Understanding political developments and disputes around the world has never seemed more important than it does today. Civil war in Syria has produced the largest flow of refugees in decades, as over a million people fled the war for the relative safety of Europe. Their arrival has raised questions about Europeans’ identity and the continuation of the famous “open borders” within the European Union (EU). And the EU was already reeling from the effects of the financial crisis of 2008–2009. That crisis began in the United States but ultimately hit Europe harder. Greece, the first stop for those million-plus migrants, was essentially bankrupted by the financial crisis and nearly forced out of the EU before the migrants arrived. At least partly in response, populist and nationalist movements that question long-held political and policy assumptions have arisen throughout the Western world, most dramatically in the 2016 electoral victory of Donald Trump as U.S. president and the British vote to leave the EU a few months earlier.

Many people now see the world as more complicated and less comprehensible than it was during either the Cold War (1944–1989), when clear and predictable divisions seemed to dominate the globe, or the post–Cold War era (1989–2001), when the international realm seemed peaceful and stable and foreign politics was of little importance. The end of communist rule in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe seemed to foreshadow a period in which understanding political differences among countries would be both easier and less important. Instead, we have witnessed

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dramatic political change: an Islamist movement that criticizes fundamental tenets of Western liberalism has gained masses of followers and its most radical elements use terrorism as a tactic to seek political change; the “Arab Spring” uprising upended authoritarian governments across the Middle East, producing one new democracy but also new authoritarian regimes and civil wars; several countries split into two or more new countries; and two full-scale genocides have occurred. On the other hand, the number of countries that could claim to have democratic governments has also increased substantially, and East Asia, led by China, has achieved unprecedented economic growth that lifted more people out of poverty more quickly than ever before in history.

Diversity of political, economic, and social life among nations exists in every period of history. Comparative politics attempts to understand this diversity, assessing current events in the light of fundamental and long-standing questions: Why do governments form? Why does a group of people come to see itself as a nation? Why do nations sometimes fall apart? How can a government convince people that it has the right to rule? Do some forms of government last longer than others? Do some forms of government serve their people's interests better than others? How do democracies form, and how do they fall apart? Can democracy work anywhere, or only in particular countries and at particular times? Are certain political institutions more democratic than others? Can government policy reduce poverty and improve economic well-being? This book introduces you to the many and often conflicting answers to these questions by examining them comparatively. It will also help you start to assess which answers are the most convincing and why.

In an increasingly globalized world, civil war in one country can have impacts around the world. Here, migrants arrive on the island of Lesbos in Greece. In 2015 the Syrian civil war produced a massive refugee crisis that flooded Europe with requests for asylum. The political and economic effects of this movement of people were huge, burdening the weak Greek economy, leading to greater support for anti-immigrant parties in many European countries and influencing the successful British vote to leave the European Union.
In Introduction

THE BIG ISSUES

Current “hot-button” political issues around the world are just the latest manifestations of a set of enduring issues that students of comparative politics have been studying for the last half century. We could list many such issues, but for the moment, let’s focus on just four to illustrate the major areas of interest in comparative politics: political development, regime type and change, participation and representation, and political economy. The logical starting point is the question of political development.

**Political Development** “How do we get to Denmark?” That is the question political scientist Francis Fukuyama (2011) asked in his magisterial study of global political history, *The Origins of Political Order*. By “Denmark,” he meant a society that enjoys political stability, the rule of law and political accountability, wealth, honesty, and inclusiveness. We can quibble with the details of how wonderful Denmark is, but we can probably all agree that life there is much better for most people than is life in Sudan, one of the poorest countries in the world and racked by decades of civil war. What explains the difference between the two countries, and how can the Sudanese come to enjoy the many benefits that the Danes have? This is the central question of the study of political development, the rise and evolution of modern nations, states, and political institutions. Why did the entity now known as Denmark, and a group of people who think of themselves as Danes, come into existence? Is this process similar for all countries? If not, how and why does it vary? And, of course, how can citizens of all countries come to enjoy the benefits of political stability, control over their political system, the rule of law, and generalized well-being?

Political scientists initially thought about these issues in a European context, but since World War II most questions about political development have emerged out of the experiences of former colonies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Most observers assumed that former colonies would go through a process of development similar to what had occurred earlier in Europe—the transformation of poor agrarian societies into wealthy industrial ones, and the simultaneous rise of democratic political systems.

In fact, neither economic nor political development has occurred as planned. Some countries, such as South Korea, have achieved rapid economic transformation and established electoral democracies. Many others, however, have not. Democracy has emerged in some very poor countries (Ghana), while nondemocratic governments have presided over great economic growth in others (Vietnam). In many countries, a sense of being a nation has never fully emerged. We start our investigation of comparative politics with political development, looking at the rise of the modern state, and why some states are strong and others are weak, in chapter 2. We turn our attention to the rise of nations and other identity groups, and their relationships to governments, in chapter 4.

**Regime Type and Change** The “Arab Spring” in 2011 replaced authoritarian regimes with democratic ones in Tunisia and Egypt, but the new Egyptian democracy
was virtually stillborn, being replaced by a new military regime within two years. In Libya and Syria, meanwhile, civil wars erupted because the old regimes crumbled but stable new ones did not develop. As the Arab Spring shows, regime change is more than just a change of government, which can happen in a democratic regime with each major election and in authoritarian China every ten years when the ruling party chooses a new leader. Regimes are not just governments but sets of political institutions that define a type of government; they establish the “rules of the game” in politics in each country. Regime change is a profound transition in a country’s political system, like the Arab Spring produced in Tunisia and Egypt.

Americans often use regime to refer to some sort of “bad” government: we (democracies) have governments, whereas they (nondemocracies) have regimes. Political scientists, however, think of regimes in more neutral terms. France has existed as a state and a nation for centuries, but it has had numerous regimes. The long-standing monarchy was overthrown by the world’s first modern social revolution in 1789 that created a very brief republic, which itself was ultimately overthrown by Napoleon Bonaparte, who created a dictatorship. His regime collapsed and the monarchy was restored in 1815, followed by two other regimes, until a long-lived democratic regime finally emerged under the third republic, lasting from 1870 until it was overthrown by Nazi Germany in 1940. Since World War II, France has been democratic again, but under two quite different regimes, with distinct constitutions. Despite being a state and nation for centuries, France has had (depending on how you count) at least nine regimes.

Political scientists classify regimes into a limited number of categories, or regime types. Two broad categories are democratic and authoritarian regimes. Many definitions of a democracy exist, but most political scientists adhere to what is often called the “minimal definition” of a democracy as a regime in which citizens have basic rights of open association and expression and the ability to change the government through some sort of electoral process. This is not to say that democratic regimes are all the same. Besides being “more” or “less” democratic, they are also organized in different ways, for example, as presidential or parliamentary systems.

Conversely, an authoritarian regime is simply a regime lacking democratic characteristics. As is the case with democratic regimes, numerous kinds of authoritarian regimes exist. The most important of these in the twentieth century were fascist regimes such as Nazi Germany, communist regimes such as the Soviet Union, modernizing authoritarian regimes such as the military government in Brazil from 1964 to 1985, personalist dictatorships such as Idi Amin’s in Uganda (1971–1979), and theocratic regimes such as the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979. Recently, political scientists delineated a new regime type, electoral authoritarian; like democracies, these regimes hold regular elections to select new leaders, but like authoritarian regimes, the same party remains in power throughout.

Once the various regime categories are identified, we can ask questions about how they differ and how they are similar. On the surface, the answer seems obvious:

democracy
A regime in which citizens have basic rights of open association and expression and the ability to change the government through some sort of electoral process

authoritarian regime
A regime lacking democratic characteristics, ruled by a single leader or small group of leaders
democracies have elections, and authoritarian regimes have dictators. In fact, the differences and similarities are much more complex. Some formally democratic regimes have significant informal limits on citizen input and participation, whereas some authoritarian regimes allow dissent and even power sharing within certain bounds.

