stability (see Box 7.1, “Does Good Democratic Performance Require a Civic Culture?”).

Inglehart (1990) reached a similar conclusion after studying survey responses from 25 industrial nations in the 1980s. Like Almond and Verba ([1963] 1989), he believed that “different societies are characterized to very different degrees by a specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable; and that they can have major political consequences, one being that they are closely linked...
In this chapter, we are primarily interested in how political culture affects the emergence and survival of democracy. Several scholars have argued that political culture is also important for the overall performance of democracy. In *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Robert Putnam (1993) argues that cultural norms affect the variation in economic and political performance exhibited by regional governments in Italy. In accordance with a long line of scholarship on Italy, Putnam found that regional governments in the north of Italy functioned far more effectively than those in the south. Putnam’s research goal was to explain this variation across Italian regional governments and to determine the causes behind variation in governmental performance in democracies more generally.

Putnam argued that institutions couldn’t possibly be the explanation for the variation in government performance between the north and south of Italy, as Italian regional governments all shared a similar institutional structure. Instead, he looked at cultural explanations and focused on the presence or absence of a civic culture. For Putnam, the key to a civic culture was **social capital**. Social capital refers to the collective value of social networks and shared norms that promote reciprocity, trust, and social cooperation. In his work on Italy, Putnam (1993, 167) argued that social capital and, in particular, “norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement,” were the key to good government performance.

In line with his expectations, Putnam found that regions with more social capital had better government performance than regions with less social capital. In effect, Putnam showed that the high performing regions in the north of Italy were characterized by a “good” civic culture that encouraged working for the common good and that the low-performing regions in the south were characterized by a “bad” culture of “amoral familism,” in which norms of reciprocity and engagement were limited to one’s family and in which self-interest was the primary motivating force behind individual actions. According to Putnam, the civic culture in the north could be traced back to the communal relations exhibited by the republican towns in this region in Italy’s medieval past, whereas the culture of amoral familism in the south could be traced back to this region’s monarchic past.

Putnam’s work on Italy has energized many in the policymaking community. “From the World Bank to city hall, the creation of social capital [and civic culture] has been embraced as a solution for social problems as diverse as promoting economic development in Africa and stemming urban decay in Los Angeles” (Boix and Posner 1996). Putnam’s study of Italy has also been a catalyst for research on political culture in the United States. In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam (2000) argues that the number of people participating in voluntary associations—one place in which social networks can be built—has been falling in the United States and that people have become disconnected from family, friends, and neighbors. Putnam’s book created quite a stir, because the decline in social capital that it described was seen to have potentially negative consequences for the state of American democracy.
to the viability of democratic institutions” (Inglehart 1990, 15). According to Inglehart, political culture is determined by, among other things, the levels of overall life satisfaction, the levels of interpersonal trust, and the support for gradual societal change among the individuals of a nation. Clearly, these determinants of political culture are very similar to those proposed by Almond and Verba. In his analysis, Inglehart (1990, 43) found that countries in which levels of life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for gradual societal change were high were more likely to be stable democracies. In other words, he too found that some kind of civic culture is required for stable democracy.

There has never been complete agreement on the precise cluster of attitudes thought to compose a civic culture. In their recent work, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) claim that there are two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation in the world today. The first dimension has to do with whether countries exhibit traditional values or secular-rational values. Traditional values emphasize the importance of religion, traditional family roles, and deference to authority. Individuals who hold traditional values typically exhibit national pride and reject things like divorce, euthanasia, suicide, and abortion. Secular-rational values place less emphasis on religion, traditional family roles, and deference to authority. Individuals who hold these values typically find things like divorce, euthanasia, suicide, and abortion more acceptable. The second dimension has to do with whether countries exhibit survival values or self-expression values. Survival values emphasize the importance of physical and economic security. Individuals who hold survival values typically hold an ethnocentric worldview and exhibit low levels of interpersonal trust and tolerance. Self-expression values emphasize the importance of gender, racial, and sexual equality; environmental protection; tolerance of diversity; civic activism; and life satisfaction. Individuals who hold these values often exhibit high levels of interpersonal trust and demand a greater say in how political and economic decisions are made.

Like Almond and Verba, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) use survey responses to determine the extent to which different societies exhibit traditional versus secular-rational values and the extent to which they exhibit survival versus self-expression values. With these survey responses, it is possible to create a “cultural map” of the world. Figure 7.2 shows a cultural map of the world based on data from the 2010–2014 World Values Survey. Moving upward on this map represents a shift from traditional to secular-rational values, while a move to the right represents a shift from survival to self-expression values. Countries that exhibit high levels of traditional and survival values (bottom left) include Jordan, Yemen, and Morocco. Countries that exhibit high levels of traditional and self-expression values (bottom right) include Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador. Countries that exhibit high levels of secular-rational and survival values (top left) include Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Countries that exhibit high levels of secular-rational and self-expression values (top right) include Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Figure 7.2 identifies nine subjective “cultural zones.” The countries in these cultural zones are thought to share similar cultural values and hence exhibit distinct political cultures.
In line with cultural modernization theory, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that socio-economic development generally produces a change in cultural values that sees countries move from the bottom left quadrant in Figure 7.2 where they are poor and authoritarian to the top right quadrant where they are rich and democratic. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), the modernization process is not linear; instead, it occurs in two distinct phases. The first phase—the industrialization phase—sees countries move upward in Figure 7.2 away from traditional values to secular-rational values. In the pre-industrial world, most people earn their living from agriculture and rely on God to provide them with good weather and good health. Social interactions with outsiders are limited, reputation rests on ties of kinship, tradition is valued, and comfort is sought in religion. The shift to an industrial society changes things. Technology gives people more control over their environment.

**Figure 7.2 | A Cultural Map of the World**

*Note:* The cultural map of the world shown in Figure 7.2 is based on data from the sixth wave (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey. The different clusters indicate countries that Inglehart and Welzel identify as sharing similar cultural values—they represent distinct political cultures.

*Source:* http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp
and science provides a rational explanation for the previously inexplicable. The result is a decline in the importance of religion and the rise of secular authorities. The modernization process is, in this sense, a secularization process (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel 2013a, b).

The second phase—the post-industrialization phase—sees countries move rightward in Figure 7.2 away from survival values to self-expression values. While industrialization brings certain changes, people generally remain poor, and they continue to be concerned about their physical and economic security. They worry about putting a roof over their head and food on the table. As socioeconomic development continues and societies become wealthier, though, existential security concerns recede and people can begin to focus on expanding their opportunities for self-expression and personal autonomy. In his earlier work, Inglehart (1977) refers to this change as a “silent revolution” in which materialist worries are replaced by post-materialist concerns. A growing sense of human autonomy leads people to question authority, hierarchies, and dogmatism. As self-expression values spread, so do demands for political liberalization, greater emancipation, and a greater say in how political and economic decisions are made. This puts pressure on authoritarian regimes to democratize and for democratic regimes to act more effectively. As you can see, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) see self-expression and secular-rational values as the core components of a civic culture.

Over the years, there has been considerable debate about the exact causal relationship between culture, economic development, and democracy. On one side of the debate are scholars who argue that economic development produces cultural change and that it is cultural change that produces democracy (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2003, 2005). This potential causal relationship, which as we have seen forms the basis for cultural modernization theory, is illustrated in Figure 7.1d. According to this story, cultural values act on, shape, and cause political institutions. We might call this the “values story.” On the other side of the debate are scholars who argue that this causal story is backward (Barry 1970; Muller and Seligson 1994; Seligson 2002). These scholars argue that economic development produces democracy and that it is experience with democracy that produces cultural change. This potential causal relationship is illustrated in Figure 7.1f. We might call this the “institutional story.” According to the institutional story, cultural values are a consequence, not a cause, of democracy.

There is, however, no reason to think that both stories can’t be true. It seems reasonable to us that societal development might increase the likelihood of democracy through its effects on cultural values as cultural modernization theorists propose—and that it could also increase the likelihood of democracy through other mechanisms such as those examined in Chapter 6. This means that whatever the existing cultural values are in some country, an increasingly modern social structure will increase that country’s probability of experiencing democracy. This experience with democracy can, in turn, contribute to cultural change that reinforces democratic practice in the future. Thus, we are not forced to choose between the institutional and values stories. Perhaps these stories work together to create a virtuous cycle tying changes in social structure to increasingly democratic outcomes.
Surveys and Comparative Research

One of the major impacts of Almond and Verba’s ([1963] 1989) Civic Culture was to encourage the use of surveys to examine the relationship between culture and democracy. The most commonly used survey today is the World Values Survey. This is the survey that provided the data for the cultural map of the world shown in Figure 7.2. Scholars who are particularly interested in the relationship between culture and democracy are frequently drawn to the following question from the World Values Survey:

Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than any other form of government. Could you please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

Many people believe that mass support for a particular system of government, and mass confidence in specific institutions, provides political systems with the legitimacy they need to operate effectively (Newton and Norris 2000). In effect, mass support for democracy is seen by some as essential in delegitimizing dictatorial rule and legitimizing democratic rule. Thus, when a low level of public support is reported in questions like this one from the World Values Survey, it is often seen as a harbinger of democratic instability or collapse.

Surveys such as the World Values Survey are increasingly being used to examine many important questions in comparative politics. Researchers who use surveys often confront certain problems, two of which we briefly discuss here. The first problem arises when surveys address sensitive topics. One of the implicit assumptions in survey research is that respondents are answering the survey questions truthfully (Blair 2015). Unfortunately, respondents often have incentives to lie or conceal their true beliefs. For example, a respondent in a dictatorship may not feel comfortable revealing her true preferences when asked about the value of democracy. This is because democracy is a sensitive topic in most authoritarian regimes. We discuss the issue of “preference falsification” in dictatorships in more detail in the next chapter. Similarly, respondents may feel unwilling to express negative attitudes toward particular ethnic, racial, religious, or sexual groups if these attitudes run counter to social norms. Social desirability bias, in which individuals tend to over-report “good behavior” and under-report “bad behavior,” helps to explain why surveys often underestimate the support for extremist anti-immigrant parties in Europe or overestimate the degree of support for minority political candidates in the United States. Social pressure, potential legal sanctions, and fear of retaliation can create incentives for respondents to lie on surveys. Indeed, these concerns can even lead to certain types of people not participating in surveys in the first place, with the result that these surveys are no longer “representative.” It is easy to see how surveys might produce biased and misleading estimates in these circumstances. For example, if citizens in authoritarian societies underreport their enthusiasm for democracy because they believe they will be punished for
expressing their sincere beliefs, cross-national surveys will overstate the positive association between attitudes toward democracy and democratic persistence.

