THE NEW SOCIOLOGY OF SCOTLAND

DAVID MCCCRONE
This is a ‘sociology’ book, not a ‘history’ book, but arguably you cannot write one without the other. It is for historians to decide how much, or how little, sociology they wish to include, but beginning to tell the story of Scotland, as this chapter tries to do, cannot be done without history. In any case, we might ask: when does the ‘past’ end and the ‘present’ begin? We cannot understand one without the other. Arguably, the sociology of any society must involve telling its story, at least in terms of how its structures, social, political and economic, and its cultures were formed.

That, however, raises an important question: how much ‘history’ to include and how to tell it? Since publishing *Understanding Scotland*, first in 1992, and in revised form in 2001, there has been a huge increase in historical scholarship and output. Nevertheless, the task in this chapter is to sketch out a ‘sociological history’: to focus on the key events and processes which have shaped Scotland and formed it as a society. To that end, it is necessary to be selective. We will focus on three key points in history at which Scotland’s identity has been especially problematic and salient: (a) in the thirteenth century, and particularly relating to the Wars of Independence; (b) at the time of the Union of Parliaments with England in 1707; and (c) at the end of the twentieth century when agitation for greater self-government culminated in the recovery of a (devolved) Scottish parliament. Each time-point has as its central question: what is Scotland? Or, in the words of the chapter title, when *was* Scotland? How can we be sure that Scotland is meaningful in sociological terms?

**Chapter aims**

- To examine where the ‘idea’ of Scotland came from: what are its origins? In other words, when was Scotland?
- To discover what impact the Union of 1707 had on Scotland, its institutions and identity.
- To see how viable the arguments are that Scotland was ‘over’, that with the loss of formal independence it ceased to be a proper ‘society’, and that its culture was weak and divided.

In the subsequent chapter we will examine how the immediate history of the twentieth century shaped Scotland.
When was Scotland?

The historian Dauvit Broun has commented: ‘However old this fundamental sense of people [Scots] and country [Scotland] may be, it must have begun sometime’ (2015: 164). So when did ‘Scotland’ as an idea begin? Broun observes: ‘to insist that Scotland was not a meaningful concept, or that Scottish identity did not exist before the end of the 13th century, would surely be to allow our modern idea of Scotland to take precedence over the view of contemporaries’ (1994: 38).

So what is he alluding to? What we think of as ‘Scotland’ is shaped by our own experiences of it as a small, advanced, capitalist society on the fringes of north-west Europe. Trying to ‘imagine’ how our ancestors thought of it is much harder for us to do. Furthermore, there is an argument that notions of modernity so shaped our understanding of ‘nations’ that we simply have to treat them as modern creations.

We cannot know, the argument goes, what meaning and significance they had in the pre-modern era. Such is the view associated with Ernest Gellner, that the ‘nation’ is a cultural construction of modernity, dating from about the end of the eighteenth century. Gellner belonged to the ‘modernist’ school of nationalism studies, and Anthony Smith to the ‘pre-modernist’ one. In an engaging debate as to whether ‘nations have navels’, that is whether they derive from previous history or are simply creatures of ‘modernity’, Gellner and Smith argued whether modern nations have any or much claim to historic ancestry (see Gellner, 1996; Smith, 1996). All of this is part of a lengthy debate in nationalism studies about how old (or, indeed, how young) nations really are, and they have implications for Scotland.

Can we be at all sure that there is a clear historical lineage from past to present? We might take the view that our notion of ‘Scotland’ is a modern one, reflecting contemporary political and constitutional concerns, which we then read back into ‘history’, by way of ideological justification. We can use such justification for political purposes, to say, for example, that Scotland is one of Europe’s oldest nations, but can we be sure that our ancestors thought of it as a ‘nation’, and, if so, in what senses? Hence Broun’s comment that we cannot assume that the ‘Scotland’ we have inherited is that of the Middle Ages; that medieval Scotland means the same as modern Scotland. Much more difficult, then, as Broun observes, to ascertain whether people in the thirteenth century had any notion of ‘Scotland’, and what it might have meant to them. The author L.P. Hartley opened his novel The Go-Between (2004 [1953]: 5) with the words: ‘The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.’ His original manuscript continued: ‘Or do they?’, a question cut from the published copy. Perhaps we can reinstate Hartley’s question for the purposes of this chapter.

‘Not-England’

Why, you might ask, the thirteenth century? ‘Scotland’ might have existed as early as the first millennium, but it was the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and above all the ‘Wars
of Independence‘ at the beginning of the fourteenth century, which arguably ‘made’ Scotland in a way we now recognise. This is territory belonging to medieval historians. Broun contends that: ‘it was not until the period between 1260 and 1290 that the idea of country, people and kingdom coincided to form what we recognise as the beginning of modern Scotland’ (2015: 165).

So what brought this about? Broun argues that this was the outcome of a long process which had its origins in England, rather than Scotland. This was the unintended consequence of legal and administrative reforms between 1154 and 1189 during the reign of the English king Henry II: ‘the main spur towards beginning to regard the Scottish kingdom as a single country may have been an intensification of royal power not in Scotland, but in England’ (2015: 167). In other words, Scotland developed a sense of itself as ‘not-England’, at the point where regal authority south of the border was flexing its muscles. Not to be incorporated into England required active dissociation. In any case, by the 1180s we have the earliest indications that local lords thought of the Scottish kingdom as a land with common laws and customs, an unintended consequence of comparable legal and administrative reforms in England during Henry’s reign.

By the middle of the thirteenth century, we have evidence of legal mechanisms in Scotland about the reporting of local land inquests to the king. Furthermore, the amount of money in circulation grew dramatically between 1250 and 1280, which was reflected in the creation of coinage mints from Inverness to Dumfries, as well as establishing sheriff courts throughout the land, both indicating jurisdictional expansion by the Crown.

We might assume, then, that the Crown was mainly responsible for shaping and imposing national institutions on ‘Scotland’, much as the monarchy did in France (Beaune, 1985). Broun argues that ‘Scotland’ came to be a phenomenon of the mind, an ‘idea that, at some point, came to be thought of by its inhabitants as one-and-the-same as the kingdom they lived in’ (2015:164). Furthermore:

When economic growth and the increasing importance of burghs is combined with the change in the procedure for inquests … it may be envisaged that those with property and possessions came more and more to identify with royal authority as a key background element in the pattern of their lives. (2015: 170)

Where was Scotland?