As the French example and the Arab Spring suggest, we also need to ask questions about regime change, the process through which one regime is transformed into another. This can take numerous forms: revolutions, such as the triumph of Chinese communists in 1949; military coups d'état, which was attempted in Turkey in 2016; and democratization, such as in South Africa after the end of apartheid. We define the major regime types in chapter 3; analyze variation in their institutions and how they function in chapters 5, 6, and 8; and discuss regime change in chapter 9.

**Participation and Representation** Closely related to the issues of regime type and democratization are popular participation and representation. Political scientist Robert Putnam (2000), among others, worried about a decline in participation in Western democracies since the 1970s. After the presidential elections of Barack Obama in 2008 and Donald Trump in 2016, though, participation in American politics seemed to explode, via the “Tea Party” in 2009 that changed the face of the Republican Party, and a diverse “progressive” movement in 2017 that produced, among other things, the largest protest in U.S. history on the day after President Trump’s inauguration. Why does participation rise, fall, and take different forms in different countries and times?

Political scientists have long sought to understand why and how people participate in the political process, as well as how that participation differs across cultures and regimes. In some countries citizens participate as part of self-conscious identity groups, such as ethnic, religious, or racial groups. In other countries identity groups have little relevance to politics. When and why do these differences emerge? What are the effects of strong “identity politics” on the stability of democracy? Citizens participate individually by voting or asking their government for assistance, but they may also band together to pursue common interests in what is called *civil society*, the sphere of organized, nongovernmental, nonviolent activity by groups larger than individual families or firms. The most familiar elements of civil society in the United States are interest groups such as the Sierra Club or the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but protest movements like the Tea Party are a growing segment of civil society as well.

Political participation also occurs through the medium of political parties, of course. Different regimes have quite distinct kinds of parties and electoral systems that encourage different kinds of citizen participation and representation. Political
scientists ask which party and electoral systems most accurately represent the interests of citizens. How can citizens ensure that their representatives actually represent them? Can representation exist in authoritarian regimes? How do different societies conceptualize political representation in different cultural contexts? We examine participation and representation in democratic regimes in chapter 6 and in authoritarian regimes in chapter 8; we then look at forms of participation that go beyond institutional boundaries—protests, political violence, and revolution—in chapter 7.

**Political Economy** Although events like the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war are dramatic and important, almost certainly the most far-reaching event of the last decade was the “Great Recession” of 2008–2009. In addition to massive unemployment and other economic losses, the recession had profound political consequences. In the years that followed, governments across Europe and the United States changed hands as voters blamed incumbents for economic decline. By 2016, this was taking a populist and nationalist turn in many countries, as seen in the British vote to leave the EU, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, and the rise of similar movements and leaders in Germany and France. Economic events profoundly influence politics, and politics and government policies profoundly influence economic well-being.

**Political economy** is the study of the interaction of political and economic phenomena. In the modern world, virtually all governments are concerned with and (at least in theory) held responsible for the economic well-being of their people. Political economists try to understand why certain kinds of economic institutions and policies arise in certain countries but not others, relating political economy to political development. They also ask if some types of regimes produce better economic outcomes than others. Many observers have argued, for instance, that modernizing authoritarian regimes can achieve more rapid economic growth in poor countries than democratic regimes can, but in recent years political scientists have found substantial evidence that the relationship is far less black and white. Some authoritarian regimes, such as China’s, have been quite capable of achieving growth, whereas others, including Zimbabwe’s, have not. Similarly, some kinds of democratic regimes seem capable of achieving beneficial economic outcomes, whereas others do not. We examine political economy in the last three chapters of the book, looking at wealthy countries in chapter 10, the “Global South” and development policies in chapter 11, and a set of key policy areas of importance to every government in chapter 12.

These big issues do not encompass all of comparative politics, but they do raise the most prominent questions that comparativists—political scientists who study comparative politics—have been grappling with for the past half century. Today, these questions are alive and well in the countries making headlines, from Russia and Ukraine to Libya and Syria. Comparativists try to look beyond the momentary hot topics to examine these enduring questions systematically, seeking ever clearer understanding of how politics works in the world and how it might be made better. Doing this requires some thought about how to study a very complex subject.
**CHAPTER 1  Introduction**

**COMPARATIVE POLITICS: WHAT IS IT? WHY STUDY IT? HOW TO STUDY IT?**

Politics can be defined as the process by which human communities make collective decisions. These communities can be of any size, from small villages or neighborhoods to nations and international organizations. Comparative politics is one of the major subfields of political science, the systematic study of politics. Politics always involves elements of power, the first concept we need to examine closely.

Individuals or groups can have power over others in a variety of ways. If someone holds a gun to your head, he has a great power over you at that moment. If your boss tells you to do something, you do it because she is paying you and could fire you. But if someone has control over a resource you need—say, admission into a college—she also may have power over you. Political theorist Steven Lukes (1974) usefully categorized power into three dimensions. The first dimension of power is the ability of one person or group to get another person or group to do something it otherwise would not do: when someone points a gun and asks for your wallet, you hand it to him. The focus here is on behavior and active decisions: making someone do something. A second dimension of power, first articulated by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962), sees power as the ability not only to make people do something but to keep them from doing something. Bachrach and Baratz argued that a key element of political power is the ability to keep certain groups and issues out of the political arena by controlling the political agenda and institutions to allow certain groups to participate and voice their concerns, while preventing or at least discouraging others from doing so: if it takes large amounts of money to run for office, poor people are likely not to try. A third dimension of power, which Lukes contributed, is the ability to shape or determine individual or group political demands by causing people to think about political issues in ways that are contrary to their own interests. The ability to influence how people think produces the power to prevent certain political demands from ever being articulated: if workers making the minimum wage believe that raising it will result in fewer jobs, they won’t demand a higher wage in the first place. We examine the role of all three of these dimensions of power in this chapter and in the rest of the book.

**What Is Comparative Politics?** In comparative politics, the primary focus is on power and decision making within national boundaries. This includes the politics of entire countries as well as more local-level politics. Politics among national governments and beyond national boundaries is generally the purview of the field of international relations, and although comparativists certainly take into account the domestic effects of international events, we do not try to explain the international events themselves. Perhaps it is self-evident, but comparativists also compare; we systematically examine political phenomena in more than one place and during more than one period, and we try to develop a generalized understanding of and explanations for political activity that seem to apply to many different situations.
Why Study Comparative Politics? Studying comparative politics has multiple benefits. First, comparativists are interested in understanding political events and developments in various countries. Why did peaceful regime change happen in Tunisia in 2011 but civil war break out in Syria? Why did the Socialist Party win back the presidency in France in 2012 after seventeen years of conservative presidents? Also, as the Middle East example shows, understanding political events in other countries can be very important to foreign policy. If the U.S. government had better understood the internal dynamics of Syrian politics, it might have been able to respond more effectively to the outbreak of civil war there.

Second, systematic comparison of different political systems and events around the world can generate important lessons from one place that can apply in another. Americans have long seen their system of government, with a directly elected president, as a very successful and stable model of democracy. Much evidence suggests, though, that in a situation of intense political conflict, such as an ethnically divided country after a civil war, a system with a single and powerful elected president might not be the best option. Only one candidate from one side can win this coveted post, and the sides that lose the election might choose to restart the war rather than live with the results. A democratic system that gives all major groups some share of political power at the national level might work better in this situation. That conclusion is not obvious when examining the United States alone. A systematic comparison of a number of different countries, however, reveals this possibility.