The second problem, which applies in particular to cross-national surveys, such as the World Values Survey, has to do with the fact that respondents don’t always comprehend survey questions in the same way. Consider the following example about self-reported health in India and the United States. Sen (2002, 860–861) writes:

The state of Kerala has the highest rates of literacy . . . and longevity . . . in India. But it also has, by a very wide margin, the highest rate of reported morbidity among all Indian states. . . . At the other extreme, states with low longevity, with woeful medical and educational facilities, such as Bihar, have the lowest rates of reported morbidity in India. Indeed, the lowness of reported morbidity runs almost fully in the opposite direction to life expectancy, in interstate comparisons. . . . In disease by disease comparisons, while Kerala has much higher reported morbidity rates than the rest of India, the United States has even higher rates for the same illnesses. If we insist on relying on self-reported morbidity as the measure, we would have to conclude that the United States is the least healthy in this comparison, followed by Kerala, with ill provided Bihar enjoying the highest level of health. In other words, the most common measure of the health of populations is negatively correlated with actual health.

Clearly, the respondents in the different regions of India and in the United States either understood the survey questions differently or evaluated their levels of health on very different scales. This problem is commonly referred to as differential item functioning. A key point here is that measuring or inferring reality by comparing people’s attitudes or perceptions across different regions, countries, or cultures can often be “extremely misleading” (Sen 2002). This particular issue is especially relevant for survey research related to democracy. This is because democracy means different things to different people around the world. For example, democracy may conjure up images of economic and political equality for some, but it may simply mean holding competitive elections for others. These different views of democracy should not come as a surprise, given that we have already seen in Chapter 5 that political scientists disagree about whether to employ a minimalist or substantive view of democracy in their own work. If experts can’t agree on what they mean by democracy, why would we expect individuals in different countries to have the same concept in mind when answering survey questions about it?

Political scientists are increasingly aware of these problems with surveys and have begun to develop ingenious methods to get around them. Blair (2015) describes four basic methods for addressing sensitive topics with surveys. The first method focuses on survey administration. The core idea here is to adopt practices that build trust with respondents. Some scholars recommend using interviewers who share similar demographic characteristics, such as
age, gender, or ethnicity, with the respondent. Adida and colleagues (2016) find that respondents in Africa give systematically different answers to survey questions if the people who interview them are coethnics as opposed to non-coethnics. Others have highlighted the importance of allowing respondents to report their answers in private rather than aloud to an interviewer (Krysan 1998; Krysan and Couper 2003). In a study of caste-sensitive attitudes in India, Chauchard (2013) provided his respondents with MP3 players so that they could self-report their answers in private.

The second method involves the use of randomized response techniques (Gingerich 2010; Blair, Imai, and Zhou 2015). The core feature of these techniques is the introduction of a randomizing device, such as a coin or a die, into the survey response process to guarantee the confidentiality of individual responses. For example, before answering a sensitive survey question that requires a “yes” or “no” answer, a respondent might be asked to roll a die in private. If the die shows a 1, the respondent is told to report “yes.” If the die shows a 6, the respondent is told to report “no.” If the die shows a 2, 3, 4, or 5, then the respondent is told to answer the question truthfully, either “yes” or “no.” As you can see, the interviewer never knows whether a given individual response is true or not; hence, the confidentiality of the individual response is guaranteed. The key, though, is that the interviewer knows the probability with which truthful answers are given (if the respondents follow the instructions) and can therefore calculate the overall numbers of respondents who said “yes” and “no” to the sensitive question. Randomized response techniques have been used to study a variety of phenomena, such as corruption within bureaucracies (Gingerich 2013), cheating by undergraduates (Fox and Meijer 2008), sexual attitudes (De Jong, Pieters, and Stremersch 2012), and the prevalence of xenophobia and anti-Semitism (Krumpal 2012).

The third method involves the use of list experiments. The core idea in list experiments is to protect the confidentiality of individual responses by mixing sensitive items into lists that include nonsensitive “control” items. In a list experiment, some survey respondents are presented with a list of nonsensitive control items and are then asked to indicate the number with which they agree. Another set of survey respondents are presented with the same list of control items except that a sensitive item is now also included. These respondents are also asked to indicate the number of items with which they agree. By comparing the number of items that respondents agree with across these two randomly selected groups, it is possible to identify the level of support for the sensitive item. As you may have realized, this method does not always guarantee that individual responses are kept confidential. This is because a respondent who answers that she agrees with none or all of the items in the list containing the sensitive item reveals her preferences about the sensitive item. As a result, researchers need to be careful about what items they include in the list of control items. List experiments have been used to study a variety of phenomena such as public support for coalition forces in Afghanistan (Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2014), vote buying in Nicaragua (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012), and the impact of citizen preferences on policy in China (Meng, Pan, and Yang, forthcoming).
The fourth method involves the use of endorsement experiments. The core idea in endorsement experiments is to protect the confidentiality of individual responses by mixing attitudes toward a sensitive political actor with attitudes toward one or more policies. In an endorsement experiment, some survey respondents are asked to give their attitudes toward a policy that a “sensitive” political actor has endorsed. The responses to this question mix the preferences of the respondents toward the policy and their preferences toward the sensitive actor. Other survey respondents are asked to give their attitudes toward the same policy but without any mention of the endorsement. The responses to this question isolate the preferences of the respondents toward the policy. By comparing the responses across the two groups, it is possible to identify just the preferences toward the sensitive political actor. Endorsement experiments have been used to study a variety of phenomena such as attitudes toward the Taliban in Afghanistan (Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013) and militants in Pakistan (Blair et al. 2013).

The fact that respondents don’t always comprehend survey questions in the same way, perhaps because they come from different cultures, is problematic. This is particularly the case if one wants to compare survey responses to learn about cultural differences. One way in which political scientists attempt to deal with this issue is through the use of anchoring vignettes (King et al. 2004; King and Wand 2007). Anchoring vignettes are useful for survey questions that use an ordinal scale—say, strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree—such as the “democracy” question seen earlier from the World Values Survey. Anchoring vignettes use additional survey questions to create “anchors” that allow for a common scale of measurement across respondents. Respondents are asked to provide a self-assessment of a particular issue. They are then asked to provide an assessment of a vignette (short story) that depicts a particular outcome of that issue. For example, respondents might be asked to judge their own political efficacy, that is, their belief that they can get their representatives to address issues important to them. They are then confronted with a vignette that includes information about some other individual’s political efficacy. The vignette provides a common reference point, or “anchor,” for the respondents and therefore allows the researcher to place the respondents’ self-assessments on a common scale. For example, the researcher could code the respondent self-assessments as “less than,” “equal to,” or “greater than” the efficacy depicted in the vignette (King and Wand 2007). Anchoring vignettes have been used in numerous settings. For example, the World Health Organization has used them to examine various health indicators, the World Bank has used them to investigate economic welfare, and other scholars have used them to look at things like corruption, political efficacy, and women’s autonomy.1

The development of these new techniques for overcoming the challenges of using survey responses to measure cultural differences is promising. But their application to the study of

1. For examples of the types of vignettes used in these studies, see King, “Examples,” at http://gking.harvard.edu/vign/eg.
political culture is in its infancy, and only time will tell whether the canonical findings of political culture scholars will stand up to this more careful analysis.

RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY

Recent arguments linking culture and democracy have increasingly focused on religion. Unlike many of their predecessors, these cultural arguments have strongly influenced public discourse and shaped the direction of public policy. For example, Samuel Huntington’s (1996) book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, in which he argues that Islamic and Confucian cultures are incompatible with democracy (see Box 7.2, “The Clash of Civilizations”), was reportedly recommended reading for many of the soldiers heading to Iraq during the second Gulf War in 2003. More recently, the issue of Islam and democracy has

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**Box 7.2**

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

In 1992 Francis Fukuyama famously declared the “end of history.” With the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama believed that liberal democracy had finally won the battle with other rival ideologies such as fascism and communism. Liberal democracy was the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and hence the “end of history.” Although Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996) took issue with the claim that we were witnessing the end of history, he agreed with the claim that conflict in the world would no longer be based on ideological divisions. He wrote,

> It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (Huntington 1993, 22)

For Huntington (1993, 24), a civilization is the “highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.” Huntington identifies many different civilizations in the world today—Western Christian, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, African, and others. The exact number is ambiguous because he refers to different civilizations in different studies. It is not always obvious how Huntington moves from his definition of a civilization to an indicator of them. On the whole, civilizations seem to be coded primarily in regard to religion, although linguistic differences and geographic proximity seem to play a role in some cases.

*Continued*
come up in the 2016 US presidential elections, with the Republican Party’s candidate, Donald Trump, calling for a ban on Muslims entering the United States as well as a national database and ID cards for Muslims (Matharu 2015; Pilkington 2015). It is worth noting, however, that these contemporary debates concerning the relationship between religion and democracy actually have a long and storied history—a history that should perhaps make us wary of unthinkingly accepting claims that certain religions are incompatible with democracy.