‘Scotland’ was envisaged in the twelfth century as the territory between the River Forth in the south, the Spey in the north, and the mountains of Drumalban in the west. However, by the late 13th century, a new sense of kingdom, country and people emerged which, of necessity, was based on something other than the logic of geography. At the end of the 12th century the kingdom was seen by contemporaries as comprising several countries, with the Scots identified as the inhabitants north
of the Forth. ... this had begun to change by ca.1220 when ‘Scotland’ appears to have meant the kingdom as a whole. By the early 1280s at the latest, not only had kingdom and country become one, but all its inhabitants were now Scots. (Broun, 2013: 6)

So strong was the conception of Scotland north of the Forth that it was thought of as an island, crossed by the bridge at Stirling (see map in Figure 1.1), which became a key battleground during the extended Wars of Independence.

Note, as shown in Figure 1.1, how the River Forth was imagined to be a continuous sea loch between east and west, with a single river crossing at Stirling (top, centre). For good

FIGURE 1.1
Matthew Paris map, fourteenth century

Source: Copyright British Library Board
measure, there are two walls dividing Scocia and Anglia, one, southern, approximating to Hadrian’s Wall, and another emerging at Berwick in the east, north of the River Tweed.

Those described as ‘Scots’ (Albanaig) north of the Forth were later described as ‘highland Scots’, reflecting territorial expansion and diversity in the later period. Broun points out that the monks at Melrose (‘chroniclers’), who derived authority from the king, may have become Scots, but this does not require that they ceased to be English. It depended on context. This ‘new’ kingdom-centric Scottish identity was grounded in obedience to the king of Scots. It is conceivable, therefore, that people continued to regard themselves as ‘English’ in the sense that their mother tongue was English, and at the same time identified as Scots. (2015: 168)

From the thirteenth century those living south of the Forth began to see themselves as ‘Scots’ living in ‘Scotland’, even if, like the Melrose monks, they viewed the northerners as somewhat unsavoury. Broun concludes:

Overall ... we seem to have kingdom, country and people coalescing round the image north of the Forth as an island, an image rooted in an awareness of a genuine topographical barrier. By the late thirteenth century kingdom, country and people has coalesced anew around the dawning concept of sovereignty. The sense of ultimate secular authority shared by both had moved its centre of gravity from geography to jurisdiction. (2015: 186)

Thus did kingdom/country/people coalesce imperceptibly into a new ‘Scotland’ as an independent realm, a view shared by its people at large.

Who were the Scots?

What we have inherited is the characterisation of Scots as a ‘mongrel people’, no pure race, but an amalgam of peoples united by territory rather than ethnicity. Scotland has no ambitions to be pure bred: we are a mongrel people, at least in our conception of ourselves. Such a descriptor has appeal to politicians. Thus, Alex Salmond in a speech in 1995:

We see diversity as a strength not a weakness of Scotland and our ambition is to see the cause of Scotland argued with English, French, Irish, Indian, Pakistani, Chinese and every other accent in the rich tapestry of what we should be proud to call, in the words of Willie McIlvanney, ‘the mongrel nation’ of Scotland. (Speech to the annual SNP conference, Perth, 1995; quoted in Reicher and Hopkins, 2001: 164)

The conventional historical wisdom (e.g. Mackie, 1964), now disputed (Broun, 2013: 280), is that there were five ‘founding peoples’: the Picts in the north and east; the Scots around...
Dalriada in the west; the Britons in the south and west; the Norse in the northern and western isles; and the Angles in the south-east. Medievalists like Broun (2013: 276) are critical of this view, pointing out that it fits a narrative showing that they were inexorably united, by conquests or by dynastic unions, in order to conform to a conventional storyline. Nevertheless, it helps to convey what the historian Christopher Smout memorably called a ‘sense of place’, rather than a ‘sense of tribe’. This is no claim to be morally superior to any other people; it was simply realpolitik. Thus:

If coherent government was to survive in the medieval and early modern past, it had, in a country that comprised gaelic-speaking Highlanders and Scots-speaking Lowlanders, already linguistically and ethnically diverse, to appeal beyond kin and ethnicity – to loyalty to the person of the monarch, then to the integrity of the territory over which the monarch ruled. The critical fact allowed the Scots ultimately to absorb all kinds of immigrants with relatively little fuss, including, most importantly, the Irish in the 19th century. (Smout, 1994:107)

This fitted in with how other historians made sense of the history of these islands. In many ways, Scotland was less homogeneous culturally and linguistically than its Celtic neighbours. The historian Sandy Grant observed:

during the Middle Ages the Welsh and the Irish surely had at least as strong a concept of racial or national solidarity as the Scots, and much more linguistic solidarity. Yet, between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries, the whole of Wales and very substantial parts of Ireland were conquered by the English; subsequently both countries experienced many anti-English rebellions, but neither was ever liberated from foreign rule. The contrast with what happened to Scotland is obvious, and demonstrates that success or failure in maintaining independence cannot simply be explained in terms of racial consciousness, nationalist myths, common language and the like. (1994: 75)

Grant’s point is that territorial interests, reinforced by state authority in the shape of the Crown, held Scotland together despite its regional and ethnic diversity; or perhaps because of it, in the sense that national integrity had to be worked at actively to offset ethnic diversity on the ground.

Stating the nation

It is in this context that we can appreciate what the iconic Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 signifies. This was a political document from the barons of Scotland to Pope John XXII, which begins with a rewriting of the history of the people, which no modern historian
could ever countenance. The Scots, the declaration averred, ‘journeyed from Greater Scythia by way of the Tyrrenhian Sea and the Pillars of Hercules, and dwelt for a long course of time in Spain among the most savage tribes, but nowhere could they be subdued by any race, however barbarous’.

Having reached their promised land, the ‘Scots’ single-mindedly pursued their goal: ‘The Britons they first drove out, the Picts they utterly destroyed, and though very often assailed by the Norwegians, the Danes and the English, they took possession of that home with many victories and untold efforts.’ So much for being a mongrel people, for live and let live: the fourteenth century was not the time to make such an essentially modern and liberal claim.

We can only assume that conveying that strong national lineage was *de rigueur* in convincing the pope to recognise their claim; the Scots were a people distinct (from the English) and, crucially, they were winners. Broun’s view is that the Declaration of Arbroath was a device to portray Scotland as exclusively Scottish in its formative years. He comments: ‘the fact that the Picts were now seen as a historical nuisance is striking testimony to how the idea of kingdom, country and people had crystallised in the heat of war into a seamless unity without any consideration of geographical reality’ (2013: 276).