Third, examining politics comparatively helps us develop broad theories about how politics works. A theory is an abstract argument that provides a systematic explanation of some phenomenon. The theory of evolution, for instance, explains how species change in response to their environments. The social sciences, including political science, use two different kinds of theories. An empirical theory is an argument that explains what actually occurs. Empirical theorists first describe a pattern and then attempt to explain what causes it. The theory of evolution is an empirical theory in that evolutionary biologists do not argue whether evolution is inherently good or bad; they simply describe evolutionary patterns and explain their causes. A good empirical theory should also allow theorists to predict what will happen as well. For example, a comparison of democratic systems in post–civil war situations would lead us to predict that presidential systems are more likely to lead to renewed conflict.

On the other hand, a normative theory is an argument that explains what ought to occur. For instance, socialists support a normative theory that the government and economy ought to be structured in a way that produces a relatively equal distribution of wealth. Although comparativists certainly hold various normative theories, most of the discipline of comparative politics focuses on empirical theory. We attempt to explain the political world around us, and we do this by looking across multiple cases to come up with generalizations about politics.
How Do Comparativists Study Politics? Clearly, political scientists do not have perfect scientific conditions in which to do research. We do not have a controlled laboratory, because we certainly cannot control the real world of politics. Physicists can use a laboratory to control all elements of an experiment, and they can repeat that same experiment to achieve identical results because molecules do not notice what the scientists are doing, think about the situation, and change their behavior. In political science, however, political actors think about the changes going on around them and modify their behavior accordingly.

Despite these limitations, comparativists use the scientific method (as explained in the “Scientific Method in Comparative Politics” box) to try to gain as systematic evidence as possible. We use several research methods to try to overcome the difficulties our complex field of study presents. Research methods are systematic processes used to ensure that the study of some phenomena is as objective and unbiased as possible.

One common research method we use is the single-case study, which examines a particular political phenomenon in just one country or community. A case study can generate ideas for new theories, or it can test existing theories developed from different cases. A single case can never be definitive proof of anything beyond that case itself, but it can be suggestive of further research and can be of interest to people researching that particular country. Deviant case studies that do not fit a widely held pattern can be particularly helpful in highlighting the limits of even widely supported theories. Case studies also deepen our knowledge about particular countries, useful in and of itself. Scholars engaging in case study research search for common patterns within the case or use a method known as process tracing, which involves careful examination of the historical linkages between potential causes and effects, to demonstrate what caused what in the particular case. Case studies serve as important sources of information and ideas for comparativists using more comparative methods.

Scholars use the comparative method to examine the same phenomenon in several cases, and they try to mimic laboratory conditions by careful selection of cases care-fully. Two approaches are common. The most-similar-systems design selects cases that are alike in a number of ways but differ on the key question under examination. For instance, Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle (1997) looked at transitions to democracy in Africa, arguing that all African countries share certain similarities in patterns of political behavior that are distinct from patterns in Latin America, where the main theories of democratization were developed. On the other hand, the most-different-systems design looks at countries that differ in many ways but are similar in terms of the particular political process or outcome in which the research is interested. For instance, scholars of revolution look at the major cases of revolution around the world—a list of seemingly very different countries like France, Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iran—and ask what common elements can be found that explain why these countries had revolutions. Both comparative methods have their strengths and weaknesses, but their common goal is to use careful case selection and systematic examination of key variables to mimic laboratory methods as closely as possible.
With about two hundred countries in the world, however, no one can systematically examine every case in depth. For large-scale studies, political scientists rely on a third method: quantitative statistical techniques. When evidence can be reduced to sets of numbers, statistical methods can be used to systematically compare a huge number of cases. Recent quantitative research on the causes of civil war, for instance, looked at all identifiable civil wars over several decades, literally hundreds of cases. The results indicated that ethnic divisions, which often seem to be the cause of civil war, are not as important as had been assumed. Although they may play a role, civil war is much more likely when groups are fighting over control of a valuable resource such as diamonds. Where no such resource exists, ethnic divisions are far less likely to result in war (Collier and Hoeffler 2001).

Each of these methods has its advantages and disadvantages. A single-case study allows a political scientist to look at a phenomenon in great depth and come to a more thorough understanding of a particular case (usually a country). The comparative method retains some, but not all, of this depth and gains the advantage of systematic comparison from which more generalizable conclusions can be drawn. Quantitative

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**Scientific Method in Comparative Politics**

Political science can never be a pure science because of imperfect laboratory conditions: in the real world, we have very little control over social and political phenomena. Political scientists, like other social scientists, nonetheless think in scientific terms. Most use key scientific concepts, including the following:

- **Theory**: An abstract argument explaining a phenomenon
- **Hypothesis**: A claim that certain things cause other things to happen or change
- **Variable**: A measurable phenomenon that changes across time or space
- **Independent variable**: The phenomenon a scientist is trying to explain
- **Dependent variable**: The thing that explains the dependent variable
- **Control**: Holding variables constant so that the effects of one independent variable at a time can be examined

In using the scientific method in political science, the first challenge we face is to define clearly the variables we need to include and measure them accurately. For instance, one recent study of civil wars by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2001) included, among other variables, measurements of when a civil war was taking place, poverty, ethnic fragmentation, and dependence on natural resources. They had to ask themselves, What constitutes a “civil war”? How much violence must occur and for how long before a particular country is considered to be having a civil war? What many saw as a civil war erupted in Ukraine in 2014, though accompanied by a Russian military invasion supporting one side. Fighting and cease-fires have been off and on ever since, with the situation by 2017 still a stalemate. So should the Ukraine be classified as having a civil war or not, and exactly when?

A second challenge we face is figuring out how to control for all the potentially relevant variables in our research. In a laboratory, scientists control many of the variables they work with, holding them constant so that they can examine the effects of one independent variable at a time. Political scientists can rarely do this directly, for we cannot hold variables constant. A common alternative is to measure the simultaneous effects of all the independent variables through quantitative studies, such as Collier and Hoeffler’s study of civil wars. Single-case studies and the comparative method attempt to control variables via careful selection of cases. For instance, a comparative case study examining the same questions Collier and Hoeffler studied might select as cases only poor countries, hypothesizing that the presence of natural resources only causes civil wars in poor countries. The question becomes, In the context of poverty, is ethnic fragmentation or the presence of natural resources more important in causing civil war? If, on the other hand, we think poverty itself affects the likelihood of civil war, we might select several cases from poor countries and several others from rich countries to see if the presence of natural resources has a different effect in the different contexts. None of this provides the perfect control that a laboratory can achieve; rather, it attempts to mimic those conditions as closely as possible to arrive at scientifically defensible conclusions.
techniques can show broad patterns, but only for questions involving evidence that can be presented numerically, and they provide little depth on any particular case. Case studies are best at generating new ideas and insights that can lead to new theories. Quantitative techniques are best at showing the tendency of two or more phenomena to vary together, such as civil war and the presence of valuable resources. Understanding how phenomena are connected, and what causes what, often requires case studies that can provide greater depth to see the direct connections involved. Much of the best scholarship in recent years combines methods, using quantitative techniques to uncover broad patterns and comparative case studies to examine causal connections more closely.

No matter how much political scientists attempt to mimic laboratory sciences, the subject matter will not allow the kinds of scientific conclusions that exist in chemistry or biology. As the world changes, ideas and theories have to adapt. That does not mean that old theories are not useful; they often are. It does mean, however, that no theory will ever become a universal and unchanging law, like the law of gravity. The political world simply isn’t that certain.