**Are Some Religions Incompatible with Democracy?**

Historically, scholars have argued that Protestantism encourages democracy but that Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Confucianism inhibit it (Lipset [1960] 1994, 5). Max Weber ([1930] 1992) is commonly thought to have provided the first argument linking Protestantism with democracy in his book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. For example, Lipset ([1960] 1994, 57) writes, “It has been suggested, by Weber among others, that a historically unique concatenation of elements produced both democracy and capitalism in this area [northwest Europe, America, and Australasia] . . . Protestantism’s emphasis on individual responsibility furthered the emergence of democratic values in these countries.” The causal story connecting Protestantism to democracy is the following: Protestantism encourages economic development, which in turn creates a bourgeoisie, whose existence is a necessary condition for democracy (Moore [1966] 1999). In effect, the causal relationship mirrors the one shown earlier in Figure 7.1c. The notion that Protestantism promotes democracy was later taken up by other scholars such as Inglehart (1990), for whom the percentage of Protestants in a country is one element of his civic culture.

Rodney Stark (2004a, 2004b) has criticized the Weberian emphasis on Protestantism by pointing out that many of the attributes of modern capitalism were present in the Italian city-states before the Protestant Reformation. Stark’s controversial study suggests that it is Christianity in general, not Protestantism per se, that encouraged the growth of capitalism and democracy. He argues that because Christianity focuses on orthodoxy (correct belief)
rather than orthopraxy (correct practice, which is the focus of Islam and Judaism) and posits a rational and personal God, a brand of science and philosophy arose in predominantly Christian countries that supported the development of democratic self-rule.

Other scholars have suggested that Protestantism really is a key determinant for contemporary levels of democracy, but not for the reasons suggested by Weber. For example, Woodberry (2004, 2012; Woodberry and Shah 2004) has argued that it is the depth and breadth of Protestant missionary activity during colonial periods that helps to explain why certain countries are democracies today and others are not. The reason has to do with the emphasis that Protestants placed on teaching people to read the scripture in their own language. These missionary efforts spearheaded mass education and the introduction of modern printing to colonial regions, which in turn unleashed many modernizing forces that encouraged democracy, such as increased literacy, greater equality, a more independent workforce, and a larger middle class. Whatever the causal process, Protestantism has historically been seen by many as a religion that encourages democracy.

In contrast to Protestantism, Catholicism has traditionally been seen as antithetical to democracy. For example, Lipset ([1960] 1994, 72) has argued that Catholicism’s emphasis on there being only one church and one truth is incompatible with democracy’s need to accept different and competing ideologies as legitimate. The hierarchy in the Catholic Church and the clear distinction between the clergy and laity are also thought to pose particular problems for the acceptance of more egalitarian institutions, such as democracy. Those who believe that democracy is difficult to establish in Catholic countries often point to the support that the Catholic Church has given to dictatorships around the world in the past. For example, the Catholic Church was an open supporter of fascist Italy under Mussolini and of authoritarian Spain under Franco. The Catholic Church has historically also supported several dictatorships in South America and Asia.

Confucianism and Islam have come to be seen as posing even bigger problems for the successful establishment of democracy than Catholicism. Huntington (1993) is perhaps the most vocal proponent of this belief. He argues that we are currently observing a clash of civilizations and that “Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures” (40).

He goes so far as to say that Confucian democracy is a contradiction in terms and that “almost no scholarly disagreement exists regarding the proposition that traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or anti-democratic” (Huntington 1993, 24). Huntington is not alone in claiming that Confucianism is incompatible with democracy. In what became known as the Asian values debate in the 1990s, scholars argued that Confucianism’s respect for authority and its emphasis on communalism and consensus rather than individual rights and competition made it incompatible with democracy (Kim 1997; Pye 1985; Scalapino 1989). To a large extent, the catalyst for this debate was the Bangkok Declaration that was signed in April 1993 by the political leaders of China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Singapore. This declaration stated that Asian values justify a different way of understanding human rights and democracy. Along these lines, Lee Kuan Yew (1994), Singapore’s prime minister from 1959 to 1990, has suggested that Confucianism’s respect for authority and its emphasis on the community are antithetical to Western images of liberalism. This line of reasoning was used by various authoritarian leaders in Asia to justify the ongoing existence of their nondemocratic forms of government (Dalton and Ong 2004, 3).

As with Confucianism, numerous reasons have been proposed for why Islam might be incompatible with democracy. One of the earliest arguments dates to Montesquieu, who claimed that Islam had a violent streak that predisposed Muslim societies to authoritarianism. While comparing Christianity and Islam, Montesquieu ([1752] 1914, 24:3–4) writes that “the Christian religion is a stranger to mere despotic power. The mildness so frequently recommended in the Gospel is incompatible with the despotic rage with which a prince punishes his subjects, and exercises himself in cruelty. . . . The Mahometan [Islam] religion, which speaks only by the sword, acts still upon men with that destructive spirit with which it was founded.” Huntington (1996, 256–258) is a modern-day proponent of the same idea. He too argues that one of the reasons democracy is so difficult to establish in Islamic countries is that Muslims are prone to political violence. A second proposed reason for the incompatibility of Islam and democracy concerns the purported inability of Islam to disassociate religious and political spheres. The recognition in Islam that God is sovereign and the primary lawgiver has led some to argue that the Islamic state is in principle a theocracy (Lewis 1993) or, as Huntington (1996, 70) puts it, that “in Islam God is Caesar.” A third proposed argument for the incompatibility of Islam and democracy concerns Islam’s unequal treatment of women (Fish 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Some believe that the repressiveness and dominance of the father in the family and of men in relation to women more generally in Islamic culture replicate themselves in the larger society, thereby creating a culture suitable for authoritarianism. Others claim that the social marginalization of women in the political sphere leaves society susceptible to dictatorship because men hold attitudes that are more conducive to domination.

Although arguments that particular religions are incompatible with democracy have strong supporters around the world (notably among the authoritarian leaders of certain countries), there is good reason to doubt their veracity. Why might these arguments be flawed? Note that many of the arguments presented so far rest on claims that there is something about the doctrine of each religion that makes them particularly compatible or incompatible with democracy. One problem with this is that virtually all religions have some doctrinal elements that can be seen as compatible with democracy and others that are not (Stepan 2000, 44). This is true even of “pro-democratic” Protestantism. For example, Przeworski and colleagues (1998, 132) argue that Protestantism’s legitimization of economic inequality and the ethic of individual self-interest associated with it provide “a poor moral basis for living together and resolving conflicts in a peaceful way.”

What about Confucianism and Islam? Well, many people argue that these religions have elements that make them compatible with democracy. For example, some claim that
Confucianism’s meritocratic system and its emphasis on the importance of education and religious tolerance suggest that it can sustain democracy (Fukuyama 1995a). Indeed, Taiwan’s president from 1988 to 2000, Lee Teng-hui, even claims that traditional Confucianism calls for limited government. In addition, the existence of a public sphere in Korea during the Joseon (Chosun or Choson) dynasty from 1392 to 1910 would seem to contradict those who assert that Confucianism cannot sustain democracy because it has no concept of civil society (Im 1997). Thus, despite claims to the contrary by some authoritarian leaders in Asian countries, there seems to be nothing explicit in Confucianism itself that would necessitate an authoritarian government. In fact, many of the elements of Confucianism mentioned above seem quite well suited to a democratic form of government. Indeed, Friedman (2002) even suggests that “Buddhist and Confucian cultures may actually have more democratic elements than Greco-Christian culture.”

Many scholars have also taken issue with the claim that Islam is incompatible on doctrinal grounds with democracy (Aboottalebi 1999; Esposito and Voll 1996; Filali-Ansary 1999; Hefner 2000; Price 1999; Rahman 1979; Sachedina 2000). For example, several scholars find a basis for democracy in the Koran’s emphasis on shura (consultation). Shura requires that even the messenger of Allah should consult with his people in earthly matters and that Muslims should consult with each other in their secular affairs. This process of consultation is in many respects similar to the process of consultation that underpins elections and legislatures in democracies. Indeed, many Islamic scholars “have come to the conclusion that general elections and a parliament properly serve that concept of consultation” (Yazdi 1995, 18). Other scholars have interpreted Islamic concepts such as ijma (consensus of the community) and ijtihad (reinterpretation), as well as legal principles, such as maslaha (public welfare), as providing a basis for Islamic forms of parliamentary governance, representative elections, and religious reform (Esposito 2003).

Still others have suggested that those who portray the rule of law in a democratic state (“law of man”) as being inherently in conflict with sharia, or Islamic law (“law of God”), are creating a false dichotomy. It is true that the primary lawgiver in Islam is God and that God’s agents such as the Islamic state enjoy only marginal autonomy to implement and enforce God’s laws. In other words, it is true that sovereignty lies in different places in democracy (with the people) and Islam (with God). Still, the reason this distinction should not be overemphasized is that, in practice, it is the state, and not God, that actually exercises sovereignty in Islam. Worth noting here is that one of the underlying concerns in both Islam and democracy is the need to limit the power of the state and the people who rule. That this is achieved in Islam by arguing that God is the primary lawgiver and that the state should simply implement God’s laws, whereas it is achieved in democracy by holding elections and implementing checks and balances, should not be allowed to hide the fact that both Islam and democracy share the same goal of limited government.

We should also point out that there is nothing inherent in democratic theory that requires a democratic state to be secular anyway (Stepan 2000, 40). It may be true that most contemporary
democracies tend to separate church and state (although there is considerable variation even in
this), but it is important to recognize that this is a choice and not necessarily part and parcel of
democratic theory. Indeed, it is illuminating to remember that until the eighteenth century,
many leaders of the Christian church vehemently opposed both democracy and secularism, just
like many proponents of Islam today. For decades, there was a great struggle between the church
and princely rulers on the one hand and between Christians and secularists on the other. It was
only during the nineteenth century that democracy and secularism became broadly acceptable
within Western Christian society. Even today, some Christians believe that the strict separation
of church and state should be relaxed. In sum, Islamic doctrine, like the doctrines of other reli-
gions, contains elements that make it compatible with many traditional aspects of democracy.

Some Empirical Evidence

Given that almost all religions seem to contain doctrinal elements that can be seen as detri-
mental to democracy and others that can be seen as conducive to it, it becomes an empirical
question as to whether certain religions pose particular difficulties for the establishment and
survival of democracy (Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 1998). So what does the empirical
evidence say?