The most famous part of the Declaration of Arbroath is well-known:

> for, as long as but one hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any condition be brought under English rule. It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom – for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself.

Few readers, however, take note of what precedes these famous few lines. If ‘our most tireless Prince, King and Lord, the Lord Robert [i.e. Bruce],’

> should give up what he has begun, and agree to make us or our kingdom subject to the King of England or the English, we should exert ourselves at once to drive him out as our enemy and subverter of his own rights and ours, and make some other man who was well able to defend us our King.

Little sign there of deferring to an absolute monarchy and the later divine right of kings. The message is clear: if Bruce (or any other king or queen, for that matter) did not defend Scotland’s independence from England, then he would be usurped, and someone better suited would be put in his place. What this implies is that the Crown is conceived of as the state, and not the person of the monarch. Bruce could govern as long as he defended Scotland’s interests, but if not, not (see Figure 1.2). Such a ‘modern’ statement has easily been mistaken as a forerunner for modern declarations of independence, notably the American one of 1776, which is unlikely to be the case; all the same, the 1320 statement has a remarkably modern ring to it.
Shaping Scotland

Why should a sociologist bother to look at this early history of Scotland? Does it really matter? First and foremost, it establishes where, and when, ‘Scotland’ came to be thought of as a nation, and makes the point that the nation was an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1996) as early as the thirteenth century. Being able to establish ‘Scotland’ in meaningful terms well before the modern period marks it as one of Europe’s oldest nations. Second, this ‘Scotland’ derived from diverse peoples and territories, which were united under the authority of the Crown, and yet without ceding absolute legitimacy to that institution. To be sure, all nations have diversity in common, even though it behoves them to claim unity in diversity. From such a reading of Scottish history derived the belief in the ‘sovereignty of the people’, set against the sovereignty of parliament, otherwise the English Crown. Third, and to reiterate the point, the Crown was imagined as a legal entity, as the state, and not the person of the monarch.

It was to take some time for the shape of Scotland to match its current contours. In the west, the Kingdom of the Isles fell to the Scots as a result of the Treaty of Perth in 1266. The northern isles of Orkney and Shetland were ceded to Scotland in the fifteenth century when the king of Norway failed to meet payment of the dowry promised to the king of Scots on the marriage of his daughter. In the far south-east, Berwick fell to the English in 1482, having changed hands between Scotland and England fourteen times in its history.

Thus were formed the modern boundaries of Scotland, which have not changed in more than 500 years. In Broun’s words, ‘Scotland was finally equipped with the essential elements of its modern identity as a nation, elements which have sustained its claim to be regarded as a nation despite the loss of independence three hundred years ago’ (2013: 7).
Whether one is for or against independence in the twenty-first century, indubitably Scotland was an independent nation for much of its history.

Did people in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries actually think of themselves as ‘Scots’? Surely this is to impose modern conceptions on a past we cannot know? The first thing to be said is that in modern Scotland we live quite happily with multiple meanings of what it means to be a Scot, by birth, descent and residence, and we know that each of these is sufficiently distinct from each other, but are also valid in their own right (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2015). Broun’s point (1998: 11) about the thirteenth century, that ‘Scotland and the Scots are, first and foremost, images which have been adapted and recreated according to the experiences and aspirations of the society to which they related’, is just as valid in the twenty-first century.

Although it is a much more difficult task, especially for a sociologist, to know what the thirteenth-century peasant made of being Scottish, the historical consensus does seem to be that at least the ‘middling folk’ and foot soldiers of Scotland at that time certainly made something of it (Broun, 1998; Ferguson, 1998; Stringer and Grant, 1995). The concept of the ‘community of the realm’ – *communitas regni* – appears to have been a sufficiently understood concept to rally the nation against the English foe, just as there is support for the existence of ‘national’ consciousness in England in the Middle Ages (Greenfeld, 1993; Hastings, 1997).

In short, the conditions for generating national awareness contra the ‘other’ were surely there for Scotland and England in mutual context, as Grant observes: ‘in the two medieval kingdoms of the British Isles, the people were involved along with their elites in their countries’ wars; in France, they were not’ (1994: 95), which is why ‘making Frenchmen’ took so much longer (Weber, 1977). The point is also made by Adrian Hastings (1997) in his analysis of the development of national consciousness in these islands. Thus it was that the designs of the English state on its neighbours, particularly Scotland, helped to mould diverse peoples into a single nation in the face of this common threat.

**Origin myth-stories**

The Scots and English did not settle down contentedly into ‘mutual other’ status, especially as far as England was concerned. Bill Ferguson’s monumental study *The Identity of the Scottish Nation* (1998) showed that the ideological battle raged as fiercely as the military one, and for longer. To twenty-first-century ears, debates about the ancient origins of peoples may seem arcane, even somewhat racist. The myth-stories, however, were deadly serious, because whether or not peoples had a right to exist depended on winning the ideological battle of origins. Much rested on whom the founding peoples were judged to be. Geoffrey of Monmouth’s *Historia Regum Britanniae* (‘History of the Kings of Britain’) written in the twelfth century was long accepted as the standard history of that realm, and helped to promote feelings of Englishness to the considerable advantage of the state.

It was, in turn, judged by the Scots to be unacceptable because it appeared to reinforce English claims to the feudal overlordship of Scotland. This claim was based, to modern
ears, on some far-fetched history. The medieval English appropriated the legend of Brutus, that the Trojan was the founder of the early kings of Britain. In Geoffrey’s account, the descendants of Brutus carried sway over the entire island, the Picts were dismissed as latecomers, and the Scots were simply a mongrel race begat by Picts and Hibernians.