Comparative politics will also never become a true science because political scientists have their own human passions and positions regarding the various debates they study. A biologist might become determined to gain fame or fortune by proving a particular theory, even if laboratory tests don’t support it (for instance, scientist Woo Suk Hwang of South Korea went so far as to fabricate stem cell research results). Biologists, however, neither become normatively committed to finding particular research results nor ask particular questions because of their normative beliefs. Political scientists, however, do act on their normative concerns, and that is entirely justifiable. Normative theories affect political science because our field is the study of people. Our normative positions often influence the very questions we ask. Those who ask questions about the level of “cheating” in the welfare system, for instance, are typically critics of the system who tend to think the government is wasting money on welfare. Those who ask questions about the effects of budget cuts on the poor, on the other hand, probably believe the government should be involved
in alleviating poverty. These normative positions do not mean that the evidence can or should be ignored. For example, empirical research suggested that the 1996 welfare reform in the United States neither reduced the income of the poor as much as critics initially feared nor helped the poor get jobs and rise out of poverty as much as its proponents predicted (Jacobson 2001). Good political scientists can approach a subject like this with a set of moral concerns but recognize the results of careful empirical research nonetheless and change their arguments and conclusions in light of the new evidence.

Normative questions can be important and legitimate purposes for research projects. This book includes extensive discussions of different kinds of democratic political institutions. One of the potential trade-offs, we argue, is between greater levels of representation and participation on the one hand and efficient policymaking on the other. But this analysis is only interesting if we care about this trade-off. We have to hold a normative position on which of the two—representation and participation or efficient policymaking—is more important and why. Only then can we use the lessons learned from our empirical examination to make recommendations about which institutions a country ought to adopt.

Where does this leave the field of comparative politics? The best comparativists are aware of their own biases but still use various methods to generate the most systematic evidence possible to come to logical conclusions. We approach the subject with our normative concerns, our own ideas about what a “good society” should be, and what role government should have in it. We try to do research on interesting questions as scientifically and systematically as possible to develop the best evidence we can to provide a solid basis for government policy. Because we care passionately about the issues, we ought to study them as rigorously as possible, and we should be ready to change our normative positions and empirical conclusions based on the evidence we find.

THREE KEY QUESTIONS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Comparative politics is a huge field. The questions we can ask are virtually limitless. Spanning this huge range, however, are three major questions. The first two are fundamental to the field of political science, of which comparative politics is a part. The third is comparativists’ particular contribution to the broader field of political science.

Probably the most common question political scientists ask is, What explains political behavior? The heart of political science is trying to understand why people do what they do in the world of politics. We can ask, Why do voters vote the way they do? Why do interest groups champion particular causes so passionately? Why does the U.S. Supreme Court make the decisions it does? Why has Ghana been able to create an apparently stable democracy, whereas neighboring Mali had its democracy overthrown by the military? By asking these questions, we seek to discover why
individuals, groups, institutions, or countries take particular political actions. Political scientists have developed many theories to explain various kinds of political actions. We discuss them in terms of three broad approaches that focus on interests, beliefs, and structures.

The second large question animating political science is, Who rules? Who has power in a particular country, political institution, or political situation and why? Formal power is often clear in modern states; particular officials have prescribed functions and roles that give them certain powers. For example, the U.S. Congress passes legislation, which the president has the power to sign or veto and the Supreme Court can rule as constitutional or not. But does the legislation Congress passes reflect the will of the citizens? Are citizens really ruling through their elected representatives (as the U.S. Constitution implies), or are powerful lobbyists calling the shots, or can members of Congress do whatever they want once in office? The Constitution and laws can’t fully answer these broader questions of who really has a voice, is able to participate, and therefore has power.

Virtually all questions in political science derive from these two fundamental questions, and virtually all empirical theories are involved in the debate these two questions raise. Comparativists add a third particular focus by asking, Where and why do particular types of political behavior occur? If we can explain why Americans on the left side of the political spectrum vote for Democrats, can we use the same explanation for the voting patterns of left-leaning Germans and Brazilians? If special interests have the real power over economic policy in the U.S. presidential system, is this the case in Britain’s parliamentary democracy as well? Why have military coups d’état happened rather frequently in Latin America and Africa but very rarely in Europe and North America? Comparativists start with the same basic theories used by other political scientists to try to explain political behavior and understand who really has power;
we then add a comparative dimension to develop explanations that work in different times and places. In addition to helping develop more scientific theories, comparing different cases and contexts can help us determine which lessons from one situation are applicable to another.

**What Explains Political Behavior?**

The core activity in all political science is explaining political behavior: Why do people, groups, and governments act as they do in the political arena? It’s easy enough to observe and describe behavior, but what explains it? In daily discussions we tend to attribute the best of motives to those with whom we agree—they are “acting in the best interests” of the community or nation. We tend to see those with whom we disagree, on the other hand, as acting selfishly or even with evil intent. You can see this tendency in the way Americans use the phrase *special interest*. We perceive groups whose causes or ideological leanings we agree with as benevolent and general; those we disagree with are “special interests.” Logically, however, any *political actor*, meaning any person or group engaged in political behavior, can be motivated by a variety of factors. Political scientists have developed three broad answers to the question of what explains political behavior: interests, beliefs, and structures. Each answer includes within it several theoretical approaches.

**Interests** We commonly assume that most people involved in politics are in it for their own good. Even when political actors claim to be working for the greater good or for some specific principle, many people suspect they are just hiding their own self-interested motives. The assumption of self-interest (broadly defined) is also a major element in political science theories about political behavior.

**Rational choice theory** assumes that individuals are rational and that they bring a set of self-defined preferences into the political arena. This does not mean that all people are greedy or selfish but rather that they rationally pursue their preferences, whatever those may be. The theory borrows heavily from the field of economics, which makes the same assumptions in analyzing behavior in the market. Political scientists use this theory to explain political behavior and its results by making assumptions about political actors’ preferences, modeling the political context in which they pursue those preferences, and demonstrating how political outcomes can be explained as the result of the interactions of those actors in that context. For instance, the allocation of money for building new roads is the result of an agreement among members of a congressional committee. All of the members of the committee have certain interests or preferences, based mainly on their desire for reelection and their constituents’ demands. The committee members pursue those interests rationally, and the final bill is a negotiated settlement reflecting the relative power of the various committee members, as well as their interests within the context of the committee and Congress more broadly.
Rational choice theorists start their analyses at the level of the individual, but they often seek to explain group behavior. They model group behavior from their assumptions about the preferences of individual members of groups. Group behavior is considered a result of the collective actions of rational individual actors in the group in a particular context. Racial or ethnic minority groups, women’s groups, or environmental and religious groups can all be analyzed in this way. Rational choice theorists would argue, for instance, that environmentalists are just as rational and self-interested as oil companies but simply have different preferences. Environmentalists gain benefits from breathing clean air and walking through unpolluted forests; they pursue those preferences in the same way that the oil industry pursues its opposition to environmental regulations. Although self-defined preferences may be easier to see when analyzing battles over material goods and money, they exist throughout the political arena. Rational choice theorists thus are not interested in the second or third dimensions of power we mentioned earlier; they examine behavior, not institutions that prevent behavior, and they do not ask how and why people have certain preferences. They instead accept people’s preferences and actions as given and then ask how they can be explained via rationality.

This raises one of the major criticisms of rational choice theories. Critics contend that rational choice theorists have difficulty explaining outcomes because they often cannot know in advance exactly which individuals or groups might be involved in a particular political dispute and exactly how they will define their preferences. When a new political issue arises, individuals or groups have to figure out if they are interested in it, and if so, what preferences they will pursue. In economics, this usually isn’t a problem. It’s a pretty safe assumption that people engage in economic activity to make money: businesses seek to maximize profits, and workers look for the highest wage. Knowing preferences in advance is much more difficult in political science. For instance, how can a rational choice theorist explain the electoral choice of a voter who is both a devout Catholic and a union member if the two available candidates are (a) a Democrat who favors raising the minimum wage and other workers’ benefits but also favors legalized abortion, and (b) a Republican with the opposite views? Will that person vote as a Catholic or as a union member? How can we use rational choice theory to figure out his preferences in this situation?