The growing empirical evidence that cultures are invented, constructed, and malleable
rather than primordial, inherited, and unchanging suggests that it is inappropriate to view
particular religions or civilizations as being permanently incompatible with democracy. For
example, Eickelman and Piscator (1996) point out that Islamic doctrine has historically been
interpreted in various ways to justify many different types of government. As to Confucianism,
the fact that the comments of Singapore’s former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, concerning
the relationship between Confucianism and democracy run directly counter to the com-
ments of Taiwan’s former president, Lee Teng-hui, suggests that Confucianism can be inter-
preted differently by different people and that it can be adapted to suit different purposes.

Considerable evidence supports the claim that the stance of different religions toward
political institutions often depends less on the content of religious doctrine and more on the
interests of religious leaders. For example, Kalyvas (1996) shows in his study of the rise of
European Christian democracy that the relationship between Catholicism and democracy
had less to do with the actual content of Catholic faith and more to do with the strategic
considerations of elites in the Catholic Church. Balmer (2006) makes a similar point with
respect to Protestants in his account of the rise of the “religious right” in the United States.
with the successful establishment of democracy in nineteenth-century Belgium but Islamic
fundamentalism did not in Algeria during the 1990s. He argues that the reasons for the dif-
ferent outcomes in the two countries had little to do with actual doctrinal issues and more to
do with the different organizational structures of the two religions (see the Religious Party
Game in the Problems section at the end of Chapter 8 for more details). Numerous other
scholars have similarly highlighted the role played by “cultural entrepreneurs” in producing
cultural change, thereby suggesting that conflicts over culture tend to be matters of interest and strategy rather than any primordially given cultural content (Laitin 1983, 1986, 1992; Posner 2004, 2005). In other words, a vast amount of empirical evidence undermines the implication made by scholars such as Huntington that the antidemocratic tendencies of certain religions and civilizations are given once and for all.

The empirical reality is that all religions have historically been compatible with a broad range of political institutions. For example, Fukuyama (1995b, 12) claims that many different types of political institutions are compatible with Confucianism. The fact that it is possible to distinguish between “political” and “everyday” Confucianism helps to explain why the imperial system mandated by traditional political Confucianism could be abolished relatively easily in China in 1911 and replaced with a variety of different political institutions without the loss of Chinese society’s essential coherence. According to Fukuyama, the important legacy of traditional Confucianism is not its political teaching but rather the personal ethic that regulates attitudes toward family, work, education, and other elements of everyday life. This helps to explain why Confucian society can exist easily in democracies like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in semi-authoritarian regimes like Singapore, or in more authoritarian regimes like China and North Korea.

Islamic countries also have considerable experience with different forms of political systems. Despite the claim that Islam requires an Islamic state, it should be noted that, with the exception of Iran since the 1979 revolution and of Afghanistan during the period of Taliban rule in the 1990s, there have been few historical precedents for mullahs, or religious leaders, controlling political power in Islamic countries. On the whole, secular political elites have controlled political power in Islamic countries for the roughly 1,400 years since the Prophet Muhammad died in 632. Despite claims that Islam is incompatible with democracy, it is important to remember that hundreds of millions of Muslims live today in such democratic countries as Canada, France, Germany, India, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Stepan 2000, 49). Indeed, several countries with majority Muslim populations are considered democracies—Albania, Indonesia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Turkey. Clearly,
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being Muslim does not preclude someone from living a peaceful and constructive life in a
democratic society.

Not only can we find evidence for the compatibility of Islam and democracy by looking
at the world today, but we can also find evidence of at least quasi-democratic institutions and
practices in Islam’s past. Perhaps the most notable example is the Constitution of Medina. In
622 the Prophet Muhammad established the first Islamic state when he migrated from
Mecca to Medina. Medina was a highly diverse city—45 percent of the residents were non-
Muslim Arabs, 40 percent were Jews, and 15 percent were Muslims. Whereas the Muslim
population accepted that Muhammad had the right to rule over them by divine decree, this
was not the case for the majority non-Muslim population. Rather than rule by force,
Muhammad explicitly sought the consent of the people he would govern by having them
agree to and sign a constitution. Interestingly, this means that Jews were constitutional part-
ners in making the first Islamic state (M. Khan 2001). As you can see, the Constitution of
Medina represents a social contract between the ruler and his people, one that occurred
almost six centuries earlier than the much more famous Magna Carta in England (A. Khan
2006). Social contract theorists, such as Hobbes and Rousseau, have typically portrayed the
social contract as a “fictional” document that helps to explain the emergence of the modern
state (see Chapter 4). The Constitution of Medina represents one of the few real-world
examples of such a document (A. Khan 2006, 2–3).

In addition to highlighting the importance of having the people’s consent and coopera-
tion for governance, the Constitution of Medina is also a symbol of pluralism and religious
tolerance in Islam (Shah 2012). The constitution created a pluralistic state with a common
citizenship that guaranteed identical rights and duties across the various religious and tribal
communities in Medina. Among other things, the constitution guaranteed social, legal, and
economic equality; cooperation; freedom of conscience; and other human rights. Importantly,
Muslims and non-Muslims were free to practice their own religions and were duty bound to
come to each other’s defense. As A. M. Khan (2010, 6) notes, the Constitution of Medina
“was the first document in history to establish religious freedom as a fundamental constitu-
tional right.” In effect, the constitution envisioned a religiously pluralistic Islamic state.

Despite the fact that cultures tend to be malleable and that all religions have been compat-
ible with a variety of political institutions throughout history, one might still wonder whether
certain religions are more or less compatible with democracy than others. In this vein, several
empirical studies have suggested that Islam is particularly bad for democracy—Islamic coun-
tries seem to have lower Freedom House scores than non-Islamic countries. For example,
Karatnycky (2002) finds that there was only one Islamic country in 2001 that was coded as
Free, whereas there were twenty-eight that were coded as Not Free. In contrast, eighty-five
non-Islamic countries were coded as Free and only twenty-one were coded as Not Free. Fish
(2002) argues that the reason Islam is so bad for democracy has to do with its treatment of
women. Why? First, he finds that Islamic countries tend to be characterized by a wider lit-
eracy gap between men and women, fewer women in government, and lower measures of
overall gender empowerment. Second, he finds that all of these measures of women's status are associated with lower Freedom House scores. This leads him to infer that it is the poor treatment of women in Islamic countries that leads to their low democracy scores.

Despite the evidence presented in these studies, we should be cautious in concluding that Islam is bad for democracy. One reason for such caution is that several of the studies mentioned above examine the effect of Islam on democracy at a fixed point in time. For example, Karatnycky (2002) examines the effect of Islam on a country's Freedom House score in 2001, while Fish examines the effect of Islam on a country's average Freedom House score in the 1990s. Why might this be problematic? What do you think a researcher would find if she examined the relationship between Catholicism and democracy in 1976? She would find that of the forty-seven countries with a Catholic majority, fourteen were coded as Free and sixteen were coded as Not Free. In contrast, eleven of the sixteen countries with a Protestant majority were coded as Free and only one was coded as Not Free. This would suggest that Catholicism is bad for democracy, at least in comparison with Protestantism. However, if the same researcher examined the relationship between Catholicism and democracy in 2004, her conclusion would be very different. Of the fifty-seven countries with a Catholic majority in 2004, forty were coded as Free and only three were coded as Not Free. As you can see, whereas Catholicism seemed to pose some difficulties for democracy from the perspective of 1976, this was no longer the case from the perspective of 2004. Our point here is that it can be dangerous to draw strong inferences about the incompatibility of a religion with democracy from a single point in time.

Note that it would be equally dangerous to draw inferences about the compatibility of a civilization with democracy from a single point in time as well. For example, consider Huntington's assertion that Western civilization is obviously compatible with democracy. Such a claim might seem eminently reasonable from our perspective today. However, it would hardly seem this way to someone living in Europe during the 1930s. As Mazower (2000, 5) notes,

> It is hard to see the inter-war experiment with democracy for the novelty that it was: yet we should certainly not assume that democracy is suited to Europe. . . . Triumphant in 1918, it was virtually extinct twenty years on. . . . Europe found other, authoritarian, forms of political order no more foreign to its traditions. (italics in original)

It turns out that most of the arguments claiming that particular religions or civilizations are incompatible with democracy are implicitly based on observations of the world at a particular point in time. For example, arguments linking Protestantism to democracy and Catholicism to authoritarianism tended to be made most frequently when Protestant countries around the world were predominantly democratic and when Catholic countries were largely authoritarian. This observed variation encouraged some scholars to look for reasons why Protestantism might promote democracy and why Catholicism might impede it. In other words, theory construction came after observing the world. Because explanation
always begins with a puzzling observation, there is nothing inherently wrong with this. But if the explanation does not suggest testable implications other than those that led to it, we call this an ex post, or ad hoc, explanation. Such explanations violate the norms of science because they do not invite falsification. Of course, the argument that Catholic countries are inherently antidemocratic has now lost most of its force because Catholic countries today are predominantly democratic. In fact, one might now even argue that Catholicism helps democratization, given the important role that the Catholic Church played in aiding democratic transitions in countries like Chile, Paraguay, the Philippines, and Poland in the 1980s. Despite this, the exact same type of argument that used to be made about Catholicism is now frequently made about Islam: we observe that there are few democratic Islamic countries at this point in time, and we therefore conclude that there must be something about Islam that is antidemocratic. The history of arguments concerning Catholicism (and Confucianism) should make us wary of accepting this type of reasoning.

What about the evidence that Islam is particularly bad for democracy because of its treatment of women (Fish 2002)? Unfortunately, because of the author’s decision to use Freedom House as his measure of democracy, it is hard to know if his evidence is truly compelling. If you remember our discussion in Chapter 5 of the Freedom House measure of democracy, you might recall that it is based on a series of questions regarding the level of political rights and civil liberties in a country. Countries that have more political rights and civil liberties are considered more free and, hence, more democratic. The problem is that some of these questions take into account, at least implicitly, the treatment and status of women. In other words, the overall Freedom House score for each country automatically varies with that country’s treatment of women simply because of the way it is constructed. As a result, it is inappropriate to test to see whether the measure of the treatment of women affects a country’s Freedom House score—we already know that it will by construction. Thus, the question as to whether Islam is bad for democracy because of its treatment of women remains an open question in our eyes.