The Scots, in turn, mobilised their own origin-myth based on Gaidel Glas, who was either the husband or son of Scota, daughter of the Pharoah of Egypt, and who had come to Hibernia via Spain. We may wonder why any of this mattered. The point was the claim that the Scots, and the Irish, were deemed to have Greek, not Trojan, roots, and as a consequence could not possibly be of the same rootstock as the English.6

These claims to roots were deadly serious. They helped to shape claim and counter-claim among historians, and much focused on whether the founding peoples were the Scots (originally from Ireland) or the Picts. In the fourteenth century, John of Fordun minimised Pictish roots in favour of the Scots so as to counter English claims that Picts were ‘really’ Teutons (‘Germans’), and hence Britons. Hector Boece, born in the second half of the fifteenth century, took the claim further by claiming that it was the ‘Scots’ who resisted the Romans, who had conquered the Picts, and held out against the Norse and the English. Boece also subscribed to the ‘forty kings’ theory, which purported to trace the lineage of Scottish monarchs (see Bruce and Yearley, 1989), and his view was shared by the Protestant reformer and historian George Buchanan in the sixteenth century, who argued that the Scots had come from Ireland. On the other hand, the Catholic priest and Jacobite, Thomas Innes, took a contrary view in the late seventeenth century, and preferred the Pictish theory of origins.

By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Pictomania had come to serve the views of those such as John Pinkerton that the true aboriginals were the Picts – Teutons – and, ergo, English. James Macpherson, who claimed to have discovered the Gaelic poems of Ossian, fell foul of anti-Scottish feeling in the eighteenth century which was aimed at denying a distinct origin-myth to the Scots as they entered the British Union.

Lest we think that this sort of historiography was well and truly over, Ferguson reminds us that the English historian Hugh Trevor-Roper was still employing Celtophobic arguments in the 1970s to undermine the claims to Scottish autonomy. Ferguson, on the other hand, says that ‘there can be little doubt … that the national identity of the Scots sprang from an early Gaelic tribal root that first flourished in Ireland’ (1998: 306).

It is almost impossible to avoid much of this historiography from becoming subordinated to one political claim or another. Ferguson, for his part, concluded: ‘Scottishness was never exclusive, but, on the contrary, has always been highly absorptive, a quality that it retains even in the vastly different circumstances of today’ (1998: 305). There are echoes here of Willie McIlvanney’s claim that Scots are a ‘mongrel nation’, drawn from many roots, but primarily concerned with the future rather than the past; a concern, as Stuart Hall put it, with ‘routes’ rather than ‘roots’ (1992). Those who wish to argue that an ethnically diverse Scotland is the morally correct one, and no barrier to common identity, are thus able to mobilise history to considerable effect. This debate about origins came to matter significantly when issues of relations between the peoples of these islands became salient.
Understanding the Union

We can take it that ‘Scotland’ as a meaningful society existed at least from the fourteenth century, if not earlier, while accepting that it took a quite different form than the one we know today. While we can never be sure, its people would probably have thought of themselves as ‘Scots’. How, then, do we understand the formal end of its ‘independence’ in 1707 when the Treaty of Union created the new state of Great Britain and brought the political existence of Scotland (and England for that matter) to an end?

The end of Scotland?

There is a conventional historiography, largely nationalist, which saw the Union in the words of the Earl of Seafield, one of the signatories to the Treaty document, as *ane end of ane auld sang* (see Figure 1.3).

Scotland would seem to have come to an end. Robert Burns took the view that its signatories to the Union were ‘sic a parcel of rogues in an nation’, bought and sold for English gold:

Fareweel to a’ our Scottish fame, Fareweel our ancient glory!

Fareweel ev’n to the Scottish name, Sae famed in martial story!

FIGURE 1.3
The Downsetting of the Scottish Parliament, the only known illustration of the pre-Union parliament in session, illustrating the procession from Holyrood to Parliament Hall, and a view of the single chamber in session

*Source*: I am grateful to National Museums of Scotland for permission to reproduce this image
However, commented Lindsay Paterson, ‘if it [Scotland] did end then, ... his [Seafield’s] political successors did not notice’ (1994: 2), and again, ‘if Scotland was departing, it took a long time about it’ (1994: 2). Paterson’s arguments are worth examining in detail. He observed:

> The debate about whether union was inevitable or, to the contrary, was imposed on Scotland by the English and their Scottish agents is intricate and endless. There is, certainly, clear evidence that the proponents of union invoked the real threat of economic or military retaliation from England. They may also have used bribery, although this common claim is not well documented and is probably exaggerated. It might even be the case that the majority of the population were opposed: there were fairly widespread riots in lowland areas against union – most notably in Edinburgh itself, where the Scottish parliament met – and numerous burghs, counties, presbyteries and parishes petitioned against it too. (1994: 27–8)

The arguments in favour of union were, according to Paterson, three-fold.

First, economic: the dearths of the previous decade, and the failure of the Darien Scheme at the turn of the century, were pragmatic persuasions for union, and although, formally speaking, it was an incorporating union with a single parliament in London, arguably it created more economic opportunities than it destroyed.

Second, and relatedly, there was the military threat to England, and in Scotland’s case, from England, in the context of the threat from the continental powers, France and Spain. Further, ensuring that the Stuarts did not succeed to the now-British throne (since 1603 when the Union of Crowns took place, James VI of Scotland becoming James I of England) was a major reason for union. Was English invasion of Scotland a real possibility? Paterson observes: ‘The Scots concluded that it would be better to ally themselves with this power than risk its wrath’ (1994: 29).

The third reason for union was religion: Scottish Presbyterians argued that British union safeguarded Protestantism against Catholic France and Spain. Thus, shared Protestantism, even though there were important internal diversities of belief, was a reinforcement of Scottishness, not its alternative. The Jacobite Wars (1715 and 1745) were as much about religion as about succession; indeed these were wholly intertwined. Paterson concludes:

> The Union which resulted was then a compromise. It contained safeguards for the continuing independence of Scots law, religion, education and local government, and offered to the merchants of the burghs some of the trading opportunities which they had long sought. The Scots knew they had struck a bargain, and this satisfaction – or indifference – extended beyond the elite groups who had done the negotiating. (1994: 31)

Above all, the British parliament was acceptable because it did not interfere, and thus guaranteed liberty, of both religious and civil sorts. The threat of an autocratic and Jacobite
Stuart regime was seen off, and the incorporation – ‘pacification’ – of the Highland Gàidhealtachd after the Battle of Culloden in 1746 ensured Protestant supremacy. The forceable incorporation of the Highlands was one of the few instances of the British state using its considerable military muscle at home rather than abroad.

Union meant that Scots had a national right to be treated as equals, and it is to that belief, more often than not, which modern nationalists have appealed. The historian Colin Kidd (2008) has observed that in the ensuing centuries ‘unionists’ went to great lengths to assert the theoretical independence of Scotland, while ‘nationalists’ went to similar lengths to argue for equal treatment under the Union. Thus, much of unionism is tinged with nationalism, and nationalism with unionism, rather than being polar opposites.