Many comparativists also ask whether rational choice theories can explain the different political behaviors seen around the world. For most of the twentieth century, for example, the most important French labor unions were closely affiliated with the Communist Party and pursued many objectives tied to party beliefs, beyond the basic “shop floor” issues of wages and working conditions. In the United States, by contrast,
no major unions were tied to communist or socialist parties, and unions focused much more on improving wages and working conditions, with less concern for broader social changes. In Britain, labor unions were not communists, but they created their own party, the Labour Party, to represent their interests in government. Rational choice theorists might be able to explain political outcomes involving these unions after correctly understanding the preferences of each, but they have a hard time explaining why unions in different countries developed strikingly different sets of preferences. Did something about the working conditions of these three countries produce different definitions of self-interest, or do different workers define their interests differently based on factors other than rational calculation?

**Psychological theories** also focus on individual interests but question the assumption of rational action and are particularly interested in how political preferences are formed. They explain political behavior on the basis of individuals’ psychological experiences or dispositions. Psychological theories look for nonrational explanations for political behavior. Comparativists who study individual leaders have long used this approach, trying to explain leaders’ choices and actions by understanding personal backgrounds and psychological states. More recently, political scientists have examined the role of emotions in explaining political behavior. Roger Petersen (2002) and Andrew Ross (2013) look at emotions such as fear to explain violent ethnic and religious conflict, whereas Bethany Albertson and Shana Gadarian (2015) argue that anxiety is important to understanding Americans’ response to threatening issues such as terrorism and climate change. In sharp contrast to rational choice theory, psychological theories are often interested in the third dimension of power: influences on the formation of individual political demands. Critics of the psychological approach argue that the inherent focus on the individual that is fundamental to psychological theories makes them irrelevant to explaining group behavior. If so, their utility in political science is limited. Explanations beyond the level of individual motivation, however, might help explain these situations.

**Beliefs**  Beliefs are probably second only to self-interest in popular ideas about political behavior. If people think a political actor is not simply self-interested, they usually assume she is motivated by a value or belief. Environmentalists care about the environment; regardless of their own personal interests, they think everyone ought to have clean air to breathe and forests to explore. People who are against abortion believe that life begins at conception and therefore abortion is murder; self-interest has nothing to do with it. Political scientists have developed various formal theories that relate to this commonsense notion that values and beliefs matter. The main approaches focus on either political culture or political ideology.

A **political culture** is a set of widely held attitudes, values, beliefs, and symbols about politics. It provides people with ways to understand the political arena, justifications for a particular set of political institutions and practices, and definitions of appropriate political behaviors. Political cultures emerge from various historical
processes and can change over time, although they usually change rather slowly because they are often deeply embedded in a society. They tend to endure, in part, because of political socialization, the process through which people, especially young people, learn about politics and are taught a society’s common political values and beliefs. Theories of political culture argue that the attitudes, values, beliefs, and symbols that constitute a given country’s political culture are crucial explanations for political behavior in that country. Widely accepted cultural values, they argue, can influence all three dimensions of power: getting people to do something, excluding them from the political arena, and influencing their political demands.

Two broad schools of thought within political culture theory exist: modernist and postmodernist. Modernists believe that clear attitudes, values, and beliefs can be identified within any particular political culture. The best-known example of this is Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s 1963 book The Civic Culture. Based on a broad survey of citizens of five countries in North America and Europe, the authors developed a typology, or list of different types, of political cultures. They saw each country as dominated primarily by one particular type of political culture and argued that more stable and democratic countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, had a civic culture. This meant that their citizens held democratic values and beliefs that supported their democracies; these attitudes led citizens to participate actively in politics but also to defer enough to the leadership to let it govern effectively. On the other hand, the authors described Mexico as an authoritarian culture in which citizens viewed themselves primarily as subjects with no right to control their government, suggesting that these attitudes helped to produce the electoral authoritarian regime that ruled the country until 2000.

Critics of the modernist approach question the assumption that any country has a clearly defined political culture that is relatively fixed and unchanging, and they contest the argument that cultural values cause political outcomes rather than the other way around. They note that subcultures (distinct political cultures of particular groups) exist in all societies. Racial or religious minorities, for instance, may not fully share the political attitudes and values of the majority. The assumption that we can identify a single, unified political culture that is key to understanding a particular country can mask some of the most important political conflicts within the country. Furthermore, political attitudes themselves may be symptoms rather than causes of political activity or a governmental system. For example, Mexican citizens in the 1960s may not have viewed themselves as active participants in government for a very rational reason: they had lived for forty years under one party that had effectively suppressed all meaningful opposition and participation. They really did not have any effective voice in government or any chance for effective participation. According to this view, the political institutions in Mexico created the political attitudes of Mexicans, rather than vice versa.

Some political scientists also accuse modernists of ethnocentrism, in that many modernist approaches argue that Anglo-American values are superior to others for political socialization

The process through which people, especially young people, learn about politics and are taught a society’s common political values and beliefs

modernists

Theorists of political culture who believe that clear sets of attitudes, values, and beliefs can be identified in each country that change very rarely and explain much about politics there

civic culture

A political culture in which citizens hold values and beliefs that support democracy, including active participation in politics but also enough deference to the leadership to let it govern effectively

subcultures

Groups that hold partially different beliefs and values from the main political culture of a country
establishing stable democracies. Still other critics suggest that political culture is more malleable than *The Civic Culture* assumed. The attitudes that surveys identified in the 1960s were just that—attitudes of the 1960s. Over time, as societies change and new political ideas arise, attitudes and values change accordingly, sometimes with breathtaking speed (Almond and Verba 1989). Many cultural theorists, for instance, have argued that both Arab and Islamic cultures tend to have nondemocratic values that support authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. The revolts of the Arab Spring in 2011 suggest that those theorists either misunderstood the cultures or the cultures changed rapidly, and the differential outcomes of those revolts—democracy in Tunisia but a return to electoral authoritarian rule in Egypt—suggest that “Islamic” or “Arab” culture is far from monolithic.

Some modernist approaches examine change in political culture. Ronald Inglehart (1971) coined the term *postmaterialist* in the 1970s to describe what he saw as a new predominant element in political culture in wealthy democracies. He argued that as a result of the post–World War II economic expansion, by the 1960s and 1970s most citizens in wealthy societies were less concerned about economic (materialist) issues and more concerned about “quality of life” issues. They had become “postmaterialist.” Economic growth had allowed most citizens to attain a level of material comfort that led to a change in attitudes and values. Individuals had become more concerned with ideas like human rights, civil rights, women’s rights, environmentalism, and moral values.

This postmaterialist shift in political culture led to a sea change in the issues that politicians came to care about and the outcomes of elections. It explained, for instance, why many self-identified Catholic voters in the United States shifted from voting Democratic in the middle of the twentieth century to voting Republican by
the end of the century. In the 1950s they voted their mostly working-class economic interests, supporting the party that created what they saw as “pro-worker” policies. Later, as they achieved greater economic security as part of an expanding middle class, they came to care more about postmaterialist moral values, such as their religious opposition to abortion, and they shifted their party allegiance accordingly.

As the bulk of American voters went through this shift in political culture, political battles focused less on economic issues and more on debates over moral and cultural values. More recently, Russell Dalton, Christian Welzel, and their colleagues have argued that postmaterialist and more participatory values have come to characterize not only Western societies but many societies around the world, and that those more participatory values result in stronger democracy and ability to govern, in contrast to *The Civic Culture*’s thesis that too much participation threatens democracy (Dalton and Welzel 2014).