**Are Some Religions Incompatible with Democracy? A New Test**

Given that questions remain about the compatibility of certain religions with democracy, it might be useful to reexamine the issue here. Let’s start with what we know. We know that Protestant and Catholic countries tend to be democratic today and that Muslim countries tend to be authoritarian. This has already been demonstrated by some of the studies we just mentioned (Fish 2002; Karatnycky 2002). In and of itself, however, this does not establish a

2. Some of you may have noticed that this type of analysis is similar to employing Mill’s Method of Difference (See Box 2.2, “The Comparative Method,” in Chapter 2). The analyst begins by observing democracies and dictatorships in the world. She then looks for things that only democracies have in common (such as Protestantism) and for things that only dictatorships have in common (Catholicism). From this pattern of observations, the analyst then generates a general theory claiming that Protestantism causes democracy and that Catholicism impedes democracy. The fact that Catholic countries are largely democratic today clearly illustrates the central problem with this mode of scientific analysis; that is, no matter how many times you observe a Catholic dictatorship, it does not logically follow that Catholicism causes dictatorship.
clear link between these religions and the prospects for democracy. We also know that democracy originated in Protestant countries. But our question is not about where democracy originated. What we really want to know is whether democracy can be transplanted to countries dominated by different religions. The evidence to answer this question is not whether more Protestant countries are democratic than Catholic or Muslim countries at some specific moment in time. Instead, what we need to know is whether democracy is more or less likely to emerge and survive in countries that are dominated by Protestants, Muslims, or Catholics. In other words, we need to examine the effect of these religions on democracy across time. To do this, we need to know what effect being a Protestant, Catholic, or Muslim country has on (a) the probability of becoming democratic and (b) the probability of staying democratic. In other words, we would like to test the following hypotheses:

* Catholic hypothesis: Countries with a majority Catholic population are less likely to become and stay democratic.
* Protestant hypothesis: Countries with a majority Protestant population are more likely to become and stay democratic.
* Islamic hypothesis: Countries with a majority Muslim population are less likely to become and stay democratic.

In Table 7.1, we list the countries with majority Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim populations. Although we have not addressed cultural diversity in this chapter, there is reason to think that high levels of cultural diversity may make countries less compatible with democracy. For example, Weingast (1997) argues that democracy can be sustained only if citizens can coordinate their beliefs about when the government has transgressed and when they should do something about this transgression. In many ways, this coordination of beliefs might be considered a “democratic culture” — something that is necessary for democracy to emerge and survive. It seems reasonable to think that this type of coordination is likely to be more difficult when there are many cultural groups in society. Other scholars have argued that ethnic diversity is particularly bad for democracy because it makes reaching compromises difficult and because it raises the risk of intercommunal violence (Dahl 1971; Horowitz 1993; Lijphart 1977; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). We might suspect that countries with a large number of religious groups or a large number of cultural groups might also be problematic for democracy on similar grounds. As a result, we also evaluate the following hypotheses in our upcoming empirical analyses:

* Ethnic group hypothesis: Countries with a large number of ethnic groups are less likely to become and stay democratic.
* Religious group hypothesis: Countries with a large number of religious groups are less likely to become and stay democratic.
Cultural group hypothesis: Countries with a large number of cultural groups are less likely to become and stay democratic.

Let’s start by looking at the emergence of democracy. In order to test our hypotheses about the cultural determinants of democracy, we conduct a similar statistical analysis to the one we did in Chapter 6 when we examined the economic determinants of democracy. The results of our statistical analysis are shown in Table 7.2. The dependent variable, which is listed at the top of the table, is the thing we want to explain. In this case, the dependent variable is the probability that a country becomes a democracy given that it was a dictatorship in the previous year. In other words, our dependent variable concerns the emergence of democracy. Our independent, or explanatory, variables, which are listed in the first column, are the things we think might affect the emergence of democracy. Next to each independent variable (in the other columns) is a coefficient with a corresponding standard error beneath it in parentheses. Recall that the sign of the coefficient is important because it tells us the
**Table 7.2** Cultural and Economic Determinants of Democratic Emergence

**Dependent variable:** Probability that a country will be a democracy this year if it was a dictatorship last year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim majority</td>
<td>−0.28***</td>
<td>−0.18</td>
<td>−0.23</td>
<td>−0.25</td>
<td>−0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant majority</td>
<td>−0.56</td>
<td>−0.42</td>
<td>−0.40</td>
<td>−0.45</td>
<td>−0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic majority</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.00004*</td>
<td>0.00003*</td>
<td>0.00003*</td>
<td>0.00004*</td>
<td>0.00004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00002)</td>
<td>(0.00002)</td>
<td>(0.00002)</td>
<td>(0.00002)</td>
<td>(0.00002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in GDP per capita</td>
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<td>−0.02**</td>
<td>−0.02**</td>
<td>−0.02**</td>
<td>−0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil production</td>
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* *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Note: Data on religious groups and whether a country is a democracy are from Przeworski and colleagues (2000), updated through 2000; data on GDP per capita and growth in GDP per capita are from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (2004; datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt61/); and data on ethnic and cultural groups are from Fearon (2003). The results shown in Table 7.2 come from a dynamic probit model. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
slope of the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable is associated with an increase in the probability that a country will become a democracy. A negative coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable is associated with a reduction in the probability that a country will become a democracy. If the statistical analysis reveals that there is no relationship between an independent variable and the probability that a country will become a democracy, then the coefficient will be zero.

Recall also that the standard error beneath the coefficient helps us to determine how confident we should be in our results. We tend to be confident that we have found a pattern in the data that is likely to be found more generally when the standard error is small relative to the size of its corresponding coefficient. Typically, as a rule of thumb, we say that we have found a statistically significant relationship whenever the coefficient is bigger than twice the size of the standard error. It is common practice for political scientists to place stars next to the coefficients of variables that are considered statistically significant; more stars signal higher statistical significance. Independent variables that do not have a coefficient with stars—where the size of the coefficient is not sufficiently large relative to the size of its standard error—are considered statistically insignificant. An independent variable is considered statistically insignificant if we don’t feel confident ruling out the possibility that the observed pattern between this variable and the dependent variable arose by chance.3

So, what do the results in Table 7.2 tell us? Model 1 in the first column examines how having a Muslim, Catholic, or Protestant majority affects the emergence of democracy without taking anything else into account. As predicted, the coefficient on “Muslim majority” is negative and statistically significant. This means that countries with a Muslim majority are less likely to become democratic. The coefficient on “Protestant majority” is statistically insignificant, meaning that we cannot confidently rule out the possibility that there is no relationship between Protestantism and the emergence of democracy. The coefficient on “Catholic majority” is positive and statistically significant. This coefficient indicates that, contrary to the claims of scholars such as Huntington (1993), Catholicism is positively associated with the emergence of democracy.

If we looked only at the results from Model 1, we would have to conclude that majority Muslim countries are bad for the emergence of democracy. We know, however, that these countries tend to be poorer than most other countries. We also know that poor countries are less likely to become democratic than rich countries (see Chapter 6). Thus, it might be the case that Muslim countries are less likely to become democratic not because they are Muslim but because they are poor. To test this possibility, we include in Model 2 the three economic variables that were used in Chapter 6 to examine the economic determinants of democracy: GDP per capita, economic growth, and oil production. Once we take these economic factors

3. For a more detailed discussion of how we determine whether an observed pattern in the data is “real” or not, see the material on significance tests covered in the Appendix at the end of Chapter 6, “An Intuitive Take on Statistical Analyses.”
into account, we see that the coefficient on “Muslim majority” is no longer statistically significant. This means that we can no longer be confident in ruling out the possibility that there is no relationship between Islam and the emergence of democracy. The evidence suggests that Muslim countries are less likely to become democratic not because they are Muslim but because they are poor. If these countries can develop economically and become wealthier, then there is no reason to think, based on the evidence presented here, that being majority Muslim will pose a significant barrier to them becoming democratic.

What about our other cultural hypotheses? Does having more ethnic, religious, or cultural groups decrease the likelihood that a country will become democratic? None of the coefficients on our ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity variables are statistically significant. As a result, we cannot confidently rule out the possibility that these forms of diversity are unrelated to the emergence of democracy.

Having examined how various cultural factors affect the emergence of democracy, we now investigate how they influence the survival of democracy. The results of our analysis are shown in Table 7.3. The dependent variable is now the probability of democratic survival. As a result, whether a coefficient is positive or negative tells us whether an increase in our independent variables is associated with an increase or decrease in the probability of democratic survival. So what do the results tell us? Model 1 in the first column examines how having a Muslim, Protestant, or Catholic majority affects the probability of democratic survival without taking anything else into account. It turns out that there were no democracies with a Protestant majority that ever collapsed into dictatorship in our sample of countries and time period. As a result, it was not possible to include this variable in the analysis. What this indicates, though, is that having a Protestant majority is strongly associated with democratic survival. What about having a Muslim or Catholic majority? The coefficient on “Muslim majority” is negative and statistically significant. This means that countries with a Muslim majority are less likely to survive as democracies. The coefficient on “Catholic majority” is not statistically significant, meaning that we cannot confidently rule out the possibility that there is no relationship between Catholicism and the survival of democracy.

If we looked only at the results from Model 1, we would have to conclude that having a Muslim majority is bad for the survival of democracy. But again, it is important to remember that majority Muslim countries tend to be poorer than most other countries. We know that poor countries are less likely to survive as democracies than rich countries (see Chapter 6). Thus, it might be the case that Muslim countries are less likely to survive as democracies not because they are Muslim but because they are poor. To test this possibility, we again include in Model 2 the three economic variables that were used in Chapter 6 to examine the economic determinants of democracy. Once we take account of these economic determinants, we see that the coefficient on “Muslim majority” is no longer statistically significant. This means that we can no longer be confident in ruling out the possibility that there is no relationship between Islam and the survival of democracy. The evidence suggests that Muslim countries are less likely to survive as democracies not because they are Muslim but because
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
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*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

† No democracy with a Protestant majority ever failed to survive in this time period. As a result, it is not possible to include this variable.