What Scotland got out of this union, this mariage de raison (marriage of convenience), was a solution to many of its most pressing economic problems and a share in an expanding ‘British’ empire, so successful that many in England complained of ‘Scots on the make’.

The defence of autonomous civil society with its institutions of law, education, religion and civil life was the achievement of union, and the reason why it lasted so long.

This independent civil society, however, as Paterson observes, was not a national expression in and of itself:

The Scots could believe that they had won a great bargain because their culture could flourish and their economy could grow. This was their conception of liberty. It is not ours, nor that of nationalism: there was no mass franchise, nor even the nineteenth century icon, a national parliament. (1994: 45)

That was to come much later, and is quite another story, but without understanding the Union of 1707 for what it was, we cannot make sense of our politics in the twenty-first century. Even asserting that it was ‘treaty’ of union, rather than conquest (as in Wales and Ireland), makes a historical point with much political force. It is the point which Kidd is making: that nationalists and unionists alike insist on the constitutional equality of Scotland with England.

**Becoming British**

In spite of popular opposition to the Union in the early years of the eighteenth century, it proved, in the nineteenth, to be relatively easy to refashion the Scots into British. The point was that Scots became British as well as continuing to be Scots, not despite that fact. The Jacobite legacy always had the most power to be a potent nationalist myth, but, as Richard Finlay (1994) has observed, that was a step too far. In the first place, Jacobite ideology could not be moulded into the Scottish Presbyterian spirit: it was too Catholic and Episcopalian for that. In the second place, Jacobite adherence to the divine right of kings could not be worked into meritocratic and liberal ideology. And finally, it contradicted the notion of a bloodless Union. While Jacobitism has always had complex potential as an alternative Scottishness, although Smout judges that ‘it is a sad misconstruction of Scottish history to
see in the Jacobite movement some appeal to an archaic, anti-capitalist, anti-improvement, green past’ (1994:110), it was too far removed from the experiences of most Scots for the connection to be made.

Rather, Scottishness in the nineteenth century was refashioned around three pillars of identity: church, state and empire. Protestantism helped to ‘forge’ the business of being British. Most people in Wales, Scotland and England, Linda Colley has observed, ‘defined themselves as Protestants struggling for survival against the foremost Catholic power. They defined themselves against the French as they imagined them to be, superstitious, militarist, decadent and unfree’ (1992: 5). That, in essence, is why most people in Ireland could not consider themselves British, nor were they permitted to be. Scottish Protestantism proved to be an important seedbed for the three dominant political creeds: Liberalism, Unionism and, latterly, Labourism.

The civilising mission: guns and God

Scottish military culture had a long pedigree in a country which relied on fighting other people’s wars for a living (Wood, 1987). The Union, first after Culloden in 1746, and later in the imperial wars of the following century, offered new and improved opportunities for professional soldiering, and throughout the following centuries, Scots had disproportionately made a living, as well as a dying, in the ranks of the military (Smout, 1994: 106). It was no coincidence that Cliff Hanley’s song ‘Scotland the Brave’ became an unofficial embodiment of the national character, to be succeeded in turn by another hymn to war, ‘Flower of Scotland’.

The British Empire proved to be the battleground, both military and ecclesiastical, for what Graeme Morton (1999) has called ‘unionist-nationalism’. In the nineteenth century, graduates from Scottish universities saw in empire new opportunities. In short, they believed that they had a mission to spread Scottish liberalism and Scottish Protestantism, and that only the Union could have given them the political influence to do that.

The missionary movement, in places like southern Africa and India – associated especially with David Livingstone and Mary Slessor – provided a powerful justification for empire, union and Presbyterianism. Tom Devine has commented: ‘By underwriting the empire as a moral undertaking, religion helped to strengthen the union with England but also assumed greater significance as an important factor reinforcing Scottish identity’ (2000: 367).

Scottish unionists in particular were able to draw together these strands of the Protestant ethic, and to infuse ideas of civic responsibility in the nineteenth century to their considerable political advantage. Not until the twentieth century did such an ideology lose its electoral power. Even by the 1920s, the Reformed tradition had begun to deteriorate into a ‘preoccupation with the moral sentiment of patriotism and the preservation of a mythical Presbyterian racial identity’ (Storrar, 1990: 47).

As we shall see in the next chapter, post-1945, the pillars, first of Protestantism, then imperialism and finally unionism, began to crumble, and a new edifice and a different
sense of ‘being Scottish’ emerged. On the one hand, growing secularisation, but above all the moral economy of the welfare state, had transformed people’s dependence on the church. On the other hand, demobilisation and the end of empire released the need for a standing army and a military attachment to the state. Finally, and not until the 1970s and 1980s, political unionism lost its appeal to Scotland’s middle classes, while there was less reason for workers to be thirled (thirl means bound with ties of affection and loyalty. It has Old English roots like many Scottish words, but has died out in English, where ‘thrall’ is its closest cognate) to the Conservative Party.

**The end of Scotland?**

The third period in which the question ‘when was Scotland?’ became highly salient was the final quarter of the twentieth century. In the light of political developments in the twenty-first century, the recovery of a parliament and the rise and rise of the SNP, it might seem strange to suggest that Scotland ‘died’ as a meaningful entity after the Union of 1707. Nevertheless, a high degree of cultural pessimism has permeated Scottish thought for much of the last 150 years. This argued that Scotland was ‘over’ as a self-governing civil society and had thrown in its lot with England. Not for nothing did David Hume title his mid-eighteenth-century book *A History of England* (and not a History of Britain). He was not making a category error, but implying that ‘England’ was culturally and politically dominant because it was one of the most progressive societies on earth. England was conceived of a ‘mature, all-round thought-world’ (Nairn, 1977: 156–7) to which Scotland could only aspire to be part of.

Cairns Craig opened his essay on twentieth-century Scottish literature with this observation: ‘When TS Eliot, in a review in 1919, asked, “Was There a Scottish Literature?”, the past tense perspective seemed all too appropriate to the possibilities of Scottish literature surviving into the twentieth century as an independent cultural force’ (1987: 1). What Scotland was not considered to be was an ‘organic whole’, a vibrant literature and culture which sustained a sense of cultural identity, and which stimulated a greater political one. In short, much of the writing about Scottish culture and politics in the twentieth century assumed that ‘Scotland’ had effectively ceased to be; it had ended.