The postmaterialist thesis shows how political culture can change over time as a result of other changes in society. Nonetheless, these theorists continued to argue that it was useful to think about societies as having identifiable political cultures that explain much political behavior. The postmodernist approach, on the other hand, pushes the criticism of modernism further, questioning the assumption that one clear set of values can be identified that has a clear meaning to all members of a society. Postmodernists, influenced primarily by postmodern French philosophers such as Michel Foucault, see cultures not as sets of fixed and clearly defined values but rather as sets of symbols subject to interpretation. When examining political culture, postmodernists focus primarily on political discourse, meaning the ways in which a society speaks and writes about politics. They argue that a culture has a set of symbols that, through a particular historical process, has come to be highly valued but is always subject to varying interpretations. These symbols do not have fixed values upon which all members of a society agree; instead, political actors interpret them through political discourse. Influencing discourse can be a means to gain power in its third dimension: influencing how people think about politics.

One example of a symbol that American political actors use in political discourse is “family values.” No American politician would dare oppose family values. In the 1980s Republicans under President Ronald Reagan used this concept in their campaign discourse very effectively to paint themselves as supporters of the core concerns of middle-class families. As a result, Democrats and their policies came to be seen at times as threatening to the ideal of the nuclear family. In the 1990s under President Bill Clinton, Democrats were able to gain back some political advantage by reinterpreting family values to mean what they argued was support for “real” American families: single mothers trying to raise kids on their own, or two-income families in which the parents worried about the quality of afterschool programs and the cost of a college education. Democrats created a new discourse about family values that allowed them to connect that powerful symbol to the kinds of government programs they supported. Family values, the postmodernists would argue, are not a fixed set of values on which
all agree but rather a symbol through which political leaders build support by developing a particular discourse at a particular time. Such symbols are always subject to reinterpretation.

Critics of the postmodern approach argue that it really cannot explain anything. If everything is subject to interpretation then how can one explain or predict anything other than “things will change as new interpretations arise”? Postmodernists respond that the discourses themselves matter by setting symbolic boundaries within which political actors must engage to mobilize political support. The ability of political leaders to interpret these symbols to develop support for themselves and their policies is a central element to understanding political activity in any country.

Advocates of political culture, whether modernist or postmodernist, argue that explaining political behavior requires understanding the effects of political culture at the broadest level. A related but distinct way to examine the effect of beliefs is the study of political ideology, a systematic set of beliefs about how a political system ought to be structured. Political ideologies typically are quite powerful, overarching worldviews that incorporate both normative and empirical theories that explicitly state an understanding of how the political world does operate and how it ought to operate. Political ideology is distinct from political culture in that it is much more consciously elaborated. In chapter 3 we examine the predominant political ideologies of the last century: liberalism, communism, fascism, modernizing authoritarianism, and theocracy.

Advocates of a particular political ideology attempt to mobilize support for their position by proclaiming their vision of a just and good society. The most articulate proponents of an ideology can expound on its points, define its key terms, and argue for why it is right. Communists, for instance, envision a communist society in which all people are equal and virtually all serious conflicts disappear, meaning government itself can disappear. They appeal to people’s sense of injustice by pointing out the inequality that is inherent in a capitalist society, and they encourage people to work with them through various means to achieve a better society in the future.

A political ideology may be related to a particular political culture, but political ideologies are conscious and well-developed sets of beliefs rather than vague sets of values or attitudes. Some scholars take political ideology at face value, at least implicitly accepting the idea that political leaders, and perhaps their followers as well, should be taken at their word. These scholars believe that political actors have thought about politics and adopted a particular set of beliefs that they use as a basis for their own political actions and for judging the actions of others. Comparativists Evelyne Huber and John Stephens (2001), for instance, argued that the strength of social democratic ideology in several northern European governments partly explains why those states have exceptionally generous welfare policies.

Critics of this approach point to what they see as the underlying motives of ideology as the real explanation for political behavior. Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1971) argued that the key element we need to understand is ideological hegemony.
In addition to describing the techniques and strategies through which the ruling class propagates and maintains its political dominance, it is also important to consider the role of ideology in this process. For Gramsci, ideology is a means by which the ruling class convinces the population that its rule is natural, justified, or both (see the “Who Rules?” section in this chapter on page 30 for a discussion of the ruling class). Clearly, this ties directly to the third dimension of power. Advocates of rational choice models might argue that a particular leader or group adopts a particular ideology because it is in its own self-interest; for example, business owners support an ideology of free markets because it maximizes opportunities to make profits. Similarly, advocates of a political culture approach see cultural values as lying behind ideology. In the United States, for instance, vague but deep-seated American values of individualism and individual freedom may explain why Americans are far less willing to support socialist ideologies than are Europeans.

**Structures** The third broad approach to explaining political behavior is **structuralism**. Structuralists argue that broader structures in a society at the very least influence and limit, and perhaps even determine, political behavior. These structures can be socioeconomic or political. An early and particularly influential structuralist argument was **Marxism**, which argues that economic structures largely determine political behavior. Karl Marx contended that the production process of any society creates discrete social classes—groups of people with distinct relationships to the means of production. He argued that in modern capitalist society the key classes are the **bourgeoisie**, which owns capital, and the **proletariat**, which owns no capital and must sell its labor to survive. According to Marx, this economic structure explains political behavior: the bourgeoisie uses its economic advantage to control the state in its interest, and the proletariat will eventually recognize and act on its own, opposing interests. These groups are acting on their interests, but those interests are determined by the underlying economic structure.

A more recent structuralist theory is **institutionalism**. Institutionalists argue that political institutions are crucial to understanding political behavior. A **political institution** is most commonly defined as a set of rules, norms, or standard operating procedures that is widely recognized and accepted and that structures and constrains political actions. Major political institutions often serve as the basis for key political organizations such as legislatures or political parties. In short, institutions are the “rules of the game” within which political actors must operate. These rules are often quite formal and widely recognized, such as in the U.S. Constitution.

Other institutions can be informal or even outside government but nonetheless be very important in influencing political behavior. In the United States, George Washington established a long-standing informal institution, the two-term limit on the presidency. After he stepped down at the end of his second term, no other president, no matter how popular, attempted to run for a third term until Franklin Roosevelt in 1940. Voters supported his decision and reelected him, but after his death the country quickly passed a constitutional amendment that created a formal rule
limiting a president to two consecutive terms. Informal institutions can be enduring, as the two-term presidency tradition shows. It held for more than 150 years simply because the vast majority of political leaders and citizens believed it should; in that context, no president dared go against it.

Broadly speaking, two schools of thought exist among institutionalists. **Rational choice institutionalists** follow the assumptions of rational choice theory outlined earlier. They argue that institutions are the products of the interaction and bargaining of rational actors and, once created, constitute the rules of the game within which rational actors operate, at least until their interests diverge too far from those rules. Barry Weingast (1997), for instance, claimed that for democracies to succeed, major political forces must come to a rational compromise on key political institutions that give all important political players incentives to support the system. Institutions that create such incentives will be self-enforcing, thereby creating a stable democratic political system. Weingast applied this argument to several countries, including the United States. He argued that political stability in early U.S. history was due to the Constitution’s provision of federalism, a particular separation of powers, and the equal representation of each of the states in the Senate. This gave both North and South effective veto power over major legislation, which enforced compromise and, therefore, stability. The Civil War broke out, in part, because by the 1850s the creation of nonslave states threatened the South’s veto power. This changed context meant that Southern leaders no longer saw the Constitution as serving their interests, so they were willing to secede. Rational choice institutionalists argue that political actors will abide by a particular institution only as long as it continues to serve their interests. Therefore, a changed context requires institutions to change accordingly or face dissolution. By looking at institutions and their effects, however, they often include the second dimension of power in their analyses, in contrast to the rational choice theorists mentioned earlier who focus solely on the first dimension of power.