Note: Data on religious groups and whether a country is a democracy are from Przeworski and colleagues (2000), updated through 2000; data on GDP per capita and growth in GDP per capita are from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (2004; datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca); and data on ethnic and cultural groups are from Fearon (2003). The results shown in Table 7.3 come from a dynamic probit model. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
they are poor. If these countries can develop economically and become wealthier, then there is no reason to think, based on the evidence presented here, that being majority Muslim will pose a significant barrier to democratic survival.

What about the other hypotheses? Does ethnic, religious, or cultural diversity decrease the likelihood of democratic survival? The results in Models 3 through 5 indicate that countries with a large number of ethnic or cultural groups are less likely to stay democratic. This is because the coefficients on the variables capturing ethnic and cultural diversity are both negative and statistically significant. We cannot confidently rule out that there is no relationship between the number of religious groups in a country and the survival of democracy. This is because the coefficient on the variable capturing religious diversity is not statistically significant.

So what conclusions can we draw from our “cultural” analysis of the emergence and survival of democracy? First, there is no compelling evidence that predominantly Muslim countries are less likely to become democratic or less likely to stay democratic. It is true that Muslim countries typically have authoritarian forms of government at present. However, there is reason to believe that this has more to do with the fact that they tend to be poor than because they are Muslim.

Second, majority Protestant countries do not seem more likely to become democratic than other countries. This runs counter to the traditional argument that Catholic countries do not provide fertile terrain for the emergence of democracy. It is unclear why having a Catholic majority might increase the likelihood of transitioning to democracy. Still, even though Catholic countries are more likely to become democratic, they seem to have a hard time staying democratic. The results in Table 7.3 when we take account of economic factors indicate that majority Catholic countries are less likely to remain democratic than other countries. In this book’s concluding chapter, we will explore the possibility that particular types of political institutions may make democratic consolidation difficult. These institutions have been linked to democratic instability in Latin American countries, many of which have Catholic majorities. Thus, there are reasons to believe that the negative association between Catholicism and democratic stability that we have observed here is not causal in nature.

Fourth, ethnically, religiously, or culturally diverse countries do not seem less likely to undergo a democratic transition than homogeneous countries. In other words, diversity of these kinds does not seem to destabilize dictatorships. In contrast, ethnic and cultural diversity do seem to destabilize democracies. Democracy is significantly less likely to survive in countries that have many ethnic or cultural groups; the number of religious groups does not
seem to matter. One interpretation of these results is that some sort of shared values or beliefs is required for democracy, but not for authoritarianism, to persist (Weingast 1997).

Finally, economic factors continue to have an important impact on democracy even when we take account of various cultural features. As modernization theory would predict, and as we found in Chapter 6, wealthy countries are more likely to become democratic and stay democratic. Economic growth is good for both dictatorships and democracies—economic growth reduces the likelihood of a democratic transition, and it reduces the likelihood of democratic collapse. One result that differs somewhat from those in the previous chapter is that we are no longer confident of ruling out the possibility that there is no relationship between being an oil producer and the emergence of democracy once we take account of various cultural features. This is a result that requires more study.

**EXPERIMENTS AND CULTURE**

So far we have examined how culture might affect democracy using survey evidence and statistical analyses. We now turn to some experimental results that also suggest that culture might be important for the establishment and survival of democracy. The experiments that we are going to examine involve individuals playing what are known as Ultimatum Games and Dictator Games.

In an Ultimatum Game, individuals (known as subjects or players) are paired together. The first player, often called the “proposer,” is provisionally allotted a divisible “pie” (usually money). The proposer then offers a portion of the total pie to the second player, called the “responder.” The responder, knowing both the offer and the total amount of the pie, can then either accept or reject the proposer’s offer. If the responder accepts, then he receives the amount offered, and the proposer gets the remainder (the pie minus the offer). If the responder rejects the offer, then neither receives any money. In either case, the game ends, and the two subjects receive their winnings and leave. In the experiments, the players are anonymous to each other, and the games use substantial sums of money. An example might help. Imagine that the proposer is given $100 and offers $40 to the responder. If the responder accepts the offer, then the responder keeps the $40, and the proposer keeps the remaining $60. If the responder rejects the offer, then both the responder and the proposer get nothing. The Dictator Game is essentially the same as the Ultimatum Game except that responders are not given an opportunity to reject the offer; they simply get whatever the proposer dictates. You should think about how much of the pie you would offer if you were the proposer. What types of offers would you accept or reject if you were the responder? Would the offer you make depend on whether you were playing the Ultimatum Game or the Dictator Game?

Why might a researcher want to compare the behavior of individuals in the Ultimatum Game with their behavior in a Dictator Game? To answer this question, think about why someone might make a positive offer in the Ultimatum Game. There are two potential
reasons. First, the proposer might make a positive offer out of a sense of fairness. In other words, the proposer realizes that he was randomly chosen to receive the pie and thinks it only fair that he should offer some of it to the responder. Second, the proposer might make a positive offer because of fear of rejection. In other words, the proposer makes only a positive offer in order to reduce the risk that he would get nothing if the responder rejects it. In the Dictator Game, there is no fear of rejection, because the responder cannot reject the proposer’s offer. As a result, any positive offer in the Dictator Game must be from a sense of fairness. Thus, the Dictator Game allows the experimenter to distinguish between proposers who make positive offers out of a sense of fairness and those who make positive offers out of a fear of rejection.

What would you expect individuals who care only about their own share of the pie to do if they acted as the proposer in an Ultimatum Game? What would they do if they acted as the responder? We sometimes refer to individuals who care only about their own share of the pie as *Homo economicus*. It turns out that we would expect a proposer who cares only about his own share of the pie to offer \( \epsilon \) to the responder, where \( \epsilon \) is only slightly larger than 0. We would then expect the responder to accept this offer because receiving \( \epsilon \) is clearly better than getting nothing, which is what both players get if the responder refuses. Thus, if we continue our example from above and assume that we are in the world of *Homo economicus*, we would expect the proposer to get $100 – \epsilon \) and the responder to get \( \epsilon \). Things look only slightly different in the Dictator Game. Now we would expect a proposer who cares only about his own share of the pie not to offer anything to the responder and to simply keep all of the $100 for himself. Remember, these are the theoretical predictions if we were in the world of *Homo economicus*. But what do we actually observe when individuals play this game in an experimental setting?

Both the Ultimatum and Dictator Games have been played in numerous experimental settings in virtually all of the industrialized democracies in the world. Typically, the experiment involves a group of students who are paired up anonymously in a computer lab. One student is randomly chosen to be the proposer and the other becomes the responder. The game then begins. What do you think happens in these games? Somewhat remarkably, there is a great deal of similarity in the results produced by these experiments despite the fact that they are conducted in different countries around the world. It turns out that the modal offer—the most common offer—in student populations playing the Ultimatum Game is almost always 50 percent, with the mean, or average, offer varying somewhere between 40 percent and 45 percent. Offers of less than 20 percent of the pie are rejected by responders about half the time. In contrast, the modal offer in student populations playing the Dictator Game is normally 0 percent. The large difference in the modal offers between the two games would suggest that many of the positive offers in the Ultimatum Game come about because of a fear of rejection, rather than a sense of fairness, on the part of the proposer. Although this is certainly true, the mean offer in the Dictator Game is still typically in the 20 percent to 30 percent range. In other words, some individuals still make quite large positive offers.
even when they know that their offers cannot be rejected. These proposers are clearly acting out of a sense of fairness; they exhibit what some call a prosocial behavior. Overall, the results from these experiments indicate that a substantial portion of the students playing these games do not approximate the theoretical *Homo economicus*.

Several scholars began to wonder whether these deviations from the theoretical predictions for *Homo economicus* were evidence of a universal pattern of human behavior or whether the deviations varied with an individual's economic and cultural setting. Do some cultures exhibit behavior that more closely resembles that of *Homo economicus*, than the behavior of other cultures? Of course, these questions cannot be answered with any satisfaction simply by looking at experimental results from student populations around the world. Although there are cultural differences among students in different countries, these differences are quite small compared with the range of cultural environments that exist in the world. As a result, a group composed primarily of anthropologists and economists decided to conduct experiments using Ultimatum and Dictator Games in fifteen small-scale societies in twelve countries on five continents (Gintis 2003; Henrich et al. 2001, 2005). These societies exhibited a wide range of cultural and economic environments: foraging societies, slash-and-burn horticulture groups, nomadic herding groups, and sedentary, small-scale agriculturalist societies. Information on these societies is shown in Table 7.4.

How did the individuals in these societies act in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games? The offers made in the Ultimatum Game are shown in a bubble plot in Figure 7.3. Data from an experiment using students at the University of Pittsburgh are included as a benchmark against which to compare the results from the fifteen small-scale societies. The size of the bubble at each location along each row represents the proportion of the sample that made a particular offer. The right edge of the lightly shaded horizontal gray bar gives the mean offer for that group. For example, if you look at the row associated with the Machiguenga from Peru, you can see that the mode (the most common offer) is 0.15, the secondary mode is 0.25, and the mean is 0.26.

The information in Figure 7.3 illustrates that no society conforms well to the predictions for *Homo economicus*. The second thing to note, though, is that there is much more variation in the offers made in the fifteen small-scale societies than in the student populations of the advanced industrial countries. Remember that the mean offer among students varies from about 40 to 45 percent in Ultimatum Games. In contrast, the range for the mean offers in the fifteen small-scale societies is much larger, varying from 26 percent for the Machiguenga in Peru to 58 percent for the Lamelara in Indonesia. Whereas the modal offer among students is 50 percent, the modal offer among the fifteen small-scale societies ranges from 15 percent to 50 percent.