The supposed effect of this cultural incorporation was to fragment the Scottish story. The novelist Willie McIlvanney observed that we had inherited a ‘pop-up picture’ school of history, that moments in history seemed unconnected, that Scottishness existed in ‘wilful fragments’ (*The Herald*, 6 March 1999). Marinell Ash in her book *The Strange Death of Scottish History* likened modern perceptions of Scotland’s past to a foggy landscape, ‘small peaks and islands of memory rising out of an occluded background’ (1980: 1). We will analyse this conception of Scottish culture and society in Chapter 17, but cultural pessimism has been a dominant trope in writing about Scotland. There seemed to be too much history in Scotland rather than too little, or perhaps too much of the wrong sort.
McIlvanney’s own explanation was that ‘when a country loses the dynamic of its own history, the ability to develop on its own terms, its sense of its past can fragment and freeze into caricature. For a long time this was Scotland’s fate’ (The Herald, 6 March 1999). In other words, there is a clear connection between Scotland’s cultural and political development. It was as if, following the Union of 1707, Scotland was left with a deficit of politics, and a surfeit of culture, but one which was over.

A glance at the ‘Scottish’ shelves in any major bookshop might suggest that much of Scotland is ‘over’, for they are weighed down with accounts of the country’s past. The conventional wisdom was that since Scotland lost its formal political independence in 1707, it could not have a ‘national culture’ worthy of the name. After all, it lacked distinctiveness as regards language and religion, being both English speaking and Protestant, and it had chosen to throw its political lot in with its richer and more powerful southern neighbour.

If proof were needed, the argument went, most of the inhabitants of Scotland had supported the suppression of the Gaelic-speaking and largely Catholic Highlanders after their defeat at Culloden in 1746. Furthermore, they became enthusiastic Unionists and Imperialists in the context of the British Empire, in contrast to the Irish and even the Welsh. The failure of political nationalism to emerge in the nineteenth century when it was the rage of Europe seemed to confirm that whatever form cultural identity and nationalism was taking at that time, it was not being mobilised in the cause of regaining Scottish statehood. Scottish history, the argument went, ceased to be important because it could not be reworked into a political programme for a separate state. Kidd (1993) argued that Scottish Whig historians looked to England for a progressive and liberating vision of society, and hence the absence of a nationalist historiography in the nineteenth century was because there was no real demand for one. Liberation and progress were to be achieved through the medium of the Anglo-British state.

Cultural pessimism

The strain of cultural pessimism ran deep among Scottish intellectuals. The perceived absence of a ‘rounded’ culture, reflecting the Scottish/British split, mapping as it does onto the culture/politics split, long had an appeal, and will be discussed more fully in Chapter 17. Writing in the 1930s, Edwin Muir saw a Scotland ‘gradually being emptied of its population, its spirit, its wealth, industry, art, intellect, and innate character’ (1935 (reprinted 1980): 3).

George Davie’s The Democratic Intellect (1961), a powerful indictment of what he took to be the Anglicisation of Scottish culture and education in the nineteenth century, is one of the most influential books of the late twentieth century. Davie observed that ‘when other neighbouring countries were becoming increasingly “history minded”, the Scots were losing their sense of the past, their leading institutions, including the Universities, were emphatically resolved – to use the catch-phrase fashionable in the early twentieth-century – “no longer to be prisoners of their own history”’ (1961: 337).

The most powerful and dominant analysis of Scottish culture was Nairn’s The Break-Up of Britain published first in 1977. This is a view of Scottish culture, epitomised
in Walter Scott, divided between ‘heart’ (representing the past, romance, ‘civil society’) and ‘head’ (the present and future, reason, and, by dint of that, the British state). There is the ‘Caledonian Antisyzygy’, a term borrowed by Hugh MacDiarmid from Gregory Smith’s (1919) characterisation of Scottish literature as containing an antithesis of the real and the fantastic.

The image of Scotland as a divided and unhealthy society became a common one in Scottish literature, which acted as a key carrier of Scottish identity. In Douglas Gifford’s words:

> Through recurrent patterns of a relationship such as father versus son, brother versus brother, or variants, a recurrent and shared symbolism states overwhelmingly the same theme; that in lowland Scotland, aridity of repressive orthodoxy, religious and behavioural, tied to an exaggerated work ethic and distorted notions of social responsibility, have stifled and repressed vital creative processes of imaginative and emotional expression, to the point where it too often has become, individually and collectively, self-indulgent, morbid and unbalanced. (1988: 244)

While Scottish civil society survived in the bosom of the British state, the Scottish ‘heart’ was split from the British ‘head’; the ‘national’ with its over-emphasis on the past, was separated from the ‘practical’ with its emphasis on the present and future. This came about because, by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the intelligentsia was ‘deprived of its historic nationalist’ role. Said Nairn, ‘there was no call for its usual services’ (1977: 154) of leading the nation to the threshold of political independence. Adam Smith, David Hume, James Mill (father of John Stuart Mill), William Robertson, Robert Adam and its other luminaries, Nairn argued, may have been Scots by birth and education, but they were universal men, and certainly, if anything, ‘British’ in orientation insofar as the term was meaningful.

Scottish culture could never, in this conventional wisdom, be an ‘organic whole’. Instead, as Cairns Craig observes, it was common to see Scotland’s as ‘fundamentally a dead literature, the literature of a nation which once existed but now has no independent identity’ (1999: 16). Much of the commentary was elegiac, as expressed in the work of critics like David Craig (no relation), which saw Scottish culture as doomed to failure, conspiring to produce a cultural wasteland. David Craig’s book, *Scottish Literature and the Scottish People* (1961), covered the period between 1680 and 1830, presumably on the grounds that after that date there was little to say. Indeed, invited by the *London Review of Books* to reflect on the Independence Referendum in September 2014, David Craig wrote:

> A free Scotland would be founded on a nationalism roughly coterminous with race, and I grew up in a world where racist nationalism was the most abhorrent and dangerous tendency under the sun. ... I mistrust any party which is founded on nationhood as such – as a self-evident good – and for that reason, if I still lived in Scotland, I would vote No. (pp. 13–15)
Pessimism, it seems, runs deep. Why should any of this matter to our question: when was Scotland? Because if, to all intents and purposes, Scotland was ‘over’, then the crucial link between culture and politics had been irrevocably broken. Does this matter? It does, because it seemed to explain why political nationalism in Scotland did not happen in the classic manner. In his book *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (1985), the Czech writer Miroslav Hroch argued that national movements went through three phases of development:

- Phase A, in which activists are engaged in small-scale scholarly enquiry into the cultural basis of the nation. This involves collecting linguistic, folkloric, historic and cultural fragments, and distilling them into a (cultural) national narrative.