**Historical institutionalists** believe that institutions play an even bigger role in explaining political behavior. They argue that institutions not only limit self-interested political behavior but also influence who is involved in politics and shape individual political preferences, thus working in all three dimensions of power. By limiting who is allowed to participate, institutions can determine what a government is capable of accomplishing. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (1995), for example, argued that two key institutions—a strong executive and a coherent party system—shaped political participation in ways that allowed certain countries in Latin America and East Asia to respond positively to economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s, improving their economies and creating stable democracies. Beyond limiting who can participate and what can be accomplished, institutions can create political preferences. Because societies value long-standing political institutions, their preservation is part of political socialization: citizens come to accept and value existing institutions and define their own interests partly in terms of preserving those institutions. Historical institutionalists thus argue that institutions profoundly shape political outcomes independent of
people’s self-interests, and can even help create political values and beliefs, operating on all three dimensions of power.

Critics of institutionalism argue that institutions are rarely the actual explanation for political behavior. Skeptics who follow rational choice theory argue that institutions are simply based on rational actions and compromises among elites who will continue to be “constrained” by these only as long as doing so serves their interests. Scholars who focus on beliefs suggest that institutions are derived from a society’s underlying values and beliefs or a more self-conscious ideology, which both shape institutions and explain political behavior.

Political scientists look to three sources as explanations for political behavior: interests, beliefs, and structures. Scholars can use each of these approaches to analyze the same political event. For instance, Chile made one of the most successful transitions to democracy in the 1990s. A rational choice institutionalist might argue that this resulted from the strategic interaction of the major political actors, regardless of what they personally believed about democracy. They came to a compromise with the former military regime and with one another around a set of constitutional rules that, given the political context, they thought was better for them than the available non-democratic alternatives. Therefore, they agreed to act within the democratic “game.” A political culture theorist would point to values in Chilean society that favored democracy, values that perhaps derived in part from the European origins of much of the population, as well as the country’s past history with democracy. A historical institutionalist, on the other hand, would argue that Chile’s prior stable democratic institutions were easy to resurrect because of their past success and that these institutions represented a legacy that many other Latin American countries did not have. So the question becomes, Which of these theories is most convincing and why, and what evidence can we find to support one or another explanation? This is the primary work of much of political science and the kind of question to which we return frequently in this book. The theories we use are summarized in Table 1.1.

Who Rules?

The second great question in comparative politics is, Who rules? Which individual, group, or groups control power, and how much do they control? At first glance, the answer may seem obvious. In a democracy, legislators are elected for a set term to make the laws. They rule, after the voters choose them, until the next election. Because of elections, it is the voters who really rule. In a dictatorship, on the other hand, one individual, one ruling party, or one small group (such as a military junta) rules. This ruler(s) has all the power and keeps it as long as he pleases, or at least as long as he is able.

Political scientists, however, question this superficial view. Even in democracies, many argue that the voters don’t really hold the power and that a small group at the top controls things. Conversely, many argue that dictatorships may not be the monoliths they appear to be, in that those officially in charge may unofficially have to
share power in one way or another. Political scientists, in trying to dig beneath the surface of the question, have developed many theories that can be grouped into two broad categories: pluralist theories and elite theories.

Pluralist Theories: Each Group Has Its Voice

Pluralist theories contend that society is divided into various political groups and that power is dispersed among them so that no group has complete or permanent power. This is most obvious in democracies in which different parties capture power via elections. When pluralists look at political groups, however, they look at far more than just parties. They argue that politically organized groups exist in all societies, sometimes formally and legally but at other times informally or illegally. These groups compete for access to and influence over power. Policy is almost always the result of a compromise among groups, and no single group is able to dominate continuously. Furthermore, over time and on different issues, the power and influence of groups vary. A group that is particularly successful at gaining power or influencing government on one particular issue will not be as successful on another. No group will ever win all battles. Pluralists clearly tend to think about power in its first dimension; they do not believe that any one group has the ability to exclude other groups from the political arena or to influence how another group thinks to the extent necessary to gain permanent power over them.

This pluralist process is less obvious in countries that do not have electoral democracies, but many pluralists argue that their ideas are valid in these cases as well. Even in the Soviet Union under Communist rule, some analysts saw elements of pluralism. They believed that for most of the Soviet period, at least after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, the ruling Communist Party had numerous internal factions that were essentially informal political groups. These were based on positions in the party, bureaucracy, economy, or region, as well as personal loyalty to a key leader. For instance, people in the KGB (the secret police) and the military were each a political group, quietly lobbying to expand the influence and power of their organizations. Leaders of particular industries, such as the oil industry, were a group seeking the ruling party’s support for greater resources and prestige for their area of the economy. Pluralist politics were hidden behind a facade of ironclad party rule in which the Communist Party elite made all decisions and all others simply obeyed.

Dictatorships in postcolonial countries can also be analyzed via pluralism. On the surface, a military government in Africa looks like one individual or small group holding all power. Pluralists argue, however, that many of these governments have very limited central control. They rule through patron–client relationships in which the top leaders, the patrons, mobilize political support by providing resources to...
### TABLE 1.1  What Explains Political Behavior?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>INTERESTS Understanding what internal factors explain political actions</th>
<th>BELIEFS Understanding the effect of values or beliefs</th>
<th>STRUCTURES Understanding how broad structures or forces shape or determine behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theory or framework</td>
<td>Rational choice</td>
<td>Political culture</td>
<td>Marxism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>Political actors bring a set of self-defined preferences, adequate knowledge, and ability to pursue those interests and rationality to the political arena.</td>
<td>A set of widely held attitudes, values, beliefs, and symbols about politics shapes what actors do.</td>
<td>Economic structures determine political behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonrational influences explain political behavior.</td>
<td>Systematic set of beliefs about how the political system ought to be structured motivates political action.</td>
<td>Production process creates distinct social classes—groups of people with the same relationship to the means of production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political institutions are widely recognized and accepted rules, norms, or standard operating procedures that structure and constrain individuals’ political actions—the “rules of the game.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of analysis</td>
<td>Individual actors</td>
<td>Group and individual identity and behavior</td>
<td>Individual actors and groups, political institutions, discourses, and practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Observe outcome of political process; identify actors involved, relative power, and preferences; demonstrate how outcome was result of actors’ self-interested interactions.</td>
<td>Explain actors’ choices and actions by understanding their personal backgrounds and psychological states.</td>
<td>Modernist approach identifies clear attitudes, values, and beliefs within any particular political culture—for example, civic culture or postmaterialist culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critiques</td>
<td>Some difficulty predicting future behavior; hard to explain variation across cases.</td>
<td>Difficult to verify connections between internal state and actions, particularly for groups.</td>
<td>Political culture is not a monolithic, unchanging entity within a given country. Cultural values are not necessarily the cause of political outcomes; the causal relationship may be the other way around. If everything is subject to interpretation, then how can anything be explained or predicted?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
their followers, the clients. The internal politics of this type of rule revolves around the competition among group leaders for access to resources they can pass on to their clients. The top clients are themselves patrons of clients further down the chain. Midlevel clients might decide to shift their loyalty from one patron to another if they don’t receive adequate resources, meaning those at the top must continuously work to maintain the support of their clients. In many cases, patrons use resources to mobilize support from others in their own ethnic group, so the main informal groups competing for power are ethnically defined (see chapter 4). Various factions compete for power and access to resources, again behind a facade of unitary and centralized power.

**Elite Theories** Whereas pluralists see competing groups, even in countries that appear to be ruled by dictators, proponents of *elite theories* argue that all societies are ruled by an elite that has effective control over virtually all power. Elite theories usually focus on the second and third dimensions of power to argue that certain elites have perpetual power over ordinary citizens. The longest tradition within elite theory is Marxism, mentioned earlier. Marx argued that in any society, political power reflects control of the economy. In feudal Europe, for instance, the feudal lord, by virtue of his ownership of land, had power over the peasants, who were dependent on the lord for access to land and thus their survival. Similarly, Marx contended that in modern capitalist society, the bourgeoisie, by virtue of their ownership of capital, are the ruling class, as the feudal lords were centuries ago. The general population, or proletariat, is forced to sell its labor by working in the bourgeoisie’s businesses in order to survive and must generally serve the desires of the bourgeoisie. Thus, in *The Communist Manifesto* Marx famously called the modern state “the executive committee of the whole bourgeoisie.”