Although we do not show any evidence here, it turns out that the rejection rates in these fifteen societies also vary quite considerably between the groups. Whereas offers below 20 percent in industrial democracies are rejected with a probability of 0.4 to 0.6, the experimenters found that rejections of very low offers such as this are quite rare in some groups.
For example, the Machiguenga rejected only one offer even though 75 percent of the offers made were below 30 percent. In some groups, though, the experimenters found that rejection rates were quite high even when offers were over 50 percent of the pie. For example, the Au and the Gnau in Papua New Guinea were equally likely to reject offers that were below or above 50 percent. The results from the Dictator Game also showed considerable variation. Among student populations, the distribution of offers has a mode at zero and a secondary mode at 50 percent. In contrast, the Orma had a mode at 50 percent, and the Hadza had a mode at 10 percent. There were no zero offers among the Tsimané; the mean was 32 percent, and the mode was 25 percent.

What explains this large variation in behavior between the different cultural groups? The researchers found that individual level characteristics such as the proposer’s (or responder’s)
sex, age, education, and wealth could not explain the variation. Instead, what mattered was how group-specific conditions such as social institutions or cultural fairness norms affected individual preferences or expectations. The researchers rank ordered the fifteen societies along two dimensions: (a) payoffs to cooperation and (b) market integration. Payoffs to cooperation refer to how important it is to cooperate with non-immediate kin in economic production. Market integration refers to how much the groups relied on market exchange in their everyday lives. At the low end of the “payoffs to cooperation” dimension were the Machiguenga and Tsimané, whose members rarely engaged in cooperative production with individuals outside of the family. At the high end of this dimension were the Lamelara, whose members hunted whales in large canoes manned by twelve or more people at a time. The researchers expected that groups in which the payoffs to cooperation were high would

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**Figure 7.3** Offers from an Ultimatum Game

![Graph showing offers from an Ultimatum Game.]

**Note:** The size of the bubble at each location along each row represents the proportion of the sample that made a particular offer. The right edge of the lightly shaded horizontal gray bar gives the mean offer for that group.

**Source:** Henrich and colleagues (2005).
make high offers in situations like the Ultimatum Game. At the low end of the “market integration” dimension were the Hadza, whose members rarely engaged in market activity. At the high end of this dimension were the Orma, whose members often worked for wages and sold livestock. The researchers expected that groups with greater market integration would make high offers in situations like the Ultimatum Game. This is because the more frequently people experience market transactions, the more they should also experience abstract sharing principles concerning behavior toward strangers. As predicted, a statistical analysis revealed that higher values on both dimensions were, indeed, associated with higher mean offers in the Ultimatum Game. In fact, fully 68 percent of the variance in offers could be explained by these two variables alone.

How should we interpret these results? One interpretation is that the individuals in these societies looked for similar situations in their everyday lives when they were faced with the novel situations presented by the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game. Rather than reason through the logic of the game, it seems that they asked themselves the following question: “What familiar situation is this game like?” They then acted in a way appropriate for this analogous situation. Consider the hyperfair offers and the frequent rejections of these offers among the Au and Gnau in Papua New Guinea. This behavior can be explained by the culture of gift giving in these societies. Providing expensive gifts is a signal of prestige and importance in these societies. At the same time, it is recognized that accepting gifts commits one to reciprocate at some future time determined by the gift giver. Moreover, particularly generous gifts put you in a clearly subordinate position. The culture of gift giving not only explains the generous offers made by the Au and Gnau proposers but also explains why large offers were so readily rejected by the responders; these “excessively” large gifts tended to produce anxiety about the unspoken strings that were attached to them.

Consider now the low offers and high rejection rates of the Hadza. This behavior is entirely compatible with the fact that Hadza hunters often try to avoid sharing their meat. One ethnographer goes so far as to call this reluctance to share “tolerated theft.” What about the Lamelara’s tendency to divide the pie equally or to offer the respondent slightly more than a fair share? In real life, when a Lamelara whaling crew returns with a large catch, a designated person carefully divides the whale into predesignated parts allocated to the harpooner, crew members, and others participating in the hunt, as well as the sailmaker, members of the hunters’ corporate group, and other community members. The Lamelara may well have seen dividing the large pie in the Ultimatum Game as similar to dividing up a whale. Similar stories to these could be told to explain the behavior of individuals from the other societies in the study.

By now, you’re probably wondering what these experiments have to do with culture and democracy. The results from these experiments suggest that culture might be considered a shared way of playing everyday games that has evolved over many years (Bednar and Page 2007). It seems clear that individual choices are shaped by the economic and social interactions of everyday life. It appears that people often search for analogous situations
when trying to figure out how to act in new situations. If this is true, then it seems reasonable to think that the shared way of playing games in some societies might be less compatible with the game of democracy than it is in other societies. For example, the game of democracy often requires cooperation, competition, and compromise. Societies that already require this type of behavior in their everyday “games” should find it easier to adopt and support democratic institutions. In contrast, societies in which individuals are engaged in games that do not encourage this type of behavior will find it much harder to consolidate democracy.

CONCLUSION

As we noted at the very beginning of this chapter, the notion that political institutions, such as democracy and dictatorship, are more suited to some cultures is not new. The rather vague claims made by scholars such as Montesquieu and Mill in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries regarding the compatibility of democracy with particular cultures were later taken up in a more systematic fashion by cultural modernization theory. Cultural modernization theory argues that economic development produces certain cultural changes and that it is these cultural changes that lead to democratization (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). A key cultural change according to this line of reasoning is the emergence of what political scientists call a “civic culture.”

For many, the existence of a civic culture is seen as a prerequisite for the successful emergence and survival of democracy (Almond and Verba [1963] 1989; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In addition to its importance for democracy, a civic culture is also seen by some as crucial for the good performance of government (Putnam 1993, 2000). Although there are strong proponents of the idea that democracy requires a civic culture, others question the direction of causality. Does a civic culture produce democracy, or does experience with democracy produce a civic culture? As we suggested earlier, the answer to both of these questions may well be “yes.” Societal development may foster democratization by producing certain cultural changes, but it may also affect democratization through other channels such as those examined in Chapter 6. Similarly, it seems reasonable that experience with democracy can contribute to producing a civic culture that in turn reinforces democratic practice in the future. If we are correct, there may be a virtuous cycle linking social development, cultural change, and democratic outcomes.

More recently, the focus of cultural arguments regarding democracy has shifted to questions of whether certain religions are compatible with democratic institutions. Given the current state of world affairs, it is not surprising that particular attention has been paid to whether Islam is compatible with democracy. As we indicate in this chapter, though, a quick glance at the history of these types of arguments should make one very cautious of unthinkingly accepting that certain religions are incompatible with democracy. For example, some political scientists used to claim as recently as the 1970s that Catholicism was antithetical to
democracy, but few do now, given how firmly established democracy has become in many Catholic countries around the world.

Many scholars point to particular doctrines to explain why such and such a religion is inimical to democracy. As we have sought to demonstrate, however, virtually all religions, including Islam, have some doctrinal elements that seem incompatible with democracy and others that seem compatible (Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 1998). This hardly seems a firm basis on which to draw such strong conclusions about the incompatibility of certain religions with democracy. Moreover, there is growing empirical evidence that the stance of different religions toward various political institutions often depends less on the content of their doctrine and more on the interests and strategic concerns of religious leaders (Kalyvas 1996, 1998, 2000). When combined with a vast literature indicating how culture is constructed and malleable rather than primordial and inherited, this growing evidence helps to explain why all religions have historically been compatible with a broad range of political institutions, including democracy.

Despite the widely held belief by many that Islam is incompatible with democracy, the empirical analyses that we conducted in this chapter suggest that there is little reason to believe that majority Muslim countries cannot become and remain democratic once we take account of their wealth. To a large extent, our analyses indicate that the hurdle these majority Muslim countries need to overcome to be able to sustain democracy has less to do with the fact that they are Muslim and more to do with the fact that they are poor.

Many arguments about the cultural determinants of democracy implicitly assume that democracy is increasingly likely to arise and be sustained as more citizens come to appreciate the benefits of democracy. But “liking democracy” is almost certainly not a sufficient condition for democracy, and it may not even be a necessary one. Indeed, a more cynical view suggests that democracy is at best most people’s second favorite form of government. Recall from the comparison of the behavior of individuals in the ultimatum and dictator games that most individuals might take most or all of the pie when they are confident that they can get away with it. Similarly, individuals might prefer monarchy if they were allowed to be the ruler, but they reluctantly accept democracy when they realize that they, or their chosen one, may not be permitted to rule. Such strategic calculations turn out to be important in the transition process from dictatorship to democracy. We focus on precisely that in the next chapter.

**Key Concepts**

- civic culture 228
- constructivist arguments 224
- cultural modernization theory 226
- differential item functioning 234
- primordialist arguments 224
- social capital 229
- social desirability bias 233
PROBLEMS

1. Consider the following argument.

Major premise: If Catholicism is incompatible with democracy, then Catholic countries are more likely to be dictatorships than democracies.

Minor premise: Catholic countries are more likely to be democracies than dictatorships.

Conclusion: Therefore, Catholicism is not incompatible with democracy.

a. Is this a valid or an invalid argument?

b. What form of categorical syllogism is this (affirming the antecedent/consequent or denying the antecedent/consequent)?

2. Consider the following argument.

Major premise: If Islam is incompatible with democracy, then Islamic countries are more likely to be dictatorships than democracies.

Minor premise: Most Islamic countries around the world today are dictatorships.

Conclusion: Therefore, Islam is incompatible with democracy.

a. Is this a valid or an invalid argument?

b. What form of categorical syllogism is this?

3. “If a democracy has a civic culture, then it will stay a democracy.” In this statement, is “having a civic culture” an example of a sufficient condition or a necessary condition?

4. Obtain a copy of M. Steven Fish’s (2002) article “Islam and Authoritarianism” from the journal World Politics (55:4–37), using your institution’s library resources. Read the article and then answer the following questions.

a. What is Fish’s dependent variable? How is it measured? What is the primary source for the dependent variable? What is the main independent variable? How is it measured?

b. What is the main hypothesis of this article? What evidence would falsify this hypothesis?

c. Why does Fish believe that having a predominantly Islamic religious tradition might be detrimental to the level of democracy in a country? Fish examines four proposed causal mechanisms for why this might be the case. Describe each of these four causal mechanisms in a sentence or two.

d. Fish tests his theory using statistical analyses. Given his dependent variable, what sign (positive or negative) does Fish predict for the coefficient on his primary explanatory variable? Hint: See your answers to parts a and b above. What sign does he find? Is the coefficient on this variable statistically significant? How do you know? Hint: The answer is in Table 3, column 1, page 13. Interpret these results in substantive terms. In other words, what does Fish find about the relationship between Islam and a country’s level of democracy?
e. Which of the four potential causal mechanisms does Fish find the most evidence for? How do you know?

f. One of the conclusions that Fish reaches is that Islam is a hindrance to democracy because women are not treated equally in Islamic countries. He reaches this conclusion using Freedom House as his measure of democracy. Why might it be problematic to use Freedom House to examine the impact that the unequal treatment of women in Islamic countries has on democracy? Find the complete list of questions that are used to create a country’s Freedom House score by going to https://freedomhouse.org/. Identify which questions make it problematic to use Freedom House scores to test Fish’s statement that Islam is bad for democracy because of its unequal treatment of women. Explain why these questions make Fish’s statement more of a tautology than a scientific statement.

g. Fish (p. 6) recognizes that one of the limitations to his analysis is that it looks at the relationship between Islam and a country’s level of democracy only at a fixed point in time. Based on our discussion in the chapter, why might this be problematic for drawing inferences about whether Islam is incompatible with the emergence and the survival of democracy?

5. Obtain a copy of Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov’s (2013) article “Empowering Women: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan” from the journal *American Political Science Review* (107:540–557) using your institution’s library resources. Read the article and then answer the following questions.

   a. Based on the information in the article, describe the state of gender equality in Afghanistan.
   
   b. What is the National Solidarity Program (NSP), and how is it connected to gender equality?
   
   c. The researchers in the study used an experiment to conduct an “impact evaluation” of the NSP as it related to gender equality. Describe their experiment in your own words. Be sure to note the difference between a village in the “treatment” group and a village in the “control” group.
   
   d. What were the researchers’ hypotheses? Explain these in your own words.
   
   e. What data did the researchers use to test their hypotheses?
   
   f. What conclusions did the researchers draw based on the experimental evidence? Which of the hypotheses, if any, were consistent with the empirical evidence?
   
   g. What do you think this experiment can tell us, more generally, about the link between culture and democracy?

6. In this chapter, we presented a question from the World Values Survey that is sometimes used as an indicator of a country’s level of democratic stability.

   a. Reread the possible responses to this survey question on page 233. Does this survey question provide a nominal, ordinal, or interval measure of democratic stability?
b. Write down two questions that you think should be put on a survey to elicit useful information about a country’s level of democratic stability. Include the possible responses that you would provide as well. Do your survey questions provide nominal, ordinal, or interval measures of democratic stability?

7. The World Values Survey website (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp) allows you to conduct online analyses. Click on the Data and Documentation link in the left-hand column. At the top of the page, you’ll be able to click on a link that allows you to “download a quick reference to using the site.” Read this document.

a. Use the information in the quick reference document to identify three survey questions from the latest wave of the World Values Survey that you find interesting. Use the online analysis tools to produce a map of the world for each of these survey questions. The maps will visually show how the responses to your survey questions vary across countries. Do the countries exhibit much variation in their responses? Do the geographic patterns that you see align with what you expected? If so, why? If not, why not?

b. Now choose one survey question of particular interest. Choose three countries and produce a graph showing how the responses to your survey question have changed over time in each of your three countries. Are the patterns over time similar across your three countries? Do the trends across time align with what you expected? If so, why? If not, why not?

8. In this chapter, we discussed some limitations that surveys face when addressing sensitive topics.

a. Explain what we mean by “social desirability bias” and why it can cause problems for drawing inferences from surveys.

b. Examine the survey question below that seeks to measure the level of support for racial diversity on university campuses.

“There should be more racial diversity on university campuses. Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree?”

Do you think this is a good survey question, or do you think that it is problematic? If you think it is problematic, explain why. What do you think the researcher can do to get a more accurate measure of the level of support for racial diversity on university campuses?

c. In the chapter, we discussed several methods that researchers can use to mitigate problems with sensitive items on surveys: better survey administration, list experiments, randomized response techniques, and endorsement experiments. Think of a sensitive topic that researchers might want to examine. Explain why the topic is sensitive, and then show how one of the methods mentioned above can be utilized to examine it.

d. While better survey administration, list experiments, randomized response techniques, and endorsement experiments can often mitigate concerns with sensitive survey items, they are not a cure-all. Can you think of potential problems that remain even with these innovative techniques?
9. In this chapter, we discussed some limitations that surveys face when respondents come from different regions, countries, ethnic groups, or cultures.

a. Explain what we mean by “differential item functioning” and why it can cause problems for surveys.

b. Examine the survey question below that seeks to determine an individual’s ideological preferences.

“In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means left and 10 means right?”

Suppose that this question was asked in a cross-national survey like the World Values Survey. Do you think this is a good survey question, or do you think that it is problematic? If you think it is problematic, explain why. What do you think the researcher can do to get a more accurate measure of an individual’s ideological preferences?

c. In the chapter, we discussed how researchers sometimes use anchoring vignettes to help overcome differential item functioning. Explain how anchoring vignettes can be helpful. Can you think of potential problems that might occur when using anchoring vignettes?

10. Obtain a copy of Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort’s (2010) article “Identifying Barriers to Muslim Integration in France” from the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (107:22384–22390) using your institution’s library resources. Read the article and then answer the following questions.

a. When it comes to measuring discrimination, the authors refer to “correspondence tests.” What is a correspondence test?

b. Why is it hard to identify a “Muslim effect” when it comes to facing discrimination in France?

c. What strategy did the authors use to isolate a Muslim effect? Explain how this strategy worked.

d. What did the authors find in their correspondence test?

11. Coordination and Democracy Game

Some political scientists argue that democracy can be sustained only if citizens can coordinate their beliefs about (a) what types of government actions are unacceptable and (b) when they ought to take action against the government in response. Countries in which citizens have coordinated their beliefs on these matters might be said to be characterized by a “democratic culture.” We now analyze a Coordination and Democracy Game inspired by Weingast (1997) to explore this argument further.

Our Coordination and Democracy Game has three actors—a state, S, and two groups of citizens, A and B. The state must decide whether to transgress or not. If the state decides to transgress, then the two groups of citizens, A and B, must simultaneously decide whether to acquiesce to the state’s transgression or challenge it. Only if both citizen groups “coordinate”
on challenging the state will their challenge be successful. The most preferred outcome for
the state is the one in which it transgresses and the two groups of citizens fail to coordinate
on challenging it. The state prefers not to transgress if a transgression produces a successful
challenge from the two citizen groups. The most preferred outcome for both citizen groups
is obviously the one in which the state does not transgress in the first place. If the state does
transgress, though, then both citizen groups prefer the outcome in which they successfully
challenge the state to outcomes in which they either do not challenge it or they challenge
unsuccessfully. Both citizen groups would rather not challenge the state than participate in
an unsuccessful challenge. Figure 7.4 illustrates the game tree for our Coordination and
Democracy Game along with cardinal payoffs capturing how the three actors evaluate the
different outcomes. The payoffs to the state are listed first, those to group A are listed
second, and those to group B are listed third.

The dashed line in Figure 7.4 indicates that when group A has to choose whether to
acquiesce or challenge, it does not know whether group B will acquiesce or challenge. In
other words, group A and group B do not make their choices sequentially; they must make
them simultaneously without knowing what the other is going to do. You are more familiar
with seeing this sort of thing being captured by a strategic form game. As a result, let’s
rewrite this particular subgame (the part of the game tree in Figure 7.4 shown in gray) in its
equivalent strategic form. This strategic form game is shown in Figure 7.5. The only thing
that is unusual about this game is that the first payoff in each cell of the payoff table belongs
to the state (even though it is not a player in this particular subgame).

**Figure 7.4**  Coordination and Democracy Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transgress</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquiesce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge</td>
<td>(8, 2, 1) Unsuccessful challenge</td>
<td>(0, 7, 7) Successful challenge</td>
<td>(2, 8, 8) Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge</td>
<td>(8, 1, 2) Unsuccessful challenge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquiesce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Transgress</strong></td>
<td>(8, 2, 2) No challenge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: A and B = citizen groups; S = state.*
a. Solve the strategic form game in Figure 7.5 for any Nash equilibria. \textit{Hint:} Ignore the payoffs belonging to the state, because the state is not a player in this game. If you solve the game correctly, you will find two Nash equilibria.

b. What are the expected outcomes associated with the two Nash equilibria? What are the payoffs that each of the three players receive in the two Nash equilibria?

c. By solving the game in Figure 7.5, you have found out that the state can expect to receive one of two possible payoffs if it transgresses. Compare each of the state's potential payoffs from transgressing with the state's payoff from not transgressing. What can you say about the circumstances under which the state will or will not transgress against its citizens?

d. How does the Coordination and Democracy Game help illustrate the notion that the coordination of beliefs between different groups in society might be considered a “democratic culture”—something that is necessary for democracy to emerge and survive?

e. In the chapter, we note that some political scientists believe that democracy is hard to sustain in countries that are characterized by a large number of ethnic or cultural groups. How does the Coordination and Democracy Game that you have just examined help to explain why this might be the case?

f. Weingast (1997) extends the game in Figure 7.4 to allow the state to transgress against only one group while keeping the other one satisfied. Without constructing and solving such a game, what difference do you think this would make to the conclusions from our original Coordination and Democracy Game? Do you think that groups will find it easier or harder to coordinate their beliefs in this new setting? What difference do you think this new setting makes to the likelihood that democracy can survive?