- Phase B, which involves a new range of activists who seek to waken the nation from its slumbers by promulgating the national story of a distinctive people with their own culture.

- Phase C, the final or mass phase, which mobilises national identity for the purpose of achieving statehood. Hroch is careful to say that the phases do not need to happen sequentially, and, indeed, that phase C, the rise of the mass movement, often happens during phase A, and they feed off each other. Hroch is also careful not to put a time-scale on the shift from cultural to political nationalism, but it is fair to characterise it as occurring classically in nineteenth-century middle Europe, with the Czech lands being a good exemplar.

Scotland, manifestly, does not fit the model. The relationship between cultural and political forms of nationalism is quite different, and, in any case, entering a political union with England in the early eighteenth century obviated any need for the national bourgeoisie, the conventional carrier of national liberation elsewhere, to strike out for national independence. The British state and Empire provided the means for that to happen. (For a broad account of the sociology of nationalism, which sets Scotland within this literature, see McCrone, 1998.)

So here we have an intriguing puzzle. Scotland does not fit conventional accounts of the rise of nationalism, at least in terms of classical timings. It was not until the final quarter of the twentieth century that a strong Nationalist Party challenged for power. Furthermore, it seemed to be strong on ‘politics’ and weak on ‘culture’. The fact that its leader Alex Salmond from the 1980s was a banker, not a poet, seemed to confirm that.

Back to our puzzle: why did Scotland not ‘end’, and, furthermore, what was the connection, if any, between culture and politics? Let us return to Davie’s influential argument in *The Democratic Intellect* (1961) in which he argued that Scottish higher education underwent an unprecedented and fatal Anglicisation in the late nineteenth century, and with it Scottish society more generally.

Paterson describes Davie’s argument as persuasive and usually undisputed, but quite wrong in its interpretation of events and processes (1994: 66). Paterson argued that change
in the Scottish universities was not driven by English models, but by German and French ones which were judged to be more successful economically, and hence to be emulated. Scottish universities did not generate the same intensity when it came to nationalist campaigning compared with elsewhere (in Ireland and Wales, for example, or in Central Europe). The Scottish middle classes saw little need to mobilise in the pursuit of power; they were already in control over civil society and its institutions within the British state.

Thus, far from being divided, even schizophrenic, Scotland could be deemed ‘normal’. That claim has been controversial for many decades now: at least since the nationalist cultural revival of the 1920s, the belief has gained currency that Scotland in the nineteenth century was subservient to England. This belief assumes that the only sure sign of not being subservient would have been a developed demand for an independent parliament. Paterson’s argument is to the contrary: ‘it is close to the image that middle-class Scots of the nineteenth century had of themselves. They had real autonomy’ (1994: 70).

Scottish culture renewed

A further attack on the thesis that ‘Scotland was culturally deformed’ came from Cairns Craig. The quest for Scottish cultural independence from a culturally suffocating and homogeneous Anglo-British one ignored the fact that the latter had itself fragmented. Craig argued that the post-1918 period saw the collapse of the English cultural imperium, and thus, ‘English culture’ could no longer be equated with ‘the culture of England’. In most English-speaking countries, there was a burgeoning of indigenous literature – in Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, the United States and Ireland. Craig comments: ‘At no time in its history could Scotland have been described as “organic” or a “unified” culture: it could never have been envisaged as one “comprehensive” mind transcending the “prejudices of politics and fashions of taste” of particular periods’ (1996: 15). The problem, he says, is that Scotland is not usually compared with Ireland or with Norway, but with England, deemed by T.S. Eliot and others to have a ‘cumulative, unbroken history, supporting an organically growing literature’ (Craig, 1999: 17).

The literary renaissance of the 1920s in Scotland expressed itself in the work of Hugh MacDiarmid, Lewis Grassic Gibbon, Eric Linklater, Fionn MacColla, Edwin Muir, James Bridie, as well as Violet Jacob and Naomi Mitchison. This renaissance was rooted in a pluralistic cultural and linguistic system in Scotland – in Gaelic (Sorley MacLean), in Scots (notably, MacDiarmid and Gibbon) and in standard English (Muriel Spark). These traditions survived and prospered, and ceased simply to be literary forms. Spoken language through radio and television also contributed to a multi-varied culture.

By and large, this was not an overtly ‘political’ literature. Writers such as these were not identifying a unique Scottish experience, but addressing the universal condition through day-to-day (Scottish) reality. The search for new images which express these experiences
was no longer simply literary but artistic and cultural in the widest sense. As an exemplar of this, the folk music revival which itself became an important carrier of Scottish culture was cross-fertilised in terms of styles, tunes and instruments. The search for what is ‘traditional’ could no longer be taken as predating the nineteenth century; nor was it confined to oral conventions (Munro, 1996).

These ways of expressing Scottish culture are to be thought of as inclusive rather than exclusive, building on the erstwhile alternative ways of being ‘Scottish’ – Lowland and Highland, Protestant and Catholic, male and female, black and white. This involved borrowing and adapting what is available. In Cairns Craig’s words:

The fragmentation and division which made Scotland seem abnormal to an earlier part of the 20th century came to be the norm for much of the world’s population. Bilingualism, biculturalism and the inheritance of a diversity of fragmented traditions were to be the source of creativity rather than its inhibition in the second half of the 20th, and Scotland ceased to have to measure itself against the false ‘norm’, psychological as well as cultural, of the unified national tradition. (1987: 7)

Borrowing the phrase ‘being between’ from the poet Sorley MacLean with reference to the mediums of Gaelic and English, Craig commented that: ‘Culture is not an organism, nor a totality, nor a unity: it is the site of a dialogue, it is a dialectic, a dialect. It is being between’ (1996: 206). What this condition signifies is not a divided but a diverse culture, which Scotland had to be from its earliest forms of statehood. It was neither feasible nor desirable to impose a single, uniform sense of culture.

Let us return to the question of the connection, or lack of it, between culture and politics in Scotland. The conventional wisdom has been to downplay the significance of ‘culture’ vis-à-vis ‘politics’ to explain the rise of nationalism in the late twentieth century. Scotland was certainly not ‘over’. Many of us, however, while rejecting the notion that Scotland was culturally and psychologically damaged by being part of the British state since 1707, downplayed the cultural content of nationalism. Writing in 2001 shortly after the devolved parliament was established, I considered that Scotland was neither fragmented nor colonised, and in its journey to greater self-determination ‘the Scots looked to see what was on offer, and have decided to travel light [in cultural terms]. No cultural icons need to be genuflected at, no correct representation needs to be observed in this journey into the future’ (McCrone, 2001: 148).

Writing fifteen years later, I am less sure of that. Clearly, political and cultural revival have gone hand in hand. Compare, for example, the three major political events of the last thirty-five years: the referendums in 1979, 1999 and 2014. What marked the first of these, on a ‘Scottish Assembly’, while producing a small majority (51.6 to 48.4 per cent) was a failure to meet the imposed 40 per cent rule such that the proposal fell. The reaction had less to do with political chicanery and more with assumed psycho-cultural traits, as in the classic cartoon by Jimmy Turnbull (Figure 1.4).
Writing before the March referendum, Willie McIlvanney sensed defeat: ‘Not to put too fine a point on it: I think a lot of us are feart. It’s a feeling I share’ (1991: 22). He too adopted the psychiatric trope: ‘I think we’ve endured a condition analogous to that, one that has left us trapped in a weird psychic shuttle that runs from bleak and sterile self-doubt to wild declarations of arrogance and back again, with not a lot of stops in between’ (1991: 20). His poem called The Cowardly Lion ended with the lines: ‘Those who loved the lion had nothing to say / the lion had turned to its cage and slunk away / and lives still among stinking straw today.’

So why the turnaround in 1997, and even the ‘No’ vote in 2014? Why no recourse to psychiatric tropes after September 2014? There is something to be said for cultural change, as this comment from Cairns Craig makes plain:

The overwhelming vote in favour of devolution in 1997 was not produced by the political parties – they were small boats rising on a tide of cultural nationalism that went from the rediscovery of the art of the ‘Glasgow Boys’ and the ‘Scottish Colourists’ to the music of the Proclaimers and Runrig, from the writings of Nan Shepherd to Ian Rankin’s Rebus. … The Parliament was not an achievement of Scottish politics and politicians but the product of a cultural revolution that had given Scotland a significant past, a creative present and a believable future. (2015: 630)
Scotland may have danced to a different set of tunes than other nations; the relationship between culture and politics may be obtuse and complex, but that they are connected cannot be denied. Whatever else we can say, Scotland is not over.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have set ourselves a rather curious question: when was Scotland? To ask such a question is to try to establish Scotland as a suitable case for sociological treatment.

Chapter summary

What have we learned in this chapter?

- That ‘Scotland’ was a meaningful entity as early as the thirteenth century, reflected in the Wars of Independence, which helped to shape Scots as a people. In saying that, we are not implying that thirteenth-century peasants relate to Scotland in the same way as twenty-first-century Scots; how would we ever know? The most we can say is that, like many peoples in the world, war against an ‘other’ helped to make Scots. It is testament to the ideological success of a document like the Declaration of Arbroath in 1320 that many have seen it as the precursor for later such declarations (of independence), which may be historically dubious.

- That the second iconic moment was the Treaty of Union in 1707, at which point Scotland technically ceased to exist as a state; but then, for that matter, so did England. It mattered more to Scotland as the smaller country because the Union was, by and large, an incorporating one, although Scotland retained hold of its civil society institutions. These were to provide the bases for civil autonomy and, ultimately, the recovery of a law-making parliament in 1999. Indubitably, Scotland continued to exist after the Union. Its ‘national’ identity was underwritten by institutional autonomy; the recovery of ‘stateness’ came later. Whatever the outcome of the Union, Scotland was not over. As the oldest elected member of the 1999 Scottish parliament, Winnie Ewing opened the session with the words: ‘I want to start with the words that I have always wanted either to say or to hear someone else say – the Scottish Parliament, which adjourned on March 25, 1707, is hereby reconvened.’

- That the final moment came in the late twentieth century. Despite claims that Scottish culture had ceased to exist, and hence could not underwrite the recovery of statehood, even short of independence, the reconnection of culture and politics could not be denied. What the future may hold in those respects is beyond us. Above all, much depends on the wager of history, and it is to the detail of Scotland’s story in the twentieth century that we now turn.
Questions for discussion

1. Is it accurate to describe Scotland as a 'nation' in the thirteenth century? Where did the idea of Scotland come from, and why has it persisted?

2. To what extent was Scottish identity defined primarily vis-à-vis not being English?

3. Why does the Declaration of Arbroath in 1320 sound to many people like a 'modern' document?

4. If Scotland was governed from London after the Union of 1707, why did Scots retain a strong sense of national identity?

5. Why did ‘cultural pessimists’ fail to predict Scotland’s future in the late twentieth century?

Annotated reading


Notes

1 The Welsh historian Gwyn Alf Williams wrote a book with the title When Was Wales? (1991) which explored the origin and idea of Wales. Asking ‘When was Scotland?’ has a similar focus in terms of ‘imagining’ Scotland, and is a tribute to Williams’ approach.

5 In the Middle Ages, the ‘three estates’ of prelates (bishops and abbots, nobles and burgh commissioners) were known as the ‘community of the realm’, a term which translated into the Estates of Parliament, or *Thrie Estaitis* in medieval Scots.
6 To twenty-first-century eyes, much of this debate can seem esoteric and irrelevant, but it had deadly import in the Middle Ages when English designs on Scotland were waged on the ideological as well as the military front. Ferguson’s book *The Identity of the Scottish Nation: An historic quest* (1998) gives the best account of why such ‘history’ mattered.
7 The Irish term *Gaeltacht* refers to the west of Ireland where Irish (Gaelic) is spoken. The term *Gàidhealtachd* refers more broadly to the area of Gaelic culture in the Scottish Highlands and Islands.
8 See, for example, David Stenhouse (2004).
9 ‘Treaty’ is preferred to ‘Act’ (of Union) because there were separate acts in Scotland and England in the respective parliaments.
10 Note the ‘wound’ of Argentina 1978, the Scottish footballing stramash [uproar] in the World Cup, on the lion’s flank.