In postcolonial societies, Marxist analysts often argue that at least part of the ruling class is outside the country it rules. With the end of colonialism, a new situation of *neocolonialism* arose. The leaders of the newly independent countries in Africa and Asia benefited politically and economically by helping Western businesses maintain access to their countries’ wealth. The new governments came to serve the interests of Western corporations as much as or more than they served their own people.

The Marxist tradition is only one type of elite theory. C. Wright Mills (1956), in *The Power Elite*, argued that the United States was ruled by a set of interlocking elites sitting at the top of economic, political, and military hierarchies. Mills shared with the Marxist tradition an emphasis on a small group controlling all real power, but he did not see the economy as the sole source of this power. He believed that the economic, political, and military spheres, while interlocking, are distinct and that all serve as key elements in the ruling elite. A more recent example of this view was put forward by Charles Lindblom (1977), who referred to the “privileged position of business” in a capitalist society. In his view, government is dependent on business for taxes and the bulk of the population is dependent on business for employment, so business is...
in a unique position to influence those in power. Modern democracies, including the United States, are not fully governed by “the people” in any real sense of the word, according to elite theorists, but rather by interlocking elites.

More recently, feminist scholars have also developed elite theories of rule based on the concept of patriarchy, or rule by men. They argue that throughout history men have controlled virtually all power. Even though women have gained the right to vote in most countries, men remain the key rulers in most places. Today, social mores and political discourse are often the chief sources of patriarchy, rather than actual law, but men remain in power nonetheless, and the political realm, especially its military aspects, continues to be linked to masculinity. A leader needs to be able to command a military, “take charge,” and “act boldly and aggressively”—all activities most societies associate with masculinity. The second and third dimensions of power help preserve male control despite women now having the same formal political rights as men. Men also continue to enjoy greater income and wealth than women and can translate economic status into political power. According to feminist theorists, men thus constitute an elite that continues to enjoy a near monopoly on political power in many societies.

Similarly, some analysts argue that a racial elite exists in some societies in which one race has been able to maintain a hold on power. Historically, this was done via laws that prevented other races from participating in the political process, such as under apartheid in South Africa or the Jim Crow laws of the southern United States. But, as with feminists, analysts of race often argue that one race can maintain dominance through a disproportionate share of wealth or through the preservation of a particular political discourse that often implicitly places different races in different positions in a hierarchy. Michelle Alexander (2010) argued that laws and discourse around crime, drugs, and “colorblindness” constitute a “new Jim Crow” in the United States; they systemically disempower and disenfranchise black men, in particular, by disproportionately putting a large number of them in the criminal justice system. More generally, race theorists contend that in the United States, cultural attributes associated with being white, such as personal mannerisms and accent and dialect of English, are assumed to be not only “normal” but implicitly superior and are thus expected of those in leadership positions. This gives an inherent advantage to white aspirants for political positions.

Determining whether pluralist or elite theories best answer the question of who rules requires answering these questions: Who is in formal positions of power? Who has influence on government decision making? Who benefits from the decisions made? If the answer to all these questions seems to be one or a select few small groups, then the evidence points to elite theory as more accurate. If various groups seem to have access to power or influence over decision making, or both, then pluralism would seem more accurate. Table 1.2 summarizes these theories, which we investigate throughout this book.
Where and Why?

“What explains political behavior?” and “Who rules?” are central questions to all political scientists. The particular focus of comparative politics is to ask these questions across countries in an attempt to develop a common understanding of political phenomena in all places and times. The third major question that orients this book is “Where and why?” Where do particular political phenomena occur, and why do they occur where they do and how they do?

For instance, Sweden is famous for its extensive and expensive welfare state, whereas the U.S. government spends much less money and attention on providing for people’s needs directly via “welfare.” Why are these two wealthy democracies so different? Can their differences be explained on the basis of competing rational choices? Did business interests overpower the interests of workers and poor people in the United States, while a large and well-organized labor movement in Sweden overcame a small, weaker business class to produce a more extensive welfare state? Or has the Swedish Socialist Party, which has been dominant over most of the last century, simply been successful at convincing the bulk of the population that its social democratic ideology produces a better society, whereas Americans’ cultural belief in “making it on your own” leads them to reject any form of socialism? Or are the differences because a strong nongovernmental institution, the Landsorganisationen I Sverige (LO), arose in Sweden, uniting virtually all labor unions and becoming a central part of the policymaking process, whereas in the United States the country’s more decentralized labor unions were weaker institutions and therefore not as capable of gaining the government’s ear on welfare policy? Comparative politics attempts to resolve this kind of puzzle by examining the various theories of political behavior in light of the evidence found.

We engage in similar comparative efforts when seeking to understand who rules. A case study of the United States, for instance, might argue (as many have) that a corporate elite holds great power in American democracy, perhaps so great that it raises questions of how democratic the system actually is. A Marxist might argue that this is due to the unusually centralized and unequal control of wealth in the United States. A political culture theorist would point instead to American culture’s belief in individualism, which leads few to question the leaders of major businesses, who are
CHAPTER 1 Introduction

often depicted as “self-made” individuals whom many citizens admire. An institutionalist, on the other hand, would argue that American political institutions allow corporations to have great influence by funding expensive political campaigns and that members of Congress have little incentive to vote in support of their parties and so are more open to pressure from individual lobbyists. A comparativist might compare the United States and several European countries, examining the relative level of corporate influence, the level of wealth concentration, cultural values, and the ability of lobbyists to influence legislators in each country. This study might reveal comparative patterns that suggest, for instance, that corporate influence is highest in countries where wealth is most concentrated, regardless of the type of political system or cultural values. We examine this kind of question throughout the book.

We proceed in this first part of the book by looking at the biggest questions involving the state: 1) what is it, how does it work, what makes it strong or weak; 2) the state’s relationship to citizens and regimes; and 3) the state’s relationship with nations and other identity groups. Part II looks at how governments and political systems work, including institutions in democracies and authoritarian regimes, participation outside institutional bounds, and regime change. Part III turns our attention to political economy questions and related policy issues. Every chapter includes key questions at the outset that you should be able to develop answers to, and features that help you understand the ideas in the chapter. “In Context” boxes put particular examples into a larger context, and “Critical Inquiry” boxes ask you to develop and informally test hypotheses about key political questions. Throughout, tables of data, maps, and illustrations help illuminate the subjects in each chapter. So let’s get going.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.2</th>
<th>Who Rules?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pluralist theory</strong></td>
<td><strong>Elite theory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society is divided into political groups.</td>
<td>All societies are ruled by an elite with control over virtually all power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power is dispersed among groups.</td>
<td>Marxism: political power reflects control of the economy; it is based on the economic power of the bourgeoisie, who owns and controls capital and is the ruling elite in capitalist societies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No group has complete or permanent power.</td>
<td>The power elite: elite consists of military and political elite as well as economic elite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even authoritarian regimes have important pluralist elements.</td>
<td>Patriarchy: the ruling elite is male; social mores and political discourse keep men in power. The political realm, especially the military, is linked to masculinity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Critical race theorists: the ruling elite is white; assumed superiority of white cultural characteristics keeps whites in power.
KEY CONCEPTS

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civic culture (p. 18)
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WORKS CITED


RESOURCES FOR FURTHER STUDY


WEB RESOURCES

CIA, World Factbook

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Data Lab
(http://www.oecd.org/statistics)

Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes & Trends
(www.pewglobal.org)

The World Bank, Data
(http://data.worldbank.